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तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंहः

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa's

Tattvopaplavasimha

(An Introduction, Sanskrit Text, English Translation & Notes)

Translated

by

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Edited

by

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Preface

“There is nothing pure like knowledge here.” – [Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā, ch-4-38 ab]. I found Prof. Esther Solomon as a personification of these words of the Gītā. It is very difficult for me to find suitable words to write about Prof. Solomon’s scholarship. Her works, namely, ‘Indian Dialectics’, ‘Avidyā–A problem of Truth and Reality’, ‘Sāṃkhyavṛtti’, ‘Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti’, ‘The commentaries of the Sāṃkhyakārikā–a study’ offer a testimony of her sharp acumen, deep maturity and strong grip on the subjects that she has dealt with.

Before her demise in June 2005, Prof. Solomon had completed translating Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa’s ‘Tattvaplavasimha’ using the Sanskrit text edited by Paṇḍita Sukhalālaṅkā and Śrī Rasiklāla Parikh published by G.O.S. in 1940. She had also consulted Eli Franco’s revised text.

It gives me immense pleasure to have the responsibility of final editing and introducing this last monumental work of Prof. Solomon on ‘Tattvaplavasimha’, a rare piece of work on Indian Skepticism, her unforgettable contribution. I have thoroughly enjoyed working on this project and have benefited from putting together this valuable translation of this rare gem of Indian Philosophy’s pluralistic richness.

I would like to thank Śrī Aviv Divekar, the nephew of late Prof. Solomon, who gave me all the assistance and encouraged to prepare this manuscript for publication. At the same time I want to thank the scholars, whose books I have consulted. In particular, I have benefited from the Sanskrit edition of Paṇḍita Sukhalālaṅkā and Śrī Rasiklāla Parikh, and from the thesis of Prof. Eli Franco [Leipzig University, Austria]. It must be noted that Prof. Solomon has mentioned about the different text, particularly the one, reedited by Eli Franco. At the same time I would like to thank Prof. R. Raj. Singh [Brock University, Canada], Prof. Kazuyuki Funatsus [Shinshu university, Japan], and Prof. Vijay Pandya [Retd. Prof. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad] for encouraging me throughout my endeavor.

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Abbreviations

T.P.S.	Tattvopaplavasimha
G.O.S.	Gaekwad Oriental Series
M.	Manuscript
S.	Pt. Sukhlalji

Contents

	Page No.
[१. ग्रन्थकरणप्रतिज्ञा ।]	
[1. Statement of the resolve to compose the text.]	1
[२. न्यायसंमतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]	
[2. Critique of the Nyāya definition of Perception.]	3
[प्रसङ्गात् जातेर्निकारणम् ।]	
[Incidental Refutation of Universal or Genus (jāti)]	9
[३. प्रसङ्गात् समवायस्य निरसनम् ।]	
[3. Incidental Refutation of inherence.]	17
[४. प्रकारान्तरेण अव्यभिचारिपदस्य निरासः ।]	
[4. Refutation in another way of the term non-erroneous (avyabhicāri).]	26
[५. प्रसङ्गादालम्बनपदार्थस्य परीक्षणम् ।]	
[5. Incidental inquiry into the meaning of the word ālambana (support).]	28
[६. पुनः प्रकारान्तरेण अव्यभिचारिपदस्यापाकरणम् ।]	
[6. Again refutation of the term 'non-erroneous' in another way.]	31
[७. भ्रमस्य स्मृतित्वं स्वीकुर्वतां प्रभाकराणां मतस्य विकल्प्य निरसनम् ।]	
[7. Dialectical Refutation of the view of the prābhākaras that Error is memory.]	37
[८. प्रसङ्गात् विप्रमोषपरीक्षा ।]	
[8. Incidental Examination of obscurator (vipramoṣa)]	40
[९. व्यवसायात्मकपदस्य समालोचनम् ।]	
[9. Examination of the term "well-determined" Vyavasāyātmaka – of the nature of determination.]	42
[१०. अव्यपदेश्यपदस्यासाधुत्वे लक्षणसारग्रन्थस्योल्लेखः ।]	
[10. Reference to the text 'Lakṣaṇasāra' in connection with the impropriety of the term 'not expressible' (avyapadeśya)]	44

[११. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नपदस्य समीक्षा]	
[11. Examination of the expression 'which arises from the contact of a sense-organ with the object']	45
[१२. इन्द्रियजन्यत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽसंभवप्रकटनम् ।]	
[12. Showing that perception cannot possibly be produced by a sense-organ.]	48
[१३. अर्थस्यापि प्रत्यक्षजनकत्वखण्डनम् ।]	
[13. Refutation of the causality of object also in the case of perception.]	49
[२. मीमांसकसंमतस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]	
[2. Examination of the definition of Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) according to the Mimāṃsakas]	50
[१. गोत्वादिप्रतिपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादीनामप्रामाण्योद्घाटनम्]	
[1. Demonstrating the invalidity of the words 'Go' (i.e. cow), etc, as the alleged means of expressing 'Gotva' (i.e. cowness), etc.]	57
[२. अर्थापत्तेरधिकरणव्यवस्थित्युपपादकत्वस्य निषेधः ।]	
[2. Denying the Justifiability of the Demonstration of the Substratum by means of Presumption.]	58
[३. प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रामाण्यखण्डनस्य सूचनम् ।]	
[3. Suggestion as to the Refutation of the validity of Recognition.]	60
[३. तात्थागतसंमतस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]	
[१. अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तुत्वेति विशेषणस्यापार्थक्यप्रदर्शनम् ।]	
[3. Examination of the Buddhist definition of a source of valid knowledge.]	
[1. Demonstrating the meaninglessness of the epithet 'cognising a thing not cognised']	60
[२. अविसंवादि ज्ञानमित्यस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्यापि निरासः ।]	
[2. Refutation of the Definition of valid knowledge as 'knowledge which is not discrepant']	63
[३. सौगतसंमताया मानमेयसंख्याया निरसनम् ।]	
[3. Refuting the Buddhist enumeration of the sources of valid knowledge and the knowables.]	66

[४. सौगतसंमतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]	
[4. Examination of the Buddhist definition of perception.]	71
[१. प्रसङ्गायाताया अस्पष्टताया विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]	
[1. A Dialectical Refutation of the incidentally occurring concept of non-lucidity (aspaṣṭatā).]	76
[२. प्रसङ्गायातायाः प्रत्यक्षीयस्पष्टताया विकल्प्य विडम्बनम् ।]	
[2. Dialectical Repudiation of the incidentally occurring concept of the Lucidity of perceptual cognition.]	79
[३. एकोपलम्भसामर्थ्यात् विकल्पिकायाः समुद्भव इत्याद्युक्तेर्निरसनम् ।]	
[3. Refutation of the statement : "Conceptual cognition is produced by the capacity of the apprehension of only one".]	86
[४. प्रत्यक्षसाधन एवेत्यादेर्बौद्धोक्तस्य खण्डनम् ।]	
[4. Refutation of the Buddhist assertion 'Having perception as its means...']	87
[५. प्रत्यक्षलक्षणगतस्य अव्यभिचारिपदस्य निरसनम् ।]	
[5. Refutation of the term 'avyabhicāri' (non-erroneous) in the definition of perception.]	91
[६. प्रसङ्गायाताया अतथ्यताया विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]	
[6. Dialectical Refutation of (the concept of) 'Unreality' that occurs here incidentally.]	92
[७. व्यभिचारित्वस्य विकल्प्य खण्डनम् ।]	
[7. Dialectical Refutation of Erroneousness.]	94
[८. ज्ञानगतस्य सम्यक्त्वस्यापि विकल्प्य विदलनम् ।]	
[8. Dialectical Refutation of the rightness also of knowledge.]	95
[९. जार्ति प्रतिवदितुं बौद्धैर्दत्तानां दूषणानामेकैकशो निरासः ।]	
[9. Refutation one after the other of the objections raised by the Buddhists to refute Jāti (genus-universal)]	101
[१०. देशभेदेनाऽग्रहणात् इत्यादेः समालोच्य प्रतिविधानम् ।]	
[10. Refutation after examination of the argument "Because it is not cognised in a different place...."]	102

[११. नास्ति घट-सामान्यम्, तदग्रहेऽग्रहात् इत्यस्य विभञ्जनम् ।]	
[11. Refutation of the argument "There is no jar-universal, because it is not cognised, when it (jar) is not cognised."]	103
[१२. एकपिण्डग्रहणकाले उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्येत्यादेः समीक्ष्य प्रतिवचनम् ।]	
[12. Examination and Refutation of the argument ("Because there is non-apprehension of universal) which is apprehensible at the time of the cognition of one entity."]	106
[१३. क्षीरोदकवद्विवेकेनाग्रहणान्नास्ति सामान्यमित्युक्तेर्खण्डनम् ।]	
[13. Refutation of the Statement, 'Universal does not exist because it is not grasped distinctly like milk and water.']	107
[१४. एकत्र दृष्टे भेदो हि — इत्यादेः कारिकायाः प्रतिवदनम् ।]	
[14. Reply to the Kārikā 'Difference seen in one place...etc'.]	108
[१५. नित्यस्य क्रमेतराभ्यामित्यादेः प्रतिसमाधानम् ।]	
[15. Refutation of "on account of there being (no efficiency) either successively or simultaneously in what is eternal..."]	109
[१६. प्रसङ्गात् बौद्धाभिमतस्य सन्तानस्य असिद्धत्वप्रदर्शनम् ।]	
[16. Incidental Demonstration of the continuum recognised by the Buddhist as not being established.]	116
[५. मीमांसकाभिमतस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य निरासः ।]	
[5. Refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka's view of Perception..]	122
[६. सांख्यसंमतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य निरसनम् ।]	
[6. Refutation of the Sāṃkhya Definition of perception.]	127
[७. नैयायिकाभिमतस्यानुमानस्य निरसनम् ।]	
[7. Repudiation of Anumāna (Inference) as accepted by the Naiyāyikas.]	133
[१. कार्यहेतुकानुमाननिरासाय कार्यत्वस्य खण्डनम् ।]	
[1. Refutation of the fact of effect for the repudiation of Inference from a mark of Inference which is an effect (i.e. of Inference based on causality.)]	136
[२. प्रसङ्गात् विरोधपदार्थस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]	
[2. An incidental dialectical refutation of the concept of the word 'opposition' (virodha).]	138

[३. हेतुफलसंबन्धावधारणस्यानुपपत्तिप्रकटनम् ।]	
[3. Demonstrating the impossibility of the ascertainment of the relation of cause and fruit (result).]	142
[४. कृतकत्वहेतुकस्यानित्यत्वानुमानस्याप्यघटमानत्वप्रदर्शनम् ।]	
[4. Demonstrating that the inference of 'non-eternality' on the strength of the reason 'artificiality' is not possible.]	148
[८. आत्मानुमानस्य निरासः ।]	
[१. नैयायिकादिसंमतस्यात्मानुमानस्य निरासः ।]	
[8. Refutation of the inference of soul.]	
[1. Refutation of the inference of soul as accepted by the Naiyāyikas, etc.]	149
[२. जैनमते उपभोगाद्यनुपपत्तिप्रकटनेन आत्मानुमाननिराससूचना ।]	
[2. Direction about the refutation of the inference of the soul in the Jain view by demonstrating that enjoyment, etc. cannot be accounted for.]	153
[३. प्रसङ्गात् जैनाभिमतस्यानेकान्तवादस्य निरसनम् ।]	
[3. Incidental refutation of the theory of Non-absolutism accepted by the Jains.]	155
[४. सांख्यमतेऽपि भोगानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनेनात्मानुमान निरासः ।]	
[4. Refutation of the inference of soul in the Sāṃkhya view by showing the impossibility of enjoyment.]	157
[५. सांख्यसंमतस्य कैवल्यस्यानुपपत्तिकत्वोपपादनम् ।]	
[5. Showing that emancipation as accepted by the sāmkhya does not stand to reason]	159
[६. वेदान्तसंमतस्यानन्दरूपकैवल्यस्यायुक्तिकताप्रदर्शनम् ।]	
[6. showing that emancipation of the nature of bliss as acceptable to vedānta is not supported by reason.]	160
[७. मीमांसकमतेनापि आत्मानुमानस्यासंभवित्वप्रकटनम् ।]	
[7. Showing the impossibility of the inference of soul in the Mīmāṃsaka's view.]	161
[९. ताथागतसंमतस्यानुमानस्य निरासः ।]	
[9. Refutation of inference as accepted by the Buddhists.]	163

[१. प्रसङ्गात् ज्ञानस्य विषयाकारत्वं विचार्य तत्खण्डनम् ।]	
[1. Incidental examination and refutation of the theory that knowledge assumes the shape of the object.]	163
[२. दृष्टान्तीभूतस्यादर्शस्य मुख्यरूपतास्वीकारार्थस्य विकल्प्य निरसनम् ।]	
[2. Dialectical refutation of the fact of the mirror serving as an illustration, accepting the form of the face.]	166
[३. कार्यानुमाननिरासाय दहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तेः पुनरुपक्रमः ।।]	
[3. Again an attempt to show the unaccountability of the relation of cause-effect between fire and smoke for the refutation of inference from effect on causality.]	169
[४. विकल्प्य विषयासंभवदर्शनेनानुमानस्य निरासः ।]	
[4. Dialectical refutation of inference by showing the impossibility of its object.]	174
[५. ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभाववाधारणस्याशक्यत्वप्रतिपादनम् ।]	
[5. Showing the impossibility of the determination that two cognitions are related as cause-effect.]	179
[६. प्रसङ्गाद् विज्ञानवादिकृतावयविनिराकरणस्य प्रतिवादः ।]	
[6. Incidental refutation of the refutation of 'whole' by the vijñānavādin.]	179
[७. प्रसङ्गादनुपलब्धिपदार्थस्य विचारः ।]	
[7. Incidental examination of the meaning of 'non-apprehension'.]	180
[८. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य रक्ताक्तत्वप्रसङ्गनिरूपस्य साधनस्य निरासः ।]	
[8. Refutation of the means of the form of urging the contingency of coloured-non-coloured in the refutation of whole.]	182
[९. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य आवृतानावृतत्वप्रसङ्गस्य खण्डनम् ।]	
[9. Repudiation of the contingency of 'covered-non-covered' employed in the refutation of 'whole'.]	184
[१०. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य चलाचलत्वकृतस्य अवयविभेदप्रसङ्गस्य प्रत्यादेशः ।]	
[10. Repudiation of the contingency of different whole due to (the contingency of) mobile-immobile employed in the refutation of whole.]	184
[११. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य 'सर्वावयवग्रहणेन' इत्यादिविकल्पजालस्य निरासः ।]	

[11. Refutation of the net of dialectical alternatives 'By the cognition of all parts....' employed in the refutation of 'whole'.]	186
[१२. अवयविनिराकरणपरायाः 'यत्र भिन्ने न तद्विद्धिः' इत्यादि युक्तेः खण्डनम् ।]	
[12. Refutation of the argument 'where there is not its cognition in respect of a different thing etc.' meant to refute 'whole'.]	186
[१३. विज्ञानवादिना साधितस्य बाह्यार्थविलोपस्य निरासः ।]	
[13. Refutation of the extinction of external object achieved by the vijñānavādin.]	190
[१४. बाह्यार्थविलोपायोपयुक्तस्य सहोपलम्भसाधनस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]	
[14. Dialectical refutation of the argument of simultaneous apprehension employed for the repudiation of external object.]	192
[१५. अवयविनिराकरणद्वारा स्थापितस्य क्षणिकत्वस्योत्थापनम् ।।]	
[15. Repudiation of momentariness established through the refutation of 'whole'.]	197
[१६. क्षणिकत्वस्थापनाय प्रयुक्तस्य विनाशहेत्वभावस्य विनाशं विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।।]	
[16. Refutation of 'absence of the cause of destruction' employed to prove momentariness by positing 'destruction'.]	198
[१७. क्षणिकत्वोपयोगिनः विनाशहेतुत्वस्य विकल्पपञ्चकेन प्रतिवदनम् ।।]	
[17. Refutation of the causelessness of destruction useful in (proving) momentariness by five-fold positing.]	199
[१८. प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यत्वेन उपपादितस्य क्षणिकत्वस्य खण्डनम् ।।]	
[18. Refutation of momentariness justified as being grasped by perception.]	200
[१९. बौद्धसंमतस्य स्वभावानुमानस्य निरासः ।।]	
[19. Refutation of inference based on identity that is admitted by the Buddhists.]	201
[१०. षड्विधार्थात्तिप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः ।।]	
[10. Refutation of the validity of the six-fold arthāpatti (implication or presumption).]	204
[११. उपमानप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः ।।]	
[11. Refutation of the validity of Upamāna (comparison).]	206
[१२. नैयायिकसंमतस्य उपमानस्वरूपस्य खण्डनम् ।।]	

[1. Refutation of the nature of Upamāna as admitted by the Naiyāyikas.]	208
[२ संज्ञाप्रतिपत्तिविषयकमतद्वयस्य निरासः ।।]	208
[१२. अभावप्रमाणस्य निरासः ।]	
[12. Refutation of the means of proof, 'Negation'.]	209
[१३. संभवैतिहाप्रमाणयोर्निरासः ।]	
[13. Refutation of the means of proof – Sambhava (inclusion) and Aitihya (tradition)]	210
[१४. शब्दप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः ।]	
[१. वाचकत्वेन शब्दप्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्योद्घाटनम् ।]	
[14. Refutation of the means of proof "word".]	
[1. Crushing of the view of those who accept the Validity of word as being expressive.]	211
[२. आसौक्त्येन शब्दं प्रमाणीकुर्वतां मतस्य निरासः ।]	
[2. Repudiation of the view of those who prove that word is valid in as much as it is uttered by a trustworthy (person).]	213
[३. अपौरुषेयत्वेन वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्य व्युदासः ।]	
[3. Refutation of the view of those who accept the validity of veda in as much as it is apauruṣeya (having no person as author).]	214
[४. विवक्षासूचकत्वेन शब्दप्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्य खण्डनम् ।]	
[4. Refutation of the view of those who admit the validity of word in as much as it indicates the intention (i.e. what is meant to be said).]	220
[५. साधुपदार्थप्रतिपत्तिं वर्णयतां वैयाकरणानां मतस्य निरासः ।]	
[5. Refutation of the view of the Grammarians who admit the apprehension of meaning from correct words.]	221

Introduction

The most perplexing riddle directing a curious mind towards philosophic speculations is the world around us. Whatever we perceive is not permanent by its nature. We do experience change that compels us to think about the very nature of things. But then a question arises : can the knowledge of Truth be obtained? Is it possible to have right knowledge? One could say that philosophizing is a process that beings with what is 'seen' and 'experienced'. But that does not necessarily mean that philosophizing leads to a definite conclusion. It is worth noting that most of the systems of Indian Thought portray the journey of their philosophic speculations initiate from the 'seen' and conclude with the 'unseen'.... From very ancient times it has been the persistent endeavor of the human psyche to arrive at some possible conclusion so far as the knowledge of 'Truth' is concerned otherwise known as Darśana or philosophy. At the same time it must be noted that right from Vedic times there was a tendency of expressing doubt about the true nature of the world around us. The hymns of the first and the tenth Maṇḍalas revealed by Viśvakarmā, Parameṣṭhin and Dīrghatamas respectively, especially declare the tendency of doubting whether Truth can be known or not. It would not be out of place to examine these hymns. In 164th Sūkta of the first Maṇḍala, Dīrghatamas inquires "I ask, unknowing, those who know, the sages, as one all ignorant for sake of knowledge, what was that one who in the Unborn's image hath established and fixed firm these world's six regions."¹ Here we find the terms indicating the tendency of doubting the revelation of knowledge. Further on, the tenth Maṇḍala also exhibits the same tendency by applying the term : Niharena Pravṛtaḥ. It states, "Ye will not find him, who produced these creatures : another thing hath risen up among you. Enwrapped in misty cloud, with lips that stammer, hymn chanters wander and are discontented."² Moving along the same track, Sūkta 129 of 10th Maṇḍala shows the specific development of such

1. R̥gveda-1-164-6. Translation cited from

The Hymns of the R̥gveda [ed.] Ralph. T.H. Griffith, Vol-1, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi-1963.

2. R̥gveda-10-82-7. [Tr.] The Hymns of the R̥gveda, vol-2.

a tendency. Hymns sixth and seventh respectively can be said to have some specific development that can lead us towards skepticism.* “Who verily knows and who can here declare it, whether it was born and whence comes this creation? The Gods are later than this world’s production who knows then whence it first came into being?”¹ Moreover, “He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it, whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, he verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not.”² We may consider these two hymns as landmarks in the history of Indian Skepticism. Here it would be pertinent to note that as per ‘The New Encyclopedia Britannica’, evidence of skeptical thought appears earlier in non western philosophy than in the western philosophy, in particular in the Upaniṣads.³ But we say that even earlier than in the Upaniṣadic era we get specific glimpses of skepticism in the above mentioned hymns of the R̥gveda. Apart from the Vedic hymns we get the skeptic tendency carried on further during early Buddhism. While not going in to its details at this juncture, we would like to mention that some of the systems of Indian thought certainly find difficulty in giving expression to the Truth.

In ‘Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam’, ŚrīHarṣa has mentioned about the Cārvāka, Vedānta and Mādhyamika thoughts as having the skeptic standpoint related to the nature of Truth.⁴ Apart from some stray references we do not have any development of Skepticism. Hence it may be assumed that Indian thought lacks the history of Skepticism. To counter this we have Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa’s Tattvopaplavasiṃha, a rare and unparallel work depicting the full-fledged form of Indian Skepticism.

* ‘Skepticism, the attitude of doubting the knowledge claims attitude of boubting the knowledge.’ The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol-10, 15th edition. Encyclopaedia Brittanica Inc.

Also see-‘Skepticism and Indian Philosophy’, Chatterjee Dipankar, Philosophy East and West, vol-2, 1977.

1. R̥gveda-10-129-6.

2. R̥gveda-10-129-6.

3. See Page 862, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica.

4. Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyam-[ed] Solomon Esther, see. pp-3-4. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, 1990.

Tattvopaplavasiṃha is a unique work in itself that evaluates, criticizes and demolishes all the testimonials of valid knowledge emphasized by the systems of Indian Thought. Hence the contribution of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is unforgettable. It is indeed unfortunate that not much work has been done in the area of Skepticism that is highlighted by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa. The Source book that contains some details about Jayarāśi is the Sanskrit edition prepared by Pandit Sukhlalji and Shri Rasiklal Parikh. On the basis of their research we can summarize some details about the date and native place of Jayarāśi.

According to some external and internal evidences, Jayarāśi can be said to have flourished between 7th and 8th century A.D.¹ The most noteworthy point about the external evidence is that, Jayarāśi view of ‘Tattvopaplava’ and its holders are referred to as ‘Tattvopaplavavādins’ by some noteworthy Jain Logicians, namely, Anaṇṭavīrya and Vidyānaṇḍin in the ninth century, A.D.² This clearly indicates that Jayarāśi might have lived before ninth century. We get some helpful link from the internal evidences too. The study of the work certainly guides us to the date of the author. It would be interesting to note that Jayarāśi has not mentioned the name of the exponents of the systems that he has criticized, except that of Bṛhaspati. Even Śaṅkara’s name has not been mentioned. This might have encouraged scholars to date him before Śaṅkara, or as his contemporary. It can be said that it might not have been a tradition at that time to refer to any system of Thought by the name of its ‘Ācāyas’ or exponent. Another sure platform is the number of the testimonials affirmed by the orthodox as well as by the heterodox systems of Indian Thought which are severely criticized and refuted by Jayarāśi. From this we may say that Jayarāśi lived during the period when six testimonials were famous and accordingly accepted by the respective systems of Thought. This leads one to consider Jayarāśi to have been lived between 7th and 8th century, A.D.

Now, as far as the native place of Jayarāśi is concerned, from more or less

1. See Introduction.

Tattvopaplavasiṃha-[ed] Pt. Sukhlalji & R.C. Parikh, Oriental Institute, Baroda-1940.

2. Cārvāka/Lokāyata-[ed] Chattopadhyaya Debiprasad, Part-3, article by Pt. Sukhlalji & R.C. Parikh. 3rd edition, Indian Council of Philosophical Research-New Delhi 2006.

the same evidence it has been stated that he belonged to South India. One can see that Jain Ācāryas, who flourished in the South, namely, Anaṇṭavīrya and Vidyānaḍin etc. have criticized Tattvopaplavavāda of Jayarāśi. Apart from them, we do not get any references related to his view. This leads us to consider South India as his native place. Another point of inquiry that is very commonly carried out by scholars is related to personal information about the author of any field of knowledge. Jayarāśi was not an exception. Was Jayarāśi a Jain or a Brāhmin? Common sense tells us that he was not a Jain. He has refuted the epistemology affirmed by the Jain system and vice versa, which confirms him as non Jain. On other hand the term 'Bhaṭṭa' is traditionally associated with Brāhmins. Moreover, the reverence rendered to Bṛhaspati, the perceptions of Gods indicates that he might have been a Brāhmin.¹

We can say that it is immaterial whether he was a Jain or a Brāhmin. What matters is his sharp acumen evident in his work, his revolutionary attempt to criticize the testimonials approved by the orthodox as well as the heterodox systems of Indian thought, and his boldness to stand alone like a lion by refuting them all.

Let us begin with an analysis of the title Tattvopaplavasiṃha. We can say that the title itself indicates its unique place in the field of revolutionary philosophic speculation. There are three terms that construct the title namely, 'Tattva', 'Upaplava' and 'Siṃha'. It implies "The Lion, annihilating or upsetting the 'Tattva' or Principles." Here the various systems of Thought with regard to 'Tattva' i.e. matter or the very core of oneself-[the term varies within each system of Indian thought.] It would not be out of place of mention that one is able to obtain knowledge with the help of various testimonials. We perceive the world around us as a combination of matter,— earth, water, light and air. These we grasp with the help of perception, which is the most applicable means of knowledge. Inference also helps us to gain knowledge. In short, Perception [Pratyakṣa], Inference [Anumāna], Analogy [Upamāna], Verbal testimony [Śabda], Inclusion [Sambhava], and Tradition [Aitihya] etc are various means which enable us to gain knowledge. It would not be out of place to mention that here only six means have been mentioned which Jayarāśi has refuted. Of

1. 'Ye yātā nahi gocaram suraguroh budhervikaplā dṛdhāh'.
Tattvopaplavasiṃha—page-125, Oriental Institute, Baroda-1940.

course, each system of Indian Thought has approved the validity of these means of knowledge according to its own perspective. But a doubt may arise : is one able to know reality or 'tattva'? Can we grasp reality as it is? Our systems of Thought have opined positively as well as negatively. It would not be out of place to reiterate that ŚrīHarṣa has noted about the Cārvāka, Vedānta and Mādhyamika systems of thought which have expressed their views rather negatively. We must note that the Cārvākas hold perception as the only valid means of knowledge. But there might be some other branch which has condemned even perception as the only valid means of knowledge.** Śaṅkara emphasizes Brahman as inexplicable, and the Mādhyamika branch of Buddhism also opines the same by emphasizing 'Śūnyatā' i.e. voidness. In short, a skeptic tendency was already prevalent among some thinkers regarding the attainment of true knowledge. It is indeed regrettable that we do not have the systematic history of the development of such a speculation.

Tattvopaplavasiṃha is the only specimen depicting full fledged development in this direction. Of course, it is rather very difficult to evaluate it either as emphasizing skepticism or vitaṇḍā¹ as a part of Dialectics.

According to its Sanskrit edition, we find Tattvopaplavasiṃha divided into fourteen sections dealing with the annihilation of various testimonials affirmed by the various systems of Thought. It opens with the statement of resolve to compose the Text. It is interesting that Jayarāśi considers this task rather difficult.² As some part of the text is missing we can not state with certitude, but it seems that he initiates his thesis by mentioning a very basic speculation which condemns everything that is beyond the grasp of perception.³ Hence there cannot be any fruit of action such as heaven. He clarifies the intention behind such a statement that one should follow the

** Cārvāka/Lokāyata-[ed.] Chattopadhyaya Debiprasad, Page-494.

1. 'The Vitaṇḍika [wangler] does not establish what he himself holds, but only keeps on criticizing and condemning the proofs adduced for proving the thesis of the other party'.

Indian Dialectics—Solomon Esther, vol-1, pp-112-113, B.J. Institute of Learning and Research, Gujarat Vidyasabha, Ahmedabad, 1976.

2. 'Tattvopaplavasiṃha eṣo viṣamo nūnam mayā.....' Page-1., T.P.S.

3. Pṛthivyādāni tattvāni loke prasiddhāni, tānyapī vicāryamaṇāni na vyavatiṣṭhante kim punaranyāni ? Page-1. T.P.S.

common practice, because the simple and learned are similar.

After the statement of resolve, he mentions about the view of Bṛhaspati, who holds the validity of four elements grasped by perception. Jayarāśi confirms that he has refuted this. Moving along the same line he refutes the characteristic of perception approved by the Nyāya system. Eventually he condemns genus i.e. 'Jāti' and inherence i.e. 'Samavāya' affirmed by the same system. In other chapters he has dealt with the other systems namely Buddhist, Jain, Mimāṃsā and Sāṃkhya respectively by criticizing and refuting their stand of Perception. Further on, he has examined the definition of testimonial i.e. 'Pramāṇa' as emphasized by Mimāṃsā and the Jain systems.

The second means of valid knowledge is inference. It is known that Nyāya system has discussed it at length. Jayarāśi has refuted the validity of Inference criticizing Nyāya and Jain systems respectively. Another interesting part emerging during this discussion is the negation of inference with regard to the self, i.e. "āman", as accepted by the Nyāya, Jain, Sāṃkhya, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta systems respectively. From this it becomes very clear that Jayarāśi approves the speculation of the Cārvāka system with regard to the self. It must be noted that refutation of self presented by Jayarāśi not only proves him as a clever logician but declares him as a great scholar, who has applied each term in the context of the particular system of thought.

While dealing with 'Arthāpatti', Jayarāśi has mentioned its six types, namely, 1. Darśanarthāpatti 2. Anumānapūrvikā 3. Abhāvapūrvikā 4. Āgamapūrvikā 5. Arthāpattipūrvikā and 6. Upamānapūrvikā, criticizing their validity. After that he negated Upamāna approved by the Nyāya system along with Abhāva emphasized by the Mimāṃsā system. Lastly he has condemned Śabda pramāṇa eventually refuting the view of grammarians too.

With this he has made the clarion call declaring the annihilation of all the 'Tattvas' i.e. principles, which emphasizes the disapproval of all the practical dealings i.e. 'Vyavahāra'.¹

It is obvious that Jayarāśi initiates his thesis by mentioning about the

1. 'Tadevamupapluteṣveva tattveṣu avicāritaramaṇiyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghatanta iti...'

system commonly approved by the people. We may say that this way he begins with the refutation of a very basic means of knowledge applied by all, whether foolish or scholarly.¹ And he ends it up by condemning 'Śabda' testimonial, which is not the subject of perception but of faith. That means he negates gross as well as subtle means of knowledge. And condemning them both establishes his thesis that nothing can be grasped or known.

It is interesting to note that Jayarāśi begins and ends up with references to Bṛhaspati which can lead one to consider him as a follower of the Cārvāka system of thought. But at the same time it can be said that as Jayarāśi has condemned even perception as the valid means of knowledge, and while concluding his work has announced his speculation moving even a step ahead of Bṛhaspati by negating every 'Tattva', as being grasped by means of knowledge, he differs from Bṛhaspati. It is difficult to state that either he was a skeptic, refuting every means of knowledge or a holder of that branch of the Cārvāka thought, which negates even a perception as a valid means of knowledge!

We may say that perhaps Jayarāśi occupies a unique place in the history of Indian Skepticism. Very critically refuting every means of valid knowledge he announces very boldly that no verbal expressions can grasp the 'Tattva'. They appear to be valid, as long as they are not investigated. He rightly praises himself by making a clarion call of surpassing even the intellect of the preceptor of God². Jayarāśi's unparallel dialectical and critical method indeed proves him as a lion upsetting the 'Tattvas' i.e. principles.

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1. 'Loka vyavaharam prati sadṛṣau bālapanditau...' Page-1, T.P.S.

2. '...Bhaṭṭaśrijayarāśidevagurubhiḥ sṛṣṭo mahārthodayaḥ, Tattvopaplavsimha eṣa iti yaḥ khyatim parām yāsyati. || Page 125, I.P.S.

भट्टश्रीजयराशिप्रणीतः
॥ तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंहः ॥

[१. ग्रन्थकरणप्रतिज्ञा ।]

[S1 M1a]*.....तां यात मुन.....

[त]त्त्वोपप्लवसिंह एष विषमो नूनं मया [सृज्यते]@.....

नास्ति तत्फलं वा स्वर्गादि । सत्यं, तावदा दे तस्य# कर्मणः सम्भा.....

उक्तं च, परमार्थविद्भरपि—

“लौकिको मार्गोऽनुसर्तव्यः अ.....

लोकव्यवहारं प्रति सदृशौ बालपण्डितौ ॥ इत्यादि ।

[२. बृहस्पतेस्तत्त्वचतुष्कोक्तेरपि तत्त्वोपप्लवपरत्वम् ।] ननु यद्युपप्लवस्तत्त्वानां किमाया.....

“अथातस्तत्त्वं व्याख्यास्यामः” “पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसञ्ज्ञा” इत्यादि ? न, अन्यार्थत्वात् । किमर्थम् ? प्रतिबिम्बनार्थम् । किं पुनरत्र प्रतिबिम्ब्यते ? पृथिव्यादीनि तत्त्वानि लोके प्रसिद्धानि तान्यपि विचार्यमाणानि न ह्यवतिष्ठन्ते किं पुनरन्यानि ।

Tattavopaplavasimha

(Lion in the form of the upsetting of Principles of Śrī Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa)

[1. Statement of the resolve to compose the text.]

.....This difficult¹ **Tattvopaplavasimha** (Lion in the form of the upsetting of an principles) is verily being composed by me.²

*. Folio 1a of the Patan manuscript is broken at both ends, much of the text is lost.

@. Pt. Sukhlaji conjectures सृज्यते

#. Manuscript has तावद् आतस्य Pt. Sukhlaji conjectures एतस्य would not आतस्य be better.

x. Pt. Sukhlaji अ[ति]

1. There is a pun on the word 'viṣama'. This text is difficult and the lion 'fierce'.

2. If the text is वि'सृज्यते' and not just सृज्यते, it could mean that the lion in the form of this text is let loose by one to annihilate every thing.

Or there is a no fruit of it—heaven etc. True, of obtained karman [no] fruit is rendered possible. And¹ even those who know the true state of affairs say, “The way of the world should be followed....As far as worldly practice is concerned, the simple and the learned are similar.” And so on.²

[2. Even the Statement of Bṛhaspati regarding the group of four principles is meant to upset the principles.]

[Objection] If the principles are to be upset why [all this effort (āyāsa) on the part of Bṛhaspati] ?

“Now, therefore we shall expand the ultimate principle”, “The principles are earth-water, fire, air, the namebody, senseorgan or body is given to their conglomeration” and so forth (Rejoinder)—No this has another purpose. What is this purpose ? It is meant to reflect (the final position). What is it that is reflected here ?³ The principles earth, etc. are well known in the world (i.e. are popularly accepted); even they do not stand (i.e. they fail to be established) when scrutinised, then what to say of others.

अथ कथं तानि न सन्ति ? तदुच्यते — सल्लक्षणनिबन्धनं मानव्यवस्थानम्, माननिबन्धना च मेयस्थितिः, तदभावे तयोः सद्व्यवहार विषयत्वं कथं [स्वयमेव*].... ताम् । अथ...* न च...@ व्यवहारः क्रियते; तदात्मनि रूपास्तित्वव्यवहारो घटादौ च सुखास्तित्व व्यवहारः प्रवर्तयितव्यः ।

1. If there is no fruit of action, there is no enjoyer or the like also. Even then we carry on our worldly dealings on the basis of the commonly accepted notions of action, fruit, enjoyer, etc. We submit to empirical behaviour and this is sanctioned by the wise. Does Jayarāsi refer here to Bṛhaspati to whose school he belongs, or is at a generally accepted statement ?
2. Can we say that in the broken folio there was originally a maṅgala śloka in the traditional manner paying homage to guru Bṛhaspati and praying for the highest purpose, viz mokṣa ? But this would be doing injustice to Jayarāsi, for all he wants is to live an easygoing healthy life free from the worry of scrutinising which leads nowhere—of course after having carried on all possible scrutiny !
3. The reflection through far removed from the original gives us an idea of the latter's nature. Even so, the sūtras of Bṛhaspati by expounding the four principles reflect or suggest the final position of tattvopaplava. Or does it mean that Bṛhaspati is only reflecting the popular opinion.

x 8 akṣaras missing. Sukhlalji conjectures स्वयमेव.

* 2 akṣaras missing.

@ 3 akṣaras missing.

M. has rūpāstivvyavahāro.

Now, how is it that they do not exist ? We explain – The system of sources of valid knowledge is based on correct definitions, and the position of knowables is dependent on the sources of valid knowledge. In the absence of that (i.e. of a correct definition), how can they (i.e. sources of valid knowledge and knowables) by themselves be themselves be taken as object of correct expression and practical behaviour (vyavahāra)¹. (Objection—)Even without this (correct definition) we resort to usages (Reply –), Then we might as well resort to usages to the effect. “The soul has colour”, “Jar, etc. have pleasure” – (Which are both absurd propositions).

[२. न्यायसंमतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]

‘अ.....

“[इ]न्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यमदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्” [न्यायसू. १.१.४] इति तल्लक्षणम्”

[२. अदुष्टकारकेत्यादिविकल्पचतुष्टयेन अव्यभिचारिपदस्य दूषणोपक्रमः]

तच्चाव्यभिचा[रि].....# किमदुष्टकारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्यत्वेन, आहोस्विद् बाधरहितत्वेन, प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन, अन्यथा वा ? तद्यद्यदुष्टकारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्यत्वेन अव्यभिचारित्वम्, सैव कारणानामदुष्टता केनावगम्यते ? न प्रत्यक्षेण; नयनकुशलादेरतीन्द्रियत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानेन; लिङ्गान्तराऽनवगतेः । ननु इदमेव ज्ञानं लिङ्गं तदुत्थं तस्य विशिष्टतां गमयति । यद्येवम् इतरेतराश्रयत्वं दुरुत्तरमापनीयद्यते । किञ्च इन्द्रियाणां गुणदोषाश्रयत्वे तदुत्थे विज्ञाने दोषाशङ्का नातिवर्तते पुंव्यापारोत्पादितशब्दविज्ञान इव ?

[2. Critique of the Nyāya definition of Perception]

²[Now,

1. **Vyavahāra** has a two-fold sense to convey – the practical dealings or behaviour, and the verbal expression describing things and situations.
- * 6 akṣaras missing. Could the reading have been अथ किं तल्लक्षणम् ?
- # 9 akṣaras missing M has Cāvyabhicā ?
Sukhlalji – अव्यभिचा[रि] could the reading have been तच्चाव्यभिचारित्वं कथं ज्ञातं नाम ?
2. The opponent wants to know how definitions, especially definitions given by great logicians and thinkers can be proved to be faulty as a result of which the system of pramāṇas (Sources of knowledge) and prameyas (knowables) topples down. Hence the forth coming series of critiques elaborated by the author.

It (perception) is defined as "Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense organ with the (i.e. its) object, which is not expressible (by words), which is non-erroneous (avyabhicāri)¹ and which is well-determined" [Nyāya-Sūtra I.1.4]

[1. Repudiation of the term non-erroneous on the basis of four dialectical arguments, viz 'brought about by the conglomerate of unvitiated 'causal factors', etc.]

Is it non-erroneous on account of its being brought about by the conglomerate unvitiated causal factors or because it is not saluted, or because of its success in activity (i.e. because it gives rise to successful activity) or on account of some other reason ?

If the non-erroneousness is due to its [i.e. of the knowledge in question] being brought about by the conglomerate of unvitiated causal factors by what is this unvitiated state of the causes known ? Not by perception, for the well-being of vision and the like cannot be an object of sense-perception. Nor even by inference for no other mark of inference (probans, liṅga) is known [Objection-] why, this very knowledge is the mark of inference, arising from (i.e. causal conglomerate) in question it enables (us) to know its particularity (i.e. the fact of its being unvitiated) (Reply) If this be so, we would be landed into the fallacy of mutual dependence (itaretarāśraya) and this unanswerable (also what cannot be got over-duruttara). Moreover in as much as the sense organs are the substrata of good qualities and faults, the knowledge arising out of them cannot but be suspected of being faulty, just as (there is suspicion) in the case of verbal congestion brought about by the operation of a man (-which cognition is liable to error)²

अथ बाधानुत्पत्त्याऽव्यभिचारित्वं ज्ञायते; बाधानुत्पत्तिर्विज्ञानस्य किं यथार्थगृहीतित्वेन, आहोस्विद् बाधकं ज्ञानोत्पादकं [M 2b] कारकं वैकल्यादिति सन्दिग्धः । दृश्यते हि बाधकः ज्ञानोत्पादककारकवैकल्याद् बाधानुत्पादः, यथा दूरे मरीचिनिचये जलज्ञाने जाते बाधा न सम्पद्यते, अभ्यासदेशावस्थितस्य कारकोपनिपाते सत्युत्पद्यते । सा चोपजायमाना संवत्सरादिकालविलयेन संजायते,

कदाचिच्च कारकवैकल्यान्नैव[#] सम्पद्यते । न चैतावता तस्य यथार्थता^x उपपद्यते ।

अपि च बाधाविरहः एव बाधासद्भावावेदकः तदुपलब्धत्वेन तत्सद्भावोपलब्धेः ।

अन्यच्च, बाधाविरहः किं सर्वापेक्षया, आहोस्वित् [M, 3A] प्रतिपत्त्रपेक्षया ? तद्यदि सर्वपुरुषापेक्षया... @ तद्विरहोऽप्य* [स]र्वज्ञाः स्युः । भवन्तु नाम सर्वे सर्वज्ञाः को दोषः । असर्वज्ञव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गः ।

अथ प्रतिपत्त्रपेक्षया बाधानुत्पादः — प्रतिपत्तुर्बाधकं विज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते तेन तदव्यभिचारिः तदयुक्तम्; प्रतिपत्तुर्बाधकज्ञानानुत्पादेऽपि देशान्तरगमन-मरणादिना मणिमरीच्यादि विपर्यय ज्ञानदर्शनात् । अथवा तद्विपर्ययज्ञानं तथाविधमेवोत्पन्नं स्वप्नभवस्वभावानुप्रवेशेन यद्बाधकविज्ञानोत्पादप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तद्वशाऽपि तथाभूत एव परेष्टसम्यग्ज्ञानवत् ।..... एवं सति यदुक्तम् — “यत्र च दुष्टं करणं यत्र च मिथ्येति प्रत्ययः । [M 3b] स एव असमीचीनः प्रत्ययः” (शाबरभाष्य १.१.५) इत्येतदेवासमीचीनम् ।

If the non-erroneousness is said to be known from the fact of no contradiction arising, we suspect whether the non-emergence of situation in the case of this knowledge is due to the fact that it is true cognition, or because there is some deficiency in the (complex of) causal factors likely to bring about the subletting knowledge. There are actually seen cases of the non-emergence of sublation because of some deficiency in the factors likely to bring about the sublating knowledge (for example;) sublation does not come about when there is the (erroneous) knowledge of water in respect of a mass of rays at a distance (.....in respects of mirage); but there is sublation when the cogniser is somewhere near (the mass of rays in question) and when the required conglomerate of causal factor is available. And even when the sublation does come about, it may do so after an interval of a year or so, or at times owing to some deficiency in the required causal factors it be may not come about at all. But just this much is no justification for the cognition in question being treated as true.

M. — वैकल्यानत्व

x. M. — यथार्थ

@ 12 akṣaras missing.

★ 16 akṣaras missing स- is conjectured by sukhlaḥji

\$ M. — तद्वशा, Eli Franco — तद् ध्वंसो

= M. — यत्र, Eli Franco — यस्य

1. 'Avyabhicārin' means agreeing thoroughly with the object not divergent from it, but corresponding to it not failing in point to point agreement with it.
2. The idea is that an information conveyed by the words uttered by a person who may behaving good qualities as also some draw backs can be either true or false, So also the knowledge brought about by a sense-organ.

Moreover, absence of sublation itself indicates the existence of sublation, since there is knowledge of its existence because of its being known.¹

Moreover, is this absence of sublation with respect to all men or with respect to the cogniser concerned? If it be with respect to all men... even its absence... should be known by all others and all would be omniscient² (Objection) Let all be omniscient, what wrong is there? (Rejoinder -) There would be the contingency of no one whatsoever being possibly called 'non-omniscient'.

If the non-emergence of sublation is with respect to the cogniser concerned - (that is to say) the cognition in question is non-erroneous because no sublating cognition arises for the cogniser concerned (then) it is not proper, for we do come across even such cases of erroneous cognition of gem, mirage, etc where no sublating cognition of all arises for the cognition concerned owing to his death, leaving for another place, or something of this kind. On the erroneous cognition is produced as such only as account of the nature of its originating cause penetrating into it so as to abstract the rise of the sublating no question proves to be a case of the type under consideration (i.e. a case where no sublation arises with respect to the cogniser concerned) - just like the cases of true cognition by the

1. Can, this be explained as follows—Absence of sublation can be known only when we are familiar with cases where sublation has been detected and hence only can we know when sublation is not there. So the existence of one should be able to establish the existence of the others. Hence there is no reason to say that sublation is not there. A Positive entity can be present or absent, so abhāva implies its existence. The very fact that we speak of the absence of sublation or contradiction implies that sublation is a reality and we at once suspect that it could be present here.
2. If absence of sublation means that no one in the world should ever experience sublation in respect of the cognition in question, then to know this one would have a omniscient as there are infinite men and it is not normally possible to know that no sublation has arisen in their case. Similarly all people should be able to know the absence of sublation in the case of all others. Thus all would be omniscient.

opponent¹. This being say what is said viz.

"Where the instrument is vitiated and where there is the apprehension that it is false, that cognition alone is incorrect". (Sābara-Bhāṣya, 1.1.5)-

This very statement is incorrect.

अथ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन अव्यभिचारितां वेत्ति; प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यं फलेनाऽभिसम्बन्धः, फलं च स्वक्चन्द्रनवनितोदकादि, तेषु सत्यफलनिष्पत्तेः तेषु फलोपचारः तद्देहसम्बन्धः प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यम् । प्रवृत्तिः कायस्था क्रिया तत्सामर्थ्यम् अव्यभिचारितां गमयति । तत्किम् अवगतम्, अनवगतम् वा ? यदि नावगतम्, तद् 'अस्ति' इति कथं वेत्ति ? अथावगतम्, तदवगतेरव्यभिचारिता कथमवगम्यत इति पूर्वोक्तमनुसर्तव्यम् ।

उदकप्राप्त्या पूर्वोत्पन्नोदकविज्ञानस्य अव्यभिचारिता व्यवस्थाप्यते । किं तत्प्रतिभातोदक [M 4a] प्राप्त्या, आहोस्वित् तज्जातीयोद [क]* प्राप्त्या, तद्वंशजलप्राप्त्या वा ?

तद्यदि प्रतिभातोदकप्राप्त्या; तदयुक्तम्; प्रतिभातोदकस्य अवस्थानं नोपपद्यते* झषमहिषपरिवर्तनाभिघातोपजातावयवक्रियान्यायेन प्रत्यस्तमयसम्भवात् ।

अथ तज्जातीयोदकप्राधान्या, एवं तर्हि असत्योदकज्ञानेऽपि जाते व्रचितोयमासादयन्ति पुमांसः तदप्यवितथं स्यात् । अथ तद्देशकालसंलग्नमुदकं न प्रापयति मिथ्याज्ञानम्, सम्यग्ज्ञानं तु

1. At times the causes of erroneous cognition are by nature such that the detection of error proves to be extremely difficult—even impossible. For example one utters an untruth and keep up the show in such a manner that he is never found out, the truth is never detected. Or the mind is from the outset biased in such a way as not allow the truth to dawn on it, as in the case of the several isms where one party does not even try to think in terms of the view of the other. Or counterfeit coins are made so carefully and cleverly that they are never detected as such. In all these cases, there is the non-appearance of contradiction (as in the case of what is recognised as true cognition by most of the logicians) and yet the cognition concerned is not true. Hence the criterion laid down in the Sābara-Bhāṣya does not yield the desired result.

The person may see the rays of a gem coming out of the chink of a door and mistake them for the gem, but does not find an opportunity to verify as he goes elsewhere. Does the case of death refer to an instance, where a person seeing the rays emitting from the gem on the head of a Śeṣanāga mistakes them for the gem and going to take it is bitten by the Śeṣa-nāga and so there is no sublation of the cognition concerned?

x. Ms —तज्जातीयोदकप्राप्त्या

तद्देशकालसंलग्नमुदकं प्रापयति तेन तदव्यभिचारितं चेत्; यन्न प्रापयति तद् व्यभिचारि तर्हि मुमुषुपदा[M 4b]र्थोत्पादितं ज्ञानं चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादिसंवेदनं च व्यभिचारि प्राप्नोति । न च तद्देशकालसंलग्नमुदकप्रापकत्वमस्ति, देशस्यापि उदकवद् विनाशःसम्भवात् ।

If you determine its non-erroneousness on the basis of success in activity, (we say :) Success in activity signifies relation with fruit and the fruit may be garland, sandal wood, woman, water etc; as the true fruit can be achieved in respect of these they are secondarily called fruit ! Success in activity means their coming into contact with the body (or coming into contact with their body) Activity is bodily operation (Lit. operation having body for its substratum); its success makes us apprehend the non-erroneousness (of the cognition which motivates the activity). Now, is this success known or not (That is to say, Does success in activity acquaint us with the non-erroneousness of knowledge, itself being known or unknown ?) if it is not known, how do you know it as 'existant' (i.e. know its existence) ? ? If it is known, how do you know that its knowledge is non-erroneous ? So the line of argument stated above should be followed.

[It may be argued-] The non-erroneousness of the cognition of water generated earlier is proved by one's finding (or obtaining) the water (Rejoinder-) is it (proved) by one's obtaining the water that appeared (that was apprehended), or by obtaining water of the same, genus or by obtaining water which is descended from it (i.e. from the series of the water that was apprehended) ? If it is urged that it is proved by obtaining the water that appeared (-that was apprehended), it is not proper. It is not justifiable (to say) that the water that appeared (-that was apprehended) continues to exist there for there appeared is the possibility of its passing away according to the law of movement of parts, which results from the whirling of fishes and the splashing of buffaloes.¹

If it is (said to be) proved non-erroneous by obtaining water of the same genus (the rejoinder is that -) in that case when in spite of a false cognition having arisen, men (acting on it) at times obtain water, even that would be an instance of true cognition.² It may be urged that false cognition does not make

1 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that if there is any disturbance in the arrangement of parts, the whole made up of these parts perishes and a new one comes into existence.

2 This is according to the *kākatāliya nyāya* – the crow sits on the tree and by chance a fruit of the tree falls. This popular maxim denotes an unexpected and accidental occurrence, welcome or unwelcome. No relation can be established on the basis of accidental occurrence.

us obtain the water connected with the same place and time, whereas true cognition makes us obtain the water connected with the same place and time, and so is non-erroneous. (Rejoinder-) What does not make us obtain it erroneous, then (i.e. if we accept this position) the cognition of (lit. generated by) objects about to perish and the apprehension of the moon, the sun, the planets, the constellations, the stars, etc would come to be erroneous.¹ Besides, there cannot possibly be the fact of its making us obtain the water connected with the same place and time, for there is the possibility of place² perishing like water.

[प्रसङ्गात् जातेर्निकारणम् ।]

न च जातेः सम्भवोऽस्ति । स एव कथम् ? कथ्यते सा उदकव्यक्तिभ्योऽभिन्ना, भिन्ना, भिन्नाऽभिन्ना वेति ?

तद्यदि तादात्म्यव्यवस्थिता; तदा इह तासां नानात्वेन तस्या अपि[§] नानात्वोपपत्तिः तदेकत्वे च सर्वासामेकतापत्तिः । एकत्वे च निःसामान्यता तादात्म्यवि[M 5a]पर्यायो वा । —

अथ अर्थान्तरभूती, सा व्यावृत्ताकारा, अनुगताकारा वा ? तद्यदि व्यावृत्ताकारा; न तस्याः सामान्य रूपत्वं व्यावृत्तैकस्वभावत्वात् तोयादिवत् ।

अथ अनुस्यूतरूपा; तत्किम् आत्मरूपानुस्यूता, पररूपानुस्यूता वा ? तद्यद्यात्मरूपानुस्यूता, तदयुक्तम्, आत्मन्यनुगमाभावात् ।

अथ पररूप[M 5b]पानुस्यूता कथं पररूपानुस्यूतता — किं तत्तादात्म्यम्, तत्समवायोवा ? तद्यदि तादात्म्यम्, सामान्यतद्वतोरभेदप्रसङ्गः।

अथ पररूप[M, 5b]पसमवायः अनुस्यूताकारता तदयुक्तम्; सामान्याद् भिन्नः समवायः । सामान्यस्य रूपमालोचयितुमारब्धं न ततोऽन्यस्य ।

1. Because in the former case the object would have perished before one reaches it; and in the latter, it would be impossible to reach the object *Samvedana* is one of the synonyma of *jñāna*. (Cf. *kamalaśīla's Pañjikā*, p.5(63,11).
2. It is not possible to reach the object conditioned by that particular place and time. Place (i.e. the earthly locus – not the 'dik' of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophers which is by definition imperishable – for is liable to destruction. The time of cognition and that of actual finding are obviously not the same.

§. M – तस्यापि

x. M – आन्तभूता

[Incidental Refutation of Universal or Genus (jāti)]

And there is no possibility of there being (any thing like) genus(jāti). How is that ? We explain. Is it (i.e. the genus water) non-different or different one or both different and non-different from the water individuals ?¹

If it is established as identical (with water individuals) then it stands to reason that because they (i.e. water-individuals) are many (and genus is identical with them) it also should be many. And if it were one, there would be the contingency of all (water individuals) being one. And if they are one, there could be the state of their having no generality, universally, or there would be the reversal of identity.

Now, if the genus is another thing (i.e. is something different from the individuals concerned), is it exclusive in character, or is it persistent in character ? If it is exclusive in character, it cannot be of the nature of generality for in that case it will have a nature that is just exclusive-like water [i.e. like the water individuals] etc.

If it is persistent in character does it persist in its own body, or in the nature of something else ? If it is said to persist in its own body, that is not proper, for a thing cannot persist in itself.

If it is said to persist in the body of something else; What is this persistence in the body of something else ? Is this its identity with that (something else) or its inherence (samavāya) in it ? If that be identity, there would arise the contingency between a genus and what possesses a genus (i.e. individual)

If the persistence of a genus means the inherence (Samavāya) in the body of something else, that is not proper, for inherence is something different from a genus, [and] we have started an inquiry into the persistent character of a genus, not of something else.²

1. Here Jayarāṣi, While presenting the alternatives has in his mind the views of the Sāṃkhyas who regard jāti and individual as non-different that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākara who regarded them as different and of the Jainas and Mimāṃsakas who regarded them as both different and non-different.
2. If the persistence of a genus in something else means the samavāya (inherence) of this genus in that thing, and if samavāya, is something different from a genus, the persistence of a genus turns out to be something that is different from this genus. And so Jayarāṣi remarks, we want to understand the persistence which characterises a genus not the alleys persistence which is something different from this genus.

यदि च उदकजातीयार्थप्राप्त्याऽव्यभिचारिता पूर्वोदितोदकविज्ञानस्य व्यवस्थाप्यते; तदा उदकजातेर्गवादावपि सम्भवोऽस्ति गवादिप्राप्त्याऽव्यभिचारिता उदकविज्ञानस्य स्यात् ।

अथ उदकत्वस्य गवादावभाव इति चेत्; किम् इतरेतराभावः, प्रागभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावः वा ? तद्यदीतरेतराभावः, तदा उदकादावपि समानम् उदकत्वस्याऽभावप्रसङ्गः । उदकरूपता न उदकत्वस्य, उदकत्वरूपता च नोद[M, 6a]कस्य@

अथ प्रागभावः, तदा उदकेऽपि उदकत्वस्याभावप्रसङ्गः ।

अथ प्रध्वंसाभावः; तदा उदकेऽपि अभावप्रसङ्गः ।

अथ अन्यत्रास्ति, नैकत्र प्रत्यस्तमितस्य अन्यत्र सम्भव उपपद्यते ।

अथ अत्यन्ताभावः, तदा उदकेऽपि तस्याभावप्रसङ्गः ।

अथ सम्बन्धाभावाद् गवादावुदकत्वाभाव इति चेत्; तत्रापि किम् इतरेतराभावः प्रागभावः= प्रध्वंसाभावः अत्यन्ताभावो वेति पूर्ववद् वक्तव्यम् । निमित्तान्तराभावाद् गवादा[M 6b] वुदकत्वाभाव इति चेत् सोऽत्रापि समानः ।

(To come to our point again -). If the non-erroneousness of the cognition of water that has previously arisen is (said to be) established demonstrated by finding an object that is of the same genus as water then the genus 'water' can possibly exist in cow, etc¹, also and the cognition of water would be non-erroneous (i.e. would be proved as such) [even] by the obtaining (finding) of cow, etc.

Now, if it is urged that there is non-existence (absence) of water-genus (waterness) in cow, etc (we ask:). Is this mutual non-existence, or prior non-existence, or posterior non-existence or is it absolute non-existence ? If it is mutual non-existence (itaretarābhāva) there would be the contingency of waterness being (equally) non-existent in water, etc also for waterness is not

@. M and Sukhlalji —नोदक

x. M —तदेदके

#. M and Sukhlalji — उदकस्या.

=. M and Sukhlalji omit —प्रागभावः

~. M — ऊद

1. The Naiyāyikas regard jāti as Vyāpaka (all-pervading) and so the genus water would be found in cow, etc. also — So thinks the Upaplavakāra.

of the form of water and water is not of the wateriness.¹

If it be prior non-existence (prāgabhāva) then there would arise the contingency of the non-existence of wateriness in water also.²

It is posterior non-existence (pradhvarṃsābhāva) then there would arise the contingency of (its) non-existence even in water. If you say that it exists elsewhere, (we reply :). You cannot logically entertain the possibility that a thing which has perished in one place exists elsewhere.

If it is absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva)³, then there is the contingency of its non-existence even in water.

If it is urged that there is non-existence of wateriness in cow, etc. On account of the non-existence of a relation then (we say that) even then it will have to be shown as before. Whether the non-existence in question is mutual non-existence, or prior non-existence or posterior non-existence or absolute non-existence. If it is said that there is non-existence of wateriness in cow, etc on account of the non-existence of another causal factor (nimitta) then the position is the same here also.⁴

न च उदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वमुपपादयितुं पर्यते । उदकम् अनुदकाकाराद् उदकाकारतया व्यावर्तते, उदकाकारात् कथं व्यावर्तते ? उदकाकारतया, किम् आकारान्तरेण ? तद्यद्युदकाकारतया व्यावर्तते, तदा अन्यासामुदकव्यक्तीनाम् अनुदकाकारता प्राप्नोति रसादेरिव । अथ अनुदकाकारतया उदकाकारान्निवर्तते ततो दहनादेरिव अनुदकत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

अथ उदकाकाररूपताऽविशेषेऽपि अवान्तरगणिकाकारः भेदपरिक्लृप्तिरिति चेत्, सत्यम्, आवान्तरगणिकाकारः तोयतादात्म्यव्यवस्थिता[M 7a] अतादात्म्य व्यवस्थितो वा ? तद्यदि तादात्म्यव्यवस्थितः, तदा उदकाकारतया उदकान्तराद् भिद्यते । एवं चान्यासामुद्रकव्यक्तीनामनुदकरूपता

1. According to the Naiyāyika, universal or genus, and individual are distinct entities, as there is mutual non-existence on mutual negation between water and wateriness, as there is between cow and wateriness.
2. If it is urged that wateriness is non-existent in the cow before that cow is generated, that would be true of water also, wateriness is eternal and comes into relation with water only after water is produced.
3. The Naiyāyika argues that wateriness is certainly all pervasive but it is related to water alone by Samavāya (inherence), whereas this relation is not there between wateriness and cow.
4. Here also no other causal or instrumental factor can account for the existence of wateriness in water.

प्राप्नोति पूर्वोदितमेव दूषणम् ।

अथातादात्म्यव्यवस्थितः तर्हि अनुदकत्वं रसादेरिव । अथ उदकत्वव्यावृत्त्या अनुदकाकाराद् व्यावर्तते; शृण्वन्तु अमी बाललपितं विपश्चितः । यद्युदकत्वव्यावृत्त्याऽनुदकाद् व्यावर्तते तोयम्, उदकत्वं च उदकात् अनुदकाच्च न जात्यन्तरं व्यावर्तकमस्ति । अभ्युपगमे वा अनिशेषप्लवाऽनुबन्धः स्यात् । तस्मात् स्वेनैव रूपेण इतरेतरात्मना व्यावर्तते न जात्या[M 7b]दिना व्यावर्तते, जात्यादेरव्यावृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् स्थितमेतत् नोदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वोपपत्तिः । तदनुपपत्तौ नोदकत्वं नाम सामान्यमस्ति स्वत्ववत् ।

And, the plurality of water-individuals cannot possibly be justified, water is distinguished from what is the shape (character, ākāra) of non-water by its having the shape of water but is it distinguished from what is of the shape of water ? Is it distinguished by reason of its having the shape of water or by reason of having another shape ? If it be distinguished by reason of its having the shape of water then the other water-individuals would come to have the shape of non-water, like earth (rasā)¹ etc. If it is distinguished from what is of the shape of water by reason of having the shape of non-water then there arises the contingency of it itself being non-water, like fire, etc.

If it is urged that even when two things are non-different in as much as both possess the shape of water, they can be different insofar as there is the imagination (or possibility) of a different subvariety of the shape, (the rejoinder is :) True, but is this subvariety of the shape established as identical water or as something different from it ? If it is something identical then it come to this that) one water-individual is different from the other water-individuals by reason of its having the shape of water. In that case, the other water-individuals turn out to be of the form of non-water (And thus) the same difficulty (fault) arises as was stated earlier.

If it be something different, then it (i.e. the first water-individual) turns out to be non-water like earth, etc. If it is said that it (i.e. a water individual) is distinguished from what is of the shape of non-water on account of wateriness (Serving) as the distinguishing factor² (or because of absence of water in the

1. Rasā -Earth. The term 'rasādeḥ' can be interpreted as 'taste, etc.' also. But earth being a substance (dravya) like water is a good contrast to it. Again, further on we have a reference to dahana, fire, another dravya.
2. Udatatva-Vyāvṛtṭyā, i.e. the distinction affected by the water-genus or = udatatvasya vyāvṛtṭyā, i.e. because water genus is absent in non-water.

latter), then may the learned men listen to this childish prattle.¹ If water is distinguished from non-water on account of waterness serving as the distinguishing factor [– or on accounts of the absence of waterness (in the latter)] how will waterness be distinguished from water and from non-water? There is no other genus to serve as the distinguishing factor. And if it is recognised, there would be the continuity of undesired attacks (over-powering). (That is to say the process would go on in infinity). Therefore; things are distinguished from each other by their own form and not through the instrumentality of genus, etc; for (on the latter hypothesis) there would be the contingency of the genus, etc, themselves not being distinguished. Hence it comes to this that the plurality of water-individuals cannot be accounted for, there is no genus called 'waterness' just as there is no genus called 'oneselfness'.²

इतोऽपि न विद्यते सामान्यम्, नित्यस्य सतोविज्ञानजनकत्वायोगात् । तदेव कथम् । व्युत्पाद्यते – विज्ञानजनकावस्थायां यदेव स्वरूपं सामान्यात्मकं शक्तिमच्छक्तिरूपं च कार[M 8a] कानपेक्षयाऽजनकावस्थायां तदेव रूपम् अतः पूर्वमपि कार्योत्पादप्रसङ्गः । अनुत्पादे वा प्रागिव इदानीमपि न जनयेत् । अथ कारकान्तमपेक्ष्य उत्पादयति कार्यम्, किं तेन कारकान्तरेण तस्य क्रियते कारकत्वम्, ज्ञाप्यते वा ? तद् यद्युत्पाद्यते, सुस्थिते नित्यत्वम् ! उत ज्ञाप्यते सिद्धं तर्हि कारकत्वम्, तदभावेऽपि विद्यमानस्याऽपेक्ष्योत्पत्त्यात् । भवतु नाम कारकत्वं को दोषः । कार्योत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः । अथ कारकत्वेऽपि कार्यं न जनयेत्, अहो राजाज्ञा गरीयसी नैयायिकपशोः ।

For this reason also (we find) that a genus does not exist. Being eternal it cannot produce knowledge (about itself). How is this only? We explain – whatever be its nature, viz-being a genus being of the form of a potency, being of the form of a possessor of potency in the state when it produces, knowledge must have been the same in the state when it did not produce knowledge, for this its

1. or "May you listen to the childish prattle of the learned man."
2. There is only one being which is oneself, So there is no question of there being the genus (one selfness : similarly if plurality of water individuals cannot be accounted for, there would be no genus called 'waterness'.

x. M – एवेदानीम्

@. M – तद् व्युत्पाद्यते

#. M omits न

~. *पादयति

nature stands in no need of the causal factors.¹ Hence there is the contingency of its producing the effect [viz. Knowledge of even before (this knowledge was produced, but this is not true.)] Or if it did not produce (knowledge formerly then it should not do so even now if you accept the alternative that) a genus produces the effect (viz. knowledge) with the help of another causal factor. (we ask :) Does this other causal factor generate its causality (i.e. causal capacity) or make it known? If you say that the causality in question is generated, then (verily) [its] eternity is well-placed (unshaken).² If you urge that it is made known, then its causality is an accomplished fact, for in this case the other causal factor has (only) revealed. Something that existed even in its absence (Objection). What harm is in it the causality of a genus is present there (all the time)? (Rejoinder) There would be the contingency of the (Perpetually) generation of the offers (viz. its knowledge) And if you argue that it may not generate the effect even though it is possessed of the causality, then very powerful must be the royal ordinance of the beast of a Naiyāyikās!³

इतोऽपि नास्ति सामान्यम्, तदुपपादकमानव्यतिरेकात् ननु अस्ति प्रमाणम् – 'अनयोः सादृश्यम्', 'एषां सारूप्यम्', तेन सदृशोऽयम्, 'असौ वातेन सदृशः' इत्यादिज्ञानं सामान्यसत्तावबोधकम् अप्रतिपन्नसामान्यस्य नोपपद्यते । अस्ति त्विदं विज्ञानं बाधाविकलं जातितनुव्यवस्थापकम् । तदेतदयुक्तम् किं निमित्तभूतेन तेन एवंविधं ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते, कर्म[M 9a]तापत्रे वा ? तद्यदि निमित्तभूतेन उत्पाद्यते, तदा न सामान्यं कल्पनीयम्, असामान्यात्मकमेव निमित्तमित्यंभूतसामान्यं ज्ञानोत्पादना, अलं सामान्यं कल्पनया । अथ कर्मतापत्रेन उत्पाद्यते, तदसत् । नैवाऽवभाति विज्ञाने सामान्यं धूर्तैरविपर्यासितसंविदाम् । ननु सादृश्यमवभाति । सत्यम् अवभाति, नापह्न्यते अपितु द्रव्यगुणकर्मात्मकं सत् पाचकादिभेदेषु – यथा एषां पाचकत्वम्, एते पाचकाः, तत्पाचकसदृशोऽयम्, असौ अनेन सदृश इति विशेषादावपि [M 9b] द्रष्टव्यम् । अत्रापि सामान्यं परिज्ञप्तिरिति चेत्, न, सूत्रव्याघातात् – "सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाभावत् तत् एव ज्ञानम्" [वैशेषिकसूत्र. ८।२।५]; अनिष्टा च – विशेषेषु सामान्ये परिकल्प्यमाने सति सन्देहः सति सन्देहे तेषु

1. What is eternal is anupakāry, that is to say near to be helped by others and so no change can be brought about in it by the latter. Hence there will be a perpetual knowledge of genus (sāmānya) or no knowledge of it at all.
2. Jāti or sāmānyā would not be eternal for the additional factor would bring about a change in its nature.
3. That a thing should by its nature have the power to generate and yet not generate is an impossibility.

x. M – कः

विशेषान्तरं परिकल्पनीयम्, पुनः सामान्यम् इत्यनिष्टा इत्यलम् असद्ग्रहाभिनिवेशेन ।

For this reason also, a genus does not exist, viz.-due to the absence of means of proof justifying its existence. (Objection) why, there is a means of proof; (to wit), knowledge apprehend. 'Similarity of these two, (gameness of form of these, 'this is similar to that which makes me cognisant of the existence of a genus, cannot be accounted. For in the case of one to whom genus is not known. But this knowledge is there, uncontradicted and establishing the reality of a genus (jāti).

(Rejoinder) This is not proper (Let us examine -) is such a knowledge generated by a genus in its capacity as an instrumentation cause or in its capacity as the object? If it is generated in its capacity the existence of a genus for an instrumental cause not of the form of a genus is adequate to produce the concerned knowledge of generality and there is no need to posit the existence of a genus. If it is said that it produces (the knowledge of genus) in its capacity as the object, (then) that (also) is wrong. A genus never appears in knowledge in the case of those whose minds are not perverted by rogues.¹ (Objection-) Similarity does appear. (Rejoinder) True, it appears, it is not denied, but (it appears) being of the nature of substance quality, action in the differences (particular cases)- viz. 'their being cooks', 'they are cooks', 'he is similar to that cook', 'he is similar to that one'- this should be seen in the case of particulars also.² If it is urged that here also genus can be posited, the reply is No, because the sūtra would be set at nought - "Because there is absence of universals and particulars in universals and particulars, there is knowledge from them only" (Vai- 8.1.5). And there is infinite regress - If genus is posited in particulars there would be doubt, there being doubt, another particular would have to be posited, (and) again genus, thus an infinite scene series, so enough of this obsession of changing to non-existent things.

अथ भिन्नाभन्नं सामान्यं भवद्भिः प्रतिपाद्यते-आकारभेदेन व्यक्तिभ्य उपलभ्यते, इत्यर्थान्तरम्, देशभेदेन[M 10a]तु नैव उपलभ्यते इत्यव्यतिरिक्तम्^x । तदेतन्महासुभाषितम् न देशभेदेनैव वस्तूनां

@. M - असदसद्

1. Lit. 'Whose knowledge or consciousness is not perverted by rogues ?

2. I fail to understand how these are regarded as viśeṣas(particulars). Jayarāśi rightly says they are of the nature of substance, quality, action. The Vaiśeṣika concept of viśeṣa is quite different. It is present in eternal things-aroms and the like.

x. M - अव्यतिरिक्ते

भेदः अपि तु आकारभेदेनैव भावाभेदमुपयान्ति । यथा च आकारभेदो नास्ति तथाऽनन्तरेमनिवेदितम् ।

If this is how you propound a genus as both different and non-different (from the concerned individuals) - It is known to have a shape different from that of the individuals (concerned), hence it is a different object; but it is never known to have a different spatial location, hence it is non-different -(our rejoinder is :) This is a grand statement. Things are not different on account of a difference in spacial location alone but things became different only as a result of difference in shape. That there is no difference as regards shape (between a genus and the concerned individuals has just been said (notified)).

[३. प्रसङ्गात् समवायस्य निरसनम् ।]

सामान्यं समवायवृत्त्या व्यक्तिषु वर्तते इति । न चासौ विद्यते । समवायो हि व्यावृत्तैकस्वभावः, अनुगतैकस्वभावो वा । तद्यदि व्यावृत्तैकस्वभावः कस्यासौ समवायः सर्वतो व्यावृत्तेः नीलादिवत् । अथ अनुगतैक[M, 10b]स्वभावः सामान्यं- तर्हि, न समवायः, नित्यस्य सतोऽनेकवृत्तेर्गोत्वादिवत्; उपपादकप्रमाणाच्च । ननु प्रत्यक्षबुद्ध्यवसेयोऽसौ; तदयुक्तम्; किं सम्बन्धबुद्ध्याऽध्यवसीयते, आहोस्विद् इहबुद्ध्या, समभावबुद्ध्या वा ?

[3 Incidental Refutation of inherence.]

It is said that a genus resides in individuals by virtue of the relation of inherence (Samavāya). But this (inherence) does not exist. For (we ask :) is inherence of the one nature of exclusion alone, or is it of the nature of persistence alone. If it is of the nature of exclusion alone, then whose inherence could it be, for it would be excluded from all, like blue etc.

If it is of the nature of persistence alone, then it is genus (Sāmānya), not inherence (Samavāya) for many things¹ like cowness, etc. And (inherence does not exist because there is no means of proof to justify its existence [Objection] why, it can be determined by perceptual cognition. (Rejoinder) This is not correct. Is it determined by the cognition of relation, or by the cognition of

~. M - सामान्यम्

@. M - 'बुद्ध्य'

1. This is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of Sāmānya. See Praśastapāda Bhāṣya on Sāmānya.

being here, or by the cognition of inherence.¹

उच्यते । तद्यदि सम्बन्धबुद्ध्या, कोऽयं सम्बन्धः ? किं सम्बन्धजातियुक्तः सम्बन्धः आहोस्विद् अनेकोपादान जनितः, अनेकाश्रितो वा सम्बन्धबु[M 11a]द्विविशेषौ वा, सम्बन्ध बुद्धयुत्पादको वा सम्बन्धाकारो वा ? तद्यदि सम्बन्ध जातियुक्तमस्ते सम्बन्धः, सोऽनुपपन्नः समवायऽसम्बन्धत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ अनेकाश्रित सम्बन्धः, तदा घटजात्यादेः सम्बन्धत्वं प्रसज्यते । अथ सम्बन्धबुद्धयुत्पादकस्ते सम्बन्धः उच्यते, तदा लोचनादेरपि सम्बन्धत्व प्रसङ्गः । अथ सम्बन्धबुद्धयवसेयः सम्बन्धोऽभिधीयते, तदा कौलेयककरिकुमारादिष्वपि सम्बन्धशब्दव्युत्पादने सम्बन्धत्वप्रसङ्गः । सम्बन्धेतरयोः एकविज्ञानविषयत्वे इतरस्य सम्बन्धरूपता प्राप्ता । अथ सम्बन्धाकारः सम्बन्धः, संयोगाभेदप्रसङ्गः । अवान्तरगणिकाकारस्तु यथा न भेदकः तथा पुरस्तादुक्तमेव दूषणम् ।

We explain – Now if it is determined by the cognition of relation, what is this relation ? Is it relation connected to the universal relation, or is it something produced by many material causes, or something resting on many (substrate), or a particular cognition of relation or of the shape of relation. Now, if your relation is something connected with the universal relation that cannot be justified to reason; there would be the contingency of samavāya not being a relation.² If relation is something produced by many material causes, then there would be the contingency of poet, etc. also being 'relation'. If relation is something resting on many (Substrate) then the jar universal etc. would come to be relation. If your relation is said to be something that produces the cognition of relation then there is the contingency of eye etc also being relation. If relation is said to be something that is determined by the cognition of

1. The sentence ends at समवायबुद्ध्या वा ? उच्यते (it is explained, we explain) should from another sentence, see Nyāyakumudacandra, P 300—तद्रूपतयाऽसौ सम्बन्धबुद्धौ प्रतिभासते, इहेदम् इत्यनुभवे, समवाय इति प्रत्यये वा ।

x. M – सम्बन्ध

ह. M – सम्बन्धाकारो

=. Ei Franco suggests समवायस्य, but this is not necessary

~. M – एकत्व०

2. If inherence is said to be connected with a universal, an infinite regress would follow, as inherence would have to be accepted as connected with the universal by another inherence, which would have to be connected with the universal also by another inherence and so on. Besides, there is only one all-pervading inherence and no group of inferences. Which could have a universal.

relation, then on the explanation of the word 'relation', there would be the contingency of relationship even in the case of kauleyaka (dog) karin (elephant), kumāra (boy), etc also.¹ If relation and another are the objects of one cognition, then the other one would come to have the form of relation. If relation has the shape of relation then there is the contingency of its non-difference from conjunction (samāyoga). And we have already shown the fault that a sub-class cannot serve as a distinguishing factor.

अथ 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' इति इहबुद्ध्याऽध्यवसीयते, न इहबुद्धेरधिकरणसंविद्रूपत्वात् । न चान्यस्मिन्नाकारे^२ प्रतीयमान अन्यत् परिकल्पयितुं न्याय्यम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अथ समवायबुद्ध्याऽऽत्मसात्क्रियते, सोऽप्यनुपपन्न एव, समवायबुद्धेरनुपपत्तेः । 'अयं तन्तुः'; 'अयं पटः', 'अयमनयोः समवायः[M 12a]' इति न जानते जनाः ।

अथ अनुमानेन अनुमीयते । द्वे अनुमाने – दृष्टम् सम्मान्यतोदृष्टं च । न दृष्टम् प्रत्यक्षव्यतिरेकात् । सामान्यतोदृष्टमपि नास्ति तत्प्रभवकार्यानुपलब्धेः ।

नन्विहबुद्धिरेव समवायज्ञापिका – 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' इति प्रत्ययः सम्बन्धनिमित्तः, अबाधित-इह प्रत्ययत्वात्, 'इह कुण्डेदधि' इति प्रत्ययवत् । किमनेन अनुमीयते – किं निमित्तमात्रम्, उत सम्बन्धः ? यदि निमित्तमात्रम्, ततः सिद्धसाध्यतया सम्बोधयितव्यः । अथ सम्बन्धः संयोगः समवायो वा ? संयोगानुमाने उपगमहानिः । समवायानुमाने सम्बन्धव्यतिरेकः । न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धेऽन्यस्य गमकत्वम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न जातु देवदत्तनय[M 12b]न कुटसम्बन्धे यज्ञदत्तेन्द्रियं रूपादिकमर्थं करणत्वसाम्यात् प्रकाशयद् दृष्टम् । एवं सति सामान्यसमवायविरहे कथं द्रव्यादि-व्यवस्था इति चिन्त्यते ।

If it is (said to be) determined by the cognition of 'being here' e.g. "cloth is here in the threads, we reply", No (it is not so) because the cognition of being here (we reply) is of the form of the cognition of the substratum (e.g. threads) It is not proper (logical) to imagine another shape when a different

1. What sort of relation as the author referring to that the words start with the consonent. Or is he referring to the grammatical, explanation of these words? The word 'kauleyaka' (dog) is derived from Kula (family). The affix दकङ् is added to कुल when the word so formed means 'a dog' otherwise कौल is formed. See Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.2.96. करिन् (elephant derived from कर (hand)). Can कुमार mean 'One whose death is bad, something one would not like' or is it derived from the verb कुमारस्य which means 'to play' ?

ह. M – चास्मिन्नाकारे

x. M – सामान्यतो

one have been cognised for that will lead to an over deduction absurdum¹ (that is to say, just anything could be imagined when one has the cognition of something). If you say that inference that also is not justified, for there is no justification for the cognition of inherence (Sāmavāya). People never have knowledge to the effect, "This is thread", "This is cloth", "This is the incoherence of those two".

If it is said to be inferred by inference, (we reply:) Inference is two-fold—that based on perception, and that based on a perception of likeness (Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam).² Dṛṣṭam cannot be of help here, for there is no perception nor also sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, for no effect arising out of it is known.

[Objection—] why, it is the cognition of 'being here' that makes us cognisant of inherence—the cognition 'cloth is here in the threads is brought about through the instrumentality of relation because it is an uncontradicted cognition of 'being here' like the cognition 'Curd is here : in the bowl.' (Rejoinder—Tell us:) What is inferred thereby—a mere instrument or relation? If it is a mere instrument (that is inferred) you should be hanged with the fault of proving what is already proved (Siddha-sādhyatā). If it is relation (that is inferred), is it conjunction (Samyoga) or inherence (Sāmavāya). If (you say that) it is conjunction that is inferred, you give up your position. If (you say that) it is inherence that is inferred then there is the absence of relation³. When there is the relation of one

1. 'Atiprasaṅg'— "The term is used when the deduction implies giving up every uniformity and the possibility of everything—" Stcherbatsky [Buddist Logic, Vol-II. p.239. St. Petersburg, 1930]
2. Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa is defined variously : On one definition, which our author seems to have in mind, it is the inference of cause from an effect on the ground of similarity. See Nyāya-Sūtra 1.1.5 with Bhāṣya and Vārtika; also Sāṃkhya-kārikā. 5-6 We see that when there is change of place, there has been movement, so it can be inferred that because the sun has changed place, it must have moved or because an act always leads to a fruit, so the Vedic rites must yield some fruit, if not here, in the other world.
3. See Nyāyakumudacandra, p 301, ll 12-4, अथ सम्बन्ध विशेषः, किं संयोगः समवायौ वा ? संयोगश्चेत् ? अभ्युपगमपाधा । अथ समवायः दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यविकलता, पक्षस्य च अप्रसिद्धविशेषणवत्त्वम्, समवायस्य क्वचिदायप्रसिद्धेः।

Nothing has ever been known to come into relation on the ground of inherence, and hence nothing can act as an illustration for inferring the existence of inherence.

thing with an object, another thing cannot give the knowledge of this object, for that would be going too far [atiprasaṅga – overdeduction and absurdum. When there is the relation of Devadatta's eye with a jar, Yajñadatta's sense-organ (i.e. eye) is never known to reveal the object colour etc. (Simply) on the ground that the latter too is a sense organ. Thus in the absence of (the categories) genus and inherence it is a matter of worry (or serious consideration) as to how we should establish (define) substance, etc.

अथ तद्वंशजजलप्राप्त्या अव्यभिचारिता ज्ञायते, तदयुक्तम्, अन्त्यावयविद्रव्याणां जनकत्वव्यतिरेकात् । न च उदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वमस्ति; यथा न विद्यते तथा निवदितं पुरस्तात् ।

किञ्च; प्रवृत्तिसाध्यैर्न अव्यभिचारिता पूर्वोदितज्ञानस्य ज्ञाप्यते — किं लिङ्गभूतेन, आहो अध्यक्षात्मकेन ? तद्यदि लिङ्गभूतेन; तदयुक्तम्, तेन साकं [M 13a] सम्बन्धानवगतः । अवगतौ वाऽलंप्रवृत्तिसाध्यैर्न । अथ अध्यक्षात्मकेन, तदयुक्तम्, पूर्वोदितप्रत्यस्तमितेन साकं सन्ति कर्षाभावात् । तद्विषयविज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षफलं निरालम्बनात् केशोण्डुकादिसंवेदनवत् । विज्ञानस्याभावोऽवभाति, न भावः तदभावात् ।

[To return to our discussion, If non-erroneousness (of the cognition of water) is (said to be) known by the finding of water that has descended from it (i.e. from the water perceived) that is not proper, for substance of the form of "final wholes" do not possess the capacity to produce (a new substances)¹ and (again) water individuals are not many; that they are not many been stated earlier.

Moreover, if the non-erroneousness of the cognition that has arisen earlier is known by the efficiency of its activity, is it known by this (efficiency) being an inferential mark, or by its being of the nature of perception ? If (it is known) by its being an inferential mark, that is not proper, for no relation with it is known. Or if it be known enough of efficient activity (—efficient activity is not required as an inferential mark). If it is known by it being of the nature of perception, that is not proper, for there is absence of contact whatsoever earlier and has perished. Knowledge having that as its object is not the fruit of

ह Ms — तद्वस्तव्यजलं.

*. Ms — नात्वम्

1. It is Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenet that certain 'Wholes' are final wholes and hence are such as never become a part of some 'whole' or be produced subsequently. The mass of water filling a pond or the like would be a 'final whole.'

perception because it is devoid of objective support like the cognition of keśonduka (hair-mass). Neither the absence of cognition appears nor its presences, because of its absence.

अविद्यमानस्य विषयार्थो वक्तव्यः — किम् आकारार्पकत्वेन वा, महत्त्वादधर्मोपेतत्वेन वा, सत्तामात्रेण वा, सहोत्पादेन वा ? सर्वस्य प्रत्यस्तमितत्वात् कथमसौ विषय ? तद्विषयत्वे केशोण्डुकादि विज्ञानस्येव, मिथ्यात्वे बी[M 13b]जमन्वेषणीयम् । आत्मसत्तामात्रेण मिथ्यात्वे सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वमापद्यते ततः तत्त्वोपप्लवः स्यात् ।

अथ अन्यथाऽव्यभिचारित्वं गृह्यते — आत्मान्तःकरणसम्बन्धेन उत्पन्नविज्ञानम् अव्यभिचारिताविशिष्टं प्रद्योत्यते, तदयुक्तम् । तदव्यभिचारित्वं तद्धर्मो वा, तत्स्वरूपं वा ? तद्यदि तद्धर्मः स नित्यः अनित्यो वा ? यदि नित्यः तदा जातिदोषेणापोदितो वेदितव्यः ।

अथाऽनित्यः — स पूर्वोत्पन्नः, सह, पश्चाद्वा जातः ? तद्यदि पूर्वोत्पन्नः, तदा कस्यासौ धर्मः । न हि धर्मिणमन्तरेण धर्मो भवितुमर्हति, सर्वतो व्यावृत्तरूपत्वात् कः कस्येति वक्तव्यम् । अथ सहोत्पन्नः, कस्तयोः सम्बन्ध इति वक्तव्यम् । तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्ति-समवायसम्बन्धाभावे सति षष्ठ्यर्थो वक्तव्यः, 'तस्य अव्यभिचारित्वम्' इति । अथ पृष्ठोत्पन्नस्तर्हि[M 14b] पूर्व व्याभिचारिता विज्ञानस्य प्राप्नोति न च आध्यात्मिकोऽव्यभिचारिरूपो धर्मोऽस्ति सुखादिव्यतिरिक्तः, तत्प्रतीत्यसंभवेन स्वयमनभ्युपगमात् । यदि च अव्यभिचारादयो धर्मा अर्थान्तरभूताः अभ्युपगम्यते तैरच्छिन्नं विज्ञानं सामग्र्या अवस्थापकम् उद्घुष्यते, तच्चानुपन्नम्, प्रत्येकमनेकविशेषणावच्छिन्नविज्ञानप्रतिपत्तिः^० कालावस्थानायोगात्, ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकयोरभावे कार्यमात्रं प्रबन्धि ज्ञानं स्यात् ।

[If it is said that the absence of this cognition appears, then it will have to be explained what the word 'object' means for something that is non-exist. Is it 'object' by providing (its) form (to the cognition) or by having attributes like magnitude, etc or by its very existence only, or by being produced with (the cognition) ? All these having been destroyed, how could it be an object of a cognition (which arises after it is destroyed). And if it is be an object, as in the case of the cognition of hair-mass (keśonduka), etc the seed (reason) for the falsity of this cognition or (-According to Eli Franco - a reason should be

0. M - विज्ञानस्येव — Eli Franco - 'विज्ञानस्यैव

~. M - 'नोत्पन्नम् । i.e. construes with न

ह. M - दोषेणपोदितो

=. M - 'रूपत्वात् ।

00. M - 'प्रतिपत्तिः ।

sought for the falsity of the cognition of the hair-mass etc. only). If falsity is due to just its existences all (cognition) could be false and therefore there would be the upsetting (annihilation) of (all) principles.

[Objection-] Non-erroneousness is known otherwise cognition which is produced by the relation of the self and the inner organ is revealed as qualified by non-erroneousness. (Rejoinder) This is not proper. Is its non-erroneousness its attribute, or its nature ? If it is its attribute, is it eternal or non-eternal ? If it is eternal, it should be known as refuted by the faults shown in the case of universal.

If it is non-eternal, is it produced before (the cognition) or along with it, or after it ? If it is produced before, then of what is it the attribute. For an attribute cannot remain without something possessing it since it has a form distinct from all, it should be explained what belongs to what.

If it was produced along with it, then it should be related as to what their relation is. If there is the absence of the relation of identity causality, or inherence, the meaning of the generative case should be explained (when it is said) "its non-erroneousness". It is produced afterwards, then it comes that the cognition was erroneous earlier. And there is no attribute of the form of the non-erroneous(ness) of the self besides pleasure, etc, because its apprehension being impossible, you yourself do not-admit it.

If the attributes like non-erroneousness are accepted as being different (from their possession, viz cognition) and the cognition delimited by these is declared as accounting, for the causal complex - this does not stand to reason, because a cognition cannot possibly endure for the time (required) for the apprehension of the cognition delimited by the several qualification one by one. In the absence of that which is made known and that which makes known the cognition would be related to the agent alone.

अथ तत्स्वरूपमव्यभिचारित्वम्^x — तर्त्तिक स्वसत्तामात्राऽनुरोधेन, अर्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन ? तद्यदि[M, 15a]दि ज्ञानसत्तामात्रतैवाऽव्यभिचारित्वमुच्यते, तदा केशोण्डुकसंविदोऽपि अव्यभिचारिता स्यात् । न च ज्ञानसत्तामात्रानुरोधेन ज्ञानं व्यभिचार्यव्यभिचारि वा उद्गीयते ।

अथ अर्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन अव्यभिचारित्वम् — किम् अनुपकारकार्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन, आहोस्विद् उपकारकार्थान्तरानुरोधेन ? तद्यदि तावद्, अनुपकारकार्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन, तदा केशोण्डुक — इन्दुद्वयसंविदोऽप्यव्यभिचारिताप्रसङ्गः ।

x. M - सत्

अथ उपकारकार्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन अव्यभिचारिता — किं प्रतीयमानार्थान्तरोपकारक-सत्तानुरोधेन, तद्विपरीतार्थान्तरोपकारक सत्तानुरोधेन वा ? तद्यदि पूर्वपक्षाभ्युपगमः, तदा अतीतानागतानुमानविज्ञानस्य योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य च चोदनावचनजनितविज्ञानस्य वाऽव्यभिचारिता न भवेत् तदवगतोपकारकार्थाभावात् । भावे वा वितानक्रियालोपप्रसङ्गः । अथ उत्तरो मतः तदा केशोण्डुक - इन्दुद्वयसंविदोऽव्यभिचारित्वं प्रसज्यते इत्यसद्गृहीतम् ।

Now, if (it is said that) non-erroneousness is its very essence (own nature), (we ask) Is it so by virtue, of its mere existence, or it is so by of the existence on account of the existence of another object (i.e. is knowledge non-erroneous on account of the existence of another object) ? If the mere existence of knowledge is said to constitute its non-erroneousness then the cognition of hair-mass (keśonḍuka) should be non-erroneous. It is not by virtue of its mere existence that cognition is declared to be either erroneous or non-erroneous.¹

If (you say) that the knowledge in question is non-erroneous by virtue of the existence of another object (we ask) Is it so by virtue of the existence of another object that is not contributory (anupakāraka) or by virtue of the existence of another object that is contributory (upakāraka). (If it is said that) it is so by virtue of the existence of another object that is not contributory, then there is the contingency of the knowledge of hair-mass (keśonḍuka) or of two moons being non-erroneous.²

If the knowledge in question is non-erroneous by virtue of the existences of another thing that is contributory, (we ask :) Is it so by virtue of the contributory existence of another object that is the opposite of it (i.e. which is not cognised) ? If the former view is accepted, then inferential cognition of past and future objects and yogic perception, or knowledge generated by an injunctory statement would not be non-erroneous, for in none of these cases does there exist a contributory thing cognised by the concerned piece of

*. Sukhlalji — 'वितान' 'क्रिया' अनयोर्मध्ये अखिलेति छिन्नं वर्तते ।

1. As a matter of fact, it is not a Nyāya view that a piece of cognition as such... is erroneous or that is otherwise, for according to the Nyāya system both the validity and the invalidity of cognitions are subject to extrinsic test and are extrinsic.
2. The other thing is there but it has no contribution to make towards the non-erroneousness of the knowledge. In that case, knowledge of keśonḍuka or of two moons might as well as non-erroneous by virtue of the existence of that same thing.

knowledge; and if there does exist such an object, there would be the contingency of the disappearance of the entire activity of sacrifices¹.

If the latter view (is accepted) then the cognition of hairmass or of two moons (also) would have to be regarded as non-erroneous, so this is a false position (view).

किञ्च, तद्विज्ञानम् अव्यभिचार्यवगतं साम्प्रयोज्ञापकम्, अनवगतं वा ? यद्यवगतम्, तस्यावगतिः आत्मसंविद्रूपा वा, ज्ञानान्तरवेद्या वा ? तद्यद्यात्मसंवेदनरूपाऽवगति, तदयुक्तम् स्व[M 16a] यमनभ्युपगमात् । अभ्युपगम वा उपगमविरोधः ।

अथ ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यं वेत्ति विज्ञानयोर्भेदबीजमन्वेष्टव्यम् । ज्ञानमज्ञानाकारात् ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते ज्ञानान्तरानु कथं व्यावर्त्तते — किं ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते आहोस्विद् आकान्तरेण ? तद्यदिज्ञानात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते, तदा अन्यस्य ज्ञानात्मना निवर्त्तते तोयादेर्यथा ।

अथ आकारान्तरेण, आकारान्तरस्वीकरणे ज्ञानाकारविरहः स्यात् आकारयोस्तादात्म्यायोगात् । तादात्म्ये वा एकं तद्वस्तु ज्ञानम् अज्ञानम् वा ? यदिज्ञानम्, न तर्हि आकारान्तरेण व्यावर्त्तते किन्तु ज्ञानात्मतयैव, अन्यस्य अज्ञानात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ अज्ञानम् सिद्धं नः समीहितम् । अथ ज्ञानत्वं व्यावर्त्तकम्, तत्केन व्यावर्त्तते इति पूर्वोक्तमनुसर्तव्यम् । विज्ञानान्तरवेद्यमपि न सम्भवति ।

अथ न वेद्यते, तदस्तीति कथं पुनर्वेत्ति ? अनेनैववर्त्मना सत्यतरविज्ञानयोर्विभागा-भावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । अतोऽव्यभिचारिपदमपार्थम् ।

Moreover, does the cogniton being known as non-erroneous give (us) knowledge of the causal complex or being not known as such ? If (it does so itself) being known (as non-erroneous), is its knowledge (i.e. the knowledge

1. The author thinks that the only thing that can possibly contribute towards the production of a piece of knowledge is the object sought to be known by this knowledge, but in the cases cited it is in the very nature of things impossible for the object of knowledge to contribute towards the production of knowledge. To take a particular case, the object of a sacrificial injunction is something to be brought about; but if this something is already in question, there is no question of one following this injunction.

~. M — अवगतसामग्र्या

x. M — द्वयम्

ह. भदे

% So in M : S' s conjectures unnecessary — Eli Franco.

of its being non-erroneous) of the nature of self-apprehension (ātma-samvid or is it known by another knowledge? If it is (said to be) knowledge of the nature of self-apprehension, that is not proper, for you yourself do not accept that.¹ or, if you accept it, you contradict your own view.

And if you regard it as by another (piece of) knowledge, the source of the difference between the two cognitions will have to be sought into knowledge is distinguished from what is of the shape of non-knowledge by virtue of its being of the nature of knowledge? But how can it be distinguished from another knowledge? – is it distinguished by virtue of its being of the nature of knowledge or on account of another shape? If it is (said to be) distinguished by virtue of its being of the nature of knowledge, then the other one ceases to be of the nature of knowledge, like water etc.

If it is (said to be) distinguished on account of another shape, then on the acceptance of another shape, there would be the absence of the shape of knowledge, for the two shape cannot be identical. Or if they are identical is that one entity knowledge or non-knowledge? If it is knowledge then it cannot be (said to be) distinguished on account of another shape; but (It is distinguished) only by virtue of its being of the nature of knowledge (then) there would be the contingency of the other (knowledge from which it is to be distinguished) being of the nature of non-knowledge. If it is (said to be) non-knowledge, then what we wanted has been achieved². If knowledgeness (genus knowledge) is said to be the distinguishing factor, then all that has been said earlier, viz. 'By what will it (knowledgeness) be distinguished (from knowledge and non-knowledge) will have to be pursued. (Thus) it cannot also possibly be known by another knowledge. (Further) If (you desperately say that it (i.e. non-erroneous known, then how possibly will you say that it exists? In this very way, the absence of distinction between true knowledge and its opposite (false knowledge) has to be accepted. Hence the term non-erroneous (avyabhicāri :) (in the Nyāya definition of perception) is meaningless.

[४. प्रकारान्तरेण अव्यभिचारिपदस्य निरासः ।]

इतोऽप्यपार्थक्यम् – इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षपदेन अपोदितत्वात् । न हि केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्य

1. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not regard knowledge as Sva-Prakāśa (self-illuminated)
 2. For we wanted to prove that on accepting the alternative under consideration knowledge would become something of the nature of non-knowledge.
- ~. Sukhlalji conjectures 'आपोहितत्वात्', but this is not necessary

नयनार्थसन्निकर्षोद्भूतिरस्ति । नन्वस्ति मरीच्यूदकं वि[M 17a]ज्ञानस्य, तदपनोदाय अव्यभिचारिपदम् । तत्र; यत उदकं प्रतिभाति, न च तेन सह सम्बन्धोऽस्ति । विद्यमानेन साकं सम्बन्ध्यते नाविद्यमानेन । तत्सम्बन्धे वा न तत्त्वपये* मिथ्यात्वमिहापपद्यते सत्योदकसंवेदनवत् ।

ननु यद्यपि प्रतीयमानोदकेन सह सम्बन्धो नास्ति चक्षुषः तथाऽप्यालम्ब्य मरीचिनिचयेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽस्ति, तस्यैव आलम्बनत्वात् तद्देशं प्रति प्रवृत्तेः, अत एव मिथ्यात्वम्; अन्यच्च प्रतिभाति ।

[4. Refutation in another way of the term non-erroneous (avyabhicāri).]

Moreover, an account of this reason also it (i.e. the term 'non-erroneous') is meaningless, for it is set aside¹ (because it is implied by) the expression contact of a sense organ and the object.² Certainly, the knowledge of keśṇḍuka (hair-mass) does not arise from the contact of the eye with the object (objection) why, the knowledge of mirage (marīci-udaka) does rise (from the contact of the eye with the object), and the term 'non-erroneous' is meant to set it aside. (Rejoinder –) It is not so, because (in this case) it is water that appears (is apprehended), while there is no relation (of the eye) with it (i.e. with weaker). A relation (of the eye with water in the case under consideration) then it is not justifiable can be established with what exists not with what is non-existent. And, if there is relation (to say) that (the cognition in question is) false with reference to its object as in the case of the cognition of real water.

[Objection] Though the eye has no relation with the water that is apprehended, still it does have relation with the mass of rays which it has for its support (ālambana), because that being the support there is movement in that direction. And because of this only there is falsity (in the cognition in question) – one thing is the support (ālambana) and another thing is apprehended.

x. M – तद्विषयो, Sukhlalji तद्विषये; Eli Franco – तद्विज्ञानस्य

ह. M – तथापाप्या.

1. Sukhlalji suggests 'apohitatvāt' instead of 'apoditatvāt', but this is not quite necessary, apohitatvāt means erroneous knowledge which it is meant to exclude is already excluded by the expression contact of a sense-organ with the object.
2. The idea is that the cognition produced as a result of the contact of a sense organ with its object must be non-erroneous.

[५. प्रसङ्गादालम्बनपदार्थस्य परीक्षणम् ।]

कोऽयमालम्बनार्थो नाम [M 17b] येनेदमुद्धृष्यते — अन्यदालम्बनं चान्यत् प्रतिभाति ? — किं विज्ञानजनकत्वम्, आकारार्पकत्वम्, विज्ञानाधिकरणत्वम्, विज्ञानावभासितता वा ? तद्यदि विज्ञानजनकत्वमालम्बनार्थः, तदा नयनालोकादेरपि आलम्बनत्वं प्रसज्यते । अथ आकारार्पकत्वमालम्बनत्वम्, तदयुक्तम्, नैयायिकसमयेऽनभ्युपगमात् । यथा च विषयाकारो विज्ञाने न युज्यते तथा उ [M 18a] परिष्ठात् प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । अथ विज्ञानाधिकरणत्वम् [न] न मरीचिचक्रोत्कालितमुदीयते ज्ञानम्, आत्मसमवेतमात्मानमासादयते । अथ विज्ञानावभासितता । आलम्बनत्वम्, तदा उदकविज्ञाने उदकं प्रतीयते न मरीचयः ।

अथ उदकाकारतया मरीचय एवं प्रतीयन्ते, स उदकाकारो मरीचिभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तोऽव्यतिरिक्तो वा ? तदव्यतिरिक्तः, स तात्त्विकोऽतात्त्विको वा ? यदि तात्त्विकः कथं तदवगतेर्मिथ्यात्वम् । अथातात्त्विकः, तदा मरीचीनामपि प्रसज्यते । अतात्त्विकोदकतादात्म्ये सति तदुदकज्ञानमतथ्यम् । किमुक्तं भवति ? मरीचिविज्ञानमतथ्यम् । एकस्मिंश्चोदकाकारे प्रतीयमाने केन एतदाख्यातम् — मरीचयः प्रतिभान्ति देवानां प्रियस्य ।

अथ अर्थान्तरभूतः, तर्हि न वक्तव्यम् — मरीचय उदकाकारतया प्रतीयन्ते उदकाकारान्तरिता मरीचयः । अथ केशोण्डुकविज्ञाने किमवभाति ? किमालम्बते । केशो [M 19a] ण्डुकस्यैव आलम्बनत्वं प्रतीयमानत्वं च तथा उदकस्यैव आलम्बनत्वं प्रतीयमानत्वं च, नालम्बनान्तरं परिकल्प्यम् । न चोदकज्ञानस्य प्रतीयमानोदकान्यालम्बनत्वेन* मिथ्यात्वम् अपि तु अभावात् तात्त्विकत्वेन, अन्यथाकेशोण्डुकसंविदोऽपिमिथ्यात्वं न प्राप्नोति, अन्यालम्बनव्यतिरेकात् ।

यदप्युक्तम् — मरीचिदेशं प्रति गमनात् मरीचीनामालम्बनत्वम्; यद्येवं देशस्यापि आलम्बनत्वमनयारीत्या उपपद्यते । न च अवभातोदकभिन्नार्थसन्निकर्षत्वम् उदकविज्ञानस्य उपपद्यते, सत्योदकविज्ञानेऽदृष्टत्वात् अन्यथा अनुमेयदहनविज्ञानस्यापि, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वमापनीपद्येत आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षजत्वात् । अथ प्रतीयमानदहनेन सह मनसो नास्ति सम्बन्धः, तदिहापि प्रतीयमानेन अम्भसा सह नास्ति सम्बन्धः चक्षुषः । तस्मादव्यभिचारिपदं न युक्तम्, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षपदेनापोदितत्वात् ।

~. Sukhlalji — प्रतिभाति ।

ह. Sukhlalji conjecture न here which is good for clarification.

x. M — आलम्बत्वेन

*. M — अभावातात्त्विकत्वेन

[5. Incidental inquiry into the meaning of the word ālambana (support).]

What is the meaning of the word 'support' on the basis of which you proclaim (announce). One thing is the support and another thing is apprehended or being illumined ? Does it mean 'being the generator of knowledge', or being the substratum of knowledge ? If being the bestower of a shape (to knowledge) (i.e. presented) by knowledge ? If the word 'support' means being the generator of knowledge, then eye, light, etc. also would have to be treated as 'support'. If being the support means being the bestower of a shape, that is not proper, for that is not accepted in the Nyāya tradition¹. We shall explain later how it is improper to hold that knowledge assumes the shape of its object. If being the support is said to mean, 'being the substratum of knowledge', (we say :) No, knowledge does not arise as something seized by the circle of rays, but it realises itself as something inherent in the soul concerned. If it is said that being the support means being illumined by knowledge, that it is water that appears in the cognition of water and not the rays. Now, If (it is urged that) the rays themselves are cognised as being of the shape of water (we ask :) Is that shape of water different from the rays or is it non-different ? If it is non-different, is it real or unreal ? If it is real, how could its knowledge be false ? Now, if it is (said to be) unreal, then there will be the contingency of the rays also being unreal. (You are saying) when the rays are non-different from the unreal water, the knowledge of this water (that arises) is false. Now what does it amount to ? (It accounts to this that) the knowledge of rays (that arises) is false. And when only the one shape of water is apprehended, who told the silly one (i.e. the Naiyāyika) that rays appear (i.e. are presented in knowledge)².

Now, if (the shape of water) is (said to be) a different object (from the rays), then you should not say that rays are cognised as being of the

1. The Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika unlike the Sautrāntika does not hold that knowledge assumes the shape of its object. The Vaibhāṣika also treats knowledge as shapeless.
2. The reference is to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of error called 'anyathākhyāti' according to which in false cognition one theory appears as another.

shape of water; (what you should say is :) the rays are screened by the shape of water. Moreover what is it that appears in the cognition of hair-mass(keṣaṇḍuka) and what is it that acts as 'support' ? It is the hairmass itself that is the support and that which is apprehended. Similarly, it is the water itself (in our case) that is the support and that which is apprehended; and it is not necessary to posit another 'support'. And the cognition of water is not false on account of its having a 'support' other than the water that is apprehended but on account of its absence (i.e. absence of water) as a real thing; otherwise, the cognition of hairmass could not be false because there is the absence (in its case of a different 'support')¹.

Again as to what is said that there is movement in the direction of the rays, so the rays are the 'support', (we reply:) If it be so, then in this way; the place (where the rays are) could justifiably be the support. And the cognition of water could not justifiably be generated by the contact (of the organ of sight) with an object different from the water that appears, for this is not seen in the case of the right knowledge of water, otherwise, even the inferential knowledge of fire should be one produced by the contact of sense-organ with an object, for it is certainly produced by the contact of soul and mind². Now, If (you argue that) the mind has no relation with the fire that is apprehended, then (we reply :) even here there is no relation of the eye with the water that is being apprehended. Therefore, the term 'non-erroneous' is not proper is set aside by the expression, 'contact of a sense-organ with the object'.³

1. The argument implies that if the support of knowledge and what appears in knowledge are one entity then the knowledge is right. If this is so, then the cognition of keṣaṇḍuka should be right cognition, for keṣaṇḍuka is the support of the cognition and the object appearing in it.
2. If all knowledge that somehow involves the contact of a sense-organ with an object is perceptual ! then the inferential cognition of fire should be perceptual in as much as it involves the contact of mind (a sense-organ) with soul. As a matter of fact what the perceptual knowledge necessarily requires is the contact of a sense-organ with the object known.
3. If there is the contact of a sense-organ with object, the cognition is in variably right. So the term 'ayabhicār' is superfluous.

[६. पुनः प्रकारान्तरेण अव्यभिचारिपदस्यापाकरणम् ।]

इतोऽप्यनुपपन्नम्, अपोह्यज्ञानासम्भवात् । अथ मरीचिज्ञानापनिनीषिया* उपादीयते, तत्कथमपनीयते अविद्यमानोद [M, 20a] कविषयत्वात् । यदि अविद्यमान~ कोऽयं विषयार्थः । पूर्वोदितमनुसरणीयम् । यदि तत्रोदकं प्रतिभाति कथं नास्ति ? सत्यम्, प्रतिभाति, किन्तु अतथ्यं प्रतिभाति ।

अतथ्यता का ? किं प्रतीयमानस्याभावः, उत प्रतीयमान एवाभासः ? तद्यदि प्रतीयमानस्य अभावः, स किं तदैव, आहोस्वित् कालान्तरेण ? यदि तदैव, स किमवगतः@ अनवगतो वा ? यद्यवगतः स केनावगम्यते, किमुदकविज्ञानेन, ज्ञानान्तरेण वा ? तद्यद्युदकविज्ञानेन; तन्न, तस्य उदकविषयत्वात् । तद्विषयत्वे वा न तर्हि 'उदकज्ञानं भ्रान्तम्' इत्युपपद्यते अभावविषयस्य परमार्थसत्त्वात् । न च उदकाकारावगाहिनि विज्ञाने तोयविनिवृत्तयोऽवभान्ति अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अथ ज्ञानान्तरेण, न; ज्ञानयौगपद्यसम्भवात् ।

यदि च अभावज्ञानेन न अभावव्यवस्था क्रियते भावज्ञानेन च भावव्यवस्था, तदा उदकस्य भावाभावौ एककालौस्याताम् । अथ भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थानं न करोति, अभावज्ञानं च अभावव्यवस्थां करोति । अहो राजाज्ञा नैयायिकपशोः ! यदि च भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थां न करोति, तदा सर्वभावेषु अनाश्वासप्रसङ्गः । तत्प्रसक्तौ अभावस्याप्यनवस्थितिः, तदनवस्थितौ च तत्त्वोपलवः स्यात् । अथानवगतिः, सोऽस्तीति कथं पुनर्वैत्ति ? अथ कालान्तरे, तदा न किञ्चिद् बाध्यते सत्योदकस्यापि कालान्तरेऽभावोपपत्तेः ।

अथ प्रतीयमान एव अभावः, कथं तद्विषयज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमुपपद्यते प्रतीयमानस्यैव अभावस्योपपत्तेः । न च भावाकारे प्रतीयमाने अभावकल्पना न्याय्या अतिप्रसङ्गात्; अन्यथा रूपादौ प्रतीयमाने रसादिकल्पना कर्तव्या । न च क्रियते, तथेहापि उदकं प्रतीयते । ननु प्रतीयते किन्तु अतथ्यम् । यद्येवम्, उदकप्रपञ्चोऽयं दीर्घोदकं मधुरोदकमिति यथा । नन्वत्र सर्वासु अवस्थासु उदकं प्रतीयते तेन तासु अम्भः प्रकल्प्यते । यद्येवं तदिहापि अवस्थाद्वयेऽपि उदकं प्रतीयते सत्योदकमसत्योदकं च । सत्योदकज्ञाने सत्योदकमभाति, नासत्योदकमनुदकं वा, स्वविषयपर्यवसायिन्यो हि बुद्धयः ।

[6. Again refutation of the term 'non-erroneous' in another way.]

For this reason also it is not justifiable since there is no possibility of any cognition that is to be excluded. If it (is urged that it) is included (in the definition) with the view of excluding the knowledge of water in respect of rays (i.e. the knowledge of rays as water), then (we ask) How is it excluded ? On account of having non-existent water for its object (If this is your reply, our

x. M — अविज्ञानायनिर्णीषयो or perhaps निर्णीषयो — the र seems to be deleted — Eli Franco

~. In S' s edition it is न

@ M — किमवगतो — Eli Franco

rejoinder is :) If it is non-existent, what is meant by calling it an object? What has been stated before should be pursued. If water appears there (i.e. is cognised there), how could it not be there? (Objection) True, it appears, but it appears in a false form, (Rejoinder) what is this falsity? Is it the non-existence of what is cognised or is what is cognised itself non-existence? If it is (said to be) the non-existence of what is cognised does it (i.e. non-existence) occur then only, or at another time? If it occurs then only, is it known or is it not known? If it is (said to be known) by what is it known? (Is it known) by the knowledge of water, or by another knowledge? If it is (said to be known) by the knowledge of water; (we reply :) It is not so, because it has water for its object or, if it has that (i.e. non-existence) for its object, then it does not stand to reason to say 'The knowledge of water is illusory (false)' for the object 'non-existence' is a veritable reality. Moreover, negations of water do not appear (i.e. are not presented) in the knowledge that grasps the shape of water for that would be going too far atiprasaṅga – that is to say, in every knowledge, the object and its negation would appear together, which is absurd. If it (i.e. non-existence of what is cognised) is (said to be known) by another knowledge, (we reply:) It is not so, for no two cognition can be simultaneous.

If (you say that) non-existence is established by the knowledge of non-existences and existence is established by the knowledge of existence, then there should be the simultaneous occurrence of the existence and non-existence of water (–Which is absurd). Now, if (you say that) the knowledge of existence does not establish existence, whereas the knowledge of non-existence establishes non-existence, (all can say is :) Oh! The royal ordinance of the beast of a Naiyāyika! And if the knowledge were not to establish existence, then there would be the contingency of lack of confidence in all existence whatsoever (i.e. in the existence of all objects). In the event of that contingency even non-existence could not remain established¹; and if that were not to remain established, there would be upsetting of all principles (tattvopaplava)!

Now, if it (i.e. non-existence of what is cognised) is (said to be) not known, how do you know that it is there? If (the non-existence of what is cognised is said to occur) at another time, then nothing is contradicted (i.e. in that case, there is no contradiction or sublation whatsoever) because it stands to reason that there should occur the non-existence of even real water of another time².

1. For 'non-existence' is a concept correlated to 'existence.'
2. Non-existence of a thing at another time does not prove that it is non-existent even at the time of its existence.

Now, if (you say that) what is cognised is itself non-existence, how possibly could the cognition having that (non-existence) for its object be false for there is justification for that non-existence alone which is cognised¹. Moreover, when it is the shape of positive to posit non-existence for that would be going too far (atiprasaṅga); otherwise, one should posit taste, etc. when colour or the like is cognised. But this is not done. Similarly, here also it is water that is cognised.

(objection) Why, it is cognised, but it is false (Rejoinder) If it be so, then this (false water) would be a kind of water just like long (strip of) water, (or) sweet water². (objection–) verily, here in all these states, water is cognised and hence water is posited in them. (Rejoinder –) If it is so, then even here in both the states, water is cognised – real water and false water. In the knowledge of real water, it is real water that appears, not false water or non-water. Similarly, in the knowledge of false water, it is false water that appears, not real water or non-water. Certainly, cognitions ultimately refer to their own respective objects³.

अथ बाध्यमानत्वेन [M, 22a], मिथ्यात्वमिति चेत्, किं बाध्यते – अर्थः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा? यद्यर्थस्य बाधा स केन बाध्यते किं स्वयमेव आत्मानं बाधते, आहो अर्थान्तरेण, ज्ञानेन वा? यदि स्वयमेव आत्मानं बाधते, तदा बाधा तेन क्रियते, ज्ञाप्यते वा? यदि क्रियते, अव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता वा, यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता, तदा बाधाक्रियते इति आत्मा अनेनोत्पाद्यते। तच्च न जाघटीति स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात्। अथ व्यतिरिक्ता क्रियते, तथापि विद्यमानस्य, साऽप्यभिन्ना, भिन्ना वा? यद्यभिन्ना, तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते, किमुक्तं भवति? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते [M, 22b], भिन्ना, तदा विद्यमानस्य ज्ञापकत्वं सिद्धं प्रतीयमानस्य चास्तित्वम्।

अथ अर्थान्तरेण बाध्यते, तथाऽपि विद्यमानयोर्बाध्यबाधकभावो भूपालयोरिव, न चैकस्य बाध्यबाधकभाव उपपद्यते। बाधाऽपि तेन प्रतीयमानस्य – किं क्रियते, ज्ञाप्यते वा? यदि क्रियते; अव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता? यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता, तदा अव्यतिरिक्ता बाधा उत्पाद्यते। किमुक्तं भवेत्? उदकमुत्पाद्यते। तदुत्पादनं च तत्सं [M, 23a] विदोऽमिथ्यात्वम्। अथ व्यतिरिक्तोत्पाद्यते, तथाऽपि तोयसम्बन्धितयोपलब्धेरम्भस उपपत्तिर्न जातुदेवदत्तस्यासत्त्वे तन्नयनव्यवहारसिद्धः। अथ ज्ञाप्यते, तदा

1. Cognition of x justifies the existence of x. So if there is cognition of 'non-existence' there is existence of non-existence.
2. Just like 'long water' or 'sweet water', false water also would be a variety of water, and as we do not regard the cognition of the former as false, we should not regard the cognition of the latter also as false.
3. It is impossible for 'cognition of x' to refer to a non-x.

साऽव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता वा ? यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता ज्ञाप्यते तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते । किमुक्तं भवति ? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते । अथ व्यतिरिक्ता सती ज्ञाप्यते, तथाऽप्युदकस्येयं बाधेति अन्यतन्त्रतया प्रतिभासनात्, नात्यन्तोभावोपपत्तिः । तस्मादर्था[M, 23b]न्तरणापि न बाधोपपत्तिः ।

Now, if (you say) that there is falseness on account of being contradicted, (we ask :) what is it that is sublated – the object, the knowledge or both ? If the object is (said to be) sublated, by what is it sublated ? Does it sublate itself, or is it sublated by another object, or by knowledge ? If it (i.e. the object) is said to sublate itself, then does it bring about the sublation or make it known ? If it (i.e. the object) is said to sublate itself, then does it bring it about the sublation or make it known ? If it brings it about, is it (i.e. the sublation) non-different or different (from the object) ? If it is (said to be) non-different, then to say that it brings about sublation is equivalent to saying, 'It itself is brought about by itself. And this does not stand to reason for it is impossible for a thing to operate upon itself. If it is (said to be) brought about as some thing different (from the object), even then (this amounts to the assertion of the doership of what is existent and not the denial of what is cognised)¹.

Now, if the sublation is said to be made known (by the object), then also we ask whether it is non-different or different (from the object) If it is non-different, then what is meant by saying 'sublation' is made known by it ? (It means 'water is made known'. If it is said to be different then what is established is the efficiency of an existent thing to make another thing known, and the existence of what is cognised (i.e. of water)².

If it (i.e. object) is (said to be) sublated by another object, even then the relation of being the sublated and the sublating agent obtains between two existent objects, like that between two rulers; but the relation of being the sublated and sublation is not justifiable in the case of just one object. Moreover, is the sublation in the object is cognised brought about or made known ? If it is (said to be) brought about, is it non-different (from the water which is cognised) or different ? If it is non-different, then what is meant by 'The non-different sublation is brought about ? (It means that) water is brought about. And if it be brought about, its cognition would be true. If it is (said to be) brought about as different, even then since it (sublation) is

1. This would amount to asserting that the existent water brings about its sublation, rather than to denying what is cognised.
2. The existent water makes known, the sublation and the water is existent because, it is cognised.

cognised as related to water, there is justification for (the existence of) water. Certainly, one cannot talk of Devadatta's eyes if he is non-existent. Now, if it (i.e. the sublation) is (said to be) made known, then is it non-different or different ? If it is made known as non-different then what is meant by 'The sublation is made known by it ? (It means) 'Water is made known.' If it is (said to be) made known as different, even then it appears as dependent on another viz. 'This is the sublation of water; therefor there is no justification for an absolute non-existence (of water). Hence there is no justification for there being sublation by another object also.

अथ ज्ञानेन बाध्यते, किं तद्विषयेण, अन्यविषयेण, निर्विषयेण वा ? यदि तद्विषयेण तदा तत् स्वरूपं विधत्ते तु विपर्यासयति तदाकारपर्यवसितरूपत्वात् । अथ अन्यविषयं बाधकम्, तदापि न युज्यते; यद् द्विविषयं तत्तस्यैव सत्तां विधत्ते न त्वन्यस्य विधायकं प्रतिषेधकं वा । स्वविषयपर्यवसायिन्यो बुद्ध्यः । अथ निर्विषयेण बाध्यते, न किञ्चिद् विदधाति प्रतिषेधति वा निर्विषयत्वादेव ।

अथ ज्ञानं बाध्यते, तस्यापि बाधा का ? किं स्वरूपव्यावृत्तिरूपा, स्वरूपापह्नवरूपा वा विषयापहारलक्षणा[M, 24a] वा ? तद्यदि स्वरूपव्यावृत्तिरूपा बाधा, तदा सर्वं बाधितं स्यात् विज्ञानस्य विज्ञानान्तरेण निवर्त्यमानत्वात् । अथ स्वरूपापह्नवरूपा, तदयुक्तम्, मिथ्योदकविज्ञानस्यापि अनुभूयत्वात् । अथ विषयापहारलक्षणां बाधा उच्यते, साऽपि न युक्ता । यथा च विषयापहारो न शक्यते कर्तुं तथाऽनन्तरमेव निवेदितम् ।

Now, if it is (said to be) contradicted by knowledge, does this knowledge have that (water) for its object, or something else, or is it objectless ? If (the sublating knowledge) (is said to have that (i.e. water) for its object, then it asserts its nature, does not falsify it, for if (the sublating knowledge) has a form terminating in the (cognition of) its shape (i.e. the shape of water)¹.

If the sublating knowledge is said to have something else for its object, that also is not proper cognition asserts the existence of that alone which is its object, but it cannot assert or deny (the existence of something else; for)it is the very nature of cognitions to terminate in their own objects. If it is (said to be) sublated by knowledge which is objectless, then (we reply) that (i.e. such knowledge) does not assert or deny anything precisely because it is objectless.

x. M निर्वर्त्य°

@. रूपम् ।

1. 'Cognition of x' refers to x (or say to the shape of x) and hence asserts the nature of x does not falsify its nature.

Now, if (you say that) is the knowledge that is sublated then (we ask :) what is the (nature of) the sublation of it too? – Is it of the form of excluding it itself or if the form of concealing it itself, or is it of the form of excluding it itself, then every cognition will be a sublated cognition, for each and every cognition excludes every cognition other than itself. If it is (said to be) of the form of concealing it itself, that is not proper, for even the false cognition of water is experienced as such (i.e. as cognition)¹. If the contradiction of the object that also is not proper. As to how it is possible to take away the object of a cognition that has just been stated.

यदि न बाध्यते किमित्यसौ अर्थक्रिया न करोति भावः । केयम् अर्थक्रिया या तेन न सम्पाद्यते@
पुंसाम् – किं विज्ञानरूपा, प्रवृत्तिरूपा, प्राप्तिरूपा, सुखदुःखोत्पादिभोगरूपा वा ? तद्यदि विज्ञानलक्षणां न करोति; तदयुक्तम्, विज्ञानलक्षणा अर्थक्रिया करोत्येव, तोयम् । अथ प्रवृत्तिरूपां न करोति; तदयुक्तम् । प्रवृत्तिर्हि पुरुषेच्छानुविधायिनी नार्थस्वरूपभावाभावानुगमयति । पुरुषो हि कामतः प्रवर्तते वा, नत्वेतावता तदभावसिद्धिः । अथ प्राप्तिरूपाम् अर्थक्रियां न करोति तेनाऽसत्त्वमत्तदप्ययुक्तम्, चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रताराकादेः प्रा[M, 25a]प्त्यभावेऽपि सत्त्वसम्भवात् । अथ सुखदुःखरूपमर्थक्रियां न करोति – किं दर्शनजं सुखं न करोति आहो देहसम्बन्धनम् ? तद्यदि दर्शनजं न करोति; तदयुक्तम्, करोत्येव । अथ देहसम्बन्धनं न करोति, तदा चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रादौ व्यभिचारः तेषां देहसम्बन्धनसुखजनकत्वं नास्ति, अथ च सत्त्वम् । न च अर्थक्रियाऽकर्तृत्वेन वस्तूनामसत्त्वं स्वहेतोरेव विज्ञानजननमात्रस्योत्पत्तेः, सहकारिविरहाद्वा न करोति । किञ्च, अर्थक्रियां न करोति – किमेकस्य [M 25b] प्रतिपत्तुः, सर्वप्रतिपत्तुणां वा । तद्यदि एकस्य प्रतिपत्तुरर्थक्रियां न करोति, तेनासत्त्वम्; तदा चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रताराकादौ व्यभिचारः सुमूर्ध्वर्षेषु च । अथ सर्वप्रतिपत्तुणामर्थक्रियां न करोति तेनाऽसत्त्वम्; एवं तर्हि सर्वभावानामसत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । नहि सर्वेभावाः सर्वपुरुषार्थहेतवः । न च सर्वपुरुषार्थक्रियाविहीनमेतद् इत्यवगन्तुं पार्यतेऽर्वाग्विदा । तस्मात् स्थितमेतद् अव्यभिचारिपदम् अनर्थकम् ।

(Objection –) If it is not sublated, how is it that thing (i.e. object in question) does not bring about successful activity (arthkriyā), (we ask What is this successful activity that is not carried out by it for men? Is it characterised, or by the bringing about and enjoyment of pleasure and pain. If (you say) it does not bring about the successful characterised by cognition, that is not proper for the water in question does carry out the successful activity in the form of cognition of waters. If it is said not to bring about the successful activity

1. If the contradiction in question really conceals the cognition of water in question, the latter should be experienced at all.

@ M सम्पाद्यते ।

in the form of movement, that is not proper. Movement depends on the will of the concerned and (so) it cannot enable one to ascertain the existence or non-existence of the object in question. If it said that it does not bring about the successful activity characterised by attainment and is therefore non-existent—that also is not proper, for there is the possibility of the existence of the moon, sun, planets, constellations, stars, etc even when there is no attainment (i.e. though one cannot reach them). If it is said that it does not bring about the successful activity of the form of pleasure produced by seeing it, or pleasure produced by physical contact? If it is said not to bring about pleasure produced by sight, that is not proper for it does bring it about. If it is said not to bring about pleasure produced by physical contact, then the argument will break down in the case of the moon, sun, planets, constellations, etc, for they do not bring about pleasure produced by physical contact and are existent. Really speaking things do not become non-existent (simply) because they do not bring about successful activity, for it is possible that thing is produced by its cause in the form of something that gives rise to cognition (and carries out no other act) or that a thing is prevented from carrying out an act because of the non-availability of the accessories (co-operating factors).

Moreover, if it is said not to bring about successful activity with reference to one cogniser or to all cognisers? If it is said not to bring about the successful activity for one cogniser and hence to be non-existent, then the argument will break down in the case of the knowledge of the moon, sun, planets, constellations, stars, etc and in the case of an object about to perish. If it is said not to bring about successful activity for all cognisers and hence to be non-existent, in that case there would be the contingency of the non-existence of all things whatever; for it is true of all things that they do not subservise the purpose of all men. And it is not possible for a man who can know only things (close by (i.e. an ordinary man having just an ordinary vision) to know that a thing lacks the capacity to carry out-an act for all men. Therefore, it is established that the term 'non-erroneous' (avyabhicāri) is meaningless.

[७. भ्रमस्य स्मृतित्वं स्वीकुर्वतां प्रभाकराणां मतस्य विकल्प्य निरसनम् ।]

अन्ये तु मरीच्युदकविज्ञानस्य स्मृतित्वं प्रतिपद्यन्ते न भ्रान्तिरूपताम् । तस्य कथं स्मृतित्वम् – किमुदकगृहीतित्वेन, गृहीतोदकगृहीतित्वेन वा, उदकग्रहणानन्तरकालभावित्वेन वा, निर्विषयत्वेन वा, 'यमहमद्राक्षम्' इत्यनेनाऽऽकरेणो*[M 26a]पजायमानत्वेन वा ?

तद्यदि उदकगृहीतित्वेन; तदा सर्वोदकविज्ञानानां स्मृतित्वप्रसङ्गः ।

★ Sukhlaji – आकरेण

[7. Dialectical Refutation of the view of the
prābhākaras that Error is memory.]

But others are of the view that cognition of mirage (lit. of water in rays) is memory and not something of the form of error. How can it be memory ?

– Because of its being the cognition (lit. grasping) of water, or because of its being the cognition of water that is cognised, or because of its coming into existence in point of time after the cognition of water, or because of its being objectless or because of its arising in the form, “(Here is something) Which I perceived” ?

If (it be regarded as memory) because it its being the cognition of water, then there would be the contingency of all cognitions of water becoming memory.

अथ गृहीतोदकगृहीतित्वेन स्मृतिरूपता; तदाऽऽद्यस्यापि गृहीतोदकगृहीतित्वे* स्मृतिरूपता प्रसज्यते, गृहीतोदकग्राहित्वाविशेषात् । %आद्यस्य गृहीतोदकग्राहित्वं नास्ति; तदानीं भिन्नविषयत्वम्, भिन्नविषयत्वे च द्वितीयस्यापि गृहीतग्राहित्वं विधीयते । अथ एकविषयत्वम्; #आयातं तर्हि प्रथमस्यापि गृहीतग्राहित्वम्, अविशिष्टार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वात्, प्रथमोत्तरविज्ञानवत् । यथा एकनीलस्वलक्षणग्राहकयुगपदुत्पन्नानेकविज्ञानात्@ नीलज्ञानरूपता न भिद्यते तथेहापि । त[M 26B]था धारावाहिविज्ञानानां स्मृतिरूपता प्राप्नोति । तथा, प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य च गृहीतग्राहित्वेन स्मृतिरूपता प्रसज्यते । अथ प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वं न विद्यते; तदा, प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वं निवर्तते, नह्याद्यं दर्शनं ‘स एवायम्’ इत्युपजायते । तथा, आनुमानिकमपि विज्ञानं(नं) गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन स्मृतिरूपतापद्यते ।

Now, if it is (said to be) memory because of its being the cognition of water that is cognised, then even the first (cognition of water), because it is the cognition of water that is cognised would come to be memory for (the fact of) cognition water that is cognised is common to both cases¹.

x. Perhaps : गृहीतित्वेन

% Eli Franco : अथ आद्यस्य

M : आयातं (i.e. construes with ‘विषयत्वम्’)

@ M : ‘विज्ञानान्’ – S. विज्ञानात् – Eli Franco ‘विज्ञानाम्’

\$ M : विज्ञान

1. The first cognition is as much a cognition of a cognised object as the second is for the object of the first is cognised by the cognised by the first.

(Objector–) The first (cognition) does not cognise water that is cognised.

(Answer –) Then it has a different object, and if the object is different, the second (cognition) also would cease to be the cognition of what is cognised. If it is said to have the same object, then (the drawback of) the first one cognising what is cognised steps in, for it is of the form of the cognition of a non-distinguished object, like the cognition after the first one. Just as the fact of being the knowledge of blue is not-different in the case of a number of cognitions produced simultaneously and cognising the one extreme particular blue, so also in the case here¹. Similarly, the case of the continuous cognitions (of the same object) would come to be cases of memory in so far as it cognises what is cognised. If it is said that the fact of being cognition of an object that is cognised does not hold good in the case of recognition, then it would be recognition; then it would for certainly, the first perceptual knowledge does not arise in the form, ‘This is that very thing.’ Similarly, inferential cognition also would come to be memory because of its being the cognition of an object that is cognised.

(S 18) अथ उदकग्रहणोत्तरभावित्वेन स्मृतिरूपता; तदा संस्कारस्य स्मरणरूपता प्राप्नोति, उदकग्रहणो [M 27a] उत्तरकालभावित्वेन, रससंवेदनस्य च ।

अथ निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतिरूपता उच्यते; तदयुक्तम्; पूर्वोदितानुभवावेदितार्थाकारावेदकत्वेन उदीयमानायाः कथं निर्विषयत्वम् ? अथ पूर्वानुभूतार्थप्रत्यस्तमये सति समानकालार्थाभावान्निर्विषयता; तदा चोदनाजनिताविज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतिरूपतापनीपद्यते, कर्तव्यतारूपार्थस्य तदाऽभावात् । भावे वा कर्तव्यतारूपता नोपपद्यते । तदनुपपत्तौ सप्ततन्तुक्रि[M 27b]याया विलोपप्रसङ्गः । यदि च निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतिरूपता; तदा विद्यमानघट-जात्यादेः, स्मरणस्यास्मृतिरूपताप्रसङ्गः ।

अथ ‘अद्राक्षम्’ इत्येनानाकारेणोपजायमानत्वेन स्मृतिरूपता; तदयुक्तम्; ‘इहोदकम्’ इत्येनानाकारेणोपजायमानायाः कथम् ‘अद्राक्षम्’ इत्येवंरूपतोपपद्यते ? अथ विप्रमुषि(त)ता अनया भङ्ग्या उपजायते ।

If it is said to be memory because of its occurring in point of time after the cognition of water, then the latent impression (saṃskāra-traces of former experiences) would come to be memory on account of occurring in time after

1. Just as the simultaneously produced cognitions of x are the same in so far as each of them is a cognition of x, so also are the successively produced cognitions of x the same in so far as each of them is a cognition of x.

* M : ‘विप्रमुषितानया S : विप्रमुषि[त]ता अनया

the cognition of water, and so also the sensation of taste (of water, since a person tastes water after he has cognised it).

Now, if it is said to be the form of memory because of its being objectless, that is not proper. How can that which arises as making known the shape of an object, which was made known the shape of an object, which was made known by an experience arisen previously be objectless? If it is said to be objectless on account of the absence of the object at that time, the object experienced formerly having perished – then the knowledge produced by injunctions being objectless (because it refers to something to be done in the future) would come to be memory, for the object of the form of what is to be brought about. (Kartavyatā) And if it were to exist (at the time of the injunction), it could not justifiably be of the form of what is to be brought about. And this not being justifiable, there would be the contingency of the disappearance of the sacrificial activity (Saptatantu-kriyā). And, if it is said to be memory on account of its being objectless, then there would be the contingency of the memory pertaining to an existing jar, a genus or the like not being memory.

If it is said to be memory because it arises in the shape, '(Here is something which) I perceived—that is not proper. How can that (cognition) which arises in the shape, 'Here is water' justifiably be of the form, 'I perceive'? It may be urged that in this way there arises the obscuration (vipramuṣitatā) (of the memory factor¹. (we ask)—

[८. प्रसङ्गात् विप्रमोषपरीक्षा ।]

कोऽयं विप्रमोषो* नाम् ? किमनुभवाकारस्वीकरणम्, स्मरणाकारप्रध्वंसो वा, अपूर्वार्थगृहीत्वं वा, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वं वा, इन्द्रियार्थाऽसन्निकर्षजत्वं वा ? तद्यदि अनुभवाकारस्वीकरणम् [M 28a]; तदा स्मृतिरूपता नोपपद्यते । अथ स्मृतिरूपता; कदाऽनुभवाकारस्वीकरणं नोपपद्यते, स्मृत्यनुभवाकारयोः इतरेतरपरिहार स्थिति लक्षणत्वात् । अथ स्मरणाकारप्रध्वंसः, तदयुक्तम्; विज्ञानस्य स्वयं

1. The Prābhākar Mīmāṃsakas hold that in error, e.g. of mirage, what happens is that while perceiving rays we perceive the elements common to both rays and the water and on account of that remember the peculiar qualities of water and hence water. But the memory-factor is here obscured and we come to believe that we perceive water and not that we remember it. This is their Akhyāti. (not distinguishing between two cognitions) theory of error.

X. M : विमोषो

स्मृतित्वेनाभ्युपगमात् । प्रध्वंसो हि अविज्ञानात्मकः कथं स्मृतिरूपतां विधत्ते ? अथ अपूर्वार्थविषयगृह्यते (०र्थगृ) हीतित्वं स्मृतिप्रमोष उच्यते; तदा अत्यन्ताऽनुभूतकनकपनासादिसंवितीनां स्मृतिविप्रमोषत्वमापद्यते । अथ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वं स्मृतिविप्रमोष उच्यते; तदा संवितीना (नां)~ स्मृति विप्र[S 19]मोषत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ [M 28b] इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वं* स्मृतिविप्रमोष उच्यते; तदा चोदनाजनितविज्ञानस्य अनुमानोपमानविज्ञानस्य च स्मृतिविप्रमोषत्वमापद्यते । तस्माद् यथा यथा विचार्यते स्मृतिविप्रमोषः तथा तथा न्यायं न विषहत इति । तस्मात् मरीच्युदकविज्ञानस्य न स्मृतिविप्रमोषरूपता अपि तु विपरीतख्यातित्वं सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वं वा ।

[8. Incidental Examination of obscuration (vipramoṣa)]

What, verily, is this obscuration? Is it the acceptance of the shape of experience (i.e. immediate knowledge) or the destruction of the shape of memory, or being the cognition of a novel thing, or being produced by the contact of a sense-organ and the object, or being produced without the contact of a sense-organ and the object, or being produced without the contact of a sense-organ and the object? If it is said to be the acceptance of the shape of experience, then the form of memory cannot possibly be there (that is to say, the cognition in question cannot be memory). And if the form of memory was actually there, then there could possibly be no acceptance of the shape of experience, for the shapes of memory and experience have this characteristic that one can exist only by setting aside the other (that is to say, the two cannot be found together). If (obscuration means) the destruction of the shape of memory, that is not proper, for you yourself have admitted that the cognition in question is memory. Certainly being of the nature of non-cognition how can destruction assume the form of memory? If obscuration of memory is said to mean being the cognition of a novel things, then the cognitions of the absolutely unperceived things such as a golden jack-fruit or the like would come to be of the nature of the obscuration of memory. If obscuration of memory is said to mean being produced by the contact of a sense-organ and the object, then there is the contingency of the direct cognitions becoming the obscuration of memory. If obscuration of memory is said to mean being produced without the contact of a sense-organ (with the object), then the cognition produced by an injunction, the inferential cognition and the analogical cognition (i.e. the cognition produced by the pramāṇa called upamāna or analogy) would come

@. S deletes : "विषय"

~. So in M. S s conjecture unnecessary

Perhaps : "इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष" – Eli Franco

to be of the nature of the obscuration of memory. Therefor, the more one scrutinises (the nature of) the "obscuration of memory", the more it fails to stand the test of reasoning. Hence, the cognition of mirage (lit. cognition of water in rays) is not of the form of the obscuration of memory; but it is either a piece of wrong cognition (viparīta khyāti)¹ or a piece of right cognition.

[९. व्यवसायात्मकपदस्य समालोचनम् ।]

[M 29a] तथा, व्यवसायात्मकपदमपि नोपादेयमप्रमे (मपने)* याभावात् । ननु स्थाण्वदिकऽर्थे[@] इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् सामान्यमात्रदर्शनम् विशेषानुपलब्धौ सन्देहज्ञानमुपजायते तदपनीयते; तस्मिन् सन्देहज्ञाने जाते किञ्चित् प्रतिभाति आहो न प्रतिभाति ? तद्यदि प्रतिभाति, स तात्त्विकः, अतात्त्विकः [M 29b] को वा ? यदि तात्त्विकः, नापनेयता तद्विषयविज्ञानस्य । अथ अतात्त्विकः, तदा अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपनीतत्वात् न व्यवसायात्मकपदमुपादेयम् ।

[9. Examination of the term "well-determined" Vyavasāyātmaka - of the nature of determination.]

Similarly, the term 'well-determined' also should not be accepted (i.e. inserted in the definition of perception), for there is nothing that is to be excluded (by such an insertion. (Objector-) why, when in respect of an object like pole, etc., as a result of the contact between a sense-organ and the object, there is perception of the mere general (i.e. of merely the common qualities belonging to a pole and a men or any such entity) (and) there is no cognition of the particular (i.e. of the differentiating characteristics of a pole or the like) there arises a doubtful cognition; (and) that is excluded (by the term 'well-determined'). (Answer-) when that doubtful cognition arises, is anything presented in it or not? (i.e. does anything appear there or nor ?) If something appears, is it a substance (lit. a thing possessing an attribute) or an attribute ? If a substance appears, is it real or unreal ? If it is (said to be) real, its knowledge is not required to be excluded. If it is (said to be) unreal, then it (i.e. its knowledge) is (already excluded by the term 'non-erroneous' (avyabhicāri, so the term 'well-determined' (Vyavasāyātmaka) need not be included (in the definition of perception).

1. The Nyāya theory of error is viparīta-or anyathā-khyāti; cognising a thing as different from what it is cognising, for example, the rays as water (yad atasminstad iti tad vyabhicāri - Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.4). But our philosopher has already refused viparīta-khyāti.

M : अप्रमेयाभावात्

@ Probably an interpolation - Eli franco

अथ धर्मः प्रतिभाति; स स्थाणुत्वलक्षणः, पुरुषत्वलक्षणः, उभयं वा ? तद्यदि स्थाणुत्वलक्षणो धर्मः प्रतिभाति; स तात्त्विकऽतात्त्विको वा ? यदि तात्त्विकः; कथं तद्बुद्धेः सन्देहरूपता, तात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वेन सत्योदकसंवेदनवत् ? अथ अतात्त्विकः; तदा अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितत्वात् न व्यवसायात्मकपदमुपादेयम् । अथ पुरुषत्वलक्षणो धर्मः प्रतिभाति; असा [M 30a] वपितात्त्विकोऽतात्त्विको वा ? यदि तात्त्विकः, कथं तद्बुद्धेः सन्देहरूपता ? अथ अतात्त्विकः तदा अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितत्वात् व्यवसायात्मकपदं न साधीयः ।

Now, if it is an attribute that appears, is it of the character of 'poleness' or 'manness' or both. If (you say, that) an attribute of the character of 'poleness' appears, is it real or unreal ? If it is (said to be) real, how can its knowledge be of the form of doubt, - this knowledge being of the form of the cognition of a real object, like the knowledge of real water ? If it is (said to be) unreal, then it is already excluded by the term 'non-erroneous', and the term 'well-determined' need not be included (in the definition). If an attribute of the character of 'manness' appears, is that, too, real or unreal ? If it is (said to be) real, how can its knowledge be of the form of doubt ? If it is (said to be) unreal, then it is already excluded by term 'non-erroneous', and the term 'well-determined' is not proper (i.e. serves no purpose).

अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति, तदा उभयोस्तात्त्विकत्वम्, अतात्त्विकत्वं वा, अथ एकस्य तात्त्विकत्वम्, अन्यस्य अतात्त्विकत्वम् तद्यदि उभयोस्तात्त्विकत्वम्; तदा तद्विज्ञानस्य तात्त्विकत्वमेव, न [S 20] सन्देहात्मता । अथ *उभावप्यतात्त्विकौ; तदा तद्विज्ञानस्य विपर्ययरूपता, न सन्देहात्मता । अथ एकस्य तात्त्विकत्वमन्यस्याऽतात्त्विकत्वम्; तदा तदेव ज्ञानं व्यभिचारि तदेवाऽव्यभिचारिअतात्त्विकार्थः [M 30b] गृहीतरूपत्वाद् व्यभिचारि, तात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वादव्यभिचारि । एतेन द्विचन्द्रशामुद्धाटितम् । तत्र हि द्रव्याकारः प्रतिभाति न गुणाकारः ।

If both (the attribute of the character of 'poleness' and that of the character of 'manness') appear, then are both real, or both unreal, or is one real and the other unreal ? If both are (said to be) real, then their knowledge can only be real (i.e. true), (and) not of the nature of doubt. Now if both are (said to be) unreal, then their knowledge should be of the form of error (i.e. wrong knowledge), not of the nature of doubt. If one is (said to be) real and the other unreal, then that very knowledge would be erroneous, and that very (knowledge) non-erroneous - it would be erroneous, being of the form of the cognition of an unreal object; and non-erroneous being of the form of the cognition

x. M : अथाभावे

of a real object. This explains (lit. unlocks) the (nature of the) cognition of two moons. For, there the shape of substance appears, not the shape of quality¹.

अथ सन्दिग्धार्थाकारप्रतिभासि सन्देहज्ञानमिति चेत्; स सन्दिग्धोऽर्थो विद्यते वा न वा ? तद्यदि विद्यते, कथं तत्संवेदनस्य सन्देहरूपता अबाधितार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वात् सत्योदक संवेदनवत् ? अथ न विद्यते; तदाऽव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितत्वात् व्यवसायात्मकपदमपार्थक्यम् ।

अ [थ न किं]चिदपि^x प्रतिभाति; न तर्हि तस्य, [M 31a] इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षज[त्वम्][%], भ्रान्तोदकविज्ञानवत् । तस्माद् व्यवसायात्मकपदमपि अनुपादेयम् ।

And, if it is said that the doubtful cognition presents the shape of a doubtful object, (we ask) – Does that doubtful object exist or not ? If it is said to exist, how can its knowledge be of the form of doubt, this knowledge being of the form of the cognition of an uncontradicted object, like the knowledge of real water. If it is said not to exist, then it (i.e. the cognition of a doubtful object) is (already) excluded by the term ‘non-erroneous’, and the term ‘well-determined’ is meaningless.

If (it is said that) nothing whatsoever appears, then it (i.e. the cognition in question) could not have been produced by the contact of a sense-organ and the object, like the cognition of illusory water. Therefore, the term ‘well-determined’ also should not be included (in the definition).

[१०. अव्यपदेश्यपदस्यासाधुत्वे लक्षणसारग्रन्थस्योल्लेखः ।]

अव्यपदेश्यपदं च यथा न साधीयः तथा लक्षणसारे द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ छ ॥

[10. Reference to the text ‘Lakṣaṇasāra’ in connection with the impropriety of the term ‘not expressible’ (avyapadeśya)]

To see in what way the term ‘not expressible’ is not proper one should consult ‘Lakṣaṇasāra’.

1. Cognition of ‘two moons’ would be non-erroneous as far as its ‘moon’ i.e. ‘substance’ aspect is concerned, but erroneous in respect of its ‘number’ i.e. ‘quality’ aspect. Substance appearing in it is real, but the quality unreal. It cannot be branded as ‘erroneous’.

x. M : अ . द . ऽपि, 3 akṣaras are missing.

% M : °जम्

[११. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नपदस्य समीक्षा]

तथा, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वमपि नोपपद्यते तद्व्यवहारात् । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो हि व्यवहितार्थानुपलब्धिलिङ्गो वा, आ [वरणलिङ्गो वा]^x, तदुत्पादितघटादिज्ञानावसेयो वा ? तद्यदि व्यवहितार्थानुपलब्धिलिङ्गः; तदयुक्तम्; तेन सह सम्बन्धाऽनुपपत्तेः, तदभावेऽप्यनुपलम्भसद्भावदर्शनात् । यदभावेऽपि यस्य सद्भावः [M 31b] स कथं तत्सद्भावावेदकः ?

अथ आवरणलिङ्गः; तदयुक्तम्; तेन सह संमतिग (संग)-तेर[%]भावात्, तदभावेऽपि सद्भावदर्शनात्, तद्भावे वा आवरणानर्थज्य(क्य)म् । तदभावे तद्वतिः कथम् ?

[11. Examination of the expression ‘which arises from the contact of a sense-organ with the object’.]

Similarly, its being produced by the contact of a sense-organ with the (i.e. its) object cannot be justified for that cannot be known. [That is to say, how can one know that the alleged contact is there ?] Does the contact of a sense-organ with the object have for its mark of inference (i.e. probans, Liṅga) the non-cognition of a distant cognition, or a covering, or can it be inferred from the knowledge of jar, etc. produced by it ? If it is said to have for its mark of inference the non-cognition of a distant object, that is not proper, for no relation could possibly obtain between the two (i.e. between the non-cognition of a distant object and the sense-object contact); because we find that there is the non-cognition (of a distant object) even in its absence (i.e. even in the absence of a sense-object contact). If a thing exists even in the absence of another, how can the former acquaint us with the presence of the latter ?¹

If it is said to have a covering for its mark of inference, that is not proper; for there is no concomitance (i.e. the relation of invariable concomitance) with

x. M : om °वरणलिङ्गो वा; one can discern a marker for an addition between वा and तद्; but that part of the leaf on which the addition could be is broken off—Eli Franco

% M : सम्मतिगतेर

~ M : °अर्थज्यम्

1. Really speaking, other conditions being present non-perception or non-cognition of a distant object is invariably concomitant with absence of sense-object contact (Vyatireka-Vyāpti, negative concomitance); thus non-cognition of distant objects indicates that sense-object contact is a cause of perception of objects. The author argues as if the apponent is of the view that non-cognition of distant objects makes the presence of sense-object contact necessary.

it (i.e. between a covering and the sense-object contact); even in the absence of it (i.e. in the absence of the sense-object contact) we find that the covering is there; and if it (i.e. the sense-object contact) is present there the covering proves useless. So, when there is no relation of invariable concomitance (between a covering and the sense-object contact) how can we know the latter (i.e. infer the latter on having observed the former)?¹

[S 21] अथ तद्वद्वकुम्भादिज्ञानेन अवगम्यते; तदयुक्तम्; तदनवगतौ तदुद्ववत्वस्यानवगतेः । पिशाचपरमाणुमहेश्वरकल्पोऽसौ सन्निकर्षः । कथं तदायत्तता वेद्यते ज्ञाने ? [M 32a] कथं च तद् इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षमावेदयति ज्ञानम् — किं विज्ञानाकारतया, आहो कार्याकारतया, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्याकारतया वा ?

तद्यदि ज्ञानस्वभावतया; तदयुक्तम्; तदभावेऽपि ज्ञानाकारस्य संभव उपमानादिज्ञाने । अथ कार्यात्मतया गमयति; तदप्ययुक्तम्; उपमानानुमानज्ञान-मरीचिनीलजलादौ तस्य सद्भावोपपत्तेः । यो येन विना [M 32b] भवति स कथं तस्य ज्ञापको नाम ? अन्यथा सत्त्वादेरपि गमकत्वं स्यात् ।

If it is (said to be) known by the knowledge of jar, etc. arising out of it (i.e. out of the sense-object contact), that is not proper; for if it is itself not known, there cannot be the knowledge of the fact of anything arising out of it. This contact is comparable to a ghost, an atom, Maheśvara (i.e. God of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) (concerning none of which we have a reliable knowledge). How can knowledge be known as dependent on it? And how does knowledge tell (us) of the contact of a sense-organ with the object? — (Does knowledge do so) on account of its being of the shape of a cognition or of the shape of an effect, or of the shape of something produced by the contact of a sense-organ with (its) object?

If (knowledge is said to tell us of a sense-object contact) on account of its being of the nature of knowledge, that is not proper, for even in its absence (i.e. even in the absence of the sense-object contact), there is the possibility of there being the shape of knowledge in a cognition produced by analogy, etc. Now, if it (i.e. knowledge) is said to make it (i.e. contact) known on account of the former being of the nature of an effect, — that also is not proper, for that would be possible in the case of the analogical and the inferential cognitions, as also in the case of (the cognition of) blue water in mirage, etc. (i.e. even in these cases, knowledge is present as an effect, i.e. as something produced, but

1. Really speaking, the absence of covering makes the sense-object contact possible; the author argues as if his opponent is of the view that the presence of a covering makes the sense-object contact possible, rather necessary.

there is here no contact of a sense-organ with its object). How can a thing which possibly exists without another give us a knowledge of the latter? Otherwise, one should be free to infer (whatever one wishes) on the basis of even existence, etc.¹

अथ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्याकारतया संशू^x(सू)चयतीति चेत्; असौ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्याकारः ज्ञानाकारादव्यतिरिक्तः व्यतिरिक्तो वा ? यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; तदा ज्ञानात्मतामात्रम्, नाऽऽकारातिरेकोऽन्योऽस्ति विभाव्यमानोऽनुमानादिज्ञानेषु यथा । आकारान्तरातिरेके वा ज्ञानरूपता हीयते । अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; तस्यैव तर्हि गमकत्वं न ज्ञानाकारस्य । तस्याप्यगमकत्वं तदवेदनात् ।

किञ्च, तदुत्पन्नम्^y इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद्^z विज्ञानं स्वरूपेणावगाहनीयम्, ततो, व्या [M 33a] प्तिस्मरणम्, तदनुपरामर्शज्ञानम्, ततोऽनुमेयावगतिरिति । न च एतावन्तं कालं विज्ञानं स्थितिपदं बध्नाति, आशुभावित्वेन प्रत्यस्तमितत्वात् । अथ बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन परिकल्प्यते = अनुमानम्; तदा अवास्तवं प्राप्नोति सुगतानुमानवत् ॥ छ ॥

And, if it is said that it (i.e. knowledge) indicates (contact) on account of its being of the shape of something produced by the contact of a sense-organ with (its) object, (we ask:) Is this shape of a sense-organ with its object non-different from the shape of knowledge or different from it? If it is non-different, then what we have is merely the form of knowledge, and there is no additional shape manifested here, just as (there is no additional shape manifested) in the cases of the cognition produced by inference, etc.² And if there were an additional shape (manifested in it), it would cease to be of the form of knowledge. Now, if it (i.e. the shape of being something produced by the sense-object contact) were something different (from the knowledge in question), then that very thing will help us to know (contact), and not the shape of knowledge. As a matter of fact, that also will not make it known, because the

1. One should be free to say, for example, 'x is of such a nature, because x exists'.

x. Sukhlālji : 'शू'

y. Probably an interpolation introduced as an explanation to तद्

z. M : धर्मधर्म

= परिकल्प्यते

2. The form of knowledge is there even in the cases of inferential cognition, etc. though these latter are not produced by the contact of a sense-organ with its object. Hence the contact of a sense-organ with its object cannot be inferred from the form of knowledge.

former is not (itself) known.¹

Moreover, that cognition produced by the contact of a sense-organ with its object would have to be cognised (fully) in its own nature, then there would be the remembrance of the rule of invariable concomitance (viz. Where there is a knowledge produced by the contact of a sense organ with its object, there must be the contact of a sense-organ with its object), then there would be the knowledge of application (parāmarśa-jñāna)², and then there would be the knowledge of what is to be inferred. But a cognition does not persist for so long a time, for being transient it perishes. And if it is supposed that inference proceeds on the basis of such a substance-attribute relationship as is conceived by the intellect (i.e. is a construction of the intellect, not a reality), then it comes to be illusory, like the inference of the Buddhists.³

[१२. इन्द्रियजन्यत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽसंभवप्रकटनम् ।]

तथा, इन्द्रियोत्पाद्यत्वमपि नोपपद्यते, इन्द्रियोत्पाद्यत्वातिरेकानवगतेः । विज्ञानं स्वभावतयैव वेद्यते; नाकारान्तरेण, तज्ज्ञप्तौ वा ज्ञानाकारविरहप्रसङ्गः । न च ज्ञानम् इन्द्रियसम्बद्धं [S 22] दृष्टं येन तद् उपलभ्यमानम् इन्द्रियं गमयति । अथ क्रिया अन्यत्र करणसाध्या दृष्टा । सैव गमिकाऽस्तु यस्याः करणस[M 33b]म्बन्धोऽवगतः । न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्य गमकत्वं किञ्चित्साध्याद् उपपद्यते । न जातु देवदत्तनयननीलसम्बन्धे सति यज्ञदत्तेन्द्रियघटादिकमर्थम् असति सम्बन्धे करणत्वसाम्यात् प्रकाशयद् दृष्टम् । तथा, अर्थजन्याकारोऽपि विज्ञाने अनेनैव प्रकारेण पर्युदस्तो वेदितव्यः ।

[12. Showing that perception cannot possibly be produced by a sense-organ.]

Again, the proposition that it (perception) is produced by a sense-organ cannot be justified, for the fact of its being produced by a sense-organ is not cognised (by us) as an independent feature of it. Cognition is known as possessed of its own nature, not as possessed of another shape; and if it were so known (i.e.

1. If it itself is not known, how can it help us to have knowledge of sense-object contact ?
2. Parāmarśa-jñāna consists in applying the concerned rule of invariable concomitance to the given case, it is this that is considered to be the immediate cause of the final inferential cognition.
3. According to the Buddhists, inference is illusory (bhrānta) (being the knowledge of the universal, which is unreal), though it is valid knowledge (pramāṇa), because it is consistent (avisamvādi) and finally takes us to a particular point-instant (svalakṣaṇa).

if it were known as possessed of another shape) there would be the contingency of the absence of the shape of knowledge (i.e. it would be knowledge no longer). Moreover, cognition is not seen to be related to a sense-organ, so that on being observed, it could give us a knowledge of the latter. If it is urged that elsewhere activity is seen to be accomplished by an instrument (and so the activity of perception also must have an instrument, viz. sense-organ), then let that (activity) alone whose relation to (its) instrument is known give us a knowledge (of its instrument). (But the activity of perception cannot give us a knowledge of a sense-organ, because their relation is not known). When there is the relation of one (activity with its instrument), another (activity) cannot enable us to know (its own instrument when its relation with its own instrument is not known) simply on the basis of some similarity. For, verily, when there is the contact of Devadatta's eye and the blue thing, Yajñadatta's sense-organ (i.e. the organ of sight) is never seen to reveal an object such as jar, etc. in the absence of a contact (between the two), simply on the ground that like it (i.e. Devadatta's eye), it is an instrument. Again, the proposition that knowledge possesses the shape of being produced by its object should be regarded as refuted in this way.¹

[१३. अर्थस्यापि प्रत्यक्षजनकत्वखण्डनम् ।]

तथा, अर्थोऽपि विज्ञानमुत्पादयति—अनुपजाताऽतिशयः, उपजातातिशयो वा, अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयो वा, व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयो वा ? तद्यदि अनु[M 34a]पजातातिशयः करोति, तदा सर्वदा कुर्यात् न वा; करणम् अकरणं वा* नोपवि(प)द्येत% ततस्वरूपाननिवृत्तेः । तथा, अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयोऽपि न करोति, अकारकाकारस्यानुगतेः । अननुगतौ वा न तर्हि तदव्यतिरिक्तोऽतिशयः । अथ व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन जन्यते तथापि नो [पपद्य]* ते, अकारकाकारानतिवृत्तेः । अतिवृत्तौ वा आयातं क्षणिकत्वम् । ततश्च नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम् ॥ छ ॥

[13. Refutation of the causality of object also in the case of perception.]

Moreover, does the object produce knowledge without any excellence (i.e. a special feature) arising in it, or when it has an excellence arisen in it; (if

1. Knowledge cannot be said to have been produced by an object, because no relation between the two is known.

x. M & S : वा

% M : नोपविद्येत

*. M is illegible. S. discerns नो...ते—Eli Franco

the latter), is that excellence which arises non-different that from it (i.e. the object), or is the excellence that arises different from it? If it is said to do so (i.e. produce knowledge) without any excellence arising in it, then it should always do so or never¹; that it (i.e. the object) should produce and then should not produce is not justifiable, for it cannot violate its own nature. So also, it (i.e. the object) cannot do it (i.e. produce knowledge) when the excellence arisen in it is non-different from it, for its shape (i.e. nature) of being a non-producer would persist.² And if it were not to persist, then the excellence in question would not be non-different from it. Now if it is said that (knowledge) is produced by an object when some excellence different from it has arisen in it, (our answer is that) even so it does not stand to reason, for the object cannot give up its shape (i.e. nature) of being a non-producer (of knowledge). And if it is said to give it up, momentariness steps in. Therefore, perception cannot be defined as 'cognition which arises from the contact of a sense-organ with the (i.e. its) object.'

[२. मीमांसकसंमतस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]

अन्ये तु अनधिगतार्थगन्तृत्वेन प्रमाणलक्षणमभिदधति* । ते[M 34b]त्वयुक्तवादिनो द्रष्टव्याः । कथमयुक्तवादिता तेषामिति चेत्; उच्यते—विभिन्नकारकोत्पादितैकार्थविज्ञानानां व्यवस्थितैकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वाऽविशेषेऽपि पूर्वोत्पन्नविज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यम् नोत्तरस्य इत्यत्र नियामकं वक्तव्यम् । अथ यथाव्यवस्थितार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वाविशेषेऽपि पूर्वोत्पन्नविज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यते न प्रथमोत्तरविज्ञानस्य; तदा अनेनैव न्यायेन प्रथमस्याप्यप्रामाण्यं प्रसक्तं गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वाऽविशेषात् । य[M 35a]था एकनीलस्वलक्षणावभासितयुगपदुत्पन्नानेकनीलविज्ञानानां नीलैकार्थ[S 23] गृहीतिरूपता न भिद्यते, तथा पूर्वापरोत्पन्नविज्ञानानामपि गृहीतार्थगृहीतिरूपता न निवर्त्यति ।

[2. Examination of the definition of Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) according to the Mimāṃsakas]

Others define Pramāṇa (i.e. valid knowledge) as the cogniser of (i.e. that which makes known) an object not cognised before. But they should be looked upon as the propounders of what is unreasonable (i.e. as those whose view is not tenable). If it is asked how it is that their view is not tenable, we reply—some

1. In the Sanskrit text, there should be only a comma (not semi-colon) after 'karoti' and there should be a semi-colon after 'na vā'.
2. The object did not formerly produce knowledge. Even when some excellence arises in it, it is non-different from the object, which should thus continue not to produce knowledge.

x. M : अभिदध इति ।

deciding factors should be pointed out as to why amongst the cognitions of one object produced by various causal factors (appropriately chosen), the cognition produced first is valid and not the succeeding one, even though they have this in common that they are of the form of the cognition of an object as it is, the validity of the cognition produced first is justifiable, not of that which comes after the first, then on this very logic the first cognition also would come to be invalid inasmuch as it too has this in common with the other that it cognises an object that is cognised. As in the case of the simultaneously produced several cognitions of the 'blue' where one extreme particular (svalakṣaṇa) blue is presented¹, their form of being the cognition of the same object—viz. the blue does not differ, so also in the case of the cognitions (of the same object) produced one after another, their form of being the cognition of an object that is cognised will not recede (i.e. will hold good).

अथा(थ)* नियतविषयत्वं पूर्वोत्तरविज्ञानयोः — पूर्वोत्पन्नविज्ञानम् अनधिगतार्थकारस्वीकरणमुखेन उपादीयते, उत्तरं तु अधिगतार्थकारविषयमुपजायते । यदि गृहीतार्थविषयत्वम्; कथं प्रतिनियतविषयत्वम् ? अथ प्रतिनियतविषयत्वम्; कथं गृही[M 35b]तार्थग्राहित्वम्, नियतविषयत्वगृहीतग्राहित्वयोर्विरोधात् ? यदि च नियतविषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरपि प्रामाण्यम् अनधिगतार्थगन्तृत्वाऽविशेषात् । अथ एकविषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरपि प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा गृहीतग्राहित्वाऽविशेषात् । सोऽयंगड्दुप्रवेशाक्षितारक-विनिर्गमन्यायोपनिपातः श्रुतिलालसानां दुरुत्तरः ।

(objection —) The first and later cognitions have their specific respective objects; that is to say, the cognition produced first is recognised as taking note of the shape of a thing not cognised, whereas the later one arises as having for its object the shape of a thing that is cognised (Reply —) If it (i.e. the later cognition) be said to have for its object a thing that is cognised, how could it be said to have its(own) specific object? And if it be said to have a specific object, how could it be the cognition of a thing that is cognised—for 'having a specific object' and 'cognising what is cognised' are mutually contradictory features? If they are said to have their specific respective objects, then both

1. The text should be 'ekanīlasvalakṣaṇābāhāsi'¹⁰ (presenting one extreme particular 'blue') and not 'ekanīlasvalakṣaṇābāhāsita'¹⁰. The argumet here is : The simultaneous cognitions of the object 'blue' are all cognitions of the same object, viz. the 'blue' — and yet they are all regarded as valid. Similarly two successive cognitions of the same object have for their object a thing cognised by the other. And there is no reason why the first of them should be valid and not the succeeding one.

x. M : अथा

(cognitions) are valid in as much as they have this in common that they both cognise a thing not cognised. If they are said to have one and the same object, then either both are valid or both are invalid, in as much as they have this in common that they both cognise a cognised thing. This unexpected event of (which is made clear by) the maxim of the failure of the eye sight on account of the tumor¹ can't be solved by the staunch followers of the Revelation.

नन्वाधिगतविषयत्वे सत्यपि [M 36a] प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमे स्मृतेरपि प्रामाण्यमनुष्यते, प्रमाणफलता वा । कोऽत्र निवारयिता ? स्मृतिरिहोपजायमाना—आद्यानुभवावेदितार्थाकारविषया वा, अन्यविषया वा, निर्विषया वा ? तद्यदि पूर्वोदितानुभवावेदितार्थाकारविषया; तदा तस्याः प्रमाणफलता नैव निवारयितुं पार्यते गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वाविशेषात् इत्युक्तम् [M 36b] । एवं च स्मृतिसञ्ज्ञकं सप्तमं प्रमाणं प्रसक्तं मीमांसकानाम् ।

(objection—) If cognition is accepted as valid even when it has a cognised thing for its object, then memory also would come to be a source of valid knowledge or the result produced by a source of valid knowledge². (Reply—) who can prevent that ? Does memory here as it arises have for its object that shape of a thing presented by the first cognition, or does it have another object, or is it objectless ? If it is said to have for its object the shape of a thing presented by a previously arisen cognition, then it is not possible to prevent it from being a result produced by a source of valid knowledge, for as has been pointed out, it has this in common (with that previously arisen cognition) that it cognises a thing that is cognised³. Thus for the Mīmāṃsakas (who recognise only six pramāṇas) there would be the contingency of recognising a seventh source of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa).

अथ पूर्वविज्ञानानवधारितार्थविषया; यद्येवं कथं तस्याः प्रमाणफलत्वमपनेतुं पार्यते ? आद्यानुभवस्यै(स्ये)*व स्मृतिरूपता च% न प्राप्नोति । दृष्टश्रुतार्थविषया हि स्मृतिर्नागृहीतार्थविषया ।

Now it might be said to have for its object a thing not noted by a previous

- 1 This maxim is found explained in the Anekāntajayapataṅkā (p.56). which explains – that “by avoiding the defect in question another greater defect occurs.”
- 2 The author makes no special use of the distinction between a source of valid knowledge and the result produced by such a source.
- 3 But the Mīmāṃsakas do not recognise memory to be a result produced by a source of valid knowledge. They recognise only six pramāṇas.

x. M : *भवस्यैव

% च should perhaps be deleted – Eli Franco.

cognition. But if this be so, how is it possible to set aside its being a result produced by a source of valid knowledge ? Moreover, in that case it would not be of the form of memory - just like the first cognition. For memory has for its object a thing perceived or heard of before, and it does not have for its object a thing not cognised before.

अथ निर्विषया इष्यते; तदा न गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यम् अपि तु केशोण्डुकसंवेदनवन्निर्विषयत्वेन । अपि च, [S 24] यदि निर्विषया; तदा गृहीतार्थग्राहिणी कथम् ? गृहीतार्थग्राहिणीति चेत्; ‘निर्विषया’ इति न वक्तव्यम् । नच निर्विषया -- ‘मातरं पितरं शुश्रूषितवानहम्’ ‘सन्ति मे पञ्चभृत्याः [M 37a]’ इति पूर्वानुभवावेदितार्थाकारपर्यवसाविन्यो हि स्मृतयः, स्मृतिज्ञानेन पूर्वानुभवावेदितार्थाकारस्य प्रतिभासनात् । अथ स्मृतिविज्ञानकाले पूर्वप्रबोधविषयीकृतार्थस्य प्रत्यस्तमितत्वान्न तद्विषयत्वम् । एवं च निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यं न गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन इत्युक्तम् ।

If you propose that it is objectless, then memory would not be invalid on account of its being the cognition of a thing that is cognised, but on account of its being objectless, like the apprehension of kesonḍuka. Moreover, if it be (said to be) objectless, how could it be (said to be) the cogniser (i.e. cognition) of a thing-that is cognised ? And if it is the cogniser of a thing that is cognised, then it should be said to be objectless. As a matter of fact, it (i.e. memory) is not objectless, for such memories as ‘I used to render service to my mother and father’. ‘I have five servants’ – refer to the shape of an object presented in a previous cognition in as much as the shape of an object presented in a previous cognition is reflected in memory-cognition. It may be urged that at the time of memory-cognition, the thing which was the object of the previous knowledge would have perished, and so could not become the object of it (i.e. memory). (our reply is) In that case, as said above, memory would become invalid on account of its being objectless, and not because it cognises a thing that is cognised.

यदि च अवधारितार्थविषयं प्रमाणमप्रामाण्यमुपपाद्यते; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य अप्रामाण्यमापनीयते । तदेव कथम् ? कथ्यते – यदेव अविनाभावसम्बन्धग्रहणकालावधारितम् अग्नित्वसामान्यं*लिङ्गा-जहद्वृत्तित्वेन प्रत्यक्षेण तदेव अनुमानादवग [M 37b] च्छति, आहोस्वित् पावकस्वरूपम्, मत्वर्थवा, लिङ्गव्यापारसमानकालीनता(लीना) स्तित्वं वा, लिङ्गोपसर्जनत्वं वा, अग्निव्यक्तिपारतन्त्र्यं वा, अग्नित्वसामान्यस्य ? तद्यदि पूर्वावधारितसामान्यविषयमभ्युपेयते; तदा प्रामाण्यं नैव समासादयति गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन स्मृतिवदेव । तदाप्रामाण्ये नाग्नित्वव्यवस्थोपपत्तिः तदनुपपत्तौ वा अर्था%पत्त्या

x. Probably on interpolation introduced as an explanation to : *अवधारितम् – Eli Franco.

* M : *कालीनतास्तित्वम्

% M & S : *पत्तौ वार्था

अग्निव्यक्तिसंस्थितिः । ततश्च 'अमुत्राग्निः' 'अग्निरानीयताम्' इति सकल लोक व्यवहारविरहः स्यात् । अथ मा भूदेतद्व्यवहारहानिरिति चेत्पूर्वाधारितेऽप्यर्थे अनुमानस्या (स्य) प्रामाण्यमभ्युपेयते; तदा अनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणमपाम[M 38a]र्थकं श्रोत्रियाणामिति ।

Moreover, if the valid knowledge having an already noted thing for its object is explained away as non-valid, then inferential cognition would come to be invalid. How is that ? We explain – That very universal 'fireness' which at the time of grasping the relation of invariable concomitance was perceptually noted as being never absent where the mark of inference (probans) is present (Lingājahadvṛttitvena), that very ('fireness') does one know by inference, or does one know the nature of fire, or the fact of possession (i.e. the fact that fire is possessed by the spot under observation), or the existence simultaneous with the functioning of the mark of inference (liṅga), or subordinateness to the mark of inference, or the dependence on the individual 'fire', of the generality 'fireness' ?¹ If it (i.e. inference) is regarded as having for its object the universal noted previously, then it could never be valid; for in that case, just like memory, it would cognise a thing that is cognised. If it (inference) were invalid, it would not be justifiable to establish the general fact of being in possession of fire (agnimattva) (e.g. the general fact that a particular mountain is fiery or has fire – parvataḥ agnimān); nor, if this were not justifiable, could the individual 'fire' be established by presumption (arthāpatti).² And in that case there would be an absence of all worldly dealings (Vyavahāra)³ like 'There is fire there', 'Bring fire'. If in order that there might not be this absence of worldly dealings, inference is recognised as valid even with respect to a thing already taken note of, then the epithet "cognising a thing not cognised before" inserted by the śrotriya (i.e. Mīmāṃsakas) (in their definition of valid knowledge) would be meaningless.

अथ पावकस्वरूपमनुमिमीषे; तत् लिङ्गाजहृत्तत्वेन पूर्वमवधारितं वा, न वा ? यदि पूर्वोपलब्धम्; अधिगतार्थविषयत्वमायातमनुमानस्य । अथ न पूर्वोपलब्धम्; अव्यापकोऽग्निः अनुमानात्तर्हि प्रतीयते, तदभ्युपगमे तृणजलादिविषयमप्यनुमानं प्रसज्यते ।

* M : अनुमानस्याप्रामाण्यम्

1. 'of the generality 'fireness' is to be construed with all the alternatives beginning from the existence simultaneous with the functioning of the mark of inference.'
2. "The mountain could not be fiery without there being an individual fire; therefore, there must be an individual fire. The universal cannot reside independently of the individual" – This should be form of the presumption here spoken of.
3. Vyavahāra : Practical dealings of behaviour and the verbal expressions describing things and situations.

Now if you infer the nature of fire, was it previously noted in the form of something that is never absent where the mark of inference is preset, or was it not ? If it was previously noted, then inference would come to have for its object that is cognised (and therefore would be invalid). If (you say) it was not known, then fire lacking invariable concomitance¹ would be known by inference. And if that be accepted, then the inference in question may as well have for its object, grass, water, etc. (i.e. the existence of even grass, water, etc. may then be inferred from smoke).

अथ मत्त्वर्थोऽनुमीयते; स पूर्वाधारितो वा, न वा ? यद्यवधारितः; कथमनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणमनुमाने संभवति ? अथ नैवावगतः; तदानीं जलतृणादि विषयमप्यनुमानं प्रसज्येत इत्युक्तम् ।

if (you say-) it is the fact of possession (e.g. the fact that fire is possessed by the mountain) that is inferred, was it previously noted or not ? If it is said to be noted, how can the epithet 'cognising a thing not cognised' be tenable with reference to inference ? If it is (said to be) not noted, then we have said that the inference in question may as well have for its object, grass, water etc.

अथ लिङ्गव्यापारसमानकालीनास्तित्वम् अग्निसामान्यस्य अनुमीयते; तदनुमानव्या[M 38b] पारसमानकालीनास्तित्वम् अग्नित्वसामान्याद् व्यक्तिरिक्तम्; अव्यतिरिक्तं वा ? तद्यदि अव्यतिरिक्तम्; तदानीं पूर्वोपलब्धास्तित्वविषयमेवानुमानम्, कथमनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणमपार्थक्यं न भवेत् ? अथ व्यतिरिक्तम्; तर्हि पूर्वोपलब्धम्, अनुपलब्धं वा ? यदि पूर्वोपलब्धम्; तद्विषयत्वेऽनुमानस्य नाऽनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणमुपपद्यते । अथ नोपलब्धम्; तत्कथमनुमीयते* जलादिकल्पधूमेन ?

If the existence simultaneous with the functioning of the mark of inference is (said to be) inferred in respect of the universal fire; (we ask :) Is that existence

1. Avyāpaka – i.e. whose invariable concomitance with smoke is not known. The mark of inference (liṅga-e.g. smoke) is less extensive than what is to be inferred (sādhya-e.g. fire) which is more extensive. Fire is present in all those places where smoke is found, and in many more, e.g. in hot iron, electric bulb, candle, etc) where there is no smoke. Vyāpaka: 'determinate concomitant'; Vyāpaka: 'determinant concomitant' (Tatia and mookerjee in 'critique of the organ of knowledge'). If without knowing fire to be the determinant concomitant of smoke, fire be inferred on having observed smoke, then grass, water, etc might as well as be inferred on having observed smoke.

x. S : अग्निः

% M : अनुमीयते

simultaneous with functioning of inferential cognition¹ different from the generality 'fireness', or is it non-different. If it is (said to be) non-different, then inference would only have for its object the existence previously cognised; (and in that case) how would the epithet 'cognising a thing not cognised' not be meaningless? (i.e. it would certainly be meaningless). Now, if it is (said to be) different, was it previously known or was it not known? If it was previously known, then the epithet 'cognising a thing not cognised' would not be true of an inference having if for its object. If it is (said to be) not known, then how could it, comparable to water, etc, be inferred from smoke?²

अथ लिङ्गोपसर्जनत्वमग्नित्वसामान्यम् [M 39a]स्य अनुमानात् प्रतीयते; तल्लिङ्गोपसर्जनत्वम् अग्निसामान्याद् भिन्नम्, अभिन्नं वा? यद्यभिन्नम्; पूर्वोपलब्ध्याऽग्नित्वसामान्यविषयमेव अनुमानं कथं प्रामाण्यभागे भवति? अथ भिन्नम्; तदा अविनाभावि-सम्बन्धग्रहणकाले लिङ्गव्यापकत्वेन अवधारितं वा, न वा? यद्यवधारितम्; कथमनधिगतार्थविषयमनुमानम्? अथ लिङ्गव्यापकत्वेना [न] वगतम्; तदा तद्विषयत्वेऽनुमानस्य परिकल्प्यमाने त्रिभुवनावेदकत्वं धूमस्य किन्न परिकल्प्यते, सम्बन्धाभावाऽविशेषात्?

Now, if subordinateness to the mark of inferences on the part of the universal 'fireness' is said to be known through inference, then (we ask :) Is that subordinateness to the mark of inference different from the universal 'fireness' or is it non-different? If it is (said to be) non-different, then how could inference, having for its object that very universal 'fireness' which was known previously be a case of valid knowledge? If it is (said to be) different, then was it noted at the time of grasping the relation of invariable concomitance as being the determinant concomitant (Vyāpaka) of the mark of inference (liṅga) or was it not (thus noted)? If it was (thus) noted, how can inference have for its object a thing not cognised? If it was not known as being

1. Anumāna = anumā-karaṇa = liṅga
2. If the existence of the universal 'fireness' simultaneous with the operation of the probans is distinct from fireness and it is not cognised before, its relation of invariable concomitance with the probans would also not be known and so far as inference is concerned, it is comparable to water, etc, – just as water, etc cannot be inferred from smoke, so it too cannot be inferred from smoke.

x. M : सामान्यद्

% M : 'लब्धप्रग्नित्व'

~ M & S : अविनाभावि°

= M : 'त्वेनावगतम्'

the determinant concomitant of the mark of inference, then in the event of inference being supposed to have it for its object, why is smoke not supposed to yield a knowledge of the three worlds, for the absence of relation is common (to both the cases)?¹

अथ [M 39b] अग्निव्यक्तिपारतन्त्र्यमनुमीयते धूमेन अग्नित्वसामान्यस्य इति चेत्; तत्पारतन्त्र्यम् अग्नित्वसामान्यस्य धूमव्यापकत्वेन अवधारितं वा, न वा? यद्यवधारितम्; पुनरपि गृहीतग्राहित्वं नातिवर्त्ततेऽनुमानम्। अथ नावधारितं धूमव्यापकत्वेन पारतन्त्र्यम् अग्निसामान्यस्य इति चेत्; कथमनुमीयते इत्युक्तं पुरस्तात्।

If dependence on the individual 'fire' on the part of the universal 'fireness' is (said to be) inferred from smoke, was this dependence of the universal 'fireness' noted as being the determinant concomitant of smoke, or was it not? If it was noted, then inference would again fail to reach beyond the range of the cognition of a thing that is cognised (–i.e. inference would again be the cognition of a thing that is cognised). If (you say that) the dependence of the universal 'fireness' was not known as being the determinant concomitant of smoke, then as said before, how could it be inferred?

[१. गोत्वादिप्रतिपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादीनामप्रामाण्योद्घाटनम्]

[S 26] एतेन पूर्वोपलब्धगोत्वादिप्रतिपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादेरप्रामाण्यमुद्घाटितम्। तदेव कथम्? कथ्यते – किं संकेतग्रहणकालावगतगोत्वार्थवाचकत्वम्, तद्व्यतिरिक्तार्थवाचकत्वं वा प्रतिपाद्यते गोशब्दस्य? तद्यदि संकेतग्रहणकालाधि [M 40a] करणगोत्वस्वरूपावेदकत्वं जेगीयते गोशब्दस्य; तदा विदितार्थाकारवेदकत्वेन न मानत्वमासादयति गोशब्दः। अथ वेदितार्थाकारवेदकत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यमावहति; तदा अनधिगतार्थगन्तृविशेषणस्य विषयो वक्तव्यः। अथ तद्व्यतिरिक्तार्थवाचकत्वम्; तदानीमसंकेत(ति) एवार्थः प्रतीयते गोशब्दात्, ततश्च स्वसिद्धान्तप्रतीतिविरोधोदुर्निवारः। अथ गोत्वमेवाऽवगम्यते गोशब्देन इति चेत्; तत्रापि प्रपञ्चितमेव अप्रामाण्यकारण(णं)* गृहीतग्राहित्वम्। तदप्रामाण्ये न गोत्वव्यवस्थितिः। तदनवस्थितौ नार्थापत्त्याधिकरणव्यवस्थितिः।

1. If the mark of inference can give us a knowledge of the thing to be inferred (probandum) even when we have no idea of the relation between the two, then it might as well give us a knowledge of all the three worlds.

x. M : नातिवर्त्तते

% M & S : 'अधिकरण–'

~ M : असंकेत

* So in M., 'ss conjecture unnecessary – Eli Franco

[1. Demonstrating the invalidity of the words 'Go' (i.e. cow), etc, as the alleged means of expressing 'Gotva' (i.e. cowness), etc.]

This reveals (i.e. uncovers) the invalidity of the words 'go' (i.e. cow), etc. in as much as they seek to express 'gotva' (i.e. cowness), etc. that were cognised earlier. How is that? We explain—Is the word 'go' demonstrated as conveying the meaning 'gotva' that was apprehended at the time of grasping the convention (saṅketa) (i.e. the fact that a particular thing is conventionally called by a particular name), or as conveying a meaning¹ different from that? Now, if the word 'go' is said to tell us of the nature of 'gotva' that was present at the time of our grasping the convention, then the word 'go' cannot be a source of valid knowledge for in that case it will be telling us of the shape of an object that is known. If it is said to be a source of valid knowledge even when it tells us of the shape of an object that is known², then the scope of the epithet—'cognising an object that is not cognised' will have to be pointed out (i.e. it will have no scope, it will be meaningless). If it is said to convey a meaning different from that (i.e. different from that conveyed at the time of our grasping the convention), then it amounts to maintaining that a meaning as regards which no convention is formed, is known by us through the instrumentality of the word 'go' and then you will not be able to avoid your going against both your own tenet and the common experience. If it is said that 'gotva' (i.e. cowness) itself is known by us through the word 'go' even thus, as has been elaborated by us, there will be present there the cause that prevents it from being a source of valid knowledge, viz. its being the cogniser of a thing that is cognised. If it (i.e. the word 'go') is no source of valid knowledge, then the existence of 'gotva' (i.e. cowness) cannot be established. And if it (i.e. the existence of cowness) is not established, the existence of its substratum (i.e. of the individual cow) too cannot be established by means of presumption (arthāpatti).³

[२. अर्थापत्तेरधिकरणव्यवस्थित्युपपादकत्वस्य निषेधः ।]

इतोऽपि नार्थापत्त्याधिकरणव्यवस्थितिरुपपत्तिरुपपादकत्वस्य निषेधः—किम् अर्थापत्त्या

1. 'Artha' means both the meaning of a word as well as the object denoted by it.
2. The text should be Veditārthākārā, and not 'veditārthākārāo' the latter meaning 'the shape of an object that is made known'.
3. Gotva (i.e. cowness)—a genus— is there, it cannot stay without the particular individuals being its substratum. Therefore, the existence of 'cowness' presupposes the existence of the cow-individuals. Now if the existence of 'cowness' is not rationally demonstrated, then that of its substratum—the individuals cow-too remains undemonstrated.

पूर्वावधारिताधिकरणप्रत्यायनं क्रियते, आहोस्वित् अपूर्वाधिकरणप्रत्यायनम् ? तद्यदि पूर्वावधारिताधिकरणपर्यवसिताऽर्थापत्तिः, तदा प्रतिपादितार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन न प्रमाणम् । अथ अदृष्टपिण्डावेदकत्वम्; तदा गोत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या गजवाजिकल्पनापि कार्या । अथ पूर्वावधारितस्य इदानीन्तनमस्तित्वम् अर्थापत्त्याऽवसीयते इति चेत्; तत् इदानीन्तनमस्तित्वं पूर्वावधारिताद् व्यतिरिक्तम्, अव्यतिरिक्तं वा ? तद्यदि अव्यतिरिक्तम्; तदा पूर्वावधारितार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन कथम् अर्थापत्तेः प्रामाण्यं वेदविदो वदन्ति ? अथ अर्था[M 41a]न्तरम्; कथं गोत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्याप्रतीयते ? तत्प्रतीत्यभ्युपगमे वा गजवाजिविषयापि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् इत्यसकृत् प्रतिपादितम् । एवं च सति यदुक्तम्—[S 27]

“इदानीन्तमस्तित्वं नहि पूर्वधिया गतम् ।”

[श्लोकवा. सूत्र ४, श्लोक २३४] इति तद् बालवल्गितम् ।

[2. Denying the Justifiability of the Demonstration of the Substratum by means of Presumption.]

For this reason also, the demonstration of the substratum (of 'cowness') by means of presumption (arthāpatti) is not justifiable. Does presumption bring about the knowledge of the substratum (e.g. the individual cow) noted earlier, or of a new substratum? Now, if presumption refers to a substratum that was noted earlier, then it cannot be a source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) for it demonstrates a thing that was demonstrated. If it is said to give knowledge of a body that was not (hitherto) perceived, then one could as well posit an elephant or a horse (as the substratum of 'cowness') on the ground that 'gotva' (i.e. 'cowness') could not be otherwise accounted for¹. And if it is said that the present existence of a thing formerly noted is cognised by presumption, then (we ask :) Is this present existence different from what was previously noted, or is it non-different? If it is (said to be) non-different, then how do the knowers of the veda (i.e. the mīmāṃsakās)² state presumption to be a source of valid knowledge even when it demonstrates a thing that was already noted? If it is a different thing, then how could it be known on the ground of 'gotva' (i.e. cowness) being otherwise not accounted for? Or if its knowledge be admitted (i.e. if presumption be admitted to yield a knowledge of the earlier-not-cognised present existence of cow), then we have shown more than once

1. An individual cow is posited because the existence of 'cowness' will not be otherwise possible, but if an individual cow is something not hitherto perceived, why not posit an elephant or a horse (or anything else) by way of accounting for the existence of 'cowness'?
2. The Mīmāṃsakas who are so much concerned with the problem of the authoritative character of the vedic injunctions and prohibitions.

that there should be a knowledge of an elephant and a horse also (by means of a presumption pertaining to 'cowness'). This being so, the following statement (of kumārila) is childish viz. "The present existence is not known by a previous cognition." (Ślokavārtika, sū-4, stanza 234).

[३. प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रामाण्यखण्डनस्य सूचनम् ।]

एतेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्यापि प्रामाण्यं प्रत्युक्तं वेदितव्यम् ॥ छ ॥

[3. Suggestion as to the Refutation of the validity of Recognition.]

The validity of recognition (pratyabhiñāna) also should be regarded as refuted by this (line of argument).

[३. ताथागतसंमतस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]

[१. अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तृत्वेति विशेषणस्यापार्थक्यप्रदर्शनम् ।]

तथा, ताथागतानामपि अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तृविशेषणमपार्थक्यम् अपोहयज्ञानाऽसंभवात् । नहि पूर्वापरकालभाविनी विज्ञाने एकविषये स्तः, न स्वलक्षणैकविषये, न सामान्यैकविषये; स्वलक्षणस्य अभिन्नै[M 41b]कस्वभावस्य क्रमवृत्त्यनेकविज्ञानजननशक्तिव्यतिरेकात् ।

अथ युगपदेकविषयोत्पन्नाऽनेकविज्ञानापनोदार्थम्; तदप्ययुक्तम्; एक विषयोत्पन्नानेकपुरुषसंवेदनस्य अप्रामाण्यमापनीपद्येत । अथ सामान्यैकविषयानेकविज्ञानापनोदार्थं विशेष[M 42a]णमुपादीयते; तदप्ययुक्तम्; न सामान्ये एकं विज्ञानमस्ति, नाप्यनेकं विज्ञानं तस्य स्वयमसंभवात् । तदाकारविरहे 'सामान्यविषयं विज्ञानम्' इति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थाहेतुर्वक्तव्यः । तदाकारे वा सामान्यस्य सदात्मता, अतात्त्विकाकारतादात्म्ये वा ज्ञानातात्त्विक[M 42b]त्व*प्रसङ्गः ।

किंच, एकविषये प्रवर्तमानयोः एकस्याऽप्रामाण्यम्, प्रमाणान्तरत्वाभावो वा ? तद्यदि अप्रामाण्यम्; तदयुक्तम्; अविशिष्टैकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वे उभयोः प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा विकल्पानुपपत्तेः, विकल्पे बाधक*विषयोत्पन्नाऽनेकपुरुषविज्ञानभेदप्रसङ्गः । अथाऽप्रमाणान्तरत्वम्; तदप्यनुपपन्नम्; किम् एक विषयोत्पादितानेकप्रत्यक्षादिज्ञानानां व्यक्तिनानात्वं नोपपद्यते, आहो आकारनानात्वम् ? तद्यदि व्यक्तिनानात्वं न जायते[S 28]टीति; तदसत्; एकनीलोत्पादितानेकनीलालोकविज्ञानानां व्यक्तिनानात्वदर्शनात् । [M 43a] अथ अनेकाकारता नोपपद्यते; तदयुक्तम्; नीलालोकविज्ञानानाम् अनेकाकारकत्वदर्शनात् । न च तदुत्पादको

x. Perhaps a lacuna at this point – Eli Franco

% M: °ज्ञानतात्त्विकत्व

* वैक – Eli Franco M & S बाधकं

नीलप्रपञ्चोस्ति, एकत्मतया स्वयमनुपगमात् । अथ एक विषयत्वे प्रत्यक्षानुमानव्यपदेशानुपपत्ति;# तदेतदयुक्तम्; भिन्नकारणकार्यत्वेन व्यपदेश्यो(देशोप)पत्तेः@ । यथा एकनीलोत्पन्नानेकदेवदत्तज्ञानानां* भिन्नकारणकार्यत्वेन [देवदत्त विज्ञानानां] भिन्नकर्तृकार्यत्वेन देवदत्तादिज्ञानव्यपदेशः तथेहापि ॥ छ ॥

[3. Examination of the Buddhist definition of a source of valid knowledge.]

[1. Demonstrating the meaninglessness of the epithet 'cognising a thing not cognised'.]

Similarly, in the case of the Buddhists also, the epithet 'cognising a thing not cognised' is meaningless for there is no possibility of there being a type of knowledge that is to be excluded (by it). Certainly a previous and a later cognition do not have one and the same object; they do not have one extreme particular (svalakṣaṇa) for their common object, nor one universal (sāmānya); (this is so) because an extreme particular being possessed of one undifferentiated nature is without the potency to give rise to a number of cognitions occurring in succession.

If it is said that (the epithet is included in the definition) in order to exclude a number of cognitions produced simultaneously in respect of one object, – that also is not proper; for this would mean that the cognition produced in respect of one object in (the minds of) many men (at the sametime) is invalid (–which it is not). And if the epithet is said to be inserted (i.e. included in the definition) so as to exclude the many cognitions having one universal for their object, that also is not proper. There is neither one cognition in respect of a universal, nor are there many cognitions, for it itself is non-existent (–lit, there is no possibility of it, i.e. the universal itself)¹. If (the cog-

~. अष्टु, गमात् – Eli Franco M & S अनुपगमात्

अनुपपत्तिः – Eli Franco M : अनुपपत्तिः

=. S. कारण Eli : कारण

@. व्यपदेशोपपत्तेः – Eli Franco M : व्यपदेशोपपत्तेः

* M. भिन्नकारणकार्यत्वेन देवदत्तविज्ञानानां Sukhlaji : भिन्नकारणकार्यत्वेन [देवदत्तविज्ञानानां]

^ कोष्ठकगतः पाठो निरर्थको भाति ।

1. The Buddhists do not regard sāmānya or universal as a real entity, they regard it as a mental construct (vikapla adhyavasāya) formed as a result of the synthesis effected by the intellect, of the cognitions of similar entities. They regard universal, e.g. 'cowness' as the negation or exclusion of what is other than it (anyavyāvṛtti or apoha). 'cowness' is nothing but a negation of 'non-cow' (see Buddhist Logic, Vol. II, PP 418-419 F N.11 –Stcherbatsky)

inition of a universal) does not have the shape of a universal, we should be shown why it is that it is the cognition of this specific object (i.e. of a universal). On the other hand, if this (cognition) does have the shape of it (i.e. a universal), the universal turns out to be something real. And if a cognition (qua the possessor of a shape—from which it is non-different) is identical with (i.e. non-different from) the shape of an unreal thing, there arises the contingency of this cognition itself turning out to be something unreal.

Moreover, of the two (cognitions) functioning with respect to one object, is one (said to be) not at all a case of valid knowledge, or is it (said to be) not another case of valid knowledge? If it is said to be not at all a case of valid knowledge, then both being alike of the form of the cognition of one common object, both would be or not be a case of valid knowledge, for the alternative (of one being and the other not being a case of valid knowledge) is not tenable. If it is said to be not another case of valid knowledge, that also is not tenable. When many perceptual and other cognitions are produced by one object, is the manyness of individuals not tenable (i.e. is the fact of there being many cognitions not tenable) or the manyness of shape? If the manyness of individuals is (said to be) untenable, that is not true; for the plurality of individuals of several visual cognitions produced by the same blue object is seen. If (it is said that) it is not possible that (several cognitions of the same object) have several forms, (then) it is not correct, because it is seen that (several) (visual) cognitions of a blue (object) have several forms. And the blue (object) which produces these (cognitions) is not many, because you accept that (the particular blue object) as having a unique nature. Now if it is said that (what is meant is that) when, there is one object, the (two) names 'perception' and 'inference' do not stand to reason¹.—then this is not proper; for these names are justifiable in as much as what they name are the effects of different (sets of) causes. Just as many cognitions on the part of Devdatta, produced by one blue are called '(many kinds of) cognitions of Devadatta' in as much as they are the effects of different causes, or they are called 'cognition of Devadatta, and the like' in as much as they are the effects having different agents (i.e. knowers)². So also is the case here (i.e. cognition pertaining to the same object may be called either 'perceptual' or 'inferential' keeping in view its causal conditions).

1. That is to say, it does not stand to reason that one type of cognition pertaining to an object be called 'perception' and another type pertaining to that very object 'inference'.
2. There seems to be some confusion in the wording of the text. For as it stands, the first illustration is not not an illustration but the thesis Jayarāśi seeks to prove.

[२. अविसंवादि ज्ञानमित्यस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्यापि निरासः ।]

अन्ये तु "अविसंवादि ज्ञानम्" [प्रमाणवा-२.१] प्रमाणमभिदधति । कोऽयमविसंवादार्थः— किं यथाव्यवस्थितार्थगृही[M 43b]तित्वम्, बाधारहितत्वं वा, प्रतीयमानार्थजन्यता वा, प्रतीयमानार्थ प्रति प्रवर्तकत्वं वा, अर्थप्रापकत्वं वा ? तद्यदि यथाव्यवस्थितार्थगृहीतित्वम्; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानं(ने)* नोपपद्यते । अथ बाधारहितत्वम्; तदप्यनुमानज्ञाने नोपपद्यते । अथ प्रतीयमानार्थोत्पाद्यत्वम्; तदप्यनुमानज्ञानस्य नोपपद्यते, सामान्याकारस्य जनकत्वव्यावृत्तेः । तथा, रागादिसंवेदनस्याप्यवभातार्थोत्पाद्यत्वं नोपपद्यते, स्वात्मोत्पादने सामर्थ्यव्यतिरेकात् । तथा, योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य* च प्रतीयमानार्थजन्यता न संभवति व्यतीताऽनागतयोरजनकत्वात्, जनकत्वे* वा अतीताऽनागत[M 44a]ता हीयते । अथ प्रतीयमानार्थ प्रति प्रवर्तकत्वमविसंवादार्थः, तद् विपर्ययज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्तकत्वं विद्यते । विपरीतोत्पन्नोदकबुद्धिः प्रवर्तते, न च तस्य अविसंवादोऽस्ति । सत्योदकज्ञानेऽपि जाते न प्रवर्तते केनापि हेतुना, तदपि विसंवादि स्यात् ।

[2. Refutation of the Definition of valid knowledge as 'knowledge which is not discrepant'¹]

Now, others state valid knowledge to be 'knowledge which is not discrepant' [avisamvādi jñānam—pramāṇa-vārttika, 2.1] what is the meaning of 'non-discrepancy'? — Does it mean being the knowledge of a thing as it is in reality, or being free from contradiction or being produced by the thing that is cognised or its turning us towards the thing cognised, or its making us (i.e. enabling us to) reach the thing (cognised)²? Now, if it means 'being the cognition of a thing as it is in reality', then it does not hold good in the case of inferential cognition³. If it is said to mean 'being free from contradiction', that also does not hold good in the case of inferential cognition. If it is said to mean 'being produced by the thing cognised', that also does not hold good of inferential cognition, for the shape of a universal (i.e. a universal-which alone can be cognised through inference) lacks the capacity to produce anything. Similarly, the characteristic, 'being produced by the thing revealed (i.e. cognised) does not hold good of the apprehen-

x. M & S : तदं E — तद्

% M : ज्ञानं — Eli : ज्ञाने

#. M & S add च

*. M : जनकत्वे

1. Avisamvādi — not discrepant, not incompatible.

2. See Nyāyabinduṭīkā, sū. 1.1.

3. For the Buddhist is of the view that the object of inferential cognition is a universal, which is not according to him a real thing.

sion of pleasure (rāga), etc. for nothing whatsoever possesses the capacity to produce itself¹. So also, the characteristic 'being produced by the thing cognised' is not possible in the case of yogic perception for the past and future objects (of which there is knowledge in yogic perception) cannot act as producers; and if they be capable of producing (knowledge), they would cease to be the past and future objects. If 'non-discrepancy' means 'its turning us towards the object cognised', then even erroneous cognition is capable of turning us (towards the object cognised by it), (so, it also should be valid). The wrongly produced cognition of water turns us (towards the object cognised), and yet it is not non-discrepant (and therefore valid). (And) even when true knowledge of water is produced, the cogniser concerned might, for some reason, not make a turn (towards the object) and then even that (true knowledge) would be (i.e. would have to be regarded as) discrepant.

अथ अर्थप्रापकत्वमविसंवादः, तत्र किम् — अर्थमात्रप्रापकत्वम्, आहो अवभातार्थप्रापकत्वम्, तज्जातीयोदकप्रापकत्वं वा, स्वोत्पादकाऽर्थप्रापकत्वं वा, अथ स्वोत्पादककारकाणां ध्रुवभावित्वमविसंवादः ? यद्यर्थमात्रप्रापकत्वम्; केशाण्डुकेन्दुद्वयं संवेदनस्यापि अविसंवादित्वमापद्यते । अ[M 44b]थ अवभातार्थप्रापकत्वम्; तदा अनुमानज्ञानस्य अविसंवादित्वं न लभ्यते अवभातार्थाऽप्रापकत्वात् । अनुमानज्ञाने हि सामान्याकारोऽवभाति, न चासौ प्राप्यते स्वयमसत्त्वात् । तथा, योगिज्ञानस्य* अतीतानागतार्थे समुत्पन्नस्य अर्थप्रापकत्वं न विद्यते । तथा, रागादिसंवेदनेऽपि जाते न अवभातरागादिप्राप्तिरस्ति । तथा, प्रत्यक्षेऽपि विज्ञाने नाऽवभातार्थप्राप्तिरस्ति, क्षणिकत्वे [M 45a]न अस्तमितत्वात् । अथ तज्जातीयोदकप्रापकत्वेन अविसंवादित्वमुच्यते; तदयुक्तम्; उदकत्वजातेरभावात् ।

If 'non-discrepancy' means 'its making us (i.e. enabling us to) reach the object', does it signify making us reach any object, or making us reach the object that appears (in knowledge), or making us reach an object (—according to the text, water—) of the same genus, or making us reach the object that produced it (i.e. the knowledge in question) ? Or is non-discrepancy the certainty (i.e. the invariable occurrence) of the causal factors producing it (i.e. the

1. It is a Buddhist position that the cognition produced by an object and pleasure, pain etc. produced by it are one and the same thing. (— they are at the most two aspects of the same phenomenon). Normally, therefore, the Buddhist must say that the cognition of pleasure, etc is nothing different from these pleasure, etc. Hence Jayarāśi argues that if the cognition of pleasure, etc is nothing different from these pleasures etc, and if a cognition is produced by its object, then here is a case of pleasure, etc producing themselves.

x. M : 'ज्ञाने स्या'ती'

knowledge in question) ? Now, if it means 'its making us reach any object', then even the knowledge of 'keśaṇḍuka' or of two moon comes to be non-discrepant. If it means 'its making us reach the object that appears (in knowledge)', then non-discrepancy does not obtain in the case of inferential cognition (i.e. inferential cognition could not be regarded as non-discrepant—), because it (i.e. inferential cognition) does not make us reach the object that appears in it. For it is the shape of a universal (sāmānya) that appears in inferential cognition, but it is not reached because it is itself non-existent. Similarly, yogic perception arising with respect to a past or future object does not make us reach the object (which is not existent at the present time). So also, when there arises the apprehension of pleasure, etc, the pleasure, etc that appear there (i.e. are experienced) are not reached¹. Moreover, even in perceptual cognition, the object that appears there (in knowledge) is not reached, for being momentary, it will have perished. And if it is said that there is non-discrepancy by virtue of its making us reach water having the same genus (jāti), that is not proper, for there is no genus-waterness (according to the Buddhists).

अथ अनुदकत्वव्यावृत्तिर्जातिरित्युच्यते; सा उदकव्यक्तिभ्योऽव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता वा ? यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता, तदा व्यक्तिरेव न जातिः । अथ व्यतिरिक्ता; सा वस्तुभूता, अवस्तुभूता वा ? यदि वस्तुभूता; अभ्युपेतहानिः । अथ अवस्तुभूता; तदतिः% कथम् ? न च उदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वममुप [M 45b]पद्यते । यथा च नोपपद्यते तथा निवेदितं नैयायिकप्रत्यक्षलक्षणाधिकारे ।

It may be argued : A genus (i.e. the genus water) is (only) the exclusion of non-waterness. (We ask —) Is it (i.e. the genus water) non-different from the water individuals or different from them ? If it is (said to be) non-different, then it is but an individual, not a genus. If it is (said to be) different is it real or unreal ? If it is (said to be) real, you give up your position (of not recognising a genus as a real entity). If it is (said to be) unreal, how can one have a knowledge of it ? Moreover, the manyness of water-individuals is not a tenable proposition. How it is not a tenable proposition has been pointed out in the section on the Nyāya definition of perception².

1. To apprehend pleasure, etc is to have pleasure, etc. and so there is no question of having them once more.

x. S : omits तदा

% M : तदतिः

2. See PP.— Pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya Parīkṣā

अथ स्वोत्पादकार्थप्रापकत्वमविसंवादकत्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; नयनालोकमनस्कारादेः प्रत्यस्तमितत्वात्।
अथ स्वोत्पादकारकाणां ध्रुवभावित्वम् अविसंवादस्तदभावे तदभावप्रसङ्गात्; यद्येवं
केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि ध्रुवभावाकारणाविसंवादोऽस्ति, अन्यथा आकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। एवं
चाव्यवस्थिते यदुक्तम् — “न ह्याभ्यामर्थं परिच्छिद्य प्रवर्तमानोऽर्थक्रियायां विसंवाद्यते” इति
तद्बालविलसितम्।

If non-discrepancy means its making us reach the entity that produced it (i.e. knowledge), that is not proper, for eyes (i.e. the organ of sight), light, mind (attention), etc. (which went to produce this knowledge) would perish (by the time, as they are momentary according to the Buddhists). It may be argued that non-discrepancy means the invariable occurrence of the causal factors generating it (i.e. knowledge). On the ground that in the absence of it (i.e. knowledge itself). (We reply :) If this is so, the knowledge of ‘Keśoṇḍuka’ also should possess non-discrepancy in the form of the invariable occurrence (of its causal factors), otherwise there would be the contingency of its being accidental¹. This not being established, the statement, ‘A person who proceeds to act after having known an object by these two (sources of valid-knowledge, viz. perception and inference) is never betrayed (lit. never faces discrepancy) in respect of purposive activity (arthakriyā)’—is childish fancy.

[३. सौगतसंमताया मानमेयसंख्याया निरसनम् ।]

[S 30] तथा, मानमेयसंख्यापि सौगतमते नोपपद्यते। तदेव कथम् ? क[M 46a]थ्यते—
द्वे एव प्रमाणे न मानन्तरमस्ति। तद्वित्त्वं किं व्यक्तिभेदेन, आकारभेदेन, विषयभेदेन वा ? यदि
व्यक्तिभेदेन; तदा अपरिसंख्येयत्वं ज्ञानव्यक्तीनामानन्त्याद्—द्वित्वानुपपत्तिः। न च ज्ञानानां भेदोऽस्ति;
अज्ञानाद्वि(द्वि)ज्ञानज्ञानात्मतया भिद्यते, ज्ञानान्तरात्तु कथं निवर्तते—किं ज्ञानात्मतया, आकारान्तरेण
वा ? यदि ज्ञानाकारतया भिद्यते; तदा अन्येषाम् अज्ञानात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गः रसादेरिव। अथ आकारान्तरेण
व्यावर्तते; तदा अज्ञानात्मता तस्य उत्पद्यते रसादेरिव। अथ आकारभेदे ज्ञानयोर्भेदः%, सोप्यनुप[M
46b]पन्न एव; ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्नकारान्तरमस्ति। तदुपगमे वा ज्ञानाकारविरहः
स्यात्। न च आकारसमूहात्मकं ज्ञानम्, तस्याभिन्नात्मकत्वात्।

x M & S : “कारणाविसंवादो”

1. Every knowledge – valid or otherwise must invariably have a set of causes giving rise to it. Otherwise, knowledge would be something just accidental, happening by chance and without any cause.

#. M : अज्ञानाद् विज्ञानम्

% M & S : “भेदे ज्ञानयोर्

[3. Refuting the Buddhist enumeration of the sources of valid knowledge and the knowables.]

Similarly, even the number assigned in the Buddhist theory to the sources of valid knowledge (māna) and to the knowables is not tenable. How is that ? We explain—the Buddhists hold that—) There are only two sources of valid knowledge and there is no other source of valid knowledge. (We ask—) Is there this duality with reference to the difference of individuals or the difference of shape, or the difference of object ? If it is (said to be) with reference to the difference of individuals, then there should be innumerable sources of valid knowledge in as much as there is an infinite number of individual pieces of knowledge,—so that duality is not tenable¹. Moreover, there can obtain no difference between pieces of knowledge for a knowledge differs from non-knowledge by virtue of its being of the nature of knowledge, but how could it differ from another knowledge ? Could it do so by its being of the nature of knowledge, or by virtue of another shape ? If it is (said to be) different by virtue of its being of the shape of knowledge, then there would be the contingency of the others (i.e. the other pieces of knowledge) being of the nature of non-knowledge, like earth etc. (which are of the nature of non-knowledge and are different from knowledge). If (knowledge) is different (from another knowledge) by virtue of another shape, then (the contingency of its being of) the nature of non-knowledge arises in its case, (—that is to say, it itself would have to be regarded as non-knowledge), like earth, etc. If the two sources of knowledge² are (said to be) different on account of difference of shape, that also is only untenable; perception and inference have no shape other than the shape of knowledge. And if it were recognised (i.e. if perception and inference are recognised as having any other shape), then there would be the absence of the shape of knowledge. Certainly, knowledge is not of the nature of an assemblage of shapes, for it is by nature something undifferentiated.³

1. There are infinite cases of knowledge—so that if the number of the sources of knowledge be determined with reference to these, one should recognise innumerable sources of knowledge.
2. There should be the reading ‘mānayaḥ bhedaḥ’ for ‘jñānayaḥ bhedaḥ’
3. The Tattvopaplavavādin says that knowledge can have only one undifferentiated character, it can be just knowledge, it is not possessed of an aggregate of different characters. Thus, two pieces of knowledge cannot differ from each other in character, in as much as such a difference would mean that one of them atleast is not knowledge. In one word, he is not prepared to accept that knowledge may be of different types.

अथ विषयभेदेन द्वैविध्यमुपपाद्यते; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य विषयार्थो वक्तव्यः—किम् अग्न्यादिस्वलक्षणविषयम्, विद्यमानसामान्यविषयम्, अपारमार्थिकसामान्य विषयं वा, निर्विषयं वा, स्वांशविषयं वा ? यदि अग्न्यादिस्वलक्षणविषयम्; तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः भेदानुपपत्तिः, अभिन्नविषयत्वात् । अथ आनुमानिके ज्ञाने अग्नि[M 47a]मात्रं प्रतीयते, प्रत्यक्षे तु ताण्डीविशेषात्मतया प्रतीयते; यद्येवं स्वलक्षणविषयत्वं नातिवर्तते^x अनुमानस्य यदि नाम वह्नेरेव प्रपञ्चता । अथ सत्सामान्यविषयत्वम् तथापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदोऽस्ति, सामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणरूपत्वात् । न च सत्सामान्यस्य विज्ञानविषयतोपपद्यते, नित्यत्वेन जनकत्वाकारार्पकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न च सत्सामान्यविषयत्वे भ्रान्ततोपपद्यते । “भ्रान्तिरप्यर्थसम्बन्धतः प्रमा” इ[S 31]ति न वक्तव्यम् । अथ असत्सामान्यविषयम्; न तर्हि तस्य भ्रान्तता असतः स्वेन रूपेणवि[M 47a]द्यमानत्वात् । न च असद् विषयभावं प्रतिपद्यते, जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वव्यतिरेकात् । अव्यतिरेके वा वस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गः, तत्प्रसक्तौ च प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः ।

Now, if duality (of the sources of valid knowledge) is justified on the ground of a difference of objects, then it will have to be pointed out what thing acts as object in the case of inferential cognition—Does it have for its object the extreme particular (Svalakṣaṇa), fire, etc, or a universal; which is existent (i.e. real), or an unreal universal ? Or is it objectless, or does it have itself (lit. the self aspect) for its object ? If it (i.e. inferential cognition) is said to have the extreme particular, fire, etc, for its object, then there would be no difference between perception and inference, for in that case they would be having no different objects. It may be argued that whereas fire alone (i.e. fire in general) is cognised in inferential cognition, fire is cognised in perception as possessed of the particular character like ‘produced by hay’ etc¹. (—our rejoinder is—) If this is so, the fact of having the extreme particular for its object holds good in the case of inference, if all these (i.e. fires possessed of different particularities) be the various types of fire itself². If (it is said that) it (i.e. inference) has real universal for its object, even then there would be no difference between perception and inference, for in that case, a universal would be of the form of an

x. M : नातिवर्तते

1. The opponent's arguments is that inference can give knowledge of just fire, it cannot tell you whether the fire is fuelled by wood or hay or the like; that is to say, the distinguishing characteristics of different fires cannot be cognised by inference, whereas perception can acquaint us with these also.
2. i.e. whether it is fire arising out of hay or any other fire, it is fire all the same. so there would not be any difference between perception and inference as both would have the extreme particular for their object.

extreme particular¹. Moreover, a real universal cannot possibly be an object of cognition, for being eternal, it can neither give rise to knowledge nor impress its own shape on it². Again, if it is said to have a real universal for its object, its erroneousness could not be tenable. And then you should not say. “**Though erroneous, it is valid knowledge on account of its connection with a (particular) thing.**”³ If it (i.e. inference) is said to have an unreal universal for its object, then it would not be erroneous, for in that case what would happen is that an unreal thing is known⁴ in its own(true) form. Moreover, what is unreal cannot become an object of knowledge, for it is devoid of the capacity to give rise (to knowledge) or to impression its own shape (on knowledge). Or if it were not devoid of this capacity, it would be a real entity, and in the event of that contingency, the difference of perception and inference would not be tenable.

अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि मानयोर्भेदोऽस्ति, अनुमानज्ञानस्य विषयाऽसंभवात् । नापि भ्रान्तता निर्विषयत्वादेव । न च ज्ञानस्य स्वसत्तामात्रेण भ्रान्तता अभ्रान्तता च उपपद्यते, किन्तु परोपधानवशात् । अथ स्वांशविषयम्; तथापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः, नानात्वाम् उभयोः[M 48a]स्वलक्षणविषयत्वात् । न चानुमानज्ञानस्य भ्रान्तता स्वांशस्याऽवञ्चनात् ।

If it (i.e. inference) is (said to be) objectless, then there are no two different sources of valid knowledge, for then there will be no possibility of there being an object in the case of inferential cognition (and what lacks an object cannot be a distinct source of valid knowledge). And precisely because it is objectless, it will not be erroneous either. Certainly, knowledge taken by

1. According to the Buddhists, only an extreme particular is existent and real. Hence if a universal be regarded as existent and real, it too must be of the form of an extreme particular.
2. A universal is regarded as eternal by both the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists, and as such it must have one eternal character. It should always give rise to knowledge and always impress its shape on it or never do it. It cannot at times do so and at other times not do it. That an object impresses its own shape on the knowledge of itself is a Sautrantika Buddhist position.
3. The Buddhists regard inference as erroneous (bhrānta) though valid. It is erroneous, because it pertains to a universal which is unreal, and is valid as it finally leads the cogniser to an extreme particular (svalakṣaṇa). See Nyāyabinduṭīkā-1.1
4. The reading should be ‘vedyamānatvāt’ for ‘vidyamānatvāt’.

itself cannot be either erroneous or non-erroneous, but it is so only with reference to something else (i.e. with reference to its object)¹. If it is said to have itself for its object, even then perception and inference could not be different, for in that case both would be having an extreme particular for their object². And in that case inferential cognition could not be erroneous, for certainly it is not deceived with respect to itself.³

तथा प्रत्यक्षस्यापि विषयो वक्तव्यः—किं रूपादिस्वलक्षणविषयम्, आत्मविषयम्, उभयविषयं वा ? तद्यदि रूपादिमात्रालोचकम्; तदयुक्तम्; तदनवगतौ एतद्गत्यभावात् । अथ ज्ञानमात्रकायावगाहकम्; तदपि नोपपद्यते, विषयभावस्यजनकत्वा-ऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन व्यवस्थितेः । न च स्वात्मनि जनकत्वमाकारार्पकत्वं चोपपद्यते—विषयिणमपेक्ष्य विषयो भवति, यथा कार[M 48b]णमपेक्ष्य कार्यं, कार्यं चापेक्ष्य कारणं तथेहापि । यदि च प्रत्यक्षज्ञानेन आत्ममात्रम् आत्मसात् क्रियते; तदाऽनुमानेप्येतदस्ति प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः । अथ उभयं विषयी क्रियते, तदप्ययुक्तम्; एकोपलम्भस्य द्वितीयाकारपरिहारेण व्यवस्थितत्वात् । यदि च रूपगृहीतिरेव ज्ञानगृहीतिः, तदा रूपस्य ज्ञानरूपता, ज्ञानस्य वा रूपरूपता, रूपगृहीतेर्वा रूपाऽव्यवस्थापकत्वम् । न च एकस्य आकारद्वयं पश्यामः ।

Similarly, the object of perception will have to be pointed out—Does it (i.e. perception) have for its object an extreme particular like colour, etc, or itself or both ? If it is said to cognise colour, etc. alone, that is not proper, for if it (i.e. perception itself) were not known, there would be no knowledge of this (i.e. colour).⁴ If it is said to cognise the body of knowledge alone (i.e. knowledge alone), that also does not stand to reason; for it is established that an object is what gives rise (to knowledge) and impresses its own shape (on knowledge), but a thing (here, knowledge) cannot possibly give rise to itself; just as an effect has a necessary reference to its cause and a cause to its effect, so also is the case here. Moreover, if perceptual cognition makes just itself the object of itself, then this is true of inference also, and in that case the distinction

1. Knowledge is non-erroneous if it is true of its object; it is erroneous if it is not thus true.
2. Does it have itself for its object ? But it itself is an extreme particular, and so this fact could not form the basis of there being a difference of nature between perception and inference.
3. Inferential cognition cognises itself as itself really is – even if the Buddhist says that it does not cognise its object as it really is.
4. perception cannot have colour, etc for its object without at the sametime having itself for its object. This is a Sautrāntika-Buddhist position and Jayarāśi is using it.

between perception and inference would not be tenable. If both (i.e. colour, etc and itself) are said (to be) made the object, that also is not proper; for the cognition of one object is established as excluding the shape of another object. And if the cognition of colour were itself the cognition of knowledge, then colour would be of the form of knowledge, or knowledge of the form of colour, or the cognition of colour would not be able to establish (the existence of) colour. Moreover, we do not see a duality of shape in the case of one thing (-here, knowledge).

न च द्वित्वावधारणा(ण) मिहो[M 49a]पपद्यते । प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानम् आत्मानं गृह्णदुपजायते नानुमानं विषययति । तथा, अनुमानमपि आत्मानमात्मसात्कुर्वदुपजायते, न प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमव[S 32]द्योतयति । एवं द्वित्वसंख्याव्यवहारानुपपत्तिः । अथ विकल्पेन द्वावधारणमिति चेत्; तदयुक्तम्; असावपि आत्मसंवेदन पर्यवसितत्वात् द्वयं गृह्णाति । ग्रहणे वा अभ्युपेतहानम् । तदनुपपत्तौ च द्वे एवेति जडचेष्टितम् ॥ छ ॥

Moreover, it is not tenable to make a definitive assertion to the effect that there are two and only two (sources of valid knowledge). Perceptual cognition arises grasping itself, it does not make inference its object. So also, inference arises making itself the object (i.e. knowing its own identity); it does not illuminate (i.e. know) perceptual cognition¹. Thus the number two cannot be spoken of (in connection with enumerating the sources of valid knowledge). If (you say that) the duality in question is ascertained by thought (vikalpa)²,—that is not proper, for it too being of the nature of a self-cognisant entity does not cognise the duality in question. Or if it were (said) to cognise (the duality in question) you give up your own position (that a piece of knowledge can be cognised only by itself). And it (i.e. the duality in question) (thus) not being accounted for, (to say) that there are only two (sources of valid knowledge) is a silly prank.

[४. सौगतसंमतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा ।]

तथा, “प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढमभ्रान्तम्” [न्यायबिन्दु-१.४] इति न वक्तव्यम्, कल्पनापोढपदस्य

x. M : “णाम्”

1. That is to say, there is never an awareness of two cognitions at the sametime, and so it is not possible to establish that cognitions are of two types, viz. perceptual and inferential.
2. ‘vikalpa’ is the Buddhist’s general word for ‘thought’, ‘intellection’; inference is a sub-species of it.

अपोहयार्थासं[M 49b] भवात् ननु कल्पनैव अपोहया; केयं कल्पना-किं गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं कल्पना, आहो स्मृत्युत्पादकं विज्ञानं कल्पना, स्मृतिरूपं वा, स्मृत्युत्पाद्यं वा, अभिलापसंसर्ग निर्भासो वा, अभिलापवती प्रतीतिर्वा कल्पना, अस्पष्टाकारा वा, अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपा वा, स्वयं वाऽतात्त्विकी, त्रिरूपास्त्रिङ्गतोऽर्थहृत्वा, अतीताऽनागतार्थनिर्भासा वा ?

[4. Examination of the Buddhist definition of perception.]

Similarly, it should not be said that perception is devoid of construction and is 'non-erroneous' (Nyāyabindu-1.4) for there is nothing whatsoever that can possibly be excluded by (an inclusion of) the term 'devoid of construction.' (Objection) why, construction (Kalpanā) itself if to be excluded. (Reply-) what is this construction? Is construction, the cognition that is produced by such peculiar characteristics (viśeṣaṇa) as quality, movement, genus, etc? Or is construction the cognition that gives rise to memory? Or is it the cognition that is of the form of memory? Or is it the cognition that is produced by memory? Or is it the cognition that reflects (i.e. grasps) association with a verbal designation (abhilāpa-saṃsarga-nirbhāsa)? Or is it the cognition that is possessed of a verbal designation (abhilāpa)? Or is it the cognition of a non-lucid shape (i.e. a cognition that is not lucid)? Or is it of the form of the cognition of an unreal object? Or is it itself unreal? Or is it the cognition that takes note of a thing with the help of the 'three-aspected mark'¹ (trirūpaliṅga)? Or is it the cognition that reflects (i.e. grasps) a past or a future thing?

तद्यदि गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं [M 50a] न कल्पना; तत्किम् अविद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादि विशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पना, उत विद्यमानोत्पाद्यत्वेन? तद्यदि अविद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; अविद्यमानस्य जनकत्वाभावादेव अकल्पनात्वम्। अथ विद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पना, तत्किं सविषयं कल्पनाज्ञानम्, निर्विषयं वा? तद्यदि सविषयं सत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्, तदयुक्तम्, गुणचलनजात्यादिजन्यत्वेऽपि [M 50b] न कल्पनात्वम् अर्थसामर्थ्यसमृद्धवत्त्वस्याऽनतिवृत्तेः। अथ निर्विषयं सत् कल्पना; तदा निर्विषयत्वमेव कल्पनात्वे कारणं न गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणजन्यत्वम्। यदि च तन्निर्विषयम्; तदा न कल्पनाज्ञानम्, नाप्यकल्पनाज्ञानम्, ज्ञानमात्रता स्यात्। ज्ञानात्मतया च कल्पनात्वे सर्वं ज्ञानं कल्पनाज्ञानं स्यात्।

1. This is stcherbatsky's rendering of the term. The three aspects of a mark of inference are (i) a compulsory presence in the referred locus (Pakṣe sattvam eva), (ii) a presence in the similar cases alone (sapakṣe eva sattvam), and (a) a compulsory absence in the dissimilar cases (Vipakṣāt Vyāvṛttiḥ eva)

Now, if the cognition produced by the peculiar characteristics—quality, movement genus, etc. is said to be construction, (we ask :) Is it construction by virtue of its being produced by the existing characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc; or by virtue of its being produced by the non-existing such characteristics? If it is construction by virtue of its being produced by the non-existing characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc—that is not proper; for what is non-existent cannot at all be generative and this precisely is why there can be no construction (in the present sense) (i.e. in the sense of being something produced by certain non-existing characteristics). If it is (said to be) construction by virtue of its being produced by the existing characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc, (we ask :) Does this constructional cognition (kalpanā-jñāna) have an object, or is it objectless? If it as having an object that it is constructional cognition, that is not proper; certainly even though it is produced by quality movement, genus, etc. the cognition in question is no construction, in as much as it does not cease to be something produced by the potency of an object¹. If it is as being objectless, that it is (said to be) construction, then objectlessness itself is the cause of its being produced by the characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc. Moreover, if it is construction, and not the fact of its being (said to be) objectless, then it cannot be constructional cognition, nor even non-constructional cognition; it would be just cognition. And if it is (said to be) construction on account of its being cognition, then all cognition should be constructional cognition².

[S 33] अथ स्मृत्युत्पादकं ज्ञानं कल्पना; तदयुक्तम्; रूपादिदर्शनादपि स्मृतिरुत्पद्यते, न च कल्पनात्वम्। 'यत्सन्निधाने यो दृष्टः तद्दृष्टेस्ततौ ('तद्ध्वनौ)' *स्मृतिः' इति वचनात्।

If the cognition giving rise to memory is (said to be) construction, that is not proper; memory arises also from the perception of colour, etc, and yet it (i.e. this perception) is not (regarded as) construction. For it is said, "When a thing is (once) perceived in the proximity of another thing, the latter's percep-

1. The cognition which is produced by its object of the form of a really existing thing is perception, not thought (vikalpa)—so that the cognition in question being produced by its object of the form of the really existing quality, etc. ought to be perception, not thought.
2. This is a refutation of Dinnāga who has spoken of the five types of Kalpanā, viz. those having a reference to (i) a name (nāman) (ii) a genus (jāti), (iii) a quality (guṇa), (iv) a movement (kriyā) and (v) a substance (dravya).—see pramāṇasamuccya, I-3.

* सन्मतिं पृ. ५२३

x. So in M : Ś s conjecture unnecessary

अपोहयार्थासं[M 49b] भवात् ननु कल्पनैव अपोहया; केयं कल्पना-किं गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं कल्पना, आहो स्मृत्युत्पादकं विज्ञानं कल्पना, स्मृतिरूपं वा, स्मृत्युत्पाद्यं वा, अभिलापसंसर्ग निर्भासो वा, अभिलापवती प्रतीतिर्वा कल्पना, अस्पष्टाकारा वा, अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपा वा, स्वयं वाऽतात्त्विकी, त्रिरूपाल्लङ्घितोऽर्थगवा, अतीताऽनागतार्थनिर्भासा वा ?

[4. Examination of the Buddhist definition of perception.]

Similarly, it should not be said that perception is devoid of construction and is 'non-erroneous' (Nyāyabindu-1.4) for there is nothing whatsoever that can possibly be excluded by (an inclusion of) the term 'devoid of construction.' (Objection) why, construction (Kalpanā) itself if to be excluded. (Reply-) what is this construction? Is construction, the cognition that is produced by such peculiar characteristics (viśeṣaṇa) as quality, movement, genus, etc? Or is construction the cognition that gives rise to memory? Or is it the cognition that is of the form of memory? Or is it the cognition that is produced by memory? Or is it the cognition that reflects (i.e. grasps) association with a verbal designation (abhilāpa-saṃsarga-nirbhāsa)? Or is it the cognition that is possessed of a verbal designation (abhilāpa)? Or is it the cognition of a non-lucid shape (i.e. a cognition that is not lucid)? Or is it of the form of the cognition of an unreal object? Or is it itself unreal? Or is it the cognition that takes note of a thing with the help of the 'three-aspected mark'¹ (trirūpaliṅga)? Or is it the cognition that reflects (i.e. grasps) a past or a future thing?

तद्यदि गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं [M 50a] न कल्पना; तत्किम् अविद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादि विशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पना, उत विद्यमानोत्पाद्यत्वेन? तद्यदि अविद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; अविद्यमानस्य जनकत्वाभावादेव अकल्पनात्वम्। अथ विद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पना, तत्किं सविषयं कल्पनाज्ञानम्, निर्विषयं वा? तद्यदि सविषयं सत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्, तदयुक्तम्, गुणचलनजात्यादिजन्यत्वेऽपि [M 50b] न कल्पनात्वम् अर्थसामर्थ्यसमृद्धवत्त्वस्याऽनतिवृत्तेः। अथ निर्विषयं सत् कल्पना; तदा निर्विषयत्वमेव कल्पनात्वे कारणं न गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणजन्यत्वम्। यदि च तन्निर्विषयम्; तदा न कल्पनाज्ञानम्, नाप्यकल्पनाज्ञानम्, ज्ञानमात्रता स्यात्। ज्ञानात्मतया च कल्पनात्वे सर्वं ज्ञानं कल्पनाज्ञानं स्यात्।

1. This is stcherbatsky's rendering of the term. The three aspects of a mark of inference are (i) a compulsory presence in the referred locus (Pakṣe sattvam eva), (ii) a presence in the similar cases alone (sapakṣe eva sattvam), and (a) a compulsory absence in the dissimilar cases (Vipakṣāt Vyāvṛttiḥ eva)

Now, if the cognition produced by the peculiar characteristics—quality, movement genus, etc. is said to be construction, (we ask :) Is it construction by virtue of its being produced by the existing characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc; or by virtue of its being produced by the non-existing such characteristics? If it is construction by virtue of its being produced by the non-existing characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc—that is not proper; for what is non-existent cannot at all be generative and this precisely is why there can be no construction (in the present sense) (i.e. in the sense of being something produced by certain non-existing characteristics). If it is (said to be) construction by virtue of its being produced by the existing characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc, (we ask :) Does this constructional cognition (kalpanā-jñāna) have an object, or is it objectless? If it as having an object that it is constructional cognition, that is not proper; certainly even though it is produced by quality movement, genus, etc. the cognition in question is no construction, in as much as it does not cease to be something produced by the potency of an object¹. If it is as being objectless, that it is (said to be) construction, then objectlessness itself is the cause of its being produced by the characteristics quality, movement, genus, etc. Moreover, if it is construction, and not the fact of its being (said to be) objectless, then it cannot be constructional cognition, nor even non-constructional cognition; it would be just cognition. And if it is (said to be) construction on account of its being cognition, then all cognition should be constructional cognition².

[S 33]अथ स्मृत्युत्पादकं ज्ञानं कल्पना; तदयुक्तम्; रूपादिदर्शनादपि स्मृतिरुत्पद्यते, न च कल्पनात्वम्। 'यत्सन्निधाने यो दृष्टः तद्दृष्टेस्ततौ (तद्ध्वनौ)*स्मृतिः' इति वचनात्।

If the cognition giving rise to memory is (said to be) construction, that is not proper; memory arises also from the perception of colour, etc, and yet it (i.e. this perception) is not (regarded as) construction. For it is said, "When a thing is (once) perceived in the proximity of another thing, the latter's percep-

1. The cognition which is produced by its object of the form of a really existing thing is perception, not thought (vikalpa)—so that the cognition in question being produced by its object of the form of the really existing quality, etc. ought to be perception, not thought.
2. This is a refutation of Dinnāga who has spoken of the five types of Kalpanā, viz. those having a reference to (i) a name (nāman) (ii) a genus (jāti), (iii) a quality (guṇa), (iv) a movement (kriyā) and (v) a substance (dravya)—see pramāṇasamuccya, I-3.

* सन्मतिं पृ. ५२३

x. So in M : Ś s conjecture unnecessary

tion (at a subsequent date) gives rise to the memory of the former's name".

अथ स्मृतिरूपत्वेन कल्पना; तत्रापि किं गृहीतग्राहित्वेन, निर्विषयत्वेन, अपूर्वार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वेन वा ? [M 51a] तद्यदि गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा प्रथमानुभवस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वाविशेषात् इत्युक्तं पुरस्तात् । अथ निर्विषयत्वेन; तदा न कल्पनाकारता नाप्यकल्पनाकारता ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकेण ।

If it is (said to be) construction by virtue of its being of the form of memory, (we ask :) Is it such on account of its being the cognition of a thing that is cognised or its being objectless, or its being of the form of the cognition of a new object (i.e. an object not already cognised) ? If it is (said to be) construction on account of its being the cognition of a thing that is cognised, then even the first experience (of the thing in question) would come to be of the nature of construction, for it has been stated (i.e. shown by us) before that the latter is equally the cognition of a thing that is cognised. If (it is said to be construction) on account of its being objectless, -then it has neither the shape of construction nor even that of non-construction as distinct from the shape of cognition (-that is to say, in that case it would be cognition pure and simple).

अथापूर्वार्थगृहीतित्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; न स्मृतेरपूर्वार्थगृहीतित्वमस्ति तदभावात् कल्पनात्वम् । यदि च अपूर्वार्थगृहीतित्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; रूपादिज्ञानानां कल्पनात्वमापद्यते ।

If it is (said to be) construction on account of its being the cognition of a new object, that is not proper; memory is not the cognition of a new object, and so in the absence of this it cannot be construction. And if it (i.e. cognition) is recognised as construction on account of its being the cognition of a new thing, then cognition of colour, etc. would come to be construction.

अथ स्मृत्युत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा रूपादिज्ञानस्यापि निर्विकल्पकत्वेनाभिमतस्य स्मृत्युत्पाद्यत्वमस्ति, तदस्तु कल्पनाज्ञानम् । अथ न भवति तत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्* [M 51b] स्मृत्याबोधस्वभावतयोत्पादितं कल्पनाज्ञानं न% स्मरणाकारतयोत्पाद्यते; तदिदं मद्विकल्पान्दोलितबुद्धेः निरुपपत्तिकाऽभिधानम् । न ह्येकस्य स्वभावद्वयमुत्पश्यामः ।

If it is (said to be) construction by virtue of its being produced by memory, then since the fact of being produced by memory (possibly) holds

x. M : ज्ञानम्

% M & S : न - Eli Franco - तु

1. The reading should be 'Kalpanā-jñānāntu' for 'Kalpanā jñānān na'

good in the case of the cognition of colour, etc. which is recognised as being pure sensation (lit. free from vikalpa or kalpanā or construction), let it also be a case of constructional cognition. It may be urged that it (i.e. the cognition of colour in question) is not a case of constructional cognition because it is produced by memory in its capacity as (mere) cognition, -whereas constructional cognition¹ is produced by memory in its capacity as memory. But all that is senseless talk on the part of one whose mind is rendered confused by the dialectics of my argumentation. We fail to see how a thing can have a dual nature (-that is to say, how memory can act in two capacities).

अथ अभिलापसंसर्गप्रतिभासा प्रतीतिः कल्पना; स संसर्गः पारमार्थिकः, अपारमार्थिको वा ? यदि पारमार्थिकः, न तदा तस्य कल्पनात्वं रूपादिज्ञानस्येव । अथ अपारमार्थिकः, कथं तदाभं विज्ञानम्, नैरात्म्यप्रसङ्गात् न चाऽतात्त्विके विषयार्थः, कश्चिन्नश्यते, जनकत्वा-ऽऽकारार्पकत्व-सहोत्पादसत्तामात्रव्यतिरेकात् । यदि च अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपम्; [S 34] तदा विप[M 52a]र्ययज्ञानम् । तच्च अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितम्, न कल्पनापोढपदमुपादेयम् ।

If construction is (said to be) the cognition that reflects (i.e. grasps) association with a designation, (we ask-) Is this association real or unreal ? If it is (said to be) real, then the cognition in question cannot be construction, like the cognition of colour, etc. If it is (said to be) unreal, how could it be reflected in a cognition, for in that case there would be the contingency of it (i.e. the cognition in question) becoming essenceless. And what is unreal (e.g. the alleged association with a designation) can be an object of knowledge in no sense whatsoever, for there is in it the absence of a generative capacity, of a capacity to impress its own shape, of a simultaneous origination, of mere existence even¹. If it is (said to be) of the form of the cognition of an unreal object, then it would be erroneous knowledge, and that has been set aside by the term 'non-erroneous' (avyabhicāri)². So the term 'devoid of construction' should not be included (in the definition).

1. The unreal association of cognition with a verbal designation cannot be an object of knowledge, since object is that which generates knowledge, or impresses its own shape on knowledge or is produced simultaneously with knowledge (-idealistic view), or at least has existence.
2. Actually the word for 'non-erroneous' is 'abhrānta' in the Buddhist definition, not 'avyabhicāri', but Jayarāsi seems to have in his mind the corresponding term occurring in the Nyāya definition. It does not make any difference as far as the argument is concerned.

अथ अभिलापवती प्रतीतिः कल्पना किम्—अभिलापात्मिका, आहो अभिलापोत्पाद्या, अभिलापगृहीतिर्वा ? तद्यदि अभिलापात्मिका; प्रतीतिः कथम् ? प्रतीतिश्चेत्, 'अभिलापात्मिका' इति न वक्तव्यम् । विरुद्धाकारयोस्तादात्म्यव्यतिरेकात् । अथ अभिलापोत्पाद्या; तदा शब्दज्ञानानां कल्पनात्वमापद्यते । तेषां च कल्पनात्वे शब्दव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः स्यात् । *अभिलापगृहीतित्वे [M 52b] न कल्पनात्वम्, तदा सर्वासाम् अभिलापगृहीतीनाम् कल्पनात्वमापद्यते, तत्कल्पनात्वे शब्दव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः ।

If construction be the cognition that is possessed of a verbal designation, (we ask :) Is it of the nature of a verbal designation, or is it capable of being generated by a verbal designation, or is it the cognition of a verbal designation? Now if it is (said to be) of the nature of a verbal designation, how could it be a cognition? (—It would be word). On the other hand, if it is (treated as) a cognition, then it should not be said to be of the nature of a verbal designation. For two things that are of mutually contradictory natures cannot be identical with each other. If it is (said to be) capable of being generated by a verbal designation, then all cognitions pertaining to words would come to be construction. And if they were construction, then to determine the exact nature (i.e. the exact import) of a word would be an untenable proposition. If it is (said to be) construction by reason of its being the cognition of a verbal designation, then all cognitions pertaining to verbal designations would come to be construction. And if they were construction, then to determine the exact nature (i.e. the exact import) of a word would be an untenable proposition.

[१. प्रसङ्गायाताया अस्पष्टताया विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]

अथ अस्पष्टाकारा प्रतीतिः कल्पना; अस्पष्टता का ? किम् अविज्ञानात्मकत्वम्, आहो स्वलक्षणाजन्यत्वम्, अथ प्रतीयमानार्थजन्यत्वम्, प्रतीयमानासत्यता वा, स्वलक्षणाप्रतिभासिता [M 53a] वा ? तद्यदि अविज्ञानात्मकत्वमस्पष्टता; तदयुक्तम्; प्रतीतिरिह अस्पष्टाकारा गीयते, सा कथं अविज्ञानात्मिका* भवितुमर्हति ? अथ स्वलक्षणाजन्यता अस्पष्टता; तदा ज्ञानाकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ प्रतीयमानार्थजन्यत्वम्; तदा रागादिसंवेदनस्य अस्पष्टता प्राप्तनोति, रागादीनां स्वात्मसंवे [M 53b] दनोत्पादकत्वाऽयोगात्, स्वात्मोत्पादकत्वं वस्तूनां न दृष्टपूर्वम् । तथा केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्या(स्य)% प्रतीयमानकेशोण्डुकोत्पाद्यत्वं न विद्यते, तदप्य(पि) स्पष्टा# भमुपजायते न तु अस्पष्टाभम्, “न विकल्पानुबद्धस्य स्पष्टार्थप्रतिभासिता” [प्रमाणवा. ३. २८३] इति वचनात् ।

*. M & S : अभि — Eli Franco — अथाभि

x. S : विज्ञानात्मिका — Eli Franco — अविज्ञानात्मिका

% M : “ज्ञानस्याप्र”

#. M : तेदप्यस्य

[1. A Dialectical Refutation of the incidentally occurring concept of non-lucidity (aspaṣṭatā).]

If the cognition of a non-lucid character is (said to be) construction, (we ask :) what is non-lucidity? Is it the fact of being of the nature of non-cognition, or of not being produced by an extreme particular (svalakṣaṇa), or of not being produced by the object that is cognised, or is it the non-reflection of an extreme particular? If non-lucidity is (said to be) the fact of being of the nature of non-cognition, that is not proper; it is a cognition that is here stated to be of a non-lucid character, how could it be of the nature of non-cognition? ¹ If non-lucidity is (said to be) the fact of not being produced by an extreme particular, then there would be the contingency of chance. (i.e. causeless) ². If (non-lucidity) is (said to be) the fact of not being produced by the object cognised, then the apprehension of pleasure, etc. would come to be non-lucid, for pleasure, etc. cannot themselves produce a cognition concerning themselves; certainly, it has never been found as yet that a thing produces itself ³. Similarly, the cognition of keṣoṇḍuka is not produced by the keṣoṇḍuka that is cognised; even then it arises as possessed of lucidity, not as possessed of non-lucidity. For it is said, “That (knowledge) which is associated with thought (vikalpa, construction) does not reflect its object lucidly” (pramāṇavārtika, 3.283)

अथ स्वलक्षणाप्रतिभासित्वमस्पष्टता; तदा निर्विकल्पाभिमतकेशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्य अस्पष्टता प्राप्नोति, तत्र स्वल [S 35] क्षणस्याप्रतिभासनात् स्पष्टाभं च तद्गीयते । न च तथागते दर्शने तथाभूतं ज्ञानमस्ति यत् स्वलक्षणाप्रतिभासि, सर्वस्मिन् ज्ञाने ज्ञानकायप्रतिभासना [M 54a] त् ।

If non-lucidity is (said to be) the fact of its (i.e. of the cognition in question) not reflecting an extreme particular, then the cognition of Keṣoṇḍuka which is recognised as pure sensation (nirvikalpa-devoid of construction) would come to be non-lucid in as much as there is not reflected in it an extreme particular; yet it (i.e. the latter cognition) is stated to be lucid. In fact, according to the Buddhist system of philosophy, there is no cognition that

1. There is an error in the text. The word should be ‘avijñānātmikā’, not ‘vijñātmikā’.

2. If svalakṣaṇas (extreme particulars) are the only real entities, then a thing not having a svalakṣaṇa for its cause must be a thing not having a real cause.

3. As has been noted earlier, the Buddhist identifies pleasure, etc. with the cognition of themselves. Hence Jayarāśi’s present objection.

x. कार्य — परि° ।

does not reflect an extreme particular; for (the system maintains that) the body of cognition is reflected in all cognition¹.

अथ प्रतीयमानासत्यता* अस्पष्टता; तदा केशोण्डुककेन्दुद्वयविज्ञानस्य अस्पष्टता प्राप्तोति । न च प्रतीयमानस्यासत्यता, विज्ञानकार्यस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् । न च तस्य विसंवादोऽस्ति ।

If non-lucidity is (said to signify) the falsity of what is cognised, then the cognition of keśoṇḍuka or of two moons would come to be non-lucid. Moreover, (in the case under consideration) what is cognised is not something false, for it is the body of cognition that is cognised. (and this body of cognition is certainly something real). Nor is it (i.e. self cognition on the part of a piece of cognition). Something discrepant (Thus, if non-lucidity cannot be defined, construction cannot be defined as the cognition of a non-lucid character).

अथ अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपा कल्पना; तदा केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते । अथ स्वयमतात्त्विकी; तदा प्रतीतिः कथम् ? प्रतीतिश्चेद् अतात्त्विकी कथम् ? ।

(Now to return to our point), if construction is (said to be) of the form of the cognition of an unreal object, then the cognition of Keśoṇḍuka also comes to be of the nature of construction. If it (i.e. construction) is itself something unreal, how can it be a cognition ? (And) if it be a cognition, how can it be something unreal ?

अथ त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थहृक् कल्पना इति चेत् ? सापि किं लिङ्गजन्यत्वेन कल्पना, आहो निर्विषयत्वेन ? तद्यदि लिङ्गजन्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्, तदा लिङ्गा[M 54b]वगाहकनिर्विकल्पविज्ञानस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते । न च अनुमेयज्ञानस्याव्यवधानेन लिङ्गोत्पाद्यत्वमस्ति ।

If (it said that) construction is the cognition that takes note of an object with the help of a 'three-aspected mark (of inference)'. (We ask :). Then too is it construction by virtue of its being produced by a mark of inference, or on account of its being objectless ? Now, if it is (said to be) construction by virtue of its being produced by a mark of inference, then even the non-constructive cognition (i.e. the pure sensation) apprehending this mark of inference, then even the non-constructive cognition (i.e. the pure sensation) apprehending this mark of inference will come to be construction (in as much as it is pro-

1. That is to say, all cognition is necessarily self revelatory. And since a piece of cognition is a Svalakṣaṇa, what reveals cognition reveals a Svalakṣaṇa.

* S : प्रतीयमानासत्यता — Eli Franco — प्रतीयमानासत्याता*

duced by this mark). Moreover, the inferential cognition is not directly produced by the mark of inference (so it cannot be regarded as construction)¹.

अथ निर्विषयत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदपि न योयुज्यते; स्वांशविषयत्वादनुमानज्ञानस्य । अथ स्वांशविषयव्यतिरिक्तविषयो नास्ति, निर्विषयत्वेन कल्पनात्वमपदिश्यते; तदा केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते ।

if it is (said to be) construction on account of its being objectless, that also is not proper, for the inferential cognition has itself (lit. self-aspect) for its object (-that is to say, like any other cognition, the inferential cognition too cognises itself). If it is urged that it has nothing except itself for its object and so is said to be construction on account of its being objectless, (then our reply is that) in that case the cognition of Keśoṇḍuka also comes to be construction (in as much as that cognition too has nothing except itself for its object).

अथ यत् निर्विकल्पकं तत् विस्पष्टतयोपजायते । आनुमानिकं तु अस्पष्टाभं तेन तत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्; तदयुक्तम्; अस्पष्टता च यथा न संभवति तथा प्रागेवोक्ता ।

It may be urged that, that which is pure sensation (lit. free from mental construction) arises as very lucid, but the inferential cognition is non-lucid, and so is constructional in character. (Our reply is—) This is not proper. It has already been shown how non-lucidity is not possible.

[२. प्रसङ्गायातायाः प्रत्यक्षीयस्पष्टताया विकल्प्य विडम्बनम् ।]

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य च स्पष्टता का ? [M 55a] किं स्वलक्षणजन्यता, आहो स्वलक्षणप्रतिभासिता ? तद्यदि स्वलक्षणजन्यता; किं प्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता, तद्विपरीतस्वलक्षणजन्यता वा ? ।

[2. Dialectical Repudiation of the incidentally occurring concept of the Lucidity of perceptual cognition.]

And what is (this) lucidity of perceptual cognition ? Is it (i.e. does it signify) the fact of being produced by an extreme particular, or is it the fact of reflecting an extreme particular ? If it is (said to be) the fact of being produced by an extreme particular is it the fact of being produced by an extreme particular which is cognised, or of being produced by an extreme particular which is the reverse of this (i.e. which is not cognised).

1. On the Buddhist view, the mark of inference directly produces the perceptual cognition of itself, which cognition in its turn produces the inferential cognition of the probandum.

[S 36] तद्यदि प्रतीत्यारूढस्वलक्षणजन्यता; प्रतीतौ किमवभाति किमर्थः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा? तद्यदि अर्थः, तदयुक्तम्; अप्रतीतायां प्रतीतौ तदनवभासनात् । अथ ज्ञानम्; न तर्हि तद् आत्मानमुत्पादयति, स्वात्मनि क्रियाव्यतिरेकात् । अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; तदयुक्तम्; एकोपलम्भस्य द्वितीयाकारपरिहारस्थितधर्मत्वात् । यदि चोभयं प्रतिभा[M 55b]ति; तदा अर्थवत् ज्ञानेनापि ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते इत्यापद्यते । तच्चायुक्तम्, स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् ।

If it (i.e. lucidity) is (said to be) the fact of being produced by an extreme particular which has come within the scope of cognition (i.e. which is cognised), (we ask :) what is it that appears in cognition? – Is it object, cognition or both? Now if the object (is said to appear in the allegedly lucid perceptual cognition), that is not proper, for it cannot appear in a cognition which has not itself been cognised¹. If cognition is said to appear (in cognition), then (it means that) it does not produce itself for there can be no operation (by oneself) on oneself². If both (are said to) appear, that is not proper, for it is the characteristic of the cognition of one thing to exist so as to exclude another shape (–i.e. it does not allow another shape to appear in it). Moreover, if both (i.e. the object and cognition), (are said to) appear (in cognition), then it would mean that cognition is produced also by cognition itself–just as (it is produced) by the object. And that is not proper, for there is a contradiction involved in (the idea of) a thing operating on itself (i.e. the idea is self-contradictory).

अथ अप्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता; व(त)द्रतिः* कथम्? न प्रत्यक्षेण; अप्रतीयमानत्वादेव । नाप्यनुमानेन, स्वभावकार्य-लिङ्गानवगतेः । न स्वभावानुमानं तत्कार्यतादात्म्ये, तदनवगतौ तस्याऽनवगतेः । नापि कार्यानुमानम्; तद्भूतकार्यानुपलब्धेः, पिशाचपरमाणुमहेश्वरकल्पार्थोत्पादितं कार्यं नेहोपलभ्यते । अथ ज्ञानमेव तस्य लिङ्गम्; तदयुक्तम्; तेन सह तस्य सम्बन्धानवगतेश्चिन्मात्रतयैव% न त्वन्योऽर्थः, न च चित् आत्मानं जनय[M 56a]ति । समनन्तरज्ञानं तस्य हेतुः इति चेत्; तदयुक्तम्;

1. On the present alternative, cognition grasps just its object—and not also itself. Hence the objection.
2. On the present alternative, cognition must be produced by what appears in it, but if what appears in cognition is cognition itself. One cannot say that cognition is produced by what appears in it (– this in turn is because one cannot say that cognition is produced by itself).

x. M : वद् गतिः ।

% Perhaps a lacuna at this point; one could expect something like चिन्मात्रतयैव ज्ञानमुपलभ्यते. Eli Franco

तदवगतौ न मानमस्ति*, परसन्तानज्ञानार्थकल्पं तदपि न स्वसंवेद्यं तत्कार्यज्ञानस्य ततो# भिन्नत्वात् परसन्तानज्ञानार्थवत् । नाप्यनुमानेन; तदायत्तताया अनवगतेश्चिन्मात्रतयैव आत्मानमवगाहयति नान्यायत्ततया ततोऽन्यस्य पिशाचेश्वरे(र)⁰ तुल्यत्वात् । यदि च समनन्तरविज्ञानोत्पाद्यत्वेन स्पष्टता; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्यापि समनन्तरज्ञानोत्पाद्यत्वेन निर्विकल्पकत्वमनुषक्तम् ।

If it (i.e. lucidity) is (said to be) the fact of being produced by an extreme particular which is not cognised, (we ask :) How is it (i.e. the extreme particular in question) known? It is not known by perception, even because (as you say) it is not cognised. Nor also by inference, because no mark of inference of the nature of identity or Effect is known¹. There cannot be inference based on identity; for if there be an identity (of the extreme particular in question) with its effect (i.e. with the cognition produced by this extreme particular), then since it (i.e. the extreme particular in question) is not cognised, there should be no knowledge of its effect (i.e. of the cognition in question either)². Nor also can there be inference based on causality; for an effect produced by it (i.e. by the extreme particular in question) is not known. Certainly no effect is found there which is produced by an object that is akin to an evil spirit to an atom, to Maheśvara (i.e. God śiva) (–that is to say, which is never cognised and whose existence is therefore not established). If the cognition (produced by the extreme particular) itself is said to be its (i.e. the latter's) mark of inference, that is not proper, for we know of no relation obtaining between this cognition and it (i.e. the extreme particular in question). Moreover, there is no other object (i.e. no object apart from consciousness) in as much as consciousness alone exists³; and consciousness does not (i.e. cannot possibly) produce itself. If (it is argued that) the immediately preceding cognition (samanantara-jñāna) is its cause (i.e. is the cause of the extreme particular in question), that is not

*. Perhaps a lacuna at this point; one could expect न प्रत्यक्षेण.....

#. M : तवो (?)

0. पिशाचेश्वरे Perhaps : पिशाच(अपरमाणुमहेश्वर)

1. The Buddhist recognise two kinds of relations for establishing the rule of invariable concomitance, viz. Identity (Svabhāva) (e.g. pine and tree—'Wherever there is pineness, there is treeness'), and causality—the mark must be an effect of the thing to be demonstrated—e.g. Smoke and fire (–Wherever there is smoke, there is fire).
2. This cognition is said to be the required mark of inference. But how can an unknown thing act as a mark of inference?
3. This seems to be the most plausible translation of cinmātratayaiva na tu anyo 'rtah', but the text may be corrupt.

proper; there is no way of knowing it (i.e. this preceding cognition). Certainly, essentially akin to cognition of another person (para-santāna-jñānārtha-kalpa) it (i.e. the preceding cognition in question) too is not cognised by that itself-which no doubt cognises itself; for the cognition (i.e. the succeeding cognition in question) that is an effect of it (i.e. of the preceding cognition in question) is different form it just as the cognition of another person (parasantāna-jñānārtha) is different from it¹. Nor is it (i.e. the immediately preceding cognition) known by inference for the dependence on it (of the succeeding cognition) is not known, it (i.e. the succeeding cognition) grasps itself as mere consciousness and not as an entity dependent on something other than itself, for anything comparable to it is comparable to an evil spirit, to God (-that is to say, is not cognised by it and is therefore non-existent for it). If there is said to be lucidity on account of its (i.e. the perceptual cognition) being produced by the immediately preceding cognition, then inferential cognition also being produced by the immediately preceding cognition will come to be free from mental construction (nirvikalpa).

अथ स्वलक्षणप्रतिभासिता स्पष्टता; तत्र किं प्रतिभाति-किम् अर्थः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा ? तद्यदि अर्थः, तदयुक्तम्; अप्रसिद्धायाः* (यां) प्र[M 56b]सिद्धौ तत्प्रसिद्धयभावात् । अथ ज्ञानम्; तदनुमानेऽपि प्रतिभाति तदप्यस्तु निर्विकल्पकम् । तन्निर्वि[S 37]कल्पकत्वे तर्हि अपोहयो मृग्योऽधुना कल्पनापोहपदस्य । अथोभयं प्रतिभाति; तदयुक्तम्; एकोपलम्भस्य द्वितीयाकारपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

If lucidity is said to signify the fact of the reflection of an extreme particular (we ask :) what is it that appears there ?- Is it the object, or cognition or both ? Now if the object is said to appear, that is not proper, for it (i.e. the object) cannot be known in case its knowledge remains unknown. If cognition is said to appear, then that appears in inference also, so let it also be free from mental construction. (-which you do not accept) And it is (regarded as) free from mental construction, then in that case you will have to search out something which is intended to be excluded by the expression 'free from mental construc-

1. Parasantānājñānārtha' here translated as 'the cognition of another person' should be literally paraphrased as 'the entity cognition belonging to another series'. This wording has reference to the Buddhist's position that the mental world of different persons from different series of cognition-moments. Jayarāśis present objection is based on his understanding that an earlier and a later members of the same series of cognition moments are as much different from each other as are a member of one series of cognition moments and a member of another such series.

x. M : अप्रसिद्धायाः

tion', (in the definition of perception). If both (are said to) appear, that is not proper, for it is accepted that it is characteristic of the cognition accepted that it is characteristic of the cognition of one thing to exist so as to exclude a second shape (-that is to say, one cognition can cognise only one thing).

अथ अतीतानागतार्थगृहीतिरूपा कल्पना; तत्र किमवभाति अर्थः, तदभावो वा, न किञ्चिद्वा ? यद्यतीतोऽर्थः प्रति[M 57a]भाति; न तर्हि तस्य कल्पनात्वम् वर्तमाननीलज्ञानवत् । नाप्यर्थस्य अतीतता प्रतीयमानत्वेन नीलजलादिवत् । नहि प्रतीयमानस्य अतीतता नाम । यदि च प्रतीयमानस्यापि अतीतता उच्यते तदा सर्वस्य बुद्ध्युपलक्षितस्य अतीतता भवेत् । ततश्च वर्तमानव्यवहारविरहः स्यात् ।

(To come to our dialectical discussion of construction again -) If construction (Kalpanā) is said to be of the form of the cognition of a past or a future object, (we ask :) what appears there ? - Is it the object or its absence, or nothing whatsoever ? If a past object is said to appear (in the cognition), then (that) cognition cannot be constructional, like the cognition of a present blue (particular). As a matter of fact, in this case the object of cognition is not a thing of the past, because it is cognised, like blue, water, etc. what is cognised cannot possibly be a thing of the past. If what is cognised is said to be a thing of the past, then everything that is cognised by knowledge would be a thing of the past. And therefore, there would be an absence of all talk of things as present.

अथ तदभावः प्रतिभाति; तस्याप्यतीतता नास्ति, स्वेनरूपेण विद्यमानत्वात् । नापि तद्विषयविज्ञानस्य कल्पनात्व[M 57b]मुपपद्यते, अभावार्थसामर्थ्येन समुद्भवात् । असामर्थ्ये वा विषयार्थश्चिन्त्यः । अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि तदतीतानागतार्थविज्ञानम् अतीतानागतार्थोपकाररहितमपदिश्यते । न च निर्विषयत्वे सति सविकल्पकत्वं निर्विकल्पकत्वं वा, अपि तु ज्ञानात्मतयैव तस्याऽव्यवस्थितिः* । न च ज्ञानमात्रतया तस्य सविकल्पकत्वमिष्यते सर्वज्ञानानां सविकल्पकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । यदि च निर्विषयत्वेन अतीतानागतार्थविज्ञानस्य सविकल्पकत्वमभ्युपेयते, निर्विकल्पकाभिमतकेशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वमापद्यते । न च अतीतानागत[M 58a] विज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वमस्ति स्वांशपयर्वसितत्वात् । नापि स्वांशव्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थोऽन्योस्ति एकोपलस्ते(लम्भे)न अपोहितत्वात्% । न च स्वांशस्य वञ्चनोपपद्यते, तदभावात् सर्वे विज्ञानं सविकल्पकं निर्विकल्पकं वा वक्तव्यं भेदानुपपत्तेः ।

If its absence (i.e. absence of the object) is said to appear, then it also cannot be past, because it exists in its own form. Moreover, it does not stand to

x. M & S : तस्याव्यवस्थितिः Eli Franco - तस्यव्यवस्थितिः

% M : एकोलम्भेस्तेनापोहितत्वात्

reason that the cognition having that (i.e. absence of the object) for its object is constructional, for it is produced by the potency, of a real thing of the form of absence (of the object). And if this thing is said not to have this potency, then the meaning of the word 'object' will have to be thought out¹. If it is said to be objectless then not receiving any aid from a past or a future object, it cannot be termed as 'cognition of a past or a future object'. Moreover, if it is objectless, it can be neither constructional nor non-constructional; on the contrary; in that case it cannot be proved to be even of the nature of cognition². (— that is to say, in that case it would not be even a piece of cognition — leave alone the controversy as to its being constructional or otherwise). And it (i.e. a piece of cognition) is not recognised as constructional simply because it is a piece of cognition, for then there would be the contingency of all cognitions (—even perceptual ones) being constructional. And if the cognition of a past or a future object is regarded as constructional on account of its being objectless, then the cognition of keṣaṇḍuka also which is recognised as devoid of construction, would come to be constructional in character. Moreover the cognition of a past or a future object is not objectless in as much as it does cognise itself. And (in a cognition) there is no object apart from its own self, for the possibility of there being such an object is set aside by its being the cognition of one object. (That is to say, if it is the cognition of itself, then it cannot also be the cognition of an object other than itself). And it is not possible that a cognition should deceive (betray) itself (i.e. a cognition should necessarily cognise itself) for in the absence of that self-cognition, all knowledge would have to be regarded as 'accompanied by construction' or all as 'devoid of construction', for in that case no differentiation would have been possible.

यदप्युक्तम् — “कल्पनापोढं प्रत्यक्षम् अर्थसामर्थ्येन समुद्भवात् रूपादिस्वलक्षणवत्” इति; तत्र किं प्रतीयमानस्व[S 38]लक्षणोद्भवं विवक्षितम्, आहो अर्थमात्रोद्भवत्वम् ? तद्यदि प्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्भवं विवक्षितम्; तदा रागादिसंवेदनस्य योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य च प्र[M 58b]तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्भवं न लभ्यते । अथ इन्द्रियजप्रत्यक्षविवक्षया इदमपदिश्यते^x अर्थसामर्थ्येन समुद्भूतत्वादिति साधनम्[%]; तत्रापि[%][प्रतीयमानार्थसमुद्भव ?]स्य बाह्यार्थनिराकरणपरत्वात् ।

1. If what is regarded as the object of piece of cognition does not produce this cognition, it should be considered how it could be called an 'object (of cognition)'.

2. The reading 'tasya vyavasthitiḥ' for 'tasyā'vyavasthitiḥ would have been better — 'In that case it would be also more consistent with what follows.'

x. Probably an interpolation introduced as an explanation to इदं

% M is illegible for = 7 akṣaras S suggests [प्रतीयमानार्थसमुद्भव ?]स्य

As to the argument, 'perception is devoid of construction, because it is produced by the potency of a real thing, just like the extreme particulars, colour, etc.'—(we ask :) What is intended here ? Is it 'the fact of being produced by the extreme particular that is cognised', or 'the fact of being produced by any object whatsoever' ? Now, if what is meant is the fact of being produced by the extreme particular that is cognised, then (this) fact of being produced by the extreme particular that is cognised is not found in the case of the apprehension of pleasure, etc. and in that of yogic perception. It may be urged that the reason 'because it is produced by the potency of a real thing' is adduced, because sensuous perception is intended to be spoken of. (We reply :) Even there the 'fact of being produced by a real thing that is cognised' would set aside an external thing.

अस्तु वा बाह्योऽर्थः; तथापि किं तेन निमित्तात्मकेन उत्पाद्यते, आहो उपादानात्मकेन ? तद्यदि निमित्तभूतेन उत्पाद्यते, तदा तदुत्पादितरूपस्य रूपरूपता न प्राप्नोति निमित्तभूतरूपोत्पादितज्ञान[M 59a]वत् । अथ उपादानात्मकेन उत्पाद्यते; तदा अनया रीत्या रूपरूपता आपद्यते ज्ञानस्य रूपोत्पादितरूपस्येव । ततः सर्वम् अविज्ञानात्मकं जगत् स्यात् । अविज्ञानात्मके च जगति मानमेयव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गः । तत्प्रसक्तौ च कस्येदं लक्षणं प्रस्तूयते ? अथ उपादानभूतेन रूपेण रूपमुत्पाद्यते निमित्तात्मकेन तु ज्ञानमिति चेत्; तदिदं महानुभावस्य दर्शनम् । न ह्यबालिश एवं वक्तुमुत्सहेत्, न ह्येकस्य अनेकाकारता नाम । न चानेकनामकरणे मेयाद्यन्यत्वमस्ति । अ[M 59b]न्यत्वे वा न तर्हीदं वक्तव्यम् — “स्वविषयानन्तरविषयसहकारिणेन्द्रियज्ञानेन मनोविज्ञानं निष्पाद्यते ।” तदेवम् इन्द्रियज्ञानस्य प्रतीयमानार्थसमुद्भवत्वाभावः । दृष्टान्तश्च साधनविकलः न रूपादिस्वलक्षणस्य रूपरूपावभातार्थोद्भवत्वमस्ति ।

Or let the external object be there. Even then, does it undertake the production (of the perceptual cognition and of colour, etc) in its capacity as an instrumental cause or as a material cause ? If it undertakes production in its capacity as an instrumental cause, then the colour produced by it cannot be of the nature of colour just as the cognition produced by colour in its capacity as an instrumental cause is not of the nature of colour. And if it undertakes production in its capacity as a material cause, then in this way, cognition should be of the nature of colour, just as the colour produced by colour. (in its capacity as a material cause) is colour. In that case (i.e. in case cognition is of the nature of colour) the entire world would be of the nature of non-consciousness. And if the world be of the nature of non-consciousness, there would be the contingency of an absence of all dealings referring to a 'source of knowledge', 'an object of knowledge'. In the event of that contingency, what

are we trying to define ? It may be urged that the colour is produced by colour in its capacity as a material cause, but cognition is produced by it in its capacity as an instrumental cause. (We reply :) This is the vision of a great one ! No one who is not being childish would dare to say so; certainly one entity cannot have diverse shapes. And it is not by giving many names that one (thing) becomes different; i.e. the object of valid cognition etc. Or if it does, then you should not say that "Mental cognition is produced by the sensory cognition associated by the object which immediately follows : is not different from its own object (i.e. the object of the sensory cognition)." Thus, sensory cognition is not produced by the perceived object. Thus in the case of sensuous cognition there is an absence of the fact of being produced by the object that is cognised. Moreover, (in the present inference), the Example is deficient in regard to the Reason (sādhana-vikala) for the fact of being produced by an object which appears in the form of colour does not hold good of the extreme particulars, colour, etc¹.

अथ अप्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्भवत्वं मे विवक्षितम्; तदाऽतीतानागतानुमानविकल्पानाम् अप्रतीयमानार्थोद्भवत्वेन निर्विकल्पकत्वमापद्यते ।

If (you say :) "The fact of being produced by an extreme particular that is not cognised is intended by me" - (we reply :) Then the inferences and thoughts pertaining to the past and future things would come to non-constructional by virtue of their being produced by an object that is not cognised (-the object cognised not being a cause of such inferences and thoughts).

[३. एकोपलम्भसामर्थ्यात् विकल्पिकायाः समुद्भव इत्याद्युक्तेर्निरसनम् ।]

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् — "एकोपलम्भसामर्थ्याद् विकल्पिकायाः समुद्भवः— 'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभे' इति किल एकभूतलोपलम्भे[S 39] इति विकल्पिका बुद्धिरुत्प[M 60a] द्यते — 'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभ्यते' इत्यादिका" एतदपि न युक्तम् । यथा रूपस्वलक्षणस्य सविकल्पकविज्ञानजनकत्वं नास्ति अविकल्पकत्वात्, तथा विज्ञानस्वलक्षणमपि*

1. The perceptual cognition is inferred to be non-constructional on the ground that it produced by an external object. The example is an external object. which too is produced by an external object (and is non-constructional). Jayarāśi says that the perceptual cognition is produced by such an external object as appears in this cognition, but an external object not produced by such an external object as appears in this former external object.

x. M & S : 'म...न

सविकल्पकविज्ञानोत्पादकत्वमतिवर्तते अविचारकत्वाऽविशेषात् । अथ अविचारकत्वाऽविशेषेऽपि निर्विकल्पकविज्ञानस्य सविकल्पकविज्ञानोदयदानसामर्थ्यं जेगीयते; तदा रूपादिस्वलक्षणस्याप्येतदस्तु, ततश्च प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः ।

[3. Refutation of the statement : "Conceptual cognition is produced by the capacity of the apprehension of only one".]

Whatever has been said : "Conceptual cognition which consists in a negation. I see this (e.g. the ground), I do not see that (e.g. the pot) is produced by the capacity of the apprehension of only one (i.e. of the apprehension of the ground); indeed, when only the ground is seen, a conceptual cognition (of both the objects) takes place : "I see this (ground), that (pot) is not seen, etc. This is not correct. Just as being itself free from construction the extreme particular does not produce cognition that is constructional, Similarly the extreme particular cognition (that is free from construction) goes beyond the production of (i.e. does not produce) constructional cognition, for non-reflection (i.e. non-construction) is common to both (these extreme particulars, viz. colour and cognition). Now, if inspite of its being a like free from construction, the non-constructional cognition is asserted to be capable of giving birth to constructional cognition, then let this be true of the extreme particulars-colour, etc also and in that case, there would be no difference between perception and inference (as both would then involve construction).

[४. प्रत्यक्षसाधन एवेत्यादेर्बौद्धोक्तस्य खण्डनम् ।]

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् — "प्रत्यक्षसाधन एव इन्द्रियधियः कल्पनाविरहः ।" [M 60b] अथ कोऽयं कल्पनाविरहो नाम ? किं ज्ञानकायतादात्म्यव्यवस्थितदेहः, तद्विपरीतो वा ? तद्यदि ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यवस्थितः; तदा प्रत्यक्षसाधनः कल्पनाविरहः इति । किमुक्तं भवति ? प्रत्यक्षसाधनो विज्ञानकारः प्रत्यक्षधियः । न केवलं प्रत्यक्षकल्पनाविरहः प्रत्यक्षसाधना(नोऽ)*नुमानधियोऽपि प्रत्यक्षसाधन एव, ज्ञानाकारस्य अनुमानज्ञानेऽपि भावात् । अथ अनुमानज्ञानस्यापि आत्मसंवित्तौ क[M 61a]ल्पनारहितत्वं बाह्यार्थपेक्षया कल्पनात्मकत्वमिति चेत्; तदेतन्मुग्धाभिधान(नं)*दुनोति मानसम् —

"कथं स्युर्विविधाकाराः तदेकस्य वस्तुनः ।"

% M : 'विशेषेणे...

x. M : साधानु

\$ M : 'आभिधान

S. considers : कथं...वस्तुनः as a quotation

[4. Refutation of the Buddhist assertion 'Having perception as its means...']

As to what is also said, "absence of construction in sensuous knowledge has perception as its means". Now, what is this absence of construction? Does it mean having its entity remaining in identity with the entity of knowledge, or the opposite of it? If it is said to remain in identity with knowledge, then 'Absence of construction having perception as its means'— what is meant by it? (Does it mean) 'The cognitive shape of perceptual cognition which has perceptual cognition which has perception as its means'? (Then, our reply is that) Not only does the absence of construction (i.e. cognitive form) in perception have perception as its means, but that of Inferential cognition has perception as its means, for the shape of knowledge is present even in Inferential cognition. Now, if it be said that even inferential cognition is devoid of construction in respect to its own apprehension (self-apprehension) and is constructional in respect of the external object, (the reply is that) the mind is distressed by such simple (silly) assertions—

"How could one thing have diverse shapes?"

अथ भेदेन व्यवस्थितः, तद्वतिः* कथम्? न स्वसंवेद्योऽसौ, ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकात् । नापि जनकत्वा-ऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन गृह्यते, विरहस्य सामर्थ्यव्यतिरेकात् । एवं च सति यदुक्तम् — "प्रत्यक्षसाधन एव इन्द्रियधियः कल्पनाविरहः" इति तद्वालवर्तितम् ॥ छ ॥

If it is said to remain as distinct (from the knowledge - entity), then how is it known? It is not self-apprehensible, because (as you say) it is devoid of the shape of knowledge (i.e. because it is not regarded as identical with knowledge). Nor is it known as being the producer or the impressor of shape, because absence or negation (viraha) is devoid of any efficiency. This being the case, the statement 'Absence of construction in sensuous knowledge has perception as its means' is a childish vaunt (swaggering, boast).

अथ "गौः" इत्यादि ज्ञानं कल्पना । कथमस्य कल्पनात्वम्, अर्थेनाऽजनितत्वात्? यदि गवादेरर्थस्य [M 61b] गौरित्यादिज्ञानोत्पाद [S 40] न सामर्थ्यं स्यात् तदा प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातवेलायामपि कुर्यात् तदाऽत्मनोऽविशेषात् । तदुक्तम् —

Now if the knowledge 'cow' etc be said to be construction (kalpanā), how can it be of the nature of construction? By virtue of its not being produced by

x. M : तद्वतिः

the object? (The prima facie can be to this effect:) If the object cow, etc had the efficiency to bring about knowledge such as 'cow' etc, then it would have done so even at the time of its first contact with the sense-contact, because it was the same then (also)¹.

It is said

"यः प्रागजनको बुद्धेरुपयोगाविशेषतः ।
स पश्चादपि तेन स्यादर्थापायेऽपि नेत्रधीः ॥"

"That which could not produce a cognition before, could not do so later on too, as the use of attention remains the same (i.e. the name 'go' has no function to perform in both the cases). Otherwise there would be visual knowledge even in the absence of the object (lit. even when the object is removed)."

अथ शब्दस्मरणमपेक्ष्य उत्पादयति; तदेवास्तु तदेहानन्तर फलत्वाद् 'गौः' इत्यादिज्ञानस्य । तदुक्तम् —

Now if it be said to bring it (knowledge of 'cow', etc.) about with the help to the memory of word (i.e. with the cooperation of memory of the word 'cow'), (the reply is :) that may be so, because the cognition 'cow' etc results immediately after the entity (of perceptual knowledge) It is said —

"अर्थोपयोगेऽपि पुनः स्मार्त्तं शब्दानुयोजनम् ।
अक्षधी [M 62a] यद्यपेक्षेत सोऽर्थो व्यवहितो भवेत् ॥"

"If even while the object is penetrating (i.e. bringing about its own knowledge), if the sense-cognition were to depend upon the assimilation of word brought about by memory, that object must be a removed one (i.e. when memory starts functioning, the real object of the knowledge should have become a thing of the past)"

तदेतदुक्तम् । प्राथमिकज्ञानं* 'गौः' इतिज्ञानम्, गोपिण्डावगाहिनि विज्ञाने 'गौः' इतिज्ञानसंज्ञा । ततश्च प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजमपि% भवति । एवं च पूर्वापरविज्ञानयोः एकविषयत्वे उभयोः 'गौः' इतिज्ञानसंज्ञाविषयत्वम् ।

1. That is to say, as the object could bring about knowledge of itself, so it should have brought about knowledge of the word 'cow'. But it does not. This shows that the name 'cow' is not inherently connected with the object, but is only given to it by convention; it is a fiction, a kalpanā.

x. S : प्राथमिकज्ञानं — Eli Franco — प्राथमिकमपि ज्ञानं

% M : Perhaps a lacuna at this point; one could expect गौर इति ज्ञानं

(Reply of the tattvopalavavādin, our philosopher :) This is not correct. The initial cognition is the cognition 'cow'; there is the cognition and the name 'cow' in respect of the cognition apprehending the cow-entity. Therefore it should be also something produced at the first contact (of the entity)-with the sense-organ. Thus if the previous and later cognitions have the one object, both must be object of the cognition and name (expression) 'cow'.

नन्वेकस्य क्रमभावविज्ञानजनकत्वम् किम्—एकेन स्वरूपेण, स्वरूपान्तरेण वा ? एकेनैव स्वभावेन जनय[M 62b]ति इति ब्रूमः । नन्वेककालीनता पूर्वापरविज्ञानयोः एकस्वभावायत्तत्वे सति आपद्यते; यद्येवम् एकनीलोत्पादितनयनालोकविज्ञानानाम् एकदेशसम्बन्धित्वम् एकाकारता एकव्यक्तित्वमापद्यते एकनीलोत्पाद्यत्वाऽविशेषात् । अथ एवंभूतं तत् तस्य स्वरूपं यत् चित्रकार्यकरणात्मकम्; यद्येवं मामकेऽपि पक्षे क्रमभाव्यनेककार्यकरणात्मकमेव स्वरूपं स्वहेतुसामर्थ्यनियमितस्योत्पत्तेः । अथवा, यथा त्वदीये पक्षे मनोज्ञानं स्वलक्षणविषयं न च प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजम् अपि तु इन्द्रियज्ञाने[M 63a]न स्वविषयानन्तरविषयसहकारिणा उत्पाद्यते तथा 'गौः' इत्यादिकमपि ज्ञानं प्रथमाक्षजेन* विज्ञानेन स्वविषयानन्तरविषयसहकारिणास्मरणाद्युपहितेन चोत्पाद्यते इति निर्विषयत्वाभावः, विषयान्तर(स्य)% स्वकारणसाध्यानुरोधेन 'गौः' इत्यादिज्ञानजननयोग्यस्योत्पत्तेः[S 41]; स्मरणमपि समर्थमुत्पन्नं सत् 'गौः' इत्युत्पादयति । एवं सति यदुक्तम् — 'यः प्रागजनको बुद्धेः' इत्यादि, तत् स्वपरमतमनालोच्यैव जेगीयते । न च ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकेण वै(वि)कल्पनाकारोऽन्योऽस्ति । कल्पनाकारो हि ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यवस्थितः । ततश्च 'कल्पनापोढं प्रत्यक्षम्' । किमुक्तं भवति ? ज्ञानापोढं प्रत्यक्षम् । यो मत्स्वभावोपनिबद्धः स निवर्तमानः तमादाय निवर्तते । ततश्च अज्ञानात्मकं प्रत्यक्षं भिक्षुणां प्रसक्तम् ॥ छ ॥

(objection) How can one thing give rise to successive cognition – Does it do so by one (and the same) nature or by another nature ? (Reply)—we say it brings it about by one (and the same) nature only. (objection—) Now, if prior and posterior cognitions be based upon one nature (a thing having one nature), then there could be the contingency of their being simultaneous. (Reply—) If this be so, visual cognitions brought about by one blue object should come to be related to one spot, should come to have shape, and should become identical in as much as they are all alike produced by one blue object.

x. M : तथमाक्षजेन S : प्रथमाक्षजेन

% M : विषयान्तर*

M : वैकल्पाकार*

Now (if it be argued that) such is its nature as to give rise to diverse effects, then in that case, in my view also its nature is such as to give rise to a number of successive effects, because there is the origination of that which is determined by the efficacy of its own cause¹. Or as in your view, mental cognition has point. Specific individual (Svalakṣaṇa) as its object, and is not produced by the first contact with the sense-organ, but is produced by sensuous cognition which has as its auxiliary the object immediately following its own object and is conditioned by memory, etc, and so is not objectless; because there is the rise of the other object which is capable of producing such knowledge as 'cow', etc. in accordance with the efficacy of its own cause. Memory also being produced as capable gives rise to (the knowledge) 'cow'. It being so, what is said viz. 'That which could not produce cognition before.....'etc, that has been stated without a consideration of one's own as well as the other party's view. And the form of construction is not anything else, distinct from the form of knowledge. For, the form of construction is established as identical with the form of knowledge. Then connected with the nature of what is meant by 'perception is devoid of construction ?' (It means) perception is devoid of knowledge. A thing connected with the nature of another, when retiring (perishing) retires taking the latter with it. (If there is no kalpanā—construction—there will not be knowledge also). Therefore, perception comes to be of the nature of non-cognition for the Bhikṣus (— Buddhas).

[५. प्रत्यक्षलक्षणगतस्य अव्यभिचारिपदस्य निरसनम् ।]

तथा अव्यभिचारि पदमपि नोपादेयम् अपोह्यज्ञानाऽसंभवात् । ननु मार्तण्डपादसंघातोत्पादितं विज्ञानमपोह्यमस्ति । कथं तदपोह्यम् ? अतथ्योदकविषयत्वात् । यद्यतथ्योदकविषयम्; कथं तदपनीयते, अतथ्योदकाकारस्यस्वेन रू[M 64a]पेण विद्यमानत्वात् मधुरोदकदीर्घोदकाकारवत् ? अथ तत्र मधुरोदकं विद्यते, स्वेनरूपेण प्रतीयमानत्वात्; तदिहाप्युदकं प्रतीयते 'उदकं गृह्णामि' इति व्यवहारदर्शनात् । सत्यम्, प्रतिभाति, अतथ्यं तु प्रतिभाति ।

[5. Refutation of the term 'avyabhicāri' (non-erroneous) in the definition of perception.]

Similarly, the term 'avyabhicāri' (non-erroneous) also should not be accepted, as there is no knowledge that can be excluded. (objection) why, there

1. That is to say, the effect is determined by the cause. If the cause is capable of producing many effects one after another, the effects must rise accordingly.

is the cognition (of mirage) produced by the mass of the rays of the sun that is to be excluded (Reply)– How does it deserve to be excluded ? (Objector) Because it has unreal water as its object. (Reply) If it has unreal water as its object, how is it set aside, because the shape of unreal water exists in its own form, like the shape of sweet water, long (stretch) water. If it be said that sweet water is present there, because it is cognised in its own form, then here also water is cognised, because we observe the verbal expression of the type. 'I cognise water'. (Objector) True, it appears, but it is the unreal (form of water) that appears.

[६. प्रसङ्गायाताया अतथ्यताया विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]

अतथ्यता का ? किं प्रतीयमानस्याभावः, अथ प्रतीयमान एवाऽभावः ? यदि प्रतीयमानस्याभावः; सोऽत्रनावभाति, उदकाकार एवाऽवभाति । अथ प्रतीयमान एवाऽभावः, सोऽप्यनुपपन्न एव; नहि भावाकारे प्रतीयमाने अभावकल्पना युक्ता, अन्यथा रसाकारे प्रतीयमाने रूपाकारः परि[M 64b]कल्पयितव्यः। ततश्चालूनविशीर्णं जगत् स्यात् । यदि च अभावः प्रतिभाति; कथं तदुक्तज्ञानम्, मिथ्याज्ञानं चोच्यते; अभावविषयस्य स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानत्वात् ?

[6. Dialectical Refutation of (the concept of) 'Unreality' that occurs here incidentally.]

(Reply) What is unreality ? Is it the negation of what is cognised, or is what is cognised itself Negation ? If it is (said to be) the negation of what is cognised, that does not appear here, only the shape of water appears. If (it is said that) what is cognised is itself Negation, that also is only untenable; when the shape of positive being is cognised; the imagination of non-being is not proper, otherwise when the shape of taste is cognised, the shape of colour should have to be imagined. Then, the world would be shattered without being torn to pieces. And if Negation appears, how is it called 'knowledge of water' and 'false knowledge', because the object of Negation exists in its own form ?

[S 42] तदेतदुदकज्ञानम् उदकं विषययति, उदकाभावम्, आत्मानम्, न किञ्चिद्वा ? तद्यदि उदकं विषययति; तदा न तस्य मिथ्यात्वं मधुरोदकसंवेदनस्येव । तत्र तथ्योदकं प्रतिभाति; किं यत् प्रतिभाति तत् तथ्योदकम् आहो यत् तथ्यं [M 65a] तत् प्रतिभाति ? तद्यदि यत् प्रतिभाति तत् तथ्यम्; इहाप्युदकं प्रतिभाति, प्राप्ता तस्यापि तथ्यता ।

x. S : मिथ्या ज्ञानं

*. M : उक्तं

Does this cognition of water have water as its object, or the negation of water, or itself or nothing at all ? If it makes water its object, then it could not be false like the apprehension of sweet water. (It may be urged:) Real water appears there, (we ask:) Is what appears real water or does what is real appear ? If what appears is real, here also water appears, so it also would come to be real.

अथ यत् तथ्यं तत् प्रतिभाति; तस्य तथ्यता कथं ज्ञायते किं प्रतीत्या, अन्यथा वा ? यदि प्रतीत्या, इहापि प्रतीतिरुत्पद्यते, अस्तु तथ्यता । अथ प्रतीतिमन्तरेण तथ्यता उपपाद्यते; तदा सुस्थितानि वस्तूनि ! सर्ववादसिद्धिः स्यात् । अथ प्रतीयते—यदि नाम बाध्यते; 'प्रतीयते बाध्यते च' इति चित्रम् । प्रतीयमानत्वं च जनकत्वा-ऽऽका[M 65b]रार्पकत्वेन व्याप्तम्, यच्च न जनयति नाकारमर्पयति य(त)न्नावभाति, यथा रूपज्ञाने रसः ! प्रतीयते च अत्र उदकम्, जनकत्वा-ऽऽकारार्पकत्वोपपत्तिः, तदुपपत्तौ च न बाधोपपत्तिः; जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वस्य सत्त्वनिबन्धनत्वात् ।

Now if (it is said that) What is real, appears. How is its reality known ? By apprehension or otherwise ? If by apprehension, here also apprehension arises, (so) let there be reality. If reality is explained (even) without apprehension, then things are well-established. (that is to say, everything should be taken as real) ! All doctrines would be established ! If it is (said to be) cognised, – If it is contradicted, that 'it is apprehended and contradicted is surprising. The fact of apprehension is invariably concomitant with the fact production (of knowledge) and the fact of impression of shape, what does not produce (cognition) and does not impress shape, does not appear, as taste is not cognised in the knowledge of colour. But water appears here, so it can be justified as being the producer (of cognition) and the impressor of shape; and this being justified, there is no possibility of contradiction, because the fact of being the producer and the impressor of shape is rooted in Existence (Reality).

अथ अभावं विषययति; न तर्हि उदकज्ञानरूपता अभावगृहीतिरूपत्वात् । नापि तस्य मिथ्यात्वम्, अभाव विषयत्वस्योपपत्तेः । न च सौगतमते अभावे कश्चिद् विषयार्थ उपपद्यते जनकत्वा-ऽऽकारार्पकत्वव्यतिरेकात्^x । उदकाकारो हि प्रतीत्युत्कलितः, तदभावश्च अप्रातीतिक इहोपपाद्यते मुग्धबौद्धैः ।

Now if it (is said to) make Negation its object, then it being of the form of cognition of non-being, there could not be the form of the cognition of water. Nor also could it be false, because it is possible for Negation to be an object. And

% M : यन्

x. S : अभावविषयत्वस्य

\$. Perhaps a lacuna at this point – Eli franco.

in the **Buddhist view**, negation could not possibly be an object-entity, because there is the absence (in it) of the fact of being a producer and impressor of shape. The shape of water is dissected by apprehension, and its negation is here explained as non-apprehensible (*aprātītika*) by the silly Buddhas !

अथ आत्मविषयम्; तद्यपि व्यभिचारिता नोपपद्यते स्वांश[M 66a]स्याऽवच्छन्नात्, नहि ज्ञानम् आत्मानं विसंवदति । नापि तद् उदकज्ञानत्वेन व्यपदेश्यं रागदिसंवेदनवत् । नहि नीलाभं संवेदनं रसविज्ञानात्मकत्वेन व्यपदिश्यमानं दृष्टम् ।

If it (is said to) have itself as its object, even then non-erroneousness is not tenable to reason, because its own part could not be deceitful; knowledge cannot be inconsistent with itself, nor also could it be called 'cognition of water' like the sensation of passion, etc. For, the apprehension of blue is never seen likes to be referred to as being of the nature of the cognition of taste.®

[S 43]अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि तदुदकज्ञानम्, उदकज्ञानतया तु प्रतिभाति, तेन जानीमो न निर्विषयम् । यदि च निर्विषयम्; कथं तन्मिथ्याज्ञानम् ? ज्ञानमात्रानुरोधेन न मिथ्याज्ञानं नापि सम्यग्ज्ञानम् । न च भवतां पक्षे ज्ञानं निरालम्बनमस्ति स्वांशपर्यवसितत्वात् ।

Further if it (be said to) be objectless, then it is not knowledge of water, but it appears as knowledge of water, so we know that it is not objectless. And if it is objectless, how could it be false knowledge ? Being knowledge only, it is neither false nor true knowledge. And in your view, knowledge is not devoid of substratum, for it culminates in its own part. (determines its own part).

[७. व्यभिचारित्वस्य विकल्प्य खण्डनम् ।]

विज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारिता किम्-स्वसत्तामात्रानुरोधेन, आहो परसत्तानुरोधेन ? तद्यदि स्वसत्तानुरोधेन; तदा सर्वं विज्ञानानां व्यभिचारिता प्राप्नोति, ज्ञानरूप[M 66b]तायाः सर्वत्र भावात्, न किञ्चिद्विज्ञानमव्यभिचारि स्यात् ।

[7. Dialectical Refutation of Erroneousness.]

Is the erroneousness of cognition with reference to its own existence alone, or with reverence to another's existence ? Now if it is (said to be) with reference to its own existence, then all cognitions would come to be erroneous, because the form of knowledge is present everywhere; no cognition whatsoever would be non-erroneous.

@ Similarly, 'cognition of cognition' could be just 'cognition of cognition' and 'not cognition of water'

अथ परसत्तानुरोधेन व्यभिचारिता उच्यते किम्-अनुपकारक परसत्तानुरोधेन, आहो उपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन ? तद्यदि अनुपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन व्यभिचारिता; तदा सर्वसंवितीनां व्यभिचारिता प्राप्नोति, अनुपकारकपरसत्ताऽविशेषात् । अथ उपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन व्यभिचारि अभिधीयते* किं-कारणभूतपरोपकारकपरसत्ता%नुरोधेन, आहो कर्मतापन्नोपकारकसत्तानुरोधेन ? तद्यदि कारणभूतपरोपकारकपरसत्ताऽविशेषात् । [M 67a]रकसत्तानुरोधेन; तदा सर्वासां संवितीनां मिथ्यात्वमापद्यते कारणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ताऽविशेषात् ।

Further, if erroneousness is said to be there with reference to another's existence is it with reference to the existence of another that is non-contributory, or with reference to the existence of another that is helping ? If erroneous is there with reference to the existence of another that is non-contributory, then all apprehensions would be erroneous, for the existence of another that is non-contributory is common to all. If it is said to be erroneous with reference to the existence of another that is contributory, is it with reference to the existence of a contributory another which has become an instrument, or with reference to the existence of a contributory another that has started operation ? If it is so on account of the interpenetration (*anuvēdha*)¹ of the existence of a contributory another that has become an instrument, then all apprehensions would become false, in as much as the existence of a contributory another that has become an instrument is common to all.

अथ कर्मकारकोपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन मिथ्यात्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; न तस्य मिथ्यात्वं सत्योदकज्ञानस्यैव कर्मकारकेण उपक्रियमाणत्वात् ।

If falseness is there on account of the interpenetration (*anuvēdha*)^{*} of the existence of a contributory another that is efficient (doer of action), that is not proper; (then) it is not false as like cognition of real water as it is useful in bringing about action (it is used by one performing action).

[८. ज्ञानगतस्य सम्यक्त्वस्यापि विकल्प्य विदलनम् ।]

तथा सम्यग्ज्ञान त्वमपि कथम् ? किं ज्ञानासत्तामात्रानुरोधेन, आहो परसत्तानुरोधेन ? तद्यदि ज्ञानसत्तामात्रानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वम्; तदा सर्वसंवितीनां सम्यक्त्वं प्राप्नोति ज्ञानाकारस्योपपत्तेः ।

x. M & S : व्यभिचार्याभिधीयते

% S : कारणभूतपरोपकारकपरसत्ता

1*. The reading should here be 'anurodhena' as in the previous cases, instead of 'anuvēdhena'-though we find this latter reading consistently even later.

\$. M : सम्यग्

[8. Dialectical Refutation of the rightness also of knowledge.]

Similarly, how is there right knowledge ? – Is it with reference to the existence of knowledge alone, or with reference to the existence of another. If truth is with reference to the existence of knowledge alone, then all apprehensions would come to be right, because the shape of knowledge is tenable.

[S 44] अथ परसत्तानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वम्; तदा किम् [M 67b] नुपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन, किंवा उपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन ? तद्यदि अनुपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वम्; तदा सर्वासां संवितीनां सम्यक्त्वमापद्यते, अनुपकारकपरसत्ताऽविशेषात् । अथ उपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन किम् करणभूतपरोपकारकपरसत्ता[@]नुवेधेन, आहो कर्मतापन्नोपकारकसत्ता[%]नुवेधेन ? तद्यदि करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ता[@]नुवेधेन, तदा सर्वासां संवितीनां सम्यक्त्वमापद्यते, करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ताऽविशेषात् । अथ कर्मतापन्नपरसत्ता[#]नुवेधेन सम्यक्त्वमभिधीयते; तदा रागादिसंवेदनस्य सम्यक्त्वं न प्राप्तनो [M 68a] ति अतीतानागतार्थविषयत्वे योगिज्ञानस्य च ।

If rightness is with reference to the existence of another, then is it with reference to the existence of another that is non-contributory, or with reference to the existence of another that is contributory ? If rightness is with reference to the existence of another that is non-contributory then all apprehensions would come to be true, because the existence of another that is non-contributory holds good like in the case of all. If it is with reference to the existence of another that is contributory on account of the interpenetration of the existence of another in its capacity as an instrument to another that has become an instrument or on account of the interpenetration of the existence of a contributory another that has started operating an action ? If it is on account of the interpenetration of the existence of a contradictory another that has become an instrument, then all apprehensions would come to be right, because that existence of a contributory another has become an instrument is common to all. If rightness is said to be there on account of the interpenetration of the existence of another that has started operating object, then sensation of pleasure likes, etc. would not be right, as also yogic knowledge when it has a past or future entity as its object (because it would not be useful in the performance of action).

@. M & S : करणभूतपरोपकारकपरसत्ता

% . S : कर्मतापन्नोपकारकसत्ता[@] Eli Franco – “कारकपरसत्ता”

#. M & S : कर्मतापन्नपरसत्ता[@]

यत् तत् व्यभिचारि ज्ञानम् तत्किम्—व्यभिचारिभूतेन उपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते, आहो अव्यभिचारिभूतेनोपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते ? तद्यदि व्यभिचारिभूतेन उपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते; तदपि व्यभिचारिभूतेन—प्राप्ता व्यभिचारिपरंपरा । संग्राह्यमव्यभिचारि न लभ्यते ।

That which (you call) erroneous knowledge, is it produced by its constituent cause—knowledge[@] – which is erroneous, or by its material cause—knowledge which is non-erroneous ? If it is (said to be) produced by its material cause—knowledge which is erroneous, and that again by (its material cause knowledge) which is erroneous, then there would be (beginningless) series of erroneous (cognitions). No knowledge is found that is non-erroneous.

अथ अव्यभिचारिभूतेनोपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते; तद् उपादानकारणमनुकुर्वद्वा उपजायते, अननुकुर्वद्वा ? तद्यदि उपादानकारणानुकारणोत्पाद्यते; तदा किमाप्नोति ? अव्यभिचारि^x स्वरूपानुकारेण उत्पाद्यते । कथम् ? अव्यभिचारस्य [M 68b] ज्ञान[%]तादात्म्येन व्यवस्थितः । न च एकदेशानुकारित्वमस्ति उपादानकारणस्य निरवयवत्वात् । एवं सर्वं विज्ञानमव्यभिचारि प्रसक्तम् अपोह्यज्ञानानुपत्तिः । न च व्यभिचाराऽव्यभिचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यतिरिक्तौ स्तः । यथा रसाकारो रूपाकारो वा ज्ञानाकाराद् भिन्नः न तथा व्यभिचाराऽव्यभिचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यतिरिक्तौ । ततश्च व्यभिचाराकारोऽत्र निराक्रियते । किमुक्तं [S 45] भवति ? ज्ञानाकारोऽत्र निराक्रियते । ततश्च अज्ञाना [M 69a] त्मकं प्रत्यक्षं प्रसक्तं सौगतानाम् ।

If it is (said to be) produced by its material cause knowledge that is non-erroneous, does it rise in imitation of the material cause, or without imitating it ? If it arises in imitation of its material cause, then what does it come to ? It comes to this that it is produced as non-erroneous in imitation of its nature. How is that ? Because non-error remains in identity with knowledge (non-erroneousness is not different from knowledge, it is identical with it). There cannot be imitation in parts because the material cause is indivisible. Thus all cognition comes to be non-erroneous and there is the untenability of any cognition that deserves to be excluded. Moreover, error and non-error are not different from knowledge. Unlike the shape of taste, or the shape of colour which is different from the shape of knowledge, error and non-error are not distinct from knowledge.

@. In the Buddhist view one point-instant of knowledge produces the succeeding one, this cause being called ‘Samanantarapratyaya’, which corresponds to upādānakāraṇa or constituent cause of other schools.

x. S : अव्यभिचारिस्वरूपा[@]

% . M : ज्ञान[@] Eli Franco—ज्ञान

Therefore the shape of error is set aside here. What is meant by this ? The shape of knowledge is set aside. Therefore, there is the contingency of perception being of the nature of non-knowledge for the Buddhists¹.

अपि च यथा रूपेण उपादानभूतेन जन्यते रूपम् तथा ज्ञानमपि उपादानभूतेनैव जन्यते । य एव तस्य रूपोत्पादने आत्मा स एव तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादनेऽपि । नहि तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादेन आत्मान्यत्वम् ।

Moreover, as colour is produced by colour as material cause, so knowledge also is produced by it (colour) as material cause. That self of its which is present in the production of colour, that very (self) is present in the production of knowledge also. It does not have any other self (nature) in the production of knowledge.

अथ निमित्तभूतेन ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते, उपादानभूतेन रूपमिति चेत्; तत्कथमेकस्य अनेकाकारयोगितोपपद्यते ? न च संज्ञान्यत्वे मेयान्यत्वमुपपद्यते, रूपवद् विज्ञानस्यापि रूपरूपता प्राप्नोति [M 69b]ति । तत्प्राप्तौ च न परलोकी आत्मा, तदभावात् परलोकः । इदमेवंचेतसि समारोप्याह भगवान् बृहस्पतिः— “परलोकिनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः”

It may be argued that knowledge is produced by it in its capacity as instrumental cause, whereas colour is produced by it in its capacity as constituent cause, then (we ask) how justifiably could one entity be associated with diverse shapes ? The knowledge does not become different only because another name is given to it (lit. When it has another name or nomenclature); like colour, knowledge too would come to be of the form of colour. In the event of that contingency, the self cannot be a resident of the other world (i.e. cannot exist after death), and in its absence there would be no other world. Keeping this in mind, Lord Brhaspati said, ‘There being no one to go to another world, there is no other world.’

अथ रूपोपादानजन्यत्वेऽपि ज्ञानरूपतैव, रूपस्यापि ज्ञानरूपता प्राप्ता रूपोपादानजन्यत्वात्

1. Error is not something different from knowledge, it is identical with it, so saying that error is repudiated is equivalent to saying that the character of knowledge is repudiated, that is to say; it becomes non-knowledge. The Buddhists regard perception as their major source of knowledge as it is devoid of mental construction which is necessarily erroneousness. When perceptual errors are repudiated it would be equivalent to repudiating the character of knowledge of perception—which would then become non-knowledge.

x. M & S : मेयान्यत्वम्; perhaps a lacuna after उपपद्यते

% M & S : एवं

* M : रूपोपादानत्वात्

ज्ञानरूपवत्[@] । अथ ज्ञा- [नं ज्ञानेन उपादानभूतेन जन्य][&]ते; रूपमपि तेनैव जन्यते, नहि तस्य रूपोपादाने[^] आत्मान्यत्वम् । एवं च—

“तदतद्रूपिणोभावाः तदतद्रूपहेतुजाः ।

तद्रूपादि किमज्ञानं विज्ञानाभिन्नहेतुजम् ॥”

If it is said that it has the form of knowledge even though it is produced by colour as its material cause, then colour also would come to be of the form of knowledge, because it is produced by colour as material cause, like the form of knowledge. If knowledge is produced by knowledge as material cause, colour also is produced by it only, it does not have another self (nature) when it gives rise to colour as its material cause. And it is thus said:—

“Entities having one or a different nature are produced by causes that are correspondingly such or different in nature. So how could colour, etc produced from a cause non-different from consciousness be of the nature of non-knowledge.”

अथ रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे^{*} विज्ञानस्य न रूपात्मता तथा ज्ञानोत्पादन[%] (ज्ञानोपादान)जन्यत्वेऽपि विज्ञानस्य न ज्ञानरूपता. ततश्च नैरात्म्यप्रसङ्गः । अथ ज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वे ज्ञानाकारपरिकल्पना तथा रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे रूपा [M 70a] कारता, आलोकोपादानजन्यत्वेन[#] आलोकाकारता प्राप्नोति; ततश्च आकारकदम्बात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रसक्तम् । अनिष्टं चैतत्, अद्वयरूपत्वेनाऽभ्युपगमात् । यत् तद्रूपोत्पाद्यं विज्ञानं तत्किम्—एक [S 46] देशेन रूपोत्पाद्यत्वेन स्थितम्, सर्वात्मना वा उत्पाद्यत्वेन पर्यवसितम् ? तद्यदि एकदेशेन स्थितम्; तदयुक्तम्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशविरहात् । अथ सर्वात्मना रूपोत्पाद्यत्वेन पर्यवसितम्; तदा विज्ञानोत्पाद्यं न प्राप्नोति यथा एककारकसमूहोत्पाद्यत्वेन पर्यवसितस्य कारकसंघातस्य[~] संघातान्तरोत्पाद्यत्वं न दृष्टम्, ततश्च विज्ञानसंघातानुपपत्तिः ।

@. M & S : ज्ञानरूपवद्,

&. conjectured by S, M is broken

^ M & S : रूपोपादाने

O. M : रूपादिकम्

x. M & S : omits ऽपि perhaps : ऽपि ज्ञानस्य — Eli Franco

% M : ज्ञानोत्पादन^{*}

#. M & S : “जन्यत्वेना”

~. M & S : कारकसंघातस्य Eli Franco—कार्यस्य

\$ M : संघातान्तरो

If knowledge even while being produced by colour as the material cause does not have the nature of colour, Similarly cognition, even while being produced by knowledge as material cause would not have the form of knowledge, and therefore there would be the contingency of essencelessness. If on account of being produced by knowledge as material cause, the shape of knowledge is imagined, Similarly there would be the shape of colour on account of its being produced by colour as material cause, and the shape of light on account of its being produced by light as materials cause; then there would be the contingency of knowledge being of the nature of an assemblage of shapes (i.e. knowledge would have diverse characters). But this is not desirable; because it has been accepted as of a non-dual form (nature). Now that cognition which is produced by colour, does it remain as particullay produced by colour or is it determined as wholly produced (by colour) ? If it remains as partially produced, that is not proper, because what is (an unbreakable) whole has no parts. Further, if its is (said to be) determined as wholly produced by colour, then it could not be produced by cognition, as an assemblage of effects that is determined as produced by one aggregate of operative factors is not seen to be produced by another assemblage, and therefore there would be the impossibility of an assemblage of cognitions¹.

[M 70b] तथा रूपमपि ज्ञानम् एकदेशेन कुर्यात्, सर्वात्मना करणपर्यवसितं वा ? तद्यदि एकदेशेन करोति; तदयुक्तम्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशाऽयोगात् । अथ सर्वात्मना करोति, तदा रूपं सर्वात्मना विज्ञानकरणे पर्यवसितं न रूपान्तरकरणे प्रवर्तते, यथा एककारकसामग्री एककार्योत्पादनपर्यवसिता कार्यान्तर सवित्री न भवति, तथा रूपमपि रूपान्तरोत्पादकं न भवति, ततश्च रूपान्तरस्य आकस्मिकत्वम् कथं तदा (०कत्वम् तदाऽऽ)कस्मिकत्वे* कार्यानुमानं विलुप्यते सौगतानाम् ।

Similarly, would colour also give rise to knowledge in parts, or as wholly determined by instrumental factors ? Now if it gives rise to it in parts, that is not proper, for what is one whole cannot have parts. If it gives rise to it wholly, then colour have parts. If it gives rise to it wholly, then colour which is wholly employed in the production of cognition does not proceed to bring about another colour; as an aggregate of operative factors occupied in the production of one effect, does not bring about another effect, similarly colour also does not bring about another colour, therefore another colour would be accidental;

1. Should the reading not be 'Kārya-saṅghātasya' instead of 'kāraḥ' ?

x. M : कथं तदाकस्मिकत्वे; perhaps कथं न विलुप्यते

and if it were accidental how could the inference from effect hold good for the Buddhists¹.

अथ अनेककार्योत्पादकत्वेन पर्यवसितं रूपस्वरूपम्; तदा घट-संख्या[M 71a]-सामान्यादेरपि अनेकाधिकरणाश्रितात्मकं रूपम्, वृत्तिविकल्पदोषानुपपत्तिः ।

If the nature of colour is determined as the producer of a number of effects, then number, universal, etc. of jar etc. also would have a form nature which could reside in a number of loci, and there would be the impossibility of the fault of construction of modes.

[९. जातिं प्रतिवदितुं बौद्धैर्दत्तानां दूषणानामेकैकशो निरासः ।]

इतोऽपि वृत्तिविकल्पदोषानुपपत्तिः— वृत्तिविकल्पदोषेण वृत्तेरेव निराकरणं कृतम्, न घट-संख्या-सामान्यदेः, ततोऽन्यत्वात् । नहि अन्यस्याऽभावे अन्यस्याभावोऽस्ति असम्बन्धात् । नहि अनुदकः कमण्डलुः इत्युक्ते कमण्डलोरभावः प्रतीयते, कपालानां तदुदकस्य वा, अपि तु कमण्डलुना साकम् उदकस्य विश्लेषमात्रं प्रतीयते ।

[9. Refutation one after the other of the objections raised by the Buddhists to refute Jāti (genus-universal)]

Hence also, there is the impropriety of the fault of construction of function-(Vṛtti-vikalpa). By the fault of vṛtti-vikapla (construction of functions) vṛtti (function) alone is repudiated, not number, universal, etc of jar etc., because they are different from it. When one is absent, another (different from it) is (consequently) not absent, because there is no relation between the two. When it is said that the gourd is without water, the negation of gourd is not known, nor of gourds or of the water in them; what is known is only the separation of water from gourd.

ननु नैयायिकैः वृत्तिमद् घट-सामान्यमभ्युपेयते, तदभावे कथं तस्य संस्थि[M 71b]तिः ? यद्येवं रूपरसविज्ञानानामपि वृत्तिरभ्यु[S 47]पेयते नैयायिकैः तदभावेऽपि सद्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेषां भवद्भिः । अथ तानि प्रतिभान्ति वृत्त्यभावेऽपि, तेन तेषामभ्युपगमः क्रियते; यद्येवं घट-संख्या-सामान्यदेरपि स्वरूपं प्रतिभाति अभिन्नानुगतात्मतया । न चानुभूयमानस्य निह्नवो युक्तः सर्वापलापप्रसङ्गात् ।

1. That is to say if causation occurs but accidentally, there could be no inference based on the relation of causality. Here katham -(how?) cannot be explained; or there should be a 'na' in the sentence. 'How could the inference from effect not perish i.e. it would certainly perish'.

अनुपलब्धौ वा सैव समर्था, अलं वृत्तिविकल्पदोषेण । यद्युपलभ्यते; तदा^१ वृत्तिविकल्पदोषो न वक्तव्यः ।
अथ नोपलभ्यते; तथापि न वक्तव्यः ।

(Objection) Why, the Naiyāyikas accept jar genus as vṛttimat (residing in a locus); if it is non-existent how could it reside ?

(Reply—) If it be so, the vṛtti(function) of colour; taste, cognition also is recognised by the Naiyāyikas, and even in its non-being, their existence is recognised by you. If you argue that they appear even in the absence of vṛtti (function) and so they are recognised, (the reply is that) in that case the form of number, universal, etc of jar also appears as identical and persisting. And it is not proper to deny what is being experienced, because there would be the contingency of the repudiation of all. If there is non-apprehension that itself is strong enough (to prove non-existence), why introduce the fault of vṛttivikalpa (construction of vṛtti-function) ? If it apprehended, the fault of vṛttivikalpa should not be urged out, if it is not apprehended even then it should not be urged.

[१०. देशभेदेनाऽग्रहणात् इत्यादेः समालोच्य प्रतिविधानम् ।]

यदप्युक्तम्—“देशभेदेनाऽग्रहणात् घट-सामान्यनुपपत्तिः” तदप्युक्तम्; न देश[M 72a]भेदेन वस्तूनां भेदोऽपितुआकारभेदेन^२, अभिन्नानुगतात्मतया तयोः स्वरूपमनुभूयते । न देशभेदाग्रहणेन स्वावयवाधिकरणेन सह तयोस्तादात्म्यं सिद्धयति असत्त्वं वा । यद्याकारभेदेन ग्रहणम्; तदा देशभेदेनाग्रहणस्य अप्रयोजकत्वम्, आकारभेदाग्रहणेन स्वरूपान्यत्वस्य प्रबोधितत्वात् । अथ आकारान्यत्वेन नावबोधोऽस्ति; स एवास्तु, असद्वयवहारसमर्थत्वात्, किं देशभेदाग्रहणेन ? स्वहेतोरेव नियतदेशकालनियमितस्योत्पत्तेर्न देशान्तरादौ ग्रहणम्, अन्यथा रूपादेरसत्त्वं स्यात् इतरदेश^३लग्नस्याऽग्रहणात् ।

[10. Refutation after examination of the argument “Because it is not cognised in a different place.....”]

As to what is said ‘There is the impossibility of jar-universal because it is not cognised in a different place (separately)’ – that also is not proper. Things are not different on account of difference of place but on account of difference of shape; their nature is experienced as non-different and persisting. (persisting as identical). By the non-cognition of difference of place, neither is their iden-

\$ M : तथा

x. Perhaps a lacuna at this point – Eli Franco.

% S : इतरदेश^४

tity with the locus of their own parts established nor (their) non-existence. If they are cognised as having different shapes, then (the argument from) non-cognition of their having different places is ineffectual, as difference of nature is indicated by the cognition of difference of shape. Now if it is argued that they are not cognised as having different shapes, then let that only be so, because it is capable of (efficient for) false empirical dealings, why bring in non-cognition of separateness in place ? As a thing determined by a specific place and time is produced from its own cause; it is not cognised in another place, etc, otherwise colour, etc (could be said to be) non-existent, on account of their non-cognition as associated with another location. (because they are not cognised as associated with another place).

[११. नास्ति घट-सामान्यम्, तदग्रहेऽग्रहात् इत्यस्य विभञ्जनम् ।]

य[M 72b]दप्युक्तम्—“नास्ति घट-सामान्यम्, तदग्रहेऽग्रहात्, किमनेन क्रियते ? किम् अवयवाधिकरणाऽव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनम्, आहो असत्त्वप्रतिपादनम् ? तद्यदि अव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं क्रियते; कस्यात्र पक्षीकरणम् ? किं घटसामान्यस्य, आहो तदवयवाधिकरणस्य ?

[11. Refutation of the argument “There is no jar-universal, because it is not cognised, when it (jar) is not cognised.”]

To come to the argument, “There is no jar-universal, because it is not cognised, when it (jar) is not cognised”—what is achieved by it ? Is the non-distinctness from the locus of its parts established, to its non-being ? Now, if non-distinctness is established, what is made the subject of the Thesis here-jar-universal or the locus of its parts.

तद्यदि घटसामान्यस्य पक्षीकरणम् तत्किम् अवगतस्य, अनव[S 48]गतस्य वा ? तद्यदि अनवगतस्य; तदप्युक्तम्, नह्यनवगते धर्मिणि हेतोरुत्थानमस्ति । न चाश्रयवैकल्य(ये)^x गमकत्वम् । अथ अवगतस्य; तदा तेनैव भिन्नाकारावगमेन अव्यतिरेकप्रत्यायकसाधनं बाध्यते ।

Further, if jar-universal is (said to be) made the subject of the thesis, is it cognised or non-cognised ? If it is (said to be) non-cognised, that is not proper because in the case of an entity that is not known, no Reason can be adduced. And it (Reason) cannot give us any knowledge when it is devoid of support. If it is (said to be) cognised, then by that very cognition of it as having a different shape, the reason acquainting us with its non-distinctness is contradicted.

x. M : “वैकल्य”

अथ तदवयवाधिकरणस्य [M 73a] पक्षीकरणम्; तत्रापि किम् स्वस्मात् स्वरूपाद् अव्यतिरेकः साध्यते ? [आहो परस्मात्] § इति ? [यदि स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यतिरेकः साध्यते,] § सिद्धसाध्यतया संबोधितव्याः । अथ परस्मादव्यतिरेकः साध्यते; स परात्मा प्रतिपन्नः अप्रतिपन्नो वा ? यदि प्रतिपन्नः ? स किम्-भिन्नाकारतया अवगतः, अभिन्नाकारावगमेन अभेदप्रत्यायकं साधनं बाध्यते । अथ अभिन्नाकारतयाऽवगतः; न तर्हि परात्मा, इदानीं स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यतिरेकः साध्यत इति सिद्धसाध्यतया संबोधितव्याः । अथ अनवगतः, न तर्हि एकत्वं रथतुरगविषाणयोरिव ।

Further, if the locus of its parts be (said to be) made the subject of the thesis, even then is non-distinctness from its own nature established (or from another) ? [If non-distinctness from its own nature is (said to be) established], then you should be charged with (the fault of) establishing what is already established. If non-distinctness from another is (said to be) established, is that other entity cognised or not ? If it is cognised, is it known as having a different shape or as having a non-different shape ? If it is known as having a different shape ? then by this very knowledge of different shape, the reason establishing non-distinctness is contradicted. If it is (said to be) known as having a non-different shape, then it is not 'another entity', and so now non-distinctness from its own nature (should be said to be) established, and thus you should be charged with establishing what is already established. If it is (said to be) non-cognised, then there cannot be oneness, as between the horns of a chariot-horse (chariot and horns of a horse).

अथ अभावः साध्यः; तत्रापि कस्य पक्षीकरणम् किं [M 73b] घटसामान्यस्य, आहो तदवयवाधिकरणस्य ? तद्यदि घटसामान्यस्य पक्षीकरणम्; तत्किम् अवगतस्य, अनवगतस्य वा ? यद्यवगतस्य; तदा तेनैव सद्भावावगमेन अभावहेतोर्बाध्यमानत्वात् अगमकत्वम् । अथ नावगतम्; कथं तस्य पक्षीकरणम् स्वयमनवगतस्य पक्षीकरणायोगात् ?

Further, if non-being (Negation) (abhāva) is (said) to be established, even then what is it that is made the subject of the thesis ? – the jar-universal or the locus of its parts ? If jar-universal is (said to be) made the subject of the thesis, then is it made so as (already) cognised, or as non-cognised ? If it is said to be known, then the Reason establishing Negation being contradicted by that very knowledge of its positive existence, would not operate (give us knowledge of negation). If it is (said to be) not cognised, then how could it be made the subject of the thesis, because one cannot make a thing, one oneself, does not know, the subject of the thesis ?

§. Conjectured by S.

अथ अवयवाधिकरणस्य पक्षीकर [M 74a] णम् §, घटसामान्यं नास्तीति प्रतिज्ञा; तदग्रहेऽग्रहात् इत्यस्य हेतोः तदभावेन सह सम्बन्धो नास्ति । तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिसम्बन्धाभावे सति कथं गमकत्वम् ?

Now, if the locus of its parts is (said to be) made the subject of the thesis, 'Jar-universal is not (has no existence)' is the thesis, 'Because it is not cognised when it (jar) is not cognised'—this Reason has no relation (of invariable concomitance) with its Negation. In the absence of the relation of Identity or causality how can a Reason prove anything ?

तदग्रहेऽग्रहादित्यस्य कोऽर्थः ? किम्—अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणमेव घटसामान्यस्य ग्रहणम्, आहो अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणा [S 49] नन्तरं घट-सामान्यस्य ग्रहणम्, किं वा घट-सामान्य [M 74b] स्याग्रहणमेव विवक्षितम् ? तद्यदि अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणमेव घट-सामान्यस्य ग्रहणं विवक्षितम्; तदा नानेनाव्यतिरेकः अन्यतरासत्त्वं वा प्रतिपाद्यते, यथा नीलतद्विद्योः एकोपलम्भेऽपि नान्यतराभावः, अव्यतिरेको वा, तथा नीललोहितयोः एकोपलम्भेऽपि नान्यतराभावः, अव्यतिरेको वा ।

What is meant by (the statement) 'It is not cognised when it (jar) is not cognised'. Is what is meant to be conveyed that the knowledge of the locus of its parts is itself the knowledge of jar-universal, or that there is knowledge of jar-universal immediately after the knowledge of the locus of its parts, or that there is no knowledge whatsoever of the jar-universal ? If what is meant to be conveyed is that the knowledge of the locus of its parts is itself the knowledge of jar-universal, then this does not establish either non-distinctness (avyatireka) or non-existence of one of the two, as even though blue and its knowledge are found together (known in one cognition), there is not the non-existence of one of the two or their non-distinctness, similarly even though blue and red may be cognised together, there is not the non-existence of one of the two, or their non-distinctness.

अथ अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणानन्तरं घट-सामान्यग्रहणं विवक्षितम्; तदा नानेनाव्यतिरेकः साध्यते अन्यतरासत्त्वं वा, यथा रूपग्रहणानन्तरं रससंवेदनं न तयोरेकतां, गमयति अन्यतरासत्त्वं वा ।

If the knowledge of jar-universal immediately after the knowledge of the locus of its parts is meant to be conveyed, then this does not establish (their) non-distinctness, or the non-existence of one of the two, as the sensation of taste immediately after the cognition of colour does not prove either their oneness or the non-existence of one of the two.

अथ अग्रहणमेव विवक्षितं घट-सामान्यस्य; तदा; 'तदग्र [M 75a] हेऽग्रहात्' इत्येतन्न वक्तव्यम्,

§. Probably an interpolation introduced an explanation to तदभावेन

‘अग्रहात्’ इत्येतावदस्तु । नहि अन्यस्याऽग्रहे तदनुपलम्भसिद्धिः; तत्स्वभावविनिवृत्तिनिबन्धनत्वात् तदनुपलम्भस्य ।

If what is meant to be conveyed is only the sheer non-cognition of the jar-universal, then it should not be stated (as the Reason) ‘because it is not cognised when it (jar) is not cognised’; let it only be ‘because it is not cognised’. Its non-cognition cannot be established on their being the non-cognition of another, because its non-cognition is dependent on the negation (absence) of its nature.

न चायं व्यतिरेकार्थो लभ्यते, ‘तदग्रहेऽग्रहात्’ इत्यस्य हेतोः% घटसामान्यस्याग्रहणमेव%, अपि तु अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणानन्तरं घट-सामान्यस्य ग्रहणं लभ्यते ततश्च विपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धो भवति ।

And this meaning of Negation is not obtained, the non-cognition of jar-universal alone is obtained from the Reason-‘Because it is not cognised when it is not cognised; on the contrary there is found to be the knowledge of jar-universal immediately after the knowledge of the locus of its parts, therefore as establishing the contradictory, the Reason is contradictory.

[१२. एकपिण्डग्रहणकाले उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्येत्यादेः समीक्ष्य प्रतिवचनम् ।]

यदप्यभ्यधायि—“एकपिण्डग्रहणकाले उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य अनुपलब्धेर्नास्ति सामान्यम् । “क एवमाह—नोपलब्धं सामान्यम् । अपि तु उपलब्धमेव । कथं ज्ञायते ? द्वितीयादिपिण्डदर्शने सति पूर्वे पिण्डे स्मृतिदर्शनात् “अनेन[M 75b]सदृशोऽसौ” एवमनुस्मरति । अथवा एकपिण्डग्रहणकाले तद् उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तं न भवति तेन नोपलब्धते । उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिरिह अनेकसहकारिपिण्डोपनिपातः । यदि चोपलब्धिलक्षण[S 50]प्राप्तम्, कथं नोपलब्धते ? अथ नोपलब्धते; न तर्हि उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तम् । उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिरिह प्रत्ययान्तसाकल्य(ल्यं)* स्वभावविशेषस्स(श्च)@ । एतच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमनुपलब्धिः । एवंभूतस्याप्यनुपलम्भेपरिकल्प्यमाने सर्ववस्तूनामनुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः । उपलब्धौ वा अन्यत् कारणमन्वेष्टव्यम् । अथ प्रत्ययान्तरसाकल्यमात्रं विवक्षितम्, न तत्स्वभाववि[M 76a]शेषः, यद्येवम् अदृश्यस्यैव अनुपलब्धिः न दृश्यानुपलब्धिर्नास्ति । यदि च अन्यकारकसाकल्यम् उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिरभिधीयते; तदापि\$ उपलब्ध्या भवितव्यम् नानुपलब्ध्या । इतरकारकसाकल्यं हि उपलम्भजननसामर्थ्यम् । तच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमनुपलब्धिः ?

*. M : चायं

% Probably an interpolation introduced as an explanation to अयं व्यतिरेकार्थं

x. M : “साकल्यं”

@. M : विशेषश्च

\$. Perhaps तथापि – Eli Franco

तस्मादनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यैव अनुपलब्धेः (ब्धिः)#, नोपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य ।

[12. Examination and Refutation of the argument (“Because there is non-apprehension of universal) which is apprehensible at the time of the cognition of one entity.”]

As to what is said, viz ‘The Universal does not exist because at the time of the cognition of one entity there is the non-apprehension of it (even though) it is apprehensible (capable of being apprehended as by nature they are non-apprehensible) – (we ask), who says universal is not cognised; on the contrary it is certainly cognised. How is it known ? (How do you know ?) When there is the perception of the second (and the third) entity and so on, there is seen to be memory with regard to the first entity, one remembers thus, ‘This is similar to that’. Or, at the time of the apprehension of one entity, it is not apprehensible, and so it is not apprehended. Attaining the characteristic of apprehension (i.e. the fact of being apprehensible) implies here the aggregate of a number of auxiliary factors (entities). If it has attained the characteristic of apprehension (If it is apprehensible) how is it not apprehended ? Now if it is not apprehended, then the characteristic of apprehension is not apprehensible. The fact of being apprehensible signifies here the full complement of other conditions as also a particular nature. If this exists, how could there be non-apprehension ? If the non-apprehension of such an entity be imagined (posited), there would be the contingency of the non-apprehension of all things. Or if there were apprehension, another cause would have to be found out. If only the full complement of other conditions is meant; then that is not particular nature; if this is so, there is (would be) the non-apprehension of only what is invisible, not the non-apprehension of what is visible. And if the full complement of other instrumental factors signifies the fact of being operative (the attainment of the characteristic of apprehension), even then there should be apprehension, not non-apprehension. For the full complement of other instrumental factors signifies the efficiency to produce apprehension. If that exists how could there be non-apprehension ? Therefore there is the non-apprehension only of what is non-apprehensible, not of what is apprehensible.

[१३. क्षीरोदकवद्विवेकेनाग्रहणात्तास्ति सामान्यमित्युक्तेर्खण्डनम् ।]

यदप्युवाच—“क्षीरोदकवद् विवेकेनाऽग्रहणात् नास्ति सामान्यम्”; तदप्युक्तम्; विवेको हि आकारान्यत्वं* व्यक्तीनामननुगमरूपता, सामान्यं तु अनुगताकारम्, अनयोः सारूप्यम् । तैः सह

#. M : “लब्धेः Perhaps a lacuna at this point.

x. M : “आनयत्वं” Perhaps a lacuna at this point.

सारूप्यमस्य इति विविक्ताकारावगमदर्शः [M 76b] नात् तथा, क्षीरोदकयोरपि विविक्तमेव ग्रहणम् । तत्र क्षीरोदकयोः एकभाजननिक्षेपे सति किम्—केवलं क्षीरं प्रतिभाति, आहो उदकम्, उभयं वा ? तद्यदि क्षीरमेव प्रतिभाति; कथं तद् उदकाकारान्न विविक्तं भवति ?

अथ उदकं केवलं प्रतिभाति; तदपि कथं क्षीरान्न विविक्तं भवति ?

अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; तदा उभयोरितरेतराकार विविक्तयोर्ग्रहणं तादात्म्यव्यतिरेकात् ।

[13. Refutation of the Statement, 'Universal does not exist because it is not grasped distinctly like milk and water.']

As to what is said viz "Universal does not exist because it is not grasped distinctly like milk and water"—that also is not proper. For distinction signifies a different shape, the non-persisting form of particular entities (i.e. the exclusive, extremely individual nature of entities), whereas universal signifies persisting nature, their coordination (sārūpya : anyavyāvṛtti). "This is in co-ordination with those"—This is so on account of their being found the knowledge of their distinct shape, milk and water also are known distinctly. There, when milk and water are poured into one vessel, does only milk appear or only water, or do both appear ? If milk alone appears, how is it not distinct from the shape of water ?

Now if water alone appears, how is it too not distinct from milk ?

If both appear, then there is the knowledge of both as being distinct in shape from each other, on account of their being the exclusion of identity.

[१४. एकत्र दृष्टो भेदो हि — इत्यादेः कारिकायाः प्रतिवदनम् ।]

[S 51] यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् —

“एकत्र दृष्टो भेदो हि छविन्नान्यत्र दृश्यते ।

न तस्माद् भिन्नमस्त्यन्यत् सामान्यं बुद्ध्यभेदतः ॥”

[प्रमाणवा. ३.१२६.]

इत्येदप्युक्तम् । एकत्र [M 77a] दृष्टे (ष्ट)स्य^x भेदस्य अन्यत्र दर्शनमस्त्येव, यथा घटवस्त्रादेः एकावयवोपरिदृष्टस्य अवयवान्तरलग्नस्य उपलम्भात्[%] तथा सामान्यमपि भिन्नमस्ति, अनुगताकारस्य बुद्धिभेदेनाध्यवसीयमानत्वात् ।

x. M : दृष्टस्य Perhaps दृष्टे 'स्य — Eli Franco

% M & S : 'ओपलम्भात्; Perhaps a lacuna at this point — Eli Franco

[14. Reply to the Kārikā 'Difference seen in one place...etc'.]

As to what is also said —

"Because Difference (i.e. extreme particular) seen in one place is not seen anywhere else, therefore there is no other entity universal different from it on account of the non-difference of cognition (i.e. because particular and universal are cognised together—[Pramānavārttika, 3.126] This also is not proper. Difference seen in one place is certainly seen elsewhere; as (difference) of jar, cloth, etc. seen over one part is cognised as associated with other parts, similarly universal also is different, because it which is persistent in shape is determined by a different of cognition.

[१५. नित्यस्य क्रमेतराभ्यामित्यादेः प्रतिसमाधानम् ।]

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्— “नित्यस्य क्रमेतराभ्यामर्थक्रियाकरणसामर्थ्यं नास्तीत्यसत् सामान्यम्”; तदेतदुक्तम्; उभयथाप्यर्थक्रियासम्पादनमुपपद्यते युगपत्, क्रमेण च । ननु क्रमकर्तृत्वमभिन्नस्य नोपपद्यते, कार्यस्यैककालीनता प्राप्नोति; एतच्चाऽसमीचीनम्; यथा भवतां पक्षे एकं नीलस्वलक्षणम् अनेकाकार [M 77b] कार्यं नियतदेशसम्बन्धि जनयति नयनालोकमनस्कारादिरूपम्, न च कार्याणाम् एकाकारता एकदेशसम्बन्धिता वा विद्यते एकस्वभावसमुद्भवत्वेऽपि, तथा इहापि एवंभूतं तत्सामान्यं यत् क्रमेतराभ्यां कार्योत्पादात्मकम् ।

[15. Refutation of "on account of there being (no efficiency) either successively or simultaneously in what is eternal..."]

As to what is said, viz. "Universal does not exist because what is eternal has no efficiency for purposive action either successively or otherwise (i.e. simultaneously)" — that is not correct. Performance of purposive action stands to reason (can be accounted for) in both ways — simultaneously and successively. (Object) What is non-different (eternal hence unchanged) cannot be a doer of successive actions, (and if it performs actions simultaneously) (all) effects would come to be simultaneous; and this is not proper. (Reply—) As in your view one particular blue produces an effect of diverse shape connected with a fixed place of the form of eyes, light, attention, etc. and still (you do not admit) any unity of shape or connection with one place in the case of effects though they are produced from one essence, similarly here also universal is such viz. of the nature of production of effects successively or otherwise (i.e. capable of producing effects successively or otherwise.

ननु यदि क्रमेण कार्यं करोति तदा तदेव जनकम्, तदेव चाऽजनकम्; सत्यम्, तदेव जनकं तदेव चाऽजनकम् । ननु जनकाऽजनकयोर्भेदप्रसङ्गः, न प्रसङ्गोस्ति, यथा त्वदीये पक्षे एकं नीलस्वलक्षणं स्वकार्या[M 78a]पेक्षया जनकम्, स्वकारणात्मापेक्षया तु अजनकम्, न तस्य स्वरूपभेदोऽस्ति ।

(Objection) why, if it produces the effect successively, then one identical and the same entity is both producer and non-producer. (How is this possible?) (Reply) True, it itself is both producer and non-producer. (Objection) There would be the contingency of the difference of the producer and the non-producer (i.e. there would be two entities, not one) ! (Reply)—There is no such contingency. As in your view one particular blue is a producer with the reference to view of its effects, but is a non-producer with reference to its cause [and to itself (entity) which is its cause], and yet there is no difference of nature in it.

अथ स्वकारणमात्मानं च जनयति; तदयुक्तम्; तद् आत्मानं कुर्वद् उत्पन्नं वा कुर्यात्, अनुत्पन्नं वा? तद्यदि उत्पन्नं[S 52]करोति; तदयुक्तम्; कृतस्य करणायोगात् । अथाऽनुत्पन्नं करोति; असतः कः कारकार्थः? तथा, स्वकारणमपि न जनयति इतरेतराश्रयत्वदोषप्रसङ्गात् । अतः तदेव कारकं तदेव च अकारकमिति, तथा सामान्यमपि जनकमजनकं च ।

(Objection) It produces its own cause and itself (so it is uniformly a producer). (Reply) That is not proper. Creating itself, would it create it which is produced or non-produced? If it creates it which is produced; that is not proper, because what is created cannot be created (again). If it is said to create it which is non-produced, what could be the causal factor in the case of that which is non-existent (i.e. it is not possible to bring into existence that which is non-existent.) Similarly it does not produce its own cause also because there would be the contingency of the fault of mutual dependence. Hence it itself is the operator cause as also the non-cause; so universal also is both producer and non-producer.

न चार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वाभावेऽसत्त्वं सिद्धयति, यथा वह्नेः अयोगोलकाङ्गारावस्थायां धूमोत्पादकत्वाभावेऽपि न निवर्तते* वह्नि[M 78b]रूपता, स्वहेतोरेव तथाभूतस्योत्पत्तेर्वह्निस्वभावस्य धूमजनकात्मकस्य च, तथा अन्यदपि कार्यं स्वहेतुनोत्पादितं यत् वस्तुस्वभावं कार्याऽजनकात्मकं च, तथा सामान्यमपि वस्तुभूतं न च कार्यमुत्पादयति ।

#. M : अनुत्पन्नं

x. M : निवर्तते

% M & S : धूमजनका Eli Franco—धूमाजनका°

Further non-existence is not established when there is the absence of efficiency for purposive action¹; as fire in its state of ball of iron or burning charcoal cannot produce smoke and yet it does not cease to be of the form of fire, because it is produced as such out of its own cause as of the nature of fire and of the nature of being the producer of smoke; Similarly another effect also which is produced from its own cause is of the nature of an entity (i.e. is existent) and (is at the sametime) non-productive of any effect. So also universal is a real entity and (yet) does not produce an effect.

ननु यदि कार्यं नोत्पादयति, तदस्तीति कथं वेत्ति? तदुपलब्ध्या । ननु तदनुत्पाद्या कथं तद्गृहीतिर्भवति? स्वहेतुसामर्थ्यनियमितायाः तद्गृहीत्यात्मतयोत्पत्तेः । नच तदुत्पाद्यत्वेन तद्गृहीतित्वम्; चक्षुरादेरपि संवेद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च विषयाकारयोगित्वेन तद्गृहीतित्व(त्वं)* विज्ञानात्मना व्यतिरेकेण@ । विषयाकारसमावेशायाः[M 79a]गात् । योऽसौ आकारो विषयार्पितः स किं ज्ञानाकारद् भिन्नः, अभिन्नो वा? यदि भिन्नः, स तात्त्विकः, अतात्त्विको वा? यदि तात्त्विकः, तद्वतिः कथम्? किं स्वसंवेद्यत्वेन, आहो जनकत्वाकारार्पकत्वेन? तद्यदि स्वसंवेद्यत्वेन; तदयुक्तम्; अज्ञानात्मतया स्वसंवेद्यत्वायोगात् । अथ जनकत्वा-ऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन; तदा प्राप्ता आकारपरम्परा । अतात्त्विकः#; तद्वतिर्नोपपद्यते; स्व संवेद्यत्वजनकत्वव्यतिरेकात् ।

(Objection) Now, if it does not produce an effect, how do you know that it is existent? (Reply—). By its cognition knowledge. (Objection) How can there be its knowledge which is not produced by it? (Reply—) Because what is determined by the efficiency of its own cause is produced as of the nature of its cognition. (knowledge originates from the previous point, instant knowledge, not from universal). And it is not cognition on account of being produced by it, because there would be the contingency of eyes etc. being apprehensible. Nor is it its cognition on account of association with the shape of the object, because there can be no imprinting of the shape of the object to the exclusion of the cognitive self (consciousness). That shape which is imprinted by the object, is it different from the shape of knowledge or non-different? (i.e. is it of the nature of knowledge or not?) If different, is it real or unreal? If real,

1. The Buddhists believe that an entity to be 'Sat' (existence) must have efficiency for purposive action (arthakriyākāri sat).

*. M : गृहीतित्व°

@. M & S : विज्ञानात्मना व्यतिरेकेण — Eli Franco — विज्ञानात्मता

~. S : अज्ञाना°

M : परम्परातात्त्विकः S : परम्परा/अतात्त्विकः

how is it known ? As Introspection (self- apprehended) or as being the imprinter of the shape of producer. If it is (said to be) as being self-apprehended, that is not proper, because being of the non-knowledge it cannot be self-apprehensible. If it is (known) as being the imprinter of the shape of producer (i.e. because it produces the knowledge of its being the producer), then there would be an endless series of shapes. If it is (said to be) unreal, its knowledge does not stand to reason (i.e. it cannot be known), because it is neither self-apprehensible nor the producer (of any shape).

अथ अव्यतिरिक्तः, स तात्त्विकः, अतात्त्विको वा ? यदि तात्त्विकः, स जडात्मा, त द्विपरीतो वा ? यदि जडात्मा; न नहि चिन्ता सह तादात्म्यम्—चिदचितोः तादात्म्यानु[S 53]पपत्तिः । अथ तद्विपरीतः; तदा ज्ञानमात्रता स्यात् । [M 79b]ज्ञानरूपता च सर्वज्ञानावधारणा* (ज्ञानसाधारणा)—प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः । अथ अतात्त्विकः; तदा ज्ञानस्यापि अतात्त्विकत्वं प्राप्नोति । यदि च विज्ञानतादात्म्येन आकारोत्पत्तिर्भवति; विज्ञानं सर्वकारकनिष्पाद्येन% साधारणम्—प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः । एवं च सति यदुक्तम् —

“अर्थेन घटयत्येनां नहि मुक्त्वार्थरूपताम् ।

तस्मादर्थधिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपता ॥”

तन्मुग्धविलसितं सौगतानाम् ।

If it is (said to be) non-different, is it real or unreal ? If real, is it insentient by nature or the opposite of it ? If it is insentient by nature then it cannot be identical with a sentient entity (knowledge), because the sentient and the non-sentient cannot be identical. If it has the opposite nature, then it would be only knowledge. The form of knowledge is common to all cognitions, and so there would be the impossibility of fixing it to (assigning it to) each action. Now if it is (said to be) unreal, then even knowledge comes to be unreal. If there is (said to be) the rise of shape in identity with consciousness, then consciousness is common to everything produced by causal factors and there would be the impossibility of firing it (assigning it) to each action. This being so, what is said, viz.

“One forms, it by the object, not by setting aside the form of the object; therefore the form of the knowable is the evidence of right knowledge for the

x. M : “ज्ञानावधारणात्” / (त् / seems to be deleted) Eli Franco

% M & S : “निष्पाद्येन

\$ प्रमाणवार्तिक. I - 34 - प्रमेयाधिगतेः

cognition of the object”-

That is a childish fancy of the **Buddhists**.

तदेवं वृत्तिविकल्पादिदूषणं सामान्यादौ न संभवति* । यथा एकं रूपम् अनेककार्योत्पादकत्वेन% साधारणम्, तथा एकं सामान्यम् अनेकाधारसाधारणम् ।

Thus, therefore, the fault of construction of modes, and other such faults are not possible in the case of universal, etc. As one colour is common (to many) as producing a number of effects, so one universal is common to a number of loci (substrata).

अथ एक*रूप[M 80a]पं नानेकं कार्यं जनयति अपि तु एकमेव; तत्रापि किं रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयति, उत ज्ञानमेव ? तद्यदि रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयति; तदा रूपस्याऽग्रहणं प्राप्नोति विज्ञानाऽजननात् ।

(Objection) What is uniform does not produce a number of effects, but produces only one (effect). (Reply) Even there does it produce only colour or only knowledge ? Now, if it is said to produce only colour, then there would be the non-cognition of colour, because cognition would not be produced.

अथ ज्ञानमेव केवलमुत्पादयति तथापि मानसं प्रत्यक्षं न प्राप्नोति । स्वविषयानन्तरविषयसहकारिणेन्द्रियज्ञानेन यज्जन्यते तत् मानसं प्रत्यक्षम् । न च स्वविषयानन्तरभावी विषयोऽस्ति रूपान्तराजनकात्^ । तस्मादेकमेव रूपं विज्ञान-नीला-दिकार्यसाधारणं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।

If it is said to produce only knowledge, even then there would not be mental perception. Mental perception is that which is produced by sensuous cognition which cooperates with the object immediately following its own object (i.e. the object of sensuous cognition.)¹ But there is no object immediately following its own object, because it does not (is said not to) produce another colour. Therefore colour alone should be considered as common to cognition, blue and such recognised.

x. Perhaps a lacuna at this point. : “ज्ञानावधारणात्” / (त् / seems to be deleted) Eli Franco

% M : “ओत्पादकत्वेन

* M & S : अर्थेक

^ S : “आजनकात्

1. Cf. Nyāyabindu I-9.

चक्षुरूपालोकादीनि कारणानि विज्ञानमुत्पादयन्ति, तानि कि[M 80b]म्—एकस्वभावयुक्तानि, आहो नियतस्वभावयुक्तानि ? तद्यदि एकस्वभावतया उत्पादयति (न्ति)%; तदा@ कारकैकत्वं प्राप्नोति अभिन्नस्वभावयोगित्वात् । अथ नियतस्वभावयुक्तानि[S 54] ज्ञानरूपंकार्यं जनयन्ति; तदा विज्ञानस्य अभेदरूपता निवर्तते नियतस्वभावकारकजन्यत्वाद् रूपशब्दादिवत् ।*

Causes like eyes, colour, light, etc. produce knowledge; are they possessed of one nature, or possessed of a specific nature ? If they as possessed of one nature, are said to produce (knowledge), then there would be unity of operative factors, as they have an identical nature. If they as possessed of a specific nature are said to produce the effect in the form of knowledge, then the non-different form of knowledge would cease to be in as much as it is produced by operative factors with their specific natures, like colour, sound, etc.

अथ विविधादपि कारणाद् अखण्डितरूपं कार्यं भवति; एवं च कार्यभेदात् भिन्नकारणानुमानं निवर्तते#—एकस्वभावादपि विज्ञानाद् अनेकं नयनालोकादिकार्यमुत्पद्यते, अनेकास्मादपि एकं भवति । एवं च सति नियतकार्यदर्शनेनियतका[M 81a]रणानुमानं निवर्तते* ।

If it is said that even from a cause of diverse nature, an effect having unity of form can be produced, (the reply is that) in that case there could not be Inference of different causes on the basis of difference in the effects—From consciousness even though of one nature, diverse effect, viz. eyes, light, etc. is produced and from diverse causes one (effect) arises. This being so, there cannot be the inference of a specific cause on perception of a specific effect.

अथ एकस्मादेव कारणादेकं कार्यं भवति न बहूनां संकलितानाम् एकाफलोत्पादकत्वम् । ततश्च नियतकार्यदर्शने नियतकारणानुमानं केन निवार्यते ? तदेतदसमीचीनम्; यद्येकं कारणम् एकं कार्यं जनयति तदाऽभ्युपगमविरोधः— “चतुर्भ्यश्चित्तचैत्ता भवन्ति, बोधाद्बोधरूपता* विषयाकारता” इत्यादि ।

(Objection) One effect arises from only one cause, many forming an

% M : *यति

@ S : *ततः

\$ S : *आधिवत्

Perhaps a lacuna at this point

* Eli Franco – ? in a place of ।

x. M & S : omit विषयाद्

aggregate cannot give rise to one result. Then what could prevent the inference of a specific cause on perception of a specific effect ? (Reply)— This is not true. If one cause is said to produce one effect, then your accepted view would be contradicted, viz. Mind and the (accompanying) mental phenomena arise from four factors, from consciousness the form of cognition, the shape of object and so on.

एकमेव जनयति किम्—समानजातीयत्वेन, आहो तदाकारत्वेन, किं वा पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन ? तद्यदि समानजातीयत्वेन जनकत्वम्; तदा समानकालीन% पश्चादुपपन्नमपि जनय[M 81b]त् । अथ तदाकारानुकारित्वेन जनकम्; तत्राप्येतदेव दूषणम् । अथ पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन जनकम्; न तर्हीदं वक्तव्यम् ‘एकमेव जनकम्’, चक्षुरूपालोकमनस्काराणां पूर्वकालभावित्वाऽविशेषात् । एवं च अनेकोपादानोत्पाद्यत्वेन आकारकदम्बकस्वरूपं विज्ञानं प्रसक्तम् । रूपाद्याकारपरिहारे वा विज्ञानाकारस्याप्यनुपपत्तिः । तदनुपपत्तौ नैरात्म्यप्रसङ्गः ।

If only one is said to produce, does it do so being of the same genus, or of that shape, or an account of their being prior and posterior in time ? If it is said to be the producer on account of its being of the same genus, then it should produce even though it be contemporary with or produced after (the effect). If it is said to be the producer on account of its being of like shape, even there is the same fault. If it is said to be the producer on account of their being prior and posterior in time, then it should not be stated that ‘There is only one producer’, because eyes, colour, attention are all like prior in point of time. And thus being produced by a number of material causes, knowledge would come to be of the nature of an aggregate of shapes. Or if the shape of colour, etc were sat aside (explained away), there would be the impossibility of even the nature of cognition. And their being its impossibility there would be the contingency of essencelessness (i.e. there would be nothing).

किंच, ज्ञानं कार्यैकस्वभावम्, कारणैकस्वभावम्, उभय स्वभावं वा ? तद्यदि कारणैकस्वभावम्; तदा कार्यरूपता न संभवति, तदभावे न वस्तुत्वम्, संस्कृतानां वस्तुत्वाभ्यु[M 82a]पगमात् । नापि कारणरूपता उपपद्यते; अनाधीयमानाऽतिशय[S 55]त्वेन जनकत्वाऽयोगात् । अथ कार्यैकस्वभावम्; तथापि न सदात्मकम्, अर्थक्रियाऽकरणे वस्तुत्वविरहात् । अथ उभयात्मकम्; एकमनेकात्मकं भवति ? केन त्वं विप्रलम्भितः ? नहि एकस्य अनेकनामकरणे नानातोपपद्यते । न चानेक नामका(क)* रणमुपपद्यते, निमित्तस्याविचित्रत्वात् । एवं विज्ञानस्याऽसंभवे सति सन्तानानुपपत्तिः, अभ्रान्तभ्रान्तद्वैतस्याऽनुपपत्तिश्च ।

% M & S : समानकालीन Eli Franco – समानजातीयम्

x. M : *कारणम्

Moreover, is knowledge of the nature of effect alone, or of the nature of cause alone or of the nature of both ? Now if it is of the nature of cause alone, then it cannot possibly be of the nature of effect, and in the absence of that it would not be a real entity, because compounded entities are recognised as real. Nor also does the form of cause stand to reason, because as no special excellence can be added to it, it could not be nature of effect alone, even then it would not be of the nature of reality, because what does not perform purposive action is devoid of reality. If it is said to be of the nature of both, does one become diverse ? By whom were you deceived (rebuffed) ? If different names are given to one entity it does not justifiably become multiple. And it is not possible to give many names, because the instrumental causes are not diverse. Thus consciousness (knowledge) not being possible, there would be the impossibility of the duality of real and illusory (There is no knowledge, so the question of their being its continuum, or of its being right or wrong does not arise at all.)

[१६. प्रसङ्गात् बौद्धाभिमतस्य सन्तानस्य असिद्धत्वप्रदर्शनम् ।]

इतोऽपि सन्तानस्यासिद्धिः, विज्ञानस्य एकत्वात् । तदेकत्वं च आकारान्तरस्यानुपपत्तेः, उपपत्तौ वा ज्ञानाकारविरहप्रसङ्गः । तत्प्रसक्तौ च सन् [M 82b] तानाऽनुपपत्तिः ।

[16. Incidental Demonstration of the continuum recognised by the Buddhist as not being established.]

Hence also continuum cannot be established, because there is oneness of consciousness. And this oneness is on account of the impossibility of another shape, or if this (another shape) were possible, there would be the contingency of the shape of knowledge, and in the event of that contingency there would be the impossibility of continuum.

इतोऽपि विज्ञानसन्तानानुपपत्तिः—विज्ञानम् असिद्धमात् सदात्मतया निवर्तते, स्वरूपान्तरात् कथं व्यावर्तते ? किं सदात्मतया, आहो आकारान्तरेण ? तद्यदि सदात्मतया व्यावर्तते; तदा रूपादेः असदाकारता प्राप्नोति, वाजिषाणयोरिव । अथ आकारान्तरेण निवर्तते; तदा ज्ञानस्य असत्त्वभावात् प्राप्नोति, तुरग विषाणवदिति ।

Further, on account of this also there is the impossibility of the continuum of consciousness : = consciousness is excluded from what is characterised by non-being on account of its being real by nature, but how is

it excluded from another nature ? By virtue of its being real, or by another shape ? Now if it is (said to be) excluded by virtue of its being real, then colour, etc. would come to be unreal in shape (nature), like the two horns of a horse. If it is excluded by virtue of another shape, then knowledge would come to be unreal by nature, like the horns of a horse.

अथ विज्ञानाकारतया निवर्तते रूपादिभ्यो विज्ञानम्; सा विज्ञानाकारता सत्त्वभावा, असत्त्वभावा (वा)^{\$} ? तद्यदि सत्त्वभावा; तदा ज्ञानाकारतया निवर्तते इति किमुक्तं भवति ? सदात्मतया निवर्तते, विज्ञान सदाकारयोरव्यतिरेकात् । ततश्च रूपादेरसदाकारता प्राप्नोति तुरगविषाणवदिति पूर्वोदितमेव दूषणमापद्यते । अथ असत्त्वभावा; [M 83a] तदा खरविषाणवद् विज्ञानरूपतां परित्यजति, त्यागे विज्ञानसन्तानानुपपत्तिः, तदनुपपत्तौ चैत्यवन्दनादिक्रियाऽनर्थक्यम् ।

Further, if consciousness is (said to be) excluded from colour, etc, by virtue of the shape of consciousness, then is that shape of knowledge of the nature of reality or of that of unreality. Now if it is real by nature (of the nature of reality) what is meant by (the statement) 'It is excluded by virtue of the shape of knowledge ?' (It should mean that) it is excluded by virtue of the nature of reality, because the shapes of knowledge and reality are non-different (one). Therefore, colour etc would come to have the shape of unreality, like the horns of a horse and thus there occurs the same fore-mentioned fault. If it be said to be of the nature of unreality, then like the horns of an ass, it gives up the form of consciousness (i.e. it should cease to be consciousness), and in the event of its giving up (that), there is the impossibility of the stream of consciousness, and if it is impossible, activities like bowing down before the sacred tree, etc would be in vain¹.

इतोऽपि विज्ञान सन्तानानुपपत्तिः, तदुत्पादक विज्ञानस्य पूर्वापरसहोत्पन्नविज्ञानं प्रति स्वरूपाविशेषात्—यदेव पूर्वसहोत्पन्नविज्ञानापेक्षया स्वरूपं तदेव अपरविज्ञानापेक्षयापि [S 56] स्वरूपं विज्ञानस्य निरवयव[व]त्वेन^x, ततश्च यथा पूर्वसहोत्पन्नविज्ञानस्य हेतुर्न भवति, एवम् अपरविज्ञानस्यापि हेतुर्न भवति—तत्स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तव्यापारातिरिक्तस्यानुपलब्धेः ।

Hence also there is the impossibility of the stream of consciousness, because the consciousness giving rise to it is not different in nature with reference to the consciousness produced before or after or simultaneously. Whatever nature it has with reference to the consciousness produced before or simulta-

\$ M : Omits वा.

1. Eli Franco – Funerary monuments...etc....

x M : निरवयवत्वेन

neously, it has the same nature with reference to the consciousness following it, on account of consciousness being partless, therefore, as it is not the cause of the consciousness produced before or simultaneously, so it is not (will not be) the cause of the consciousness following it; on account of the non-apprehension of any peculiarity of operation as distinct from its nature.

अथ पूर्वकालभाव एवातिशयः, तेन तस्य हेतुत्वमुपपाद्यते; यद्येवं यथा देवदत्तज्ञानपूर्वकालभावि देवदत्तज्ञान[%]कारणं तथा सर्वपुरुषज्ञानानां देवदत्तज्ञानकालो[#]त्पन्नानां देवदत्तज्ञानं प्रति[M 83b], हेतुत्वं प्रसक्तम्; तत्प्रसक्तौ अनेकद्वीपदेशान्तरितपुरुषानुस्य(नुभू)[#]तार्थानुस्मरणं स्यात् । तथा, स्वजनभुजङ्गमादौ^{\$} (मादावन)नुभूतेष्वर्थे[~]नुस्मरणं स्यात् । तथा, तथागतावदातज्ञानजन्यत्वे देवदत्तज्ञानानामवदातता स्यात् । ततश्च सर्वे सर्वज्ञाः स्युः । अथ नैव अवदातता देवदत्तादिज्ञानानाम्, तथागतावदात[M 84a][@] ज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वेऽपि देवदत्तादिज्ञानेनापि जनितत्वात्; तज्जन्यत्वेनैव तथागतज्ञानस्याप्यवदातरूपता न प्राप्नोति । ततश्चासावपि अवीतरागः स्यादसर्वज्ञश्च ।

Now, if it be argued that priority of existence itself is the peculiarity, hence its being the cause can be justified, (the reply is that) if that is so then as what is prior to Devadatta's knowledge is the cause of Devadatta's knowledge, so there would be the contingency of the cognitions of all persons, which are produced simultaneously with Devdatta's knowledge being the cause with respect to Devadatta's knowledge in the event of that contingency there should be persisting remembrance of things running through men separated by several continents (or better with the reading anubhūtarthā....there would be remembrance of things experienced by men separated by several continents). Similarly, there should be remembrance even of previously unexperienced entities like relatives, serpents, etc. so also on their account of being produced by the pure knowledge of the Buddha, cognitions of Devdatta (also) should be pure. (undefiled). Then all should be omniscient. Further if it be said that the cognitions of Devadatta and others are never pure, because even while being produced by the pure knowledge of the Tathāgata (Buddha) as the material

% M & S omits : देवदत्त ज्ञानम् one could read perhaps : देवदत्तज्ञान पूर्वकालभावि & avoid the conjecture – Eli franco

* M & S omits : °पूर्व

M : °आनुस्यूता

\$ M : °भुजङ्गमादौ'नुभूते : Perhaps a lacuna at this point : Eli franco.

~ S omits : °आदि

@ Foils are missing

cause, it is also produced by the knowledge of Devdatta and others, (the reply is that in that case) even on account of being produced by it, the knowledge of the **Buddha** also would not be pure. Then he too would not be free from passions and would not be omniscient.

इतश्च सन्तानानुपपत्तिः, विज्ञानयोः सहोत्पादे हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तेः । यदैव कारणज्ञानं विनश्यति तदैव कार्यज्ञानं जायत इति वः सिद्धान्तः । कारणज्ञानस्य च विनाशः तदुत्पाद एव । ततश्च कारणज्ञानविनाशकाले कार्यज्ञानं भवति । किमुक्तं भवति ? कारणज्ञानोत्पादकाल एव भवति । ततश्च सहोत्पन्नयोः हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तिः एककालोद्गतयोः गोविषाणयोरिव । कारणज्ञानस्य चानुपपत्तिः[~]स्योत्पत्तिवद् अनुत्पन्नस्य विनाशप्रसङ्गः । ततश्च क्षणमपि नोपलभ्येत, उपलब्धौ वा सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः, तदात्मभूतविनाशस्य उपलम्भविधाताकर्तृत्वात् । विधातकर्तृत्वे वा एकक्षणोपलम्भस्यापि अनुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गः । अथ एकक्षणोपलम्भस्वभावकं संजातं तेन [न][%] सततोपलब्धिः अनुपलब्धिर्वा, यद्येवं द्वादशाष्टक्षणोप[S 57]लम्भस्वभावकं संजातं किन्न कल्प्यते ? किंच, उत्पादविनाशयोरभेदे सति कार्यकारणयोः समं विनाशः स्यात् ।

Because of this also there is the impossibility of a continuum if cognitions are produced simultaneously, they could not be related as cause and effect. Your law is that the knowledge which is the effect arises even when the knowledge that is the cause perishes. And the destruction of the cause-knowledge is itself its origination. And therefore the effect-knowledge arises at the time of the destruction of the cause knowledge. What is meant by this ? That it rises at the time of the rise of the cause-knowledge. And therefore there is the impossibility of the relation of cause-effect between two things that are produced simultaneously, as in the case of the two horns of a bull that have sprung up at one time. Like the production of unproduced cause-knowledge, there would be the contingency of the destruction of that knowledge which is unproduced. And therefore it would not be found even for a moment, or if it be apprehended there would be the contingency of perpetual apprehension, because destruction which is its very essence could not bring about the end of apprehension¹. Or if it were to bring about its end, there would be the contingency of the infeasibility of even momentary apprehension (i.e. lasting for a moment). Now if it be argued that it is produced of such a nature as to be

x. M according to S : °चानुपपन्न

% M according to S omits न

1. In Kṣanabhaṅgavāda, the thing, its origination and destruction all signify one entity only – the point instant.

capable of being cognised for one moment, so there is neither perpetual apprehension nor non-apprehension, (our reply is that) if it is so why is it not conceived as having being produced of such a nature as to be capable of being cognised for twelve or eighteen moments. Moreover, if there were no difference between origination and destruction, effect and cause would perish together (simultaneously).

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् — “मातुरुदरनिःक्रम(निष्क्रम)णानन्तरं यदाद्यं ज्ञानं तज्ज्ञानान्तरपूर्वकं ज्ञानत्वात् द्वितीयज्ञानवत् ।” न, असिद्धत्वात् दृष्टान्तस्य, द्वितीयादिज्ञानस्यापि यथा ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं नावगाहयितुं पार्यते तथा प्रागेव आवेदितम् । किंच, यदि (द्धि)* ज्ञानत्वात् ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वानुमानम्, न किलाऽवबोधात्मककारणमन्तरेण बोधात्मकं कार्यमुपपद्यते । एतच्चावद्यम् — अबोधात्मकादपि नीलालोकलोचनादिकारणादुपजायते — तदा% गर्भादौ यदाद्यं विज्ञानं तद् भूतसंघातादेव भविष्यति न ज्ञानान्तरं परिकल्पनीयम् । यस्यानन्तरं यद् भवति तत् तस्य कारणं नापरिदृष्टसामर्थ्यम्, विज्ञानाभावे विज्ञानजन्याकारता निवृत्ता न तु ज्ञानाकारता, यथा इन्द्रियव्यापारमन्तरेणोपजायमाने मनोविज्ञाने इन्द्रियजन्याकारता निवर्तते न तु ज्ञानाकारता ।

As to what is said, viz. “The first knowledge after emerging from the mother’s womb must have another knowledge preceding it, because it is knowledge, like the second cognition.” (We say) No (it is not correct), because the illustration is unreal. It has already been stated that it is possible to comprehend the fact of even the second and other cognitions being preceded by knowledge. Moreover as to the inference of being preceded by knowledge on the ground of its being knowledge, it is known that an effect of the nature of knowledge is not possible without a cause that is of the nature of knowledge (avabodha). And this is faulty, viz. it (knowledge) is produced even from causes like blue (object), light, eyes, etc which are of the nature of non-knowledge. Then the first knowledge in the womb, etc will rise from only an aggregate of material elements and no other knowledge need be posited. If a thing occurs immediately after another, the latter is its cause, not that whose efficiency is not seen. (that which is immediately prior is the cause of a thing, not that whose efficiency is not observed); in the absence of consciousness, the nature of being produced by consciousness ceases (is not found), but not the shape of knowledge, as in mental consciousness arising without the operation of the sense-organs the shape of being produced by sense-organs is not there (lit. ceases); but not its shape of knowledge.

x. S : conjectures यद्धि

% S & M according to S. तदा — Eli Franco — तथा

यदि च सदृशात् सदृशस्योत्पत्तिर्नियम्यते तदा धूमेन दहनानुमानं न प्राप्नोति, दहनस्य धूमसारूप्यमन्तरेण उपादानकारणत्वायोगात् । अथ रूपरूपता सारूप्यमुभयोरिति चेत्; तदिहापि स्वलक्षणरूपता सारूप्यं भूतविज्ञानयोः, अलं परलोकविज्ञानकल्पनया । अथ विज्ञानरूपता भूतानां न विद्यते तेन तेषामुपादानकारणत्वं नास्ति विज्ञानं प्रतीतिश्चे (प्रतीति चे) त्; इहापि धूमरूपता नास्ति दहनस्य, नोपादानकारणत्वम्, तदभावे न दहनानुमानम् ।

If it is determined that like is produced from like, then it would not be possible to infer fire from smoke, because fire could not be the material cause without the coordination of form with smoke. If (it is said that) being of the form of colour signifies the coordination of both, then here also the form of point-instant (i.e. that both are point instants) signifies the coordination of elements and consciousness, what is the need of imagining consciousness of the other world (existence). Now if it is argued that elements are not of the form (nature) of knowledge, so they cannot be the constituent cause with respect to consciousness, (we reply) here also fire is not of the form of smoke, (hence) it is not the material cause, and without that (i.e. without its being the material cause) there cannot be the inference of fire (from smoke).

तथा, अनुभवज्ञानादनुभवज्ञानस्यैव निष्पत्तिरभ्युपेया उपादानकारणानुकारित्वेन कार्यस्य निष्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् । न च एकदेशानुकारित्वमस्ति तद्विज्ञानस्याऽविचित्रत्वात् । अनुभवा[S 58]कारणानुकारित्वे च ज्ञानाकारताविरहः स्यात्, अनुकरोति च विज्ञानरूपताम्, तेन कथं नानुभवात्मकम् ? तदुपपत्तौ च प्राप्ता अनुभवपरम्परा इत्यतः स्मरणानुपपत्तिः, तदनुपपत्तौ च अनुमानज्ञानस्याप्यनुपपत्तिः, ततश्च सर्वव्यवहारविलोपप्रसङ्गश्च एवं (प्रसङ्गः। एवं च)% न सन्तानसिद्धिः, नापि सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकज्ञानद्वैराश्यमस्ति, नापि व्यभिचाराव्यभिचारद्वैविध्यमुपपद्यते सौगते मते ॥ छ ॥

Similarly, it will have to be accepted that experiential (immediate) knowledge alone arise from experimental knowledge, because it is accepted that the effect arises in imitation of the material cause. And there is not (i.e. cannot be) partial imitation, because its seed is not variegated. And if it were not to imitate the shape (nature) of experience, there would be absence of the shape of knowledge, and (i.e. but) it does imitate the form of consciousness, so how could it not be of the nature of experience (immediate apprehension). If this were true, there would be a series of immediate apprehensions, and therefore there would be the impossibility of Memory, and if that (memory) were not

x. M : according to S : प्रतीतिश्चेद्

% M : accordings to S : प्रसङ्गश्चेवम्

possible, inferential knowledge also would not be possible, and therefore there would be the contingency of the disappearance of all empirical behavior (i.e. without Memory and Inference all worldly dealings would come to a stand still). And thus continuum is not established, nor is there the distinct classification of determinate (conceptual) and indeterminate (sensation) knowledges (i.e. the two are not different), nor even is the difference (classification) of error and non-error possible in the **Buddhist** view ॥ छ ॥

[५. मीमांसकाभिमतस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य निरासः ।]

तथा, “सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत् प्रत्यक्षम्” [जैमि. १.१.४]; तदपि प्रत्युक्तम् । कथम् ? एतत्सूत्रं कदाचित् लक्षणपरम्, कदाचिच्च कारकसंख्याप्रतिपादनपरम्; कदाचिच्चानुवादपरम् । तद्यदि लक्षणपरम्; तदावबोधस्याव्यभिचारित्वं नावगन्तुं पार्यते—नादुष्टकारणजन्यत्वेन, नापि प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन, नापि बाधारहितत्वेन, नान्यथा वा—सर्वं पूर्वोदितमनुस्मृत्य वक्तव्यम् ।

[5. Refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka's view of Perception..]

Similarly this also stands refuted, viz. “There is the rise of knowledge when the sense-organs of a man come into contact with an existent thing” [Jaimini sū. I.1.4]. How is it ? This sūtra (aphorism) may be meant to give the definition, or may be meant to lay down the causal factors (in perception) or may be by way of restatement (of what is already known). Now, if it is meant to give the definition, then it is not possible to know the non-erroneousness of knowledge—not by its being produced by undefiled causes, nor even by efficiency, nor by its being devoid of contradiction, nor in any other way. What was said earlier should be recalled and stated here.

नापि इन्द्रियार्थसम्प्रयोगजत्वं विज्ञानस्यावबोधस्य चार्वाग्विदावगम्यते, तदतीन्द्रियत्वेन तादयत्ताऽनधिगतेः । नापि इन्द्रियजन्यत्वमवगन्तुं पार्यते, इन्द्रियाणामतीन्द्रियत्वादेव । अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या सन्निकर्षपरिकल्पना क्रियते; अवबोधस्य अन्यथानुपपत्तिर्न भवति काऽनुमा ?

Nor even is the nature of consciousness and knowledge of being produced by the contact of sense-organs and object known by one who knows the nearer part—because it being supersensuous, dependence on it is not cognised. Nor even can the fact of being produced by the sense-organs be known, even because the sense-organs are beyond the ken of the senses. If it is said that contact is presumed (hypostatised) because knowledge cannot be otherwise possible, (the reply is that) it is not that knowledge cannot be otherwise pos-

sible. What is (this) inferential knowledge ? (It is produced without contact).

अथ कारकसंख्यार्थम्; किं तेन परिसंख्यातेन प्रयोजनम् ? आलोकादीनामपि कारकत्वात् तान्यपि परिसंख्येयानि भवन्ति ।

If it is (said to be) meant to give the number of causal factors then (we ask) what is the use of this enumeration ? Light, etc also are operative factors, they also should have been enumerated.

अथ अनुवादपरता; प्रसिद्धस्यानुवादो नाऽप्रसिद्धस्य । नच अध्यक्षं द्विद्विदितम् । ननु लोके विदितम्; ‘न विदि[S 59]तम्’ इति ब्रूमः, अव्यभिचारितयाऽनवगतेः । नापि सत्संप्रयोगजत्वं विदितम्, ततश्च प्रत्यक्षानधिगतिः, तदनवगतौ चानुवादानुपपत्तिः ।

If it is (said to be) meant for restatement, then (we say) there is the restatement of what is well known, not of what is not well known and perception is not known anywhere (i.e. an exposition of perception has not been given earlier in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras). (Objection) Why it is known in the world (i.e. even the man in the street knows what perception is) (Reply) we say ‘It is not known’, because it is not known as non-erroneous. Nor also is the fact of being produced by contact with an existent thing known, restatement is not justifiable.

इतोऽप्यनुवादानुपपत्तिः प्रयोजनाभावात् । नहि प्रयोजनं विना अनुवादः प्रवर्तते, अनूद्य क्वचित् किञ्चिदधीयते प्रतिषिध्यते वा ।

Hence also restatement is not justifiable, because there is no use of it. Restatement does not operate without an end in view, by restatement, either something is either asserted or denied.

नन्वत्रापि धर्मं प्रति निमित्तत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते । तदुक्तम् “धर्मं प्रत्यनिमित्तं प्रत्यक्षं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् सम्प्रयोगजत्वाच्च ।” तत्र किम् अन्यपदार्थावभासोत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षं धर्मं प्रति निमित्तात्वेन प्रतिषिध्यते, किं वा धर्मावभासोत्पन्नम्, अनुत्पन्नं वा ? तद्यदि अन्यपदार्थावभासोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षव्यावृत्तिः क्रियते; तदाऽविप्रतिपत्त्या संबोधयितव्या जडमतयः ।

(Objector) Why here also the instrumentality of perception with respect to Dharma (Religious Act) is denied. It is said, “Perception is not an instrument towards Dharma, because it cognises what is existent (whereas Dharma pertains to what is to be achieved) and is produced by contact.” (Reply) (we ask) There, is produced as the knowledge of another entity denied as being the

instrument of Dharma, or perception produced as the knowledge of Dharma, or (perception) that is unproduced ? Now, if perception produced as the knowledge of another entity is excluded, then the dull-witted (who say this) should be charged with non-contradiction (i.e. they say what is true, knowledge of another entity can contribute nothing towards Dharma).

अथ धर्म्य(र्मा)* वबोधकोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षव्यावृत्तिः क्रियते; तदा विरोधेन प्रत्यवस्थेयो भवति—धर्मावबोधकोत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षम्, न च धर्मनिमित्तम् इति व्याहतपदिश्यते, अन्यथा चोदनावचनजनितविज्ञानस्यापि धर्मावबोधकत्वेन उत्पन्नस्यातन्निमित्तत्वं स्यात् । अथानुत्पन्नस्य धर्मावबोधकत्वं नास्ति; केनात्र प्रतिपद्यते—यत्रोत्पन्नं तद् धर्मावबोधकम् ? नापि कमलदलावबोधकं स्वयमसत्त्वात् ।

If perception produced as the illuminator of Dharma is denied, then he (the Mīmāṃsaka) should be charged with contradiction. That perception is produced as the illuminator of Dharma and is (yet) not an instrument with respect to Dharma is a conflicting (contradictory) statement; otherwise knowledge produced by an injunctory statement also as an illuminator of Dharma would not be its instrument. If (perception that is) unproduced is said not to be the illuminator then (we reply) who is of the view that what is not produced is the illuminator of Dharma (gives knowledge of Dharma) ? It is not an illuminator of a lotus-flower (also even though it is an existent thing) because it is itself non-existent.

यदप्युक्तम्—‘सत्संप्रयोगजत्वात्’ इति, तदप्युक्तम्; सत्संप्रयोगजत्वं यथा न भवति तथा प्रागेवोक्तम् ।

As to what is stated viz. ‘Because it is produced by contact with an existent thing’, that also is not proper. It has already been stated earlier as to how it is not produced by contact with an existent thing.

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् — ‘विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् किल प्रत्यक्षं विज्ञानं विद्यमानवबोधयति’; यद्येवं न केवलं प्रत्यक्षम् अपि तु सर्वप्रमाणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं विद्यमानावबोधकम् ।

As to what is further said viz. “Because it cognises what is existent, perceptual cognition illuminates (gives knowledge of) what is existent.” (we reply) if this be so, not only perception, but knowledge produced by all sources of cognition is the illuminator of what is existent.

अथ चोदनावचनं विज्ञानम् अविद्यमानकर्तव्यार्थावबोधकम्; यद्यविद्यमानम्; कथमवबोध्यते ?

x. M : accordings to S : धर्म्यव*

अथ अवबोध्यते; [S 60] कथमविद्यमानता ? अवबोध्यमानत्वेनैव विद्यमानता प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणावबोधितार्थवदिति । नाप्यवबोधनमवबोध्यमन्तरेण उपजायते प्रत्यक्षावबोधनवत् ।

If it be said that knowledge produced by an injunctory statement is the illuminator of what is non-existent and is (yet) to be achieved, (we ask) If it is non-existent, how could it be cognised and if it is cognised how could it be cognised ? Because there is existence (i.e. a thing is recognised as existent) only by virtue of its being cognised, as in the case of a thing made known by the source of cognition, viz. perception. Nor can cognition arise without an object that can be cognised, e.g. like perceptual cognition.

अपि च चोदनावचनजनितविज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमुपपद्यते, अविद्यमानविषयत्वात् केशोण्डुकज्ञानवत् । केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि प्रतीयमानोपकारकार्थभावे मिथ्यात्वम्, तदिहापि प्रतीयमानोपकारकार्थो[ना]स्त्येव, कथं न मिथ्यात्वम् ? तदन्वये वा कर्तव्यार्थविषयत्वं प्रतिहीयेत चोदनावचसः ।

Moreover, it stands to reason that knowledge produced by an injunctory statement is false, because it has a non-existent object, like the knowledge of keśaṇḍuka. Knowledge of keśaṇḍuka also is false in the absence of an efficient object that is cognised, so here also there is no efficient object that is cognised, how could it then not be false ? Or if it (object) be present, then the injunctory statement would cease to be one that has as its object a thing that is to be brought about.

किंच, चोदनावचनं विज्ञानं कर्तव्यार्थविषयं वा, तदभावविषयम्, निर्विषयं वा ? तद्यदि कर्तव्यार्थविषयम्; तदा तस्य वर्तमानतैव प्रतीयुत्कलितत्वाद् विद्यमानतोयादिवत् । [तोयादेरप्रतीयमानत्वं स्वसत्ताधूमादग्नौ सति जनकत्वादिना निमित्तेन]* एतच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमविद्यमानता ? अथ तदभावविषयम्; तस्यापि स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानत्वात् न कर्तव्यता । अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि चोदना कर्तव्यावबोधिका अपि तु निर्विषया इत्येवं वक्तव्यम् । एवंस्थिते यथा प्रत्यक्षं विद्यमानोपलम्भकं तथा अन्यान्यपि प्रमाणानि ।

Moreover, does knowledge produced by an injunctory statement have as its object a thing that is to be achieved or its negation, or is it objectless ? Now if it has a thing to be achieved as its object, then it is present (a thing of the present), because it is known (utkalita) by cognition, like existent water. []¹

x. M : accordings to S : स्य

% . does not seem to make sense – Eli Franco

1. The words in [] brackets seem to be irrelevant.

And if this (cognition) is there, how could it (object) be non-existent ? If it is said to have its non-being as the object, it also is present in its own form, and so is not a thing to be achieved. If it is said to be objectless, then it should not be stated that an injunctory statement gives knowledge of what is to be brought about, but it should be stated objectless. This being the case as perception is the illuminator of what is existent, so also are the other sources of cognition (illuminators of existent things).

बुद्धिजन्म प्रत्यक्षम्, न च बुध्यवगमे प्रमाणमस्ति । प्रत्यक्षावसेया सा न भवति, स्वयमनभ्युपगमात् । अनुमानगम्यापि न भवति, तथा प्रतिबद्धलिङ्गानवगतेः ।

The rise of knowledge is called perception. (perception is the rise of knowledge), and there is no means of proof for the knowledge of Buddhi (knowledge). It is not something that can be determined by perception. (i.e. it cannot be known by perception), because it itself is not accepted. It is not also known by Inference because no Mark of Inference connected with it is known.

अथ अर्थपत्त्या प्रतीयते; किम्-घटार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्या, आहो तदुपादानपरित्यागान्यथानुपपत्त्या, घटावबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या वा ? तद्यदि घटार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्या; तदयुक्तम्, न बुद्धिकार्यो घटः, अपि तु बुद्धिरिह तत्कार्या । अथ घटोपादानपरित्यागान्यथानुपपत्त्या बुद्धिपरिकल्पना क्रियते; तदयु[S 61]क्तम्, बुद्धिस्वरूपस्यानेककालान्तरावस्थानायोगात् अर्थापत्तेर्निषयत्वम् । केनापि बलवता प्रेरितो बुद्धिमन्तरेण वा तदुपप्लवाद्वा घटोपादानपरित्यागाय घटते तेन संदिग्धाऽर्थापत्तिः । नच सम्बन्धग्रहणमन्तरेण नियतायां बुद्धौ प्रतिपत्तिरूपपद्यते । अर्थापत्तितस्तु तदनुपपत्तौ इन्द्रियकल्पनापि दुर्घटा ।

Now if it be argued that it is known by Arthāpatti (presumption), (we ask) is it so because the object jar is not otherwise explained, or because the abandonment of its material cause cannot be otherwise explained, or because the knowledge of jar cannot be otherwise explained ? If it be because the object jar cannot be otherwise explained, that is not proper, jar is not an effect of knowledge, on the contrary knowledge is here brought about by it. If it be said that Buddhi (knowledge) is here imagined because the abandonment of the material cause of jar cannot be otherwise explained, that is not proper, the nature of Buddhi (knowledge) cannot remain for a long period of time, so Arthapatti (presumption) would be objectless. Being inspired by some powerful factor, it is possible to abandon the material cause of jar, either without Buddhi (knowledge) or by its being overpowered; so Arthāpatti would be doubtful (as another way out is there). And without grasping relationship,

awareness of a specific cognition is not possible (cannot be justified). But if it is not justified by presumption, it is impossible (difficult) to imagine sense-organs also.

अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या बुद्धिपरिकल्पना क्रियते; तस्यापि बुद्ध्या सह सम्बन्धो नास्ति, कथमवबोधयति ? अवबोधे चावगते प्रत्यक्षावगतैव बुद्धिः नावबोधगम्या, अवबोधबुद्धि-विज्ञानशब्दानां पर्यायत्वाद् अवबुध्यते ज्ञायत इत्येकोऽर्थः ॥ छ ॥

Now if it is said that Buddhi (knowledge) is imagined because cognition cannot otherwise be explained, (we reply) it too has no relation to Buddhi, how does it give knowledge ? When cognition is known, Buddhi is known by perception only, not by cognition. Avabodh (Apprehension), Buddhi (knowledge), Vijñāna (cognition), these words are synonyms, therefore, avabudhyate (it is cognised), jñāyate (it is known) have one meaning ॥ छ ॥

[६. सांख्यसंमतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य निरसनम् ।]

तथा “श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका” एतदपि प्रत्युक्तम्; श्रोत्रादिका* (क)रणानां शब्दादिविषयाकारतया विपरिणामो वृत्तिशब्देनाभिधीयते । सा चानेकप्रकारा भवति—सम्यग्ज्ञानरूपा विपर्ययज्ञान—संदेहरूपा च । तदुक्तम्—

“तमो मोहो महामोहस्तामिस्रोऽन्धतामिस्रः । ” इत्यादि ।

[6. Refutation of the Sāṃkhya Definition of perception.]

Similarly, “Non-determinate modification of ear, etc”, this also is refuted. The modification of the instruments in the **shape of objects**—word, etc is termed ‘vṛtti’. It is manifold (of various kinds)—of the form of right knowledge, and of the form of erroneous knowledge and doubt. It is said, “**Tamas (Dullness), Moha (infatuation), mahāmoha (Great Moha), Tāmisra (Darkness) Andha-tāmisra (Blind darkness)**” etc.

तद्यदि श्रोत्रादिवृत्तेः प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, तदा विपर्ययादिवृत्तेरपि प्रत्यक्षं प्राप्नोति । अथ अबाधितपदोपादानं क्रियते; तत् सूत्रे न श्रूयते । भवतु वा तस्य कल्पना, तथापि अव्यभिचारित्वं ज्ञातुं न शक्यते । तच्च नैयायिकप्रत्यक्षलक्षणाधिकारे प्रपञ्चितम् । यदि च अव्यभिचारिपदेन विपर्ययरूपा वृत्तिरपोद्यते तत् तदात्मतया व्यवस्थिता सम्यग्रूपापि वृत्तिरपोदिता भवति । ततश्च संग्राह्या न लभ्यते वृत्तिः ।

Now, if the modification of ear, etc is said to be perception, then modifica-

x. M : accordings to S : “कारणानां”

tion of the form of error, etc would also come to be perception. (Objection) The term 'Abādhita' (uncontradicted) is included (i.e. can be accepted, and then the definition would not apply to error, etc). (Reply) That is not heard (i.e. found) in the sūtra. Or if it is imagined, even then it is not possible to know its non-erroneousness. And this has been discussed at length in the section on the Nyāya definition of perception. If by the term 'non-erroneous' modification of the form of error is (said to be) excluded, then even the modification of the right form (i.e. right knowledge) becomes excluded, because it is established as having the same nature. Therefore, the modification that could be acceptable is not available.

अथ सम्यग्रूपा वृत्तिरिह संग्राह्या, तदाऽपोह्या न लभ्यते, वृत्तीनां स्वरूपैकताभ्युपगमात् । भेदानभ्युपगमे[%] च[#] अभ्युपेतहानम् । नहि भवतां पक्षे इन्द्रियाद् भिद्यन्ते वृत्तयः [S 62]। तच्चेदभिन्नम्, कथं वृत्तीनां भेदः ? भेदाभ्युपगमे इन्द्रियैकत्वं हीयते । इन्द्रियाव्यतिरेकित्वं न^x वक्तव्यम् । इन्द्रियाव्यतिरेकित्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने नीललोहितघटादीनां सर्वदा उपलब्धः स्यात्, इन्द्रियावस्थाने तदव्यतिरिक्ताया वृत्तेः अवस्थानसंभवात्, तत्संभवे च घटाद्यनुलम्भानुपपत्तिः ।

Now if it is said that modification of the right form (i.e. right knowledge) is acceptable here, then that which can be excluded is not available, because it is accepted that modifications have a uniform nature. And if difference be not¹ accepted, there would be the giving up of the accepted view. In your view, modifications are not different from the sense-organs. If it were non-different, how could there be difference among the modification ? If difference were accepted oneness with sense-organs is given up. Identity with sense-organs should not be stated. If identity with sense-organs be accepted, there would always be the cognition of blue, red, jar, etc, because if the sense-organs persist there is the possibility of the modification which is identical with from them also persisting, and in the event of that possibility, there would be the impossibility of the non-apprehension of jar, etc. (i.e. jar, etc would be constantly cognised).

अथ वृत्तिसद्भावेऽपि अनुपलब्धिः, न कदाचिदुपलब्धिः स्यात्, नहि भवतां पक्षे किंचिदपूर्वं जायते पूर्वं वा निरुद्धयते । ततश्च सर्वस्याऽस्तित्वे उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी किंकृते ? सदोपलब्धिरनु(प)लब्धिर्वा ।^{\$}

% . S & M : accordings to S : भेदानभ्युपगमे Perhaps : भेदेनाभ्युपगमे – Eli Franco

. S & M : accordings to S : च

1. Considering the trend of the argument it seems the reading should be 'bhedābhyupagame' (if difference is accepted).

x. S & M : accordings to S omits वा

\$. M : accordings to S. अनुपलब्धिर्

नह्येवं वादिनो द्वितीया गतिरस्ति ।

Now, if it be argued that there is non-apprehension even when the modification (vṛtti) is present, (the reply is that in that case) there will never be apprehension, in your view anything (unique) new is not produced, or what is previously existent is not destroyed. And therefore, when everything is existent, how could apprehension and non-apprehension be caused (occasioned) ? There should be either perpetual apprehension or perpetual non-apprehension. There is no second alternative for those who hold this view.

किंच, शब्दादय उपलभ्यन्ते किम्—अनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते, आहोस्विदुपलभ्यस्वभावा (वाः) ?[%] तद्यदि अनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; तदा उपलब्धिः कथम् ?[#] यदि अनुपलभ्यस्वभावाः, कथम् उपलभ्येरन् ?^x अन्यथा आत्मादेरप्युपलब्धिः स्यात् ।

Moreover, word, etc are cognised—are they non-apprehensible by nature, or are they apprehensible ? Now if being non-apprehensible, they are (said to be) apprehended, how (possibly) could there be apprehension. If they are non-apprehensible, how could they be apprehended ? Otherwise, there should be apprehension even of self, etc.

अथ उपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; अनुपलब्धिः कथम् ? किं तेनैवाकारेण, आहोस्विद् आकारान्तरेण ? यदि तेनैव आकारेण अनुपलब्धिः, आत्मादेरपि अनुपलब्धिर्न प्राप्नोति, उपलब्धौ वा बीजान्तरं वचनीयम् । अथ आकारान्तरेण नोपलभ्यन्ते; तथापि उपलभ्यमानाऽनुपलभ्यमानयोः नैकत्वम्, शब्दात्माकारयोरिव, नहि उपलभ्यस्वभावाच्छब्दानुपलभ्यस्वभाव आत्माऽव्यतिरिक्तो दृष्टः ।

If being apprehensible by nature, they are (said to be) apprehended, then how could there be non-apprehension ? By virtue of that very shape (nature) or by virtue of another shape ? If there be non-apprehension by virtue of that very shape, then there would not be the non-apprehension of self, etc also. Or, if there is apprehension, some other cause must be stated (pointed out). If they are said not to be cognised by virtue of another shape, even then there cannot be oneness of what is cognised and what is not cognised, as in the case of the shapes of word (sound) and soul. Soul of a non-apprehensible nature is not seen to be non-different from sound of an apprehensible nature.

% . M : accordings to S. स्वभावा

. Perhaps an interpolation – Eli Franco.

अथ तस्यैवाऽभिव्यक्तस्योपलब्धिः, तत्स्वरूपदभिव्यक्तेः सर्वदानव (°दाव)* स्थानात् सततोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः । अथ तिरोधाने सति अनुपलब्धिः, तदा तत्स्वरूपतादात्म्यात् सततानुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः, उभयोर्वाऽवस्थाने सममुपलम्भाऽनुपलम्भौ[S 63]स्याताम् । ततश्च- 'इदानीमुपलभे पूर्व नोप(पा)लभे%' इति व्यवहारविरहः स्यात् । तथा, 'पूर्वमुप(पा)*लभे इदानीं नोपलभे' इत्येतदपि न प्राप्नोति ।

If it is said that there is apprehension of that very thing when it is manifest, then because like its nature manifestation is always present there would be the contingency of perpetual apprehension. If there is said to be non-apprehension when there is obscurity (i.e. when it is covered up), then on account of identity with its nature there would be the contingency of constant non-apprehension; or if both (manifestation and obscurity) were to remain, there would be apprehension and non-apprehension simultaneously. Then there would be the absence of worldly talk. (Statement). Like, "Now I cognise, formerly I did not cognise !" Similarly there also would not be (a statement like), "Formerly I cognised, now I do not cognise."

अथ अवयवोपचये सति उपलम्भः; तस्य सर्वदा भावात् सर्वदोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः । अथ स्वलक्षणपुष्टौ सत्यामुपलम्भः, तस्याः सर्वदा सत्त्वात् सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः । अथ संस्थानोत्कर्षे सत्युपलम्भः, तस्यापि सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात् सततोपलब्धिः स्यात् । तस्माद् येन येन निमित्तेन उपलम्भपरिकल्पना, तस्य तस्य सर्वदा भावात् सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः । अथ देशकालकारकापबन्धादनुपलम्भः; तदा तस्यापबन्धस्य सर्वदा भावाद् अनुपलम्भाऽनुपलम्भः स्यात् ।

Now if it be said that there is apprehension when the parts come together (form an aggregate), then that being always there, there would be the contingency of constant apprehension. If it is said that there is apprehension when its own characteristic is (fully) developed (when there is increase of point-instants), then that being always there, there would be the contingency of constant apprehension. If it be said that there is apprehension when there is excellence of structure (when the structure is well developed), then that also is always present, so there would be the contingency of constant apprehension.

X. M : accordings to S. सर्वदानवस्थानात्

% S : उपलभ

\$ S : उपलभ

Perhaps : देशकालाकारकापबन्धाद् - Eli Franco

If it be said that there can be non-apprehension on account of the obstruction caused by instrumental factors like place, time, (instrumental factors), then that obstruction being always present, there would not be an end to non-apprehension.

तथा, इन्द्रियाणामपि करणरूपता नोपलभ्यते फलवैकल्यात् । ननु अस्ति विज्ञानं फलम्; न, तस्य सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात् । सर्वदा विद्यमानयोः, हेतुफलभावो नोपपद्यते, यथा गुणानां परस्परमात्मभेदानां वा । नहि आत्मा आत्मान्तरस्य हेतुर्भवति ततफलं वा, तथा इहापि अनाद्यन्ता सत्ता न फलं हेतुर्वा उच्यते ।

Similarly, the instrumentality (form of being indispensable instruments of knowledge) is not apprehended on account of the absence of the fruit (result). (Objection) Why, knowledge is there as the fruit. (Reply) No, because it is always existents. Two things that are permanently existent cannot possibly have between them the relation of cause and effect, e.g. the gunas (psycho-physical constituents of prakṛti) amongst themselves or the different souls (difference of souls). One soul cannot be the cause of another soul or its effect, Similarly here also beginningless and endless Existence is called neither fruit (effect) nor cause.

किंच, भूजलादि अनेकं कार्यम्-तत्किं गुणत्रयाद् व्यतिरिक्तम्, अव्यतिरिक्तं वा ? तद्यदि व्यतिरिक्तम्; तत्किं तात्त्विकम्, अतात्त्विकं वा ? तद्यदि तात्त्विकम्; न तर्हि गुणत्रयोपादानपूर्वकम्, ततो भिन्नत्वाद् आत्मस्वरूपवत् । न च गुणत्रयेण सह अन्यतमोऽपि सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते तद्विन्नकार्यस्य । न मात्रामात्रिक-सम्बन्धः, नापि सहचरसहचरि[त]भावः*, नापि निमित्त-नि(नै)मित्तिक*भावः, उपकार्योपकारकभावो वा ।

Moreover, there is diverse effect, Earth, water, etc. Is it different from the three Gunas or non-different from them ? Now if it be different, is it real or unreal ? If it be real, then it could not be preceded by the material cause, the three gunas, because it is different from them, like the nature of the soul. Effect different from them could not possibly have any of the relations with the three gunas-the relation of the measure and the measured (mātrāmātrika), the relation of the accompanier-accompanied (sahacara-sahacarita), the relation of instrument-effect (nimitta-naimittika), or the relation of helped-helper (upakārya-upkārka).

अथ अतात्त्विकम्; कथं तेन गुणत्रयं प्रतीयते, गुणत्रयेण सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः ? नच सदसतोः

X. M accordings to S : *सहचरिभावो*

% M accordings to S : निमित्तनिमित्तिक*

सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते आत्मस्वरविषाणयोरिव । तदभावात् नानुमानाद् गुणत्रयप्रति[S 64]पत्तिः । नापि प्रत्यक्षेण गुणावधारणम्, स्वयमनभ्युपगमात् । तदुक्तम्—

“गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथप्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥”

तदनवगमे च न भोग्येन भोक्तुरनुमानम् । ततश्च नात्मा, न गुणत्रयम् ।

If it is said to be unreal, how could the three guṇas be known on its basis of it ? There can be no relation between what is existent and what is non-existent as in the case of soul and ass's horn. In its absence there cannot be knowledge of the three guṇas by Inference. Nor can the guṇas be known (determined) by perception, because you yourself do not accept this. It is said:

“The truest form of the guṇas does not come within the range of vision. And that which has come within the range of vision is like Māyā (Illusion), quite unreal.”

And if they (guṇas) be not known, there cannot be the inference of the enjoyer on the basis of the enjoyable. (viz. guṇas)¹. Therefore the soul does not exist, nor do the three guṇas exist.

अथ अव्यतिरिक्तम्; तत्किम्—तात्त्विकम्, अतात्त्विकम् वा ? यदि तात्त्विकम्; तदा कार्याणामपरिसंख्येयत्वे गुणानामप्यपरिसंख्येयता । ततश्च ‘त्रयो गुणाः’ इति न वक्तव्यम् । अथ गुणानां त्रित्वम्; तदा कार्यस्यापि त्रित्वं प्राप्नोति, आनन्त्यं हीयते । तथा, कार्यस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वे गुणानामपि प्रत्यक्षत्वम् । किंविषयं प्रधानानुमानम् ? गुणत्रयं प्रधानम्, तच्च उपलब्धम् अलम् अन्वयशक्तिपरिमाणवैश्वरूप्योपकार्योपकारकादिसाधनेन । अथ नोपलभ्यते प्रधानम्; तदव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यमपि नोपलभ्येत, तदभावान्न पुरुषसिद्धिरुपपद्यते ।

If it be non-different, then is it real or unreal ? If it be real, then the effects being innumerable, the guṇas also would be innumerable. Therefore, it should not be stated that ‘The guṇas are three.’ If there are three guṇas, then there would also be three effect, and (the view of) infiniteness (of effectness) would be lost (i.e. have to be given up). Similarly, if the effects be perceptible, the guṇas also would be perceptible. What is the object of the Inference of

1. The sāmkyas establish puruṣa (soul) by Inference. Prakṛiti is capable of being enjoyed, therefore it must have an enjoyer. All enjoyable things have an enjoyer associated with them because they are meant for them.

pradhāna (Matter) ? Pradhāna signifies the three guṇas, and that is apprehended, so enough of signs (Marks of Inference) like Anvaya (persistence), śakti (potentiality), parimāṇa (size), vaiśvarūpya (multiformedness), relation of helped and helper (upakāryōpakāraka), etc (to prove the existence of pradhāna) (i.e. they are not at all needed). If (it is said that) pradhāna is not apprehended, then the effect non-different from it is also not cognised, and without that the existence of puruṣa (soul) cannot be established.

अथ अतात्त्विकम्; तदा गुणत्रयस्यापि अतात्त्विकत्वम् । तदभावात् न चित्सिद्धौ प्रमाणमस्ति । तदसिद्धौ परलोकिनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः । तदेवं प्रत्यक्षं नोपपद्यते ॥ छ ॥

If (effect of the three guṇas) is (said to be) unreal, then the three guṇas also would be unreal, and in their absence there is no means of proof to establish the sentient principle. And if be not established, there would be the absence of the other world, because there would be the absence of one who could go to the other world. Thus, therefore, perception does not stand to reason (is not possible). ॥ छ ॥

[७. नैयायिकाभिमतस्यानुमानस्य निरसनम् ।]

अथ इदानीमनुमानं विचार्यते—किं पुनरनुमानम् ? “तत्पूर्वकमनुमानम्” [न्यायसू०. १.१.५] कथम् ? कथ्यते — रसवतीप्रदेशे नयनादिव्यापारेण दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं क्रियते, तेन च संस्कारः, तदुत्तरकालं द्वितीयलिङ्गदर्शनम्; तदनन्तरं व्याप्तिस्मरणम्, व्याप्तिस्मरणानन्तरं परामर्शज्ञानमनुमानं लिङ्गसचिवम् ।

[7. Repudiation of Anumāna (Inference) as accepted by the Naiyāyikas.]

Now, inference is considered—what, again, is Inference ? “Inference is based on that (perception), (Nyāya-sū. 1.1.5) How ? We may explain—The relation of fire and smoke is determined by the operation of eyes, etc. in the kitchen; thereby an impression (is created); consequently there is a second perception of Inference. (Liṅga, viz. smoke). Then the remembrance of the invariable concomitance (Vyāpti), after the remembrance of the invariable concomitance there is the knowledge of application (parāmarśa i.e. knowledge of the subject as possessed of smoke which is invariable concomitant with fire—vahnivyāpya—dhumavān) which is the anumāna (means or organ of inference). (liṅga).

तदभावे तस्याभावः तत्पूर्वकत्वात् । नहि कारणं विना कार्यं लोके भवद् दृष्टम्, प्रत्यक्षं च कारणं गीयते तदभावात् कथमनुमानकृतिः, क्लृप्तौ वा कार्याऽकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गः । प्रत्यक्षाभावमङ्गीकृत्य

उक्तम् — “अविनाभावसम्बन्धस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् ।”

If it (perception) is not there, it (inference) (also) should be absent, because it (inference) is preceded by it. The effect is not seen in the world to come about without the cause and perception is said to be the cause (of inference); in its absence how could inference be possible, or if it be possible there would be the contingency of the effect being accidental. Keeping in view the absence of perception it is said — ‘Because the relation of invariable concomitance is not capable of being grasped.’

इतोपि अविनाभावसम्बन्धग्रहणानुपपत्तिः— किं सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्, आहोऽस्वलक्षणयोः, सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोर्वा ? तद्यदि सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्, तदयुक्तम्, सामान्यानुपपत्तेः। तदनुपपत्तिश्च प्रागेवोपपादिता । नापि सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः, सामान्यासंभवादेव ।

Hence also it is not possible to justify the grasping of the relation of invariable concomitance. Is the relation between two universals (sāmānya) ascertained, or that between two extreme particulars (point-instants-svalakṣaṇa), or that between universal and particular ? If relation between two universals is (said to be) determined, that is not proper, because the universal cannot be proved. Its unjustifiably has already been demonstrated earlier. Nor also (can the relation) between universal and particular (be determined), even because there is the impossibility of universal.

नापि स्वलक्षणयोः, दहनधूमव्यक्तीनामानन्त्यात्, अभिज्ञानेकानुगामिनिमित्ताऽसंभवाच्च । तद्भावेऽपि आनन्त्यस्याऽनतिवृत्तेः, अतिवृत्तौ वा भावाभावप्रसङ्गः; तत्प्रसक्तौ च वद इदानीं कस्य सम्बन्धावधारणम् ?

Nor also (the relation) between two particulars, because there is an infinity of fire-individuals and smoke individuals, and because there is the impossibility of any causal factor which being non-different runs through many (entities). Even if it were there (the difficulty of) infinity could not be overcome; or if it could be overcome, there would be the contingency of the non-being of being (i.e. nothing would be existent), and in the event of that contingency tell me whose relation would be determined.

देशकालस्वभावविप्रकर्षाच्च न व्यक्तीनां सम्बन्धावधारणाय अलं प्रत्यक्षम् । न च सम्बन्धग्रहणमन्तरेण सम्बन्धबुद्धेरुपपत्तिः तदधिकरणत्वात् सम्बन्ध-तद्बुद्धयोः । न च सम्बन्धग्रहणसमये सर्वे सम्बन्धिनोऽवभान्ति अप्रतिभासनात् । न च अप्रतीयमानस्य प्रतीयमानत्वं कल्पयितुं न्याय्यम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अन्यथा हि रासने विज्ञाने रसे प्रतीयमाने रूपमपि कल्प्यं स्यात् ।

And because the individuals are separated by place, time and nature, perception is not efficient for the ascertainment of their relation. Without the knowledge of the entities to be related, it is not possible to have the knowledge of their relation, because the relation and its knowledge have the entities as their substrata. And at the time of grasping the relation, all the entities that are related are not manifest because they are not known. (there is not their reflex). And it is not proper to imagine what is not known as known, because that would be an over-absurdity (atiprasaṅga). Otherwise when in gustatory cognition taste is known, colour also could be imagined (as known).

अथ अविनाभावसम्बन्धग्रहणकालोपलक्षितकतिपयव्यक्तीनां सम्बन्धावधारणम्, न सर्वासामिति चेत्; यद्येवं तासामेव गमकत्वं नान्यासाम् । नहि अन्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्य गमकत्वमस्ति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न जातु देवदत्तनयनघटसम्बन्धे जाते जलादौ ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते नियतदेशकालस्वभावाऽयोगित्वात् स्वभावः स्यात् । आत्मान्यत्वे च अन्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्याऽगमकत्वम् तदाकारव्यतिरेकात् । अव्यतिरेके वा पर्वते नैकबलकृत् धूमाकारानुप्रवेशप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । तदनुप्रवेशे च न तत्संवित्यानुमेया अग्निसंवित्तिरूपपद्यते, नालिकेरद्वीपवासिन इव तयोः सम्बन्धानवगतेः । तदनवगतिश्च अनुमेयदहनस्य पिशाचेश्वरतुल्यत्वात् । पावकसम्बन्धिसंवित्तौ सम्बन्धबुद्धेरुपपत्तिरतिप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद् धूमाः लिङ्गावगम इवाः तात्त्विक्या दृष्ट्या न केनाप्युत्पाद्यते इति किञ्च कल्प्यते धूमबलेन धूमधूमस्वरूपं किमधुनोत्पन्नम्, चिरोत्पन्नम्, कारणाद्वाजातम्, आकस्मिकम्, मात्रावद्योतकत्वेन पर्यवसिते आकस्मिकमपि स्वरूपमुपपद्यते जगतो वैश्वरूप्यदर्शनात् । अथ आकस्मिकत्वे नियतदेशकालसम्बन्धित्वं न लभ्यते; तन्न युक्तम्, तत्स्वभावस्य तस्योत्पत्तेराकस्मिकनियतदेशकालसम्बन्धाभावानवगतेः । एवंभूतं तत् कारणं विनोत्पन्नं यत् नियतदेशकालप्रतिष्ठितदेहम् । एवं च स्थिते धूमोपलम्भे सति नानुमेयाग्निप्रतिपत्तिः, अनुपलम्भात् ।

If it is argued that relation of a few individuals, that are present at by the time of the ascertainment of the relation of invariable concomitance is ascertained, not of all, (we reply)—If it is so, only those can give us knowledge (of the relation), not all (only those can serve as Marks of inference, not all). When there is relation of one, another cannot give knowledge (cannot serve as the Mark of inference), because that would be over-absurdity (atiprasaṅga). When a relation has been established between the eye of Devdatta and a jar, knowledge never arises with respect to water, etc, because there is no relation with a fixed place, time, nature.....nature....would be.....And when two things are of distinct nature, if there is relation of one, another cannot give knowledge (cannot be a mark of Inference) because it does not have that character. Or if it is not absent, in the mountain.....there would be contingency of the shape

of smoke interpenetrating (into fire). And if it were to impenetrate, the knowledge of fire could not possibly be inferred from its knowledge, as in the case of one residing in Nalikeradvīpa (cocoanut Island) because their relation is not known. Its non-cognition is on account of the fact that the inferrable fire is comparable to piśāca (ghost), God (Īśvara). When there is knowledge of fire, the entity that is related, the knowledge of relation is possible, because of over-absurdity (atiprasaṅga) (i.e. otherwise there would be over-absurdity). Therefore...like the knowledge of the Mark of Inference...is, from the real point of view, not produced by anything, so why is it (?) not imagined on the strength of smoke...Is the nature of smoke produced now, or was it produced since long, is it produced from a cause or is it accidental? If it is determined as being the sign of...only...the nature can possibly be accidental also, because manifoldness is seen in the world. If (it be argued, that if) it be accidental, there would not be found the fact of its being related to a fixed place and time, (our reply is that) this is not true because the absence of relation with an accidental of definite place and time of it which is of this nature is not known. (i.e. Are all kinds of things, so it cannot be known whether the smoke is present on the mountain just accidentally or its location is determined by force of circumstances). Such is that produced without a cause which has its entity situated in a fixed place and time. It being so, when smoke is found; knowledge of smoke, there is not the knowledge of the inferrable fire (fire that is intended to be inferred), because it is not known.

[१. कार्यहेतुकानुमाननिरासाय कार्यत्वस्य खण्डनम् ।]

इतोऽपि नानुमेयप्रतिपत्तिः, धूमस्य कार्यरूपत्वाऽसंभवात् तदनुपपत्तिश्च सत्ताविच्छेदस्यानवगतेः । ननु प्रत्यक्षेणैव अवगम्यते; किं तत् प्रत्यक्षं विधिमुखेन उपजायते, आहो प्रतिषेधमुखेन ? तद्यदि विधिमुखेन उपादीयते; तर्हि धूमविषयम्, आहो अन्यविषयम्, निर्विषयं वा ? तद्यदि धूमविषयम्; तदा तत्स्वरूपावगाहिना तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वं विधीयते न तत्स्वरूपखण्डना । अथ अन्यविषयम्; न तर्हि तेन तस्य खण्डना विधीयते तत्स्वरूपवत्, अपि तु यद् यद्विषयं तत् तस्यैवाऽस्तित्वं विदधाति । अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि तत् किञ्चिद् विदधाति नापि प्रतिषेधति मूकान्धबधिरतुल्यत्वात् ।

[1. Refutation of the fact of effect for the repudiation of Inference from a mark of Inference which is an effect (i.e. of Inference based on causality.)]

Hence too there cannot be the knowledge of what is to be inferred, because smoke cannot possibly be of the nature of effect. It is not possible because the discontinuity of existence is not known (i.e. we seem to mark a

continuity between the cause and the effect or between two consecutive point instants). (Objection) Why it is known by perception itself ! (Reply) Does the perception arise positively or negatively ? If it be accepted as positive, does it have smoke as its object or another thing or is it objectless ? If it is said to have smoke as its object, then by it (perception) diving into its nature (i.e. cognising its nature) the existence of its nature is asserted, its nature is not negated. Now if it is said to have another object, then it would not bring about its repudiation as it would not assert the existence of that only which is its object. If it is said to be objectless, then it neither asserts nor denies anything, because it is comparable to the dumb, blind and deaf.

अथ प्रतिषेधमुखेन उपादीयते; तदपि किं धूमविषयम्, आहो अन्यविषयम्, निर्विषयं वा ? तद्यदि धूमविषयम्; तदा तत्सत्तोपनिबद्धं तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वविधायकं न तु व्यावर्तकम् । अथ अन्यविषयम्; अन्यविषयपर्यवसायिना न सत्सत्ताखण्डना अवद्योत्यते तत्सत्तावत् । अथ निर्विषयम्; न तत् किञ्चिद्विदधाति नापि प्रतिषेधति मूढात्मतयोत्पत्तेः ।

Now if it is accepted as negative, does that too have smoke as its object or another thing or is it objectless ? If it is said to have smoke as its object, then being connected with its existence, it would assert the existence of its nature and not repudiate it. If it is said to have another object, then by it grasping another object, repudiation of its existence confined to light, just as its existence (is not illumined) (i.e. it would neither deny its existence nor assert it). If it is said to be objectless, then it would neither assert nor deny anything because it is born (it rises) as of the nature of ignorant (i.e. by its very nature it is stupid-devoid of the capacity to illumine anything or give knowledge of anything).

अथ सत्ताविच्छेदो हि प्रध्वंसः, सोऽनेन आत्मसात् क्रियते; नेदं चतुरस्रं वचः । प्रध्वंसो हि विषयान्तरम्, तत्रोत्पन्नं विज्ञानं तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वविधायकं न तु कस्यचित् प्रतिषेधकम् । तस्मिंश्च संवेद्यमाने न कस्यचित् खण्डनाऽवगम्यते स्वविषयपर्यवसायीनि विज्ञानानि स्वविषयास्तित्वविधानपराणि । का कस्य खण्डना ?

If it is said that discontinuity of existence is the same as destruction (pradhvaṃsa) (destruction means discontinuity of existence) (and) that is embraced by (i.e. cognised by) this (perception), (we reply) this is not a symmetrical (i.e. consistet) statement. Pradhvaṃsa (destruction) is another object (altogether), cognition produced with regard to it asserts the existence of its nature, but does not repudiate anything. And when it is apprehended, nothing is known to be repudiation; cognitions determining to their own object are

intent on asserting the existence of their own object. What can repudiate whom?

अथ प्रध्वंसज्ञाने धूमस्वरूपं न प्रतिभाति, तेनासौ तस्य खण्डना इति चेत्; यद्येवं त्रैलोक्यस्य खण्डना, तस्मिन् धूमध्वंसज्ञाने त्रैलोक्यं नावभाति, त्रैलोक्यात्मको वा न भवति ध्वंसः ।

If it be argued that the nature of smoke does not appear in the knowledge of pradhvarṇsa (destruction), so that is its repudiation, (we reply—) In that case there would be the repudiation of (all) the three worlds, the three worlds (certainly) do not appear in the knowledge of destruction of smoke, nor is destruction of the nature of the three worlds.

[२. प्रसङ्गात् विरोधपदार्थस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]

अथ धूमविरोधित्वेन असौ धूमस्य खण्डना इति चेत्; कः पुनरसौ विरोधार्थः ? किम् — अतदाकारता, आहो असमानकालीनता, तत्सद्भावे तस्यानुपलब्धौ वा, तज्जन्यता वा, तज्जनकत्वं वा, भिन्नक्रियाकर्तृत्वं वा, भिन्नहेतुत्वाद्यत्वं वा, आश्रितानाश्रितत्वं वा ?

[2. An incidental dialectical refutation of the concept of the word 'opposition' (virodha).]

Now if it be said that being opposed to smoke, it is its repudiation, (we ask) What again does this 'opposition' (virodha) signify ? (What is this category of opposition ?) Is it the fact of not being of that shape, or of not being in the same time, or of its not being found when it (smoke) is present, or of being produced by it, or of being its producer, or of being the agent of a different activity, or of being produced by a different cause or of not being supported by what is itself supported ?

तद्यदि तावद् अतदाकारता विरोधः, तदा त्रैलोक्यस्य सा खण्डना, न केवलं धूमस्य, त्रैलोक्याकारपरिहारेण तत्स्थितेः । अथ असमानकालीनता विरोधार्थः, तदा अतीतानगतवर्त्तमानकालानामन्योन्यविरोधित्वप्रसङ्गः । न चासना(चासमान)कालीनता स स्वभावेन उभयोः स्वभावपक्षेः ।

Now, if opposition (is said to) mean, the fact of not being of that shape, then that would be the repudiation of the three worlds, not of smoke alone, because it exists by the exclusion of the shape of the three worlds. If opposition be said to mean the fact of not being in the same time, then there would be the contingency of the past, the future and the present times being opposed to one another. And it (opposition) is not the fact of not being in the same time

by nature, because it would be the nature of both.

अथ तत्सद्भावे तस्यानुपलब्धिः विरोधार्थः; तदा अतिदूरादिनिमित्तोपनिपाते सति तदनुलब्धिर्दृष्टा, न च तेषां तत्खण्डनात्मता । तथा, दीपाभावे घटधूमादेरनुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा, न च सा घटधूमादेः सत्ता खण्डिता ।

Now, if opposition means its non-apprehension when that (smoke) is present, then its non-apprehension is observed even when there is the occurrence of such causal factors as very great distance, etc. and (yet) these are not of the nature of its repudiation. Similarly, when there is no light, non-apprehension of jar, smoke, etc. is observed, but (this does not mean that) the existence of jar, smoke, etc is repudiated.

अथ दूरादिनिमित्तोपनिपाते यत्रानुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा तत्रोपलब्धिरपि पुनर्दृष्टा, इह तु पुनः ध्वंसे संजाते न जातु धूमकुम्भादेरुपलब्धिरस्ति । केन नोपलभ्यते ? किं केनापि, आहो सर्वज्ञातृभिः ? तद्यदि केनापि नोपलभ्यते, तेन तदा तस्य स्वरूपखण्डना; तदयुक्तम्, दूरा[व]रणादिनिमित्तोपनिपाते सति यथैके तमर्थं न पश्यन्ति अपरे पश्यन्ति, एवं सति संजाते ध्वंसे तमर्थम् एके नोपलभन्ते अन्ये तु उपलप्स्यन्त इति ।

If it is argued that where on there being the aggregate of causal factors like distance, etc. non-apprehension is observed, there is also observed apprehension even there, whereas here once destruction is caused about, there is not the apprehension of smoke, jar, etc; (we ask—) By whom is it not apprehended ? By some one or by all cognisers ? Now if it is said to be not cognised by some one and on account of that its nature is (said to be) repudiated then, that is not proper; when there is the occurrence of such causal factors as distance covering, etc as some do not see that object, while others see it, if it is as (you say) (even) when destruction is caused, some may not apprehend that object, but others will (certainly) apprehend it.

अथ सर्वज्ञातृभिर्नोपलभ्यते; कानुमा ? 'एतदनुभवविकलाः सर्वे ज्ञातारः'; न मानमस्ति, परचित्तवृत्तीनां दुरन्वयत्वात् बुद्धिवैचित्र्यस्य च उपपत्तेः ।

If it is (said to be) not cognised by all knowers, what is the proof ? (anumā) ? "All knowers are devoid of this experience of this"—there is no means of proof (for this Thesis), because it is difficult to follow the modifications of the minds of others, and because diversity of notions is possible.

ध्वंसे सति अनुपलब्धिः किं—नियतदेशकाले, सर्वदा वा ? तद्यदि नियतदेशकाले अनुपलब्धिः; तदा न सत्तापगमोऽवगम्यते, सिद्धसाध्यतया च बोद्धव्याः । अथ सर्वदेशकाले नोपलभ्यते; तदयुक्तम्, न नियामकं किंचिद् बीजमस्ति न च बीजमन्तरेणाभ्युपगमो युक्तः ।

There is non-apprehension when there is destruction (dhvamsa)—Is it at a particular place and time or always (and everywhere)? If the non-apprehension is (said to be) at a particular place and time, then cessation of existence is not be known, and they (the opponents) should be charged with the fallacy of proving what is already an established fact. (All agree that when a thing is destroyed, it is not seen at a particular place and time). If it is said to be not cognised at all places and times, that is not true, there is no deciding source (factor) (of this knowledge) and it is not proper to accept anything without a source (i.e. without evidence).

अथ ध्वंसे सति सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वे कथं वस्तुत्वसंस्थितिः? कदा सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वम्? किम् उपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्, आहो अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्? तद्यदि उपलब्धिमधिकृत्योच्यते; उपलभ्यते च सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वं च इति चित्रम्।

If it is argued that there being destruction, there is absence of all naming (upākhyā), and so how could there be the presence of 'thingness' (existence, reality)? (We ask—) when is there the absence of all devoid of name (knowledge)? Is it in the state of apprehension or in the state of non-apprehension? Now if this be said with reference to apprehension, it is strange that a thing should be apprehended and yet there should be the state of absence of naming!

अथ अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थामङ्गीकृत्योच्यते सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वम्; तदयुक्तम्, दूरावरणादिनिमित्तोपनिपाते सति अनुपलब्ध्यै सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वं सत्त्वं च इत्यनेकान्तः। यदि च ध्वंसे सति अत्यन्तानुपलम्भः; अनुपलम्भप्रपञ्चोऽयं न तत्स्वरूपस्यातावद(तादव)स्थ्यम्, आवरणादि कृतानुपलम्भे यथा।

If the (state of) absence of naming is stated with reference to the state of non-apprehension, that is not proper, when there is non-apprehension, that is not proper; when there is non-apprehension on there being the occurrence of such causal factors as distance, covering etc, there are (both) the state of absence of naming and (also) existence, so (your reasoning) is Inconclusive¹. And if it is argued that when there is destruction there is absolute non-apprehension, (we reply) this is a phenomenon of non-apprehension, not the non-identity of its nature. (i.e. the thing remains as it is even in this case) as in the

1. The opponent argued that whenever there is absence of naming, there is no reality of the thing. But this is not always so; there may be in cases absence of knowledge (naming) and yet existence.

(event of) non-apprehension brought about by covering, etc.

तज्जन्यता विरोधार्थः; तदा दण्डादिनापि जनिततत्वात् तद्विरोधित्वप्रसङ्गः। न च व्यापारातिशयोऽस्ति, तं प्रति क्रियातिरेकस्य अनुपलब्धिः (ब्धेः)। अथ तज्जनकत्वं विरोधार्थः; तदयुक्तम्, न घटधूमात्मा तद् ध्वंसोत्पाद्यः तैरेव अनभ्युपगमात्। यदि च तज्जनकत्वेन विरोधित्वम्; तदा अभावज्ञानस्य अभावो विरोधी स्यात्।

If 'opposition' (is said to) mean 'the fact of being produced by it, then because it is produced by staff, etc, there would be the contingency of its being opposed to them. And there is no speciality of operation, because no additional activity is apprehended in connection with it. If 'opposition' (is said to) mean the fact of its being the producer, that is not true, the entity of jar and smoke are not produced by their destruction¹, because they (the opponent-Naiyāyikās) themselves do not accept this. And of there could be opposition by the fact of being its producer, then non-being (abhāva) would be opposed to the knowledge of Non-being (because it gives rise to the latter).

अथ भिन्नार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वम्; तदा सर्वे सर्वस्य विरोधिनः प्राप्नुवन्ति। अथ भिन्नहेतूत्पाद्यत्वं विरोधार्थः; तदयुक्तम्, एकेन देवदत्तेन कुम्भतद्विच्छेदयोरुत्पद्यमानत्वात्। यदि च नियतहेतूत्पाद्यत्वेन विरुद्धत्वं जेगीयते सदसतोः; तदा सर्वे भावा नियतसामग्र्या उत्पाद्या अन्योन्यविरोधिनो भवेयुः। नित्यानित्याकारयोर्विरोधप्रसङ्गः, नित्याकारस्य निर्बीजत्वात्, बीजवत्त्वे वा नित्यतैव न स्यात्।

If ("opposition" is said to mean) being the agent of a different purposive action, then all would come to be opposed to all other things. If opposition is said to mean the fact of being produced by a different cause, that is not proper, because jar and its extinction (which the Naiyātikas believe to be opposed to each other) are both produced by (the one) Devdatta. And if existence and non-existence are pronounced to be opposed to each other on account of the fact of their being produced by particular causes, then all entities being produced by a peculiar specific complement of causal factors would be opposed to one another. There would be contingency of entities having eternal and non-eternal shapes being opposed to each other, because the eternal shape (what has an eternal shape) is seedless (has no cause), or if it had a seed (cause) eternality itself would not be there.

अथ आश्रितानाश्रितत्वं विरोधार्थः; तदा आत्मज्ञानयोः विरोधित्वमापनीपद्यते; कुम्भापगमस्य सर्वविरोधित्वं प्राप्नोति, आश्रितानाश्रितत्वस्याऽविशेषात्। न च सम्बन्धमन्तरेण षष्ठी सम्पद्यते, अपि

1. The reading should be tad.dhvaṁsotpādyah.

तु सम्बन्धे सति देवदत्तनयनतुरगव्यपदेशो यथा । अथ सम्बन्धमन्तरेण कुम्भाभावव्यपदेशोऽभ्युपगम्यते; तदास्तं गतं विश्वं स्यात्, सम्बन्धाभावस्याऽविशेषात् ।

If 'opposition' signifies not "being supported by what is itself supported"; then self and knowledge would come to have opposition, the extinction of pitcher would come to be opposed to everything, because the fact of not being supported by what is itself supported is common. The genitive case could not be there without relation, but (only) when there is relation, e.g. the expression 'Devdatta's eye', "Devdatta's horse". If it is accepted that one could speak of negation of pitcher without (any) relation being there, (between the two), then the universe should meet with extinction, because absence of relation is equally found.

[३. हेतुफलसंबन्धावधारणस्यानुपपत्तिप्रकटनम् ।]

इतोऽपि हेतुफलसम्बन्धावधारणां नोपपद्यते—किं निरुपचरितकारणग्रहणानन्तरं गृह्यते कार्यम्, आहोस्विद् उपचरितकारणग्रहणानन्तरम् ? यदि निरुपचरितकारणग्रहणानन्तरं गृह्यते; तदयुक्तम्, सामग्र्या अतीन्द्रियत्वेन संवेदनायोगात् । अथ उपचरितकारणानन्तरीयकत्वेन तद् गृह्यते तेन तस्य तत् फलम्; तदयुक्तम्, उपचरितस्य कारणत्वमेव न विद्यते कथं तत् फलतां याति ।

[3. Demonstrating the impossibility of the ascertainment of the relation of cause and fruit (result).]

Hence also it is not possible to determine the relation of cause and fruit (result)—Is the effect cognised after the cognition of the cause which is real (not figurative), or after the cognition of the cause which is figurative (superimposed)¹. If it is (said to be) cognised after the cognition of the real (not figurative) cause, that is not proper, because the apparatus not being amenable to the senses, there cannot be apprehension. If it is (said to be) cognised as immediately following the figurative cause and so is (regarded as) its fruit, that is not proper, the figurative cannot be a cause at all, so how could it be its fruit ?

अन्यच्च, तन्तूनां कार्यं वस्तुं(स्त्रं) किम्—पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन, आहो पूर्वापरग्रहणेन ? तद्यदि पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन, तदा नियतकारणकार्यत्वं न लभ्यते अम्बरफलस्य, तत्समानकालीनाऽनेककार्योत्पादकानां तत्पूर्वापरकालभावित्वाविशेषात् ।

1. Before a thing has produced the effect it cannot be its cause, it can be so only figuratively.

Again, is cloth the effect of threads—by their being prior and posterior in point of time, or by their prior and later cognition ? If by their being prior and later cognition ? If by their being prior and posterior in time, then the fruit (effect) cause would not be the effect of a specific cause, because a number of producers of effect which are in the same time (as what is regarded as its specific cause) would also equally have with it the relation of being prior and posterior in time.

अथ अन्वयव्यतिरेकयुक्तस्य यस्य पूर्वकालभावित्वं तत्कारणं तदस्ति, ध्रुवभाविकार्यदर्शनात् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकशब्देन किमभिधीयते ? किम्—कारणम्, अन्यद्वा ? तद्यदि कारणम्; तदा न किंचिद् बाध्यते कारणात्मतया तत् कारणम् । अथ अन्यत् तत्; न जानीमः किं तद् इति ? न च पूर्वापरभावः सिद्धोऽत्र ज्ञानमन्तरेण । ज्ञानं विना न जाने किं सहोत्पन्नौ, पूर्वापरभावोत्पन्नौ वा, अनुत्पन्नौ वा ?

If it is said that it has that as its cause which being invariably related both positively and negated, is prior to it in time, because it is found that the effect definitely occurs (in such cases), (we ask), what do you (want to) signify by the expression 'positive-negative' (anvaya-vyatireka) ? The cause or something else ? If it be the cause, then nothing is sublated, on account of the causal nature, it has that as its cause. If it is something else, we do not know what that is. And prior and posterior existence cannot be proved here without knowledge. Without knowledge I do not know what are simultaneously produced, or are produced as prior and posterior, or are non-produced.

अथ पूर्वापरग्रहणक्रमेण पूर्वापरोत्पाद—तदभावव्यवस्था इति चेत्; तदेतदपि ग्रहणेऽपि तुल्यम् । सती सत्ता संवेद्यते नाऽसती । सहोत्पन्नयोरपि क्रमेण ग्रहणं दृष्टं गोविषाणयोः । अनुत्पन्नयोश्च गोत्वाऽस्तितव्योः । तथा, पटग्रहणानन्तरं तन्तूनां ग्रहणं दृष्टम् । तथा, एकमेव ग्रहणं दृष्टम्, न च तयोर्भेदोऽस्ति, न च तयोर्हेतुफलभावः यथा च भेदो नास्ति तथा, प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम् । एवं संवेदनमपि संवेद्यात् न भिद्यते सदाकारतया, न च तयोः आकारान्तरमस्ति, एकं हि वस्तु ।

If it is said that prior and posterior origination and its absence are determined according to the order of prior and posterior cognition, then this also is the same in the case of cognition also. It is existent being that is apprehended not non-existent (being) Bull's horns though produced simultaneously are seen to be cognised in order (one after the other); and so also bullness and existence which are non-produced. similarly, threads are seen to be cognised after the cognition of cloth. Similarly, there is seen to be only one cognition, there is not their difference (they are not different), and they are not related as cause and result (effect). That there is not difference has already been explained earlier. Thus apprehension is not different from the apprehended,

because of its shape as 'existent'; and they do not have another shape, for a thing is one.

इतोऽपि हेतुफलयोर्विज्ञानं न वेदनम्, यथा उत्पन्नं विज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनं न भवति, विज्ञानाकारातिरिक्ताकारान्तरविरहात् । अथ क्रियातिरेकापायेऽपि स्वसंवेदनमपदिश्यते; अस्वसंवेदनं किं न व्यपदिश्यते, क्रियातिरेकाभावस्याऽविशेषात् ?

Hence also the cognition is not the cognition of cause and effect, as cognition that is produced is not self-apprehension, because it is devoid of any shape other than the character of cognition. If it be said to be self-apprehension even in the absence of an additional act, then why is it not called non-self-apprehension, because the absence of an additional act is common (to both) ?

तथा, अर्थस्यापि न तद्वेदनम् । अथ कथं तत् अर्थस्य वेदनं न भवति ? कथ्यते—तत् सत्तामात्रेण अर्थस्य वेदनम्, तज्जन्यतया वा ? तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण अर्थस्य वेदनम्; तदा विश्वस्य तद्वेदनं स्यात् तद्देहाविशेषात् । अथ तज्जन्यतया तत्संवेदनमुद्गीयते; तदा नयना लोकेश्वरादेरपि तत् संवेदनमापद्यते, तैर्जन्यमानत्वोपपत्तेः । न चार्थस्य व्यापारातिरेकोऽस्ति, क्रियातिरेकस्यानधिगतेः । व्यापारातिरेके हि नियतफलोऽर्थः स्यात् । भवतु; न, अदृष्टत्वात्, एकं हि इदं फलं कारककदम्बसम्पाद्यम् । ततश्चार्थसंवेदनवत् तत्सर्वकारकसंवेदनवत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ कारकान्तरस्य न तत् वेदनम्; अर्थस्यापि न तत् वेदनम् । तदभावात् हेतुफलभावावगमः । तदनवगतौ च न कार्यं दृष्ट्वा कारणं प्रत्येति ।

Similarly, it is not the cognition of the thing also. If it is asked how it is not the cognition of the thing, we explain—Is it the (means of) cognition of the thing by its very existence, to by virtue of being produced by it ? If it is the cognition of the thing by its very existence, then it would be the cognition of the universe, because that constitution of its is common (to all cases). If it is said to be its apprehension by virtue of being produced by it, then it should be the apprehension of the eyes, light, God, etc. also, by reason of the fact that it is produced by these. And the thing has no additional operation, as that additional act is not cognised. In the event of there being additional operation, the thing would have a specific fruit (effect, result). May it be so. No, because it is not observed (to have a peculiar effect); for this one effect results from the aggregate of causal factors. Therefore there would be the contingency of its being the apprehension of all its causal factors, as it is the apprehension of the thing. If it is said that it is not the cognition of other causal factors, then it is not the cognition of the thing also. And in its absence, there is not the knowledge of the relation of cause-result. And in the event of its not being known, one does not have knowledge of the cause on seeing the effect.

अपि च, कार्यं दृष्ट्वा किमयम् अनुमाता कारणं स्मरति, आहो प्रत्येति ? तद्यदि स्मरति; तन्नाननुभूतं स्मर्तुमीशः ।

Moreover, on seeing the effect, does this person who infers remember the cause or apprehend it ? If he is said to remember, then (we say) he could not be capable of remembering that which is not experienced.

अथ प्रत्येति; तत्रापि किम् उपचरितं प्रत्येति, आहो निरुपचरितम् ? तद्यदि उपचरितं प्रत्येति; तदयुक्तम्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः, अकारकत्वेन गमकत्वानुपपत्तिः ।

If he apprehends, even then does he apprehend the figurative (cause), or the non-figurative (real one) ? If he is said to apprehend the figurative (cause), that is not proper, because there cannot be any relation with it, there is not the possibility of its being the gamaka (that which helps to cognise) on account of its not being a causal factor.

अथ निरुपचरितं प्रत्येति; तत्रापि किम्-विद्यमानम् अविद्यमानं वा ? तद्यदि विद्यमानम्; तदयुक्तम्, जनकत्वयोगेन जनकमपदिश्यते, यथा दण्डयोगेन दण्डी, द्रव्यत्वयोगेन द्रव्यम् । न भवतां पक्षे जनकत्वयुक्तस्य अनेककालान्तरावस्थानमस्ति, कार्यानेकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अथ जनकत्वे सत्यपि न जनयति; सर्वदेवाऽहेतुः स्यात् । अथ अविद्यमानं प्रत्येति; अविद्यमानम्, प्रत्येति च इति चित्रम् ।

If he apprehends the non-figurative (real) one, is it existent or non-existent. If it is (said to be) existent, that is not proper. A thing is called producer, on account of being associated with its producership, as a person is called daṇḍin (staff-holder) due to association with a staff, (and a thing is called) substance on account of association with substanceness. In your view, what is associated with producership, does not persist for a number of other times, as (otherwise) there would be the contingency of numerous effects. If it is urged that in spite of having producership, it does not produce, then it would always be a non-cause. If it is said that he apprehends the non-existent (cause), then it is odd that it is non-existent and he apprehends.

किञ्च, कार्यं दृष्ट्वा कारणं प्रत्येति, आहो कारणपूर्वकत्वम्, कारणपूर्वकं वा कार्यम् । तद्यदि कारणं प्रत्येति; तदा एतदापद्यते—अस्ति कारणं कार्यात्, यथा अस्ति आत्मा काकस्य काष्ण्यात् ।

Moreover, having seen the effect, does he apprehend the cause, or the precedence of the cause, or the effect preceded by the cause. If he (is said to) apprehend the cause it would come to this—The cause exists, because there is the effect, as the soul exists because the crow is black (That is to say, there is no relation whatsoever between the probans and the probandum).

अथ तत्कारणपूर्वकत्वं कार्यस्यानुमीयते, तत्कारणपूर्वकत्वम् स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धः, सत्ता वा, धर्मान्तरं वा ? तद्यदि स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धोऽनुमीयते; तदयुक्तम्, तस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात् । न च प्रत्यक्षेण अवगम्यमाने अनुमानं न्याय्यम्; हेतावप्यनुमानप्रसङ्गात् । तदुक्तम्— “सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यताम् (ता), सामान्यं समानता प्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वेन अर्थस्य ।”

If the fact of the effect being preceded by the cause is inferred, is this precedence of the cause, the relation of existence to its cause, or existence or another attribute ? If the relation of existence to its cause is (said to be) inferred, that is not proper, because it is the object of perception. And inference is not proper, in respect of a thing that can be known by perception, because otherwise there would be the contingency of inference even in respect of the probans. It is said, “If the object is common, there would be the fault of the already proved being proved (siddhasādhya), sāmānya means samāntā (commonness), due to the thing being the object of perception and inference.”

अथ सत्ताऽनुमीयते; साऽपि प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते अलमनुमानेन । इहाप्येतद् द्रष्टव्यम् — ‘सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता ।’ अथवा सिद्धस्य विद्यमानस्य साधनम् सिद्धसाधनम् । यथा च न तौ स्तः तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम् ।

If ‘existence’ is (said to be) inferred, that too is apprehended by perception, so there is no need of inference. Here also this should be considered, “If the object is common there would be the fault of the already proved being proved.” Or siddhasādhana means the bring about (sādhana) of what is siddha, existent. That both these are not there has already been explained.

अथ कारणपूर्वकत्वं धर्मान्तरं तदनुमीयते; तदपि उपलब्धिलक्षणपाप्ताधिकरणस्थं प्रत्यक्षावसेयम्, न मानान्तरमाकाङ्क्षति । न च अनुपलब्धिकारणम् आवरणदूरादि किञ्चिदस्ति । अनुपलब्धौ वा घटादावप्यनुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः । तदुक्तम्— “विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः” । विशेषो हि अनुमानैकग्राह्योऽर्थः तेन सह सम्बन्धो नावगतः । तदनवगतौ न लिङ्गात् लिङ्गा(लिङ्ग)गतिः । न च षट्पदार्थव्यतिरिक्तं धर्मान्तरमस्ति स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्, अभ्युपगमे वा अभ्युपेतहानम् । यदि च कारणपूर्वकत्वं धर्मान्तरं तदनुमीयते लिङ्गात्; न तर्हि कारणमवगतं दिगीश्वरादि ।

If precedence of the cause is another entity and that is inferred, that also being attribute present in a substratum that is apprehensible can be determined by perception, and does not require another organ of knowledge. And there is no cause whatsoever of non-apprehension such as obstruction, distance, etc. and, if there be non-apprehension, there would be the contingency of non-

apprehension, even in the case of jar etc. It is said, “There is absence of persistence in the particular.” The particular is a thing that can be cognised by inference alone; relation with it is not known; if it is not known, the probandum cannot be known from the probans. And there is no entity other than the six categories, because you yourself do not accept it, and if you were to accept it, you would be abandoning your own views. And if precedence of the cause is another attribute, and that is inferred from the mark (probans), then such causes as direction, God, etc would not be cognition (as they have no mark).

अथ कारणपूर्वकं कार्यमेव प्रतीयते; तदेतत् प्रज्ञामान्दविचेष्टितम् । कथम् ? तत्स्वरूपस्य प्रत्यक्षावगाहितदेहस्य किमनुमानेन ? अत्रापि तदेव उपनतम् — ‘सामान्ये सिद्धसाधनम्’ समानं प्रत्यक्षानुमान विषयत्वे सामान्यमित्यपदिश्ये, तस्मिन् सामान्ये साध्यमाने साधनवैकल्यमापद्यते । किञ्च, यद्यनुमानादपि कार्यं प्रत्येति; कारणं न केनाप्यवद्योतितं स्यात् । तदनवद्योतने कालादिव्यहारविरहः स्यात् ।

If it is said that the effect itself as preceded by the cause that is cognised, then (we can only say that) this is the revelation of the dullness of the intellect. How ? Its nature being such as is comprehended by perception, of what use is inference ? Here also that same difficulty would befall (you) viz. ‘In the event of commonness (sāmānya), there would be the proving of what is already proved’; common in being the object of (both) perception and inference is called commonness (sāmānya); and if the sāmānya were to be proved, the proving would come to be in vain. Moreover, if he apprehends the effect by inference also, then the cause would not be manifested (made known) by anything at all. And in the event of its non-manifestation, there would be the absence of all practical utterances about time, etc.

तथा, कारणदर्शनेन कार्यानुमानमपि न संभवति । भवतां पक्षे कारकाणां सामग्र्यं जनकम् । तच्चेन्न प्रत्यक्षं न च साधनान्तरं विद्यते तत्स्वरूपावेदकम् । अपि च, लिङ्गग्रहणानन्तरं व्याप्तिस्मरणम्, तदनु परामर्शज्ञानम्, ततोऽनुमेयप्रतिपत्तिः । न च एतावन्त कालं सामग्र्यवस्थानमस्ति ।

Similarly, even the inference of the effect is not possible on the perception of the cause. In your view, the aggregate of causal factors is the producer. If it is so, neither perception nor any other means can give knowledge of its nature. Moreover, there is the memory of the relation of invariable concomitance after the cognition of the probans, then there is the knowledge of application (e.g. ‘Here there is smoke which is invariably related with fire’), and then there is the apprehension of the inferrable (the probandum). And the causal aggregate cannot remain (persist) for this much time.

अथ कारकैकदेशग्रहणे सति कार्यमनुमिमीषे; तदयुक्तम्, कारकैकदेशरूप (शस्या)जनकत्वात् । जनकत्वयोगे सति जनकम् इत्यपदिश्यते । नच जनकत्वयुक्तस्य अनुमेयप्रतिपत्तिकाले अवस्थानमस्ति । न चाकारकं कार्यं गमयति अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।

If you infer the effect on their being the cognition of a part of the causal apparatus, that is not proper, because a part of the causal apparatus, cannot be as a producer. And a thing is called 'producer' when there is association with producership. And that which is associated with producership does not continue to remain at the time of the cognition of the probandum. And a non-producer cannot enable one to know of the effect, as this would lead to the contingency of absurd over-extension (ati-prasaṅga-anything can enable us to know just anything).

[४. कृतकत्वहेतुकस्यानित्यत्वानुमानस्याप्यघटमानत्वप्रदर्शनम् ।]

तथा, कृतकत्वेन अनित्यत्वानुमानमपि नोपपद्यते, अनित्यत्वं हि स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धः, सत्ता वा, धर्मान्तरं वा, शब्दध्वंसोवा, शब्दस्वरूपं वेति । तत्र तावत् स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्ध-सत्ता-धर्मान्तर-स्वरूपपक्षे उक्तमेव दूषणम् ।

[4. Demonstrating that the inference of 'non-eternality' on the strength of the reason 'artificiality' is not possible.]

So, even the inference of non-eternality from artificiality is not possible. Is non-eternality the relation of existence with its cause, or existence or another entity, or the destruction of word, or the nature of word ? We have already stated the drawback in respect of the views that it is relation of existence to its cause, existence, or of the nature of another entity.

अथ ध्वंसोऽनुमीयते, तदयुक्तम्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानवगतेः । न शब्दसत्ताकाले तद्ध्वंसोऽस्ति, तदभावान्न सम्बन्धावगतिः, एकस्य सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः । न चाभावस्य विषयभावोऽस्ति, भावे वा शब्दलिङ्गं न भवेत् । शब्दलिङ्गसद्भावे वा विज्ञानस्य अभावो न विषयः, तदभावात् । एतेन तपनोदयास्तमित्योर्गम्यगमकभावः पर्युदस्तो वेदितव्यः ।

If it is said that destruction is inferred, that is not proper, because relation with it is not cognised. At the time of the existence of word, its destruction is not present, and in its absence, there is not the knowledge of its relation, because there is not properly the relation of one (there can be relation if there is only one thing). And negation (absence) cannot be an object, and if it were existent, the mark, word would not be there. Or if there be the presence of the

mark of word, the absence would not be an object of knowledge, because of its absence. By this, the relation of probandum and probans between sun-rise and sun-set must be considered as excluded (repudiated).

[८. आत्मानुमानस्य निरासः ।]

[१. नैयायिकादिसंमतस्यात्मानुमानस्य निरासः ।]

तथा, [आत्मा]नुमान(नं) सुखद्वेषा(ष)ज्ञानादिना न संभवति, तेन सह सम्बन्धानवगमात्, तदनवगतौ च अनुमानानर्थक्यम् । किं चात्र साध्यते ? किम्-ज्ञानसुखादीनाम् आश्रितत्वम्, आहो स्विद् आश्रयाश्रितं वा ज्ञानस्वरूपम् ? त(अ)थाश्रितत्वं साध्यते; तदा आत्म(मा) नैवाऽवबोधितः, ततोऽन्यत्वाद् आश्रितत्वस्य । अथ आत्मा साध्यते; तदेवं भवति-अस्ति आत्मा विज्ञानात्, नच व्यधिकरणस्य गमकत्वं विद्यते । अथ आश्रितं ज्ञानस्वरूपं साध्यते; तच्च प्रत्यक्षेणावगतम् । अन्योऽनुमानस्य विषयो वक्तव्यः । किं ज्ञानसुखादि आत्मसम्बन्धित्वेन व्यपदिश्यते-किं सत्तामात्रेण, आहो तज्जन्यतया, तज्जनकत्वेन वा, तत्समवायित्वेन वा, तत्स्वरूपतादात्म्याद्वा ? तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण सुखं विज्ञानं वा आत्मनोऽपदिश्यते; तदा आत्मवत् सर्वे भावाश्चेतना स्युः विज्ञानसत्ताऽविशेषात् । तथा, सर्वे सुखिनो भवेयुः, आनन्दसत्ताऽविशेषात् । अथ तज्जन्यतया विज्ञानमात्मनोऽपदिश्यते; तदा नयनालोकपत्रः चेतनाः स्युः, तैर्जन्यमानत्वाऽविशेषात् । अथ तज्जनकत्वेन तस्य इति चेत्; तदयुक्तम्, न विज्ञानेन आत्मा उत्पाद्यते भवतां पक्षे, उत्पादने वा स्मरणानुपपत्तिः ।

[8. Refutation of the inference of soul.]

[1. Refutation of the inference of soul as accepted by the Naiyātikas, etc.]

Similarly, the inference of soul from pleasure, harted, knowledge, etc. is not possible, because relation with it is not known, and if it is not known, inference becomes useless. And what is that is proved here ? -that knowledge, Pleasure etc are supported, or that the nature of knowledge is supported by a substratum (support) ? If it is proved that they are supported, then the soul is not known at all, because the state of being supported is different from it. If it is urged that the soul is proved, it is like this - 'The soul exists because there is knowledge', but what is found in a different cannot enable one to know (cannot serve as a probans). If it is said that the nature of knowledge is proved. (we say that) it is known by perception. Something else will have to be pointed out as the object of inference. How are knowledge, pleasure, etc. referred to as being related to the soul-by virtue of their very existence, or because of being produced by it, or by their being its producer, or because of their being inherent in it, or because of

identity with its nature. If pleasure, or knowledge is said to belong to the soul by virtue of their very existence, then like the soul, all things should be sentient, because the existence of knowledge is there alike in all cases. Similarly, all should be happy, as there is the existence of happiness in all cases alike. If knowledge is said to belong to the soul because it is produced by it (soul), then eyes, light, cloth should be sentient, because it is alike produced by them. If it is said to belong to it on account of its (soul's) being its producer, that is not proper, in your view, the soul is not produced by consciousness; or if it be produced, memory would not be justified.

अथ आत्मसमवायित्वेन विज्ञानम् आत्मनोऽपदिश्यते; न तदभावात् । भवतु वा, समवाये(यो) हि अखण्डितात्मा सर्वात्मवस्त्रादिसाधारणः । ततः सर्वे चेतनाः स्युः । अथ विज्ञानोपलक्षितस्य नान्यत्र संभवोऽस्ति; तदयुक्तम्, तद् उपलक्षितस्य अन्यत्र संभवात् । तत्संभवश्च तस्य एकत्वात् । असंभवे वा समवायानेकत्वप्रसङ्गः, असमवायित्वं वाऽन्येषाम् ।

If knowledge said to belong to the soul by virtue of its being inherent in the soul, it is not so, because this is absent or get it be there, inherence being one whole, would be common to all souls, clothes, etc, so all should be sentient. If it is said that, that which is characterised by consciousness is not possible elsewhere, that is not proper; as that which is characterised by it is possible elsewhere, and its possibility is due to its being one. Or if it be not possible, there would be the contingency of the multiplicity of inherence, or of others being not-inherent.

तथा, विज्ञानसमवाय आत्मनः समवायः किम्सत्तामात्रेण, आहोस्विद् आत्मजनकत्वेन, तज्जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवायित्वेन, आत्मस्वरूपतादात्म्याद्वा ? तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण आत्मनः समवायोऽपदिश्यते; तदा ज्ञानसमवायसत्ताऽविशेषात् सर्वेषां ज्ञानसमवायित्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ तज्जन्यत्वेन; तदयुक्तम्, नहि आत्मना समवायोत्पादनं क्रियते नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अथ तज्जनकत्वेन आत्मनः समवायः; तदनुपपन्नम्, आत्मनो नित्यत्वात् । अथ आत्मनि समवेतः तेन आत्मसमवायोऽभिधीयते; तदयुक्तम्, समवायान्तराभ्युपगमात् । अथ आत्मतादात्म्येन वर्तते इति आत्मसमवायः उच्यते; तदा आत्मा विद्यते नान्यः समवायोऽस्ति तत्स्वभावानुप्रवेशात् । एवं विज्ञानानन्दादीनां समवायसम्बन्धेन न नियतात्मव्यपदेश उपपद्यते ।

Similarly, in the case of the inherence of consciousness, is the inherence said to belong to the soul by virtue of its mere existence, or because of its producing the soul, or due to its being produced by it, or due to its being inherent in it, or due to its identity with the nature of the soul? If the inherence is said to belong to the soul by its mere existence, then the existence of the

inherence of knowledge being common, there would be the contingency of all having knowledge inherent in them. If it is so an account of its being produced by it, that is not proper; for inherence, being accepted as eternal, is not brought about by the soul. If inherence is said to belong to the soul on account of its producing it, that is not justifiable, since the soul is eternal. If it is urged that it is called soul's inherence as it is inherent in the soul, that is not proper, as another (a second) inherence is not recognised. If it is said to be soul's inherence as it exists as identical with the soul, then the soul exists, and there is nothing else called inherence, as it would have penetrated its nature. Thus consciousness, bliss, etc cannot justifiably be referred to specific souls by the relation of inherence.

अथ आत्मतादात्म्येनोपजायमानं विज्ञानानन्दादिकम् आत्मनोऽपदिश्यते; तदा विकारी प्राप्नोति अनया भङ्गया आत्मा । ततश्च स्मरणानुमानप्रत्यभिज्ञानानुपपत्तिः ।

If consciousness, bliss etc rising as identical with the soul are referred to the soul, then in this way the soul comes to be modificatory in character, and then memory, inference, recognition could not be accounted for.

इतोऽपि आत्मा सुखादिकार्याधिकरणोऽवगन्तुं न पार्यते; किं तेनात्मना अनुपजातातिशयेन तापादि कार्यं क्रियते, आहोस्विद् उपजातातिशयेनापि, किं व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन, अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन वा ? तद्यदि अनुपजातातिशयेन उत्पाद्यते तापादि कार्यम्; तदा सर्वदा कुर्यात्, अनुपजातबलस्य कार्यकारणाभ्युपगमात्, न तापादिविकलः स्यात्, समं सुखादि कार्यं प्रसज्यते । अथ अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन उत्पाद्यते तापादि कार्यं; तदा अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशय इति किं भणितं भवति ? आत्मा उपजायते । ततश्च स्मरणानुमानप्रत्यभिज्ञानानुपपत्तिः ।

For this reason also, the soul cannot be considered as the substratum of the effects, pleasure, etc—Does the soul in which no speciality is brought about give rise to the effect heat, etc or the soul in which speciality is brought about, or the soul in which a speciality is brought about as distinct from it, or the soul in which a speciality is brought about as non-different from it ? Now if the soul in which no speciality is brought about gives rise to the effect, pain, etc, then it would always of so, as that in which no efficacy (force) has arisen is (here) regarded as the cause of the effect, it would not be devoid of pain, etc, and the effect pleasure, etc would come to be simultaneous. If the soul in which a speciality is brought about as non-different from it is said to give rise to the effect, pain, etc. then what is signified by the expression 'in which a speciality is brought about as non-different from it' ? It means 'the soul is born'. Then memory, inference, recognition could not be accounted for.

अथ व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन जन्यते तापादि कार्यम्; स तेनात्मना सह सम्बद्धो वा, न वा ? यदि न सम्बद्धः; स तस्यातिशयः कथम् ?

If the soul in which a speciality is brought about as distinct from it gives rise to the effect, pain, etc is it (speciality) related to the soul or not ? If it is not related, how could it be its speciality ?

अथ सम्बद्धः किम्—जनकत्वेन, अथ जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवायित्वेन वा ? तद्यदि जनकत्वेन सम्बद्धः; तदा आत्मा तेनातिशयेन उत्पद्यते इति स्मरणानुपपत्तिः । अथ जन्यत्वेन; सोऽपि तेन कथमुत्पाद्यते ? किम्—अनुपजाततिशयेन, व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन वा इति प्राप्ता प्रश्नपरम्परा । अथ तत्समवायित्वेन; न, तस्य सर्वसाधारणत्वात्, तदभावाच्च ।

If it is related, is it so by virtue of being the producer or being produced, or being there by the relation of inherence ? If it is related by virtue of being the producer, then the soul is brought about by that speciality, and so memory could not be accounted for. If (it is related) by virtue of being produced by it, (we ask) How is it too brought about by it ? A series of questions would be there, viz. Is it brought about by it in which no speciality has arisen, or is it brought about by it in which a speciality as distinct from it has arisen ? If it is (said to be) related by virtue of being inherent in it, that is not (proper), as it (inherence) is common to all, and because it is absent (there is nothing like inherence).

अथ एककार्यजनकत्वेन सम्बद्धः, तदेवेदं चिन्तयितुमारब्धम् — किमिदं जनकत्वं नामेति ? किंच, यदेव अनुपजातेऽतिशये आत्मनो रूपं तदेव जातेऽपि, तत् कथं कार्यं कुर्यात् ? अथ पूर्वस्वरूपस्यातदवस्थ्यम्; सुस्थितं नित्यत्वम् । अथ तादवस्थ्यम्; तथापि न करोति कार्यम् । एवं नैयायिकादिमतेन आत्मन उपभोगस्मरणादिकं न जाघटीति ।

If it is (said to be) related by virtue of its giving rise to the some effect, then this is exactly what we have started considering—what is this producership ? Moreover, if the soul in which a speciality has arisen has the same form (character) as the soul in which the speciality has not arisen, then how could it bring about the effect. If the former character does not remain, then eternality is well preserved ! (i.e. it has gone to dogs !) If it (former character) remains, even then it does not bring about an effect. Thus, in the view of the Naiyāyika, etc, enjoyment, memory, etc. cannot stand to reason in the case of the soul.

[२. जैनमते उपभोगाद्यनुपपत्तिप्रकटनेन आत्मानुमाननिराससूचना ।]

यस्यापि देहपरिमाणमात्र आत्मा, तस्यापि सुखदुःखोपभोगानुभवस्मरणानुपपत्तिः । कथम् ? उपपाद्यते—सुखादिकार्यम् आत्मनो भिन्नम्, अभिन्नम्, भिन्नाभिन्नं वा ? तद्यदि भिन्नम्; तत्किम्—सत्तामात्रेण, तज्जन्यत्वेन, तज्जनकत्वेन, तत्समवायित्वेन वा—इति पूर्वोक्तं दूषणमनुसृत्य वक्तव्यम् ।

[2. Direction about the refutation of the inference of the soul in the Jain view by demonstrating that enjoyment, etc. cannot be accounted for.]

Even in the view of one who holds that the soul is of the same size as the body, pleasure, pain, enjoyment, experience, memory cannot be accounted for. How ? We explain—Is the effect, pleasure, etc. different from the soul or non-different or different-cum-non-different ? If it is different, is it so by its very existence, or by its being produced by it, or by its being its producer, or by its being inherent in it—the above-mentioned refutation should be pursued here.

अथ अभिन्नं सुखदुःखोपभोगस्मरणादिकार्यमुत्पद्यते; एवं तर्हि आत्मा उत्पद्यते । तदुत्पत्तौ स्मरणानुमानानुपपत्तिः, सुखादिवद् आत्मनो नानात्वोपपत्तेः । अथ एक एव आत्मा; सुखादेरप्येकता प्राप्ता । ततश्च एकत्वे अनुभवस्यैवावस्थानाद् अनुमानस्मरणानुपपत्तिः । अथ नानात्वं सुखादीनाम्; आत्मनोऽपि तदेवापद्यते, तदव्यतिरेकात् । अथ सुखादिभेदेऽपि आत्मा नैव भिद्यते; तदा सुखादितादात्म्यं न लभ्यते । अथ सुखादितादात्म्यम्; तदा एकता नोपपद्यते, सुखादिवत् नानात्वोपपत्तेः ।

If a non-different effect, viz. pleasure, pain, enjoyment, memory etc is (said to be) produced, then thus the soul is produced, and if it is produced, memory and inference cannot be accounted for as like pleasure, etc. The soul would come to be multiple. If the soul is (said to be) one pleasure, etc also would come to be one. And in the event of this oneness, experience alone would remain, so inference and memory would not be possible. If pleasure, etc are (said to be) many, then this would hold good of the soul also, as it is non-different from them. If it is urged that the soul does not at all become different even when pleasure, etc are different, then it could not be identical with pleasure etc. And if it is identical with pleasure, etc, then it could not be one, as it would come to be many like pleasure, etc.

अथ भिन्नाभिन्नं सुखादि कार्यं तेन नोदितं दूषणमिति चेत्; कथम् ? किम् आकारान्यत्वेन, आहोस्वित् कार्यान्यत्वेन, कारणान्यत्वेन वा ? तद्यदि आकारान्यत्वेन आत्मनो भिद्यते सुखादिकार्यम्; तदयुक्तम्, आकारान्यत्वं हि अन्योन्याकारपरिहारेण स्वात्मना व्यवस्थितम्, अभेदपर्युदासेन भिन्नबुद्धिविषयत्वेनावस्थितेरेकत्वानुपपत्तिः । एकत्वं हि एकस्वभावता, एकस्वाभाव्ये हि नानास्वभावता

नोपपद्यते, नानास्वाभाव्ये हि एकस्वभावतो(ता) नोपपद्यते—अन्योन्याकार परिहारेण एतावाकारौ व्यवस्थितौ ।

If it is urged that the effect, pleasure etc is different-cum-non different, and so the above mentioned fault is not there, we (ask), 'How' ? —By virtue of another character, or by the effect being different, or the cause being different ? If the effect, pleasure, etc is said to be different from the soul by virtue of having another character, that is not proper; difference of character is self-sufficient by the exclusion of their mutual characters; and as it remains as the object of a different cognition so as to exclude non-difference, oneness is not justifiable. Oneness signifies having one nature, and if there is one nature, the possession of diverse natures is not justified, and if there are diverse natures, the possession of one nature is not justified—these characters are established so as to exclude each other's character.

अथ कारणान्यत्वेन भेदपरिकल्पना; तदयुक्तम्, भिन्नादपि कारणादभिन्नं कार्यं दृष्टम् । मृत्पिण्डदण्डाद्यनेकं कारणम् अखण्डितं कार्यं जनयति । तथा एकेनापि कारणेन अनेकं कार्यं जन्यमानं दृष्टं घटादि । तेन न कारणभेदेन वस्तूनां भेदः, नापि कार्यभेदेन, अपि तु आकारभेदेनैव भेदः । स च आकारभेदः अस्ति सुखात्मनोः, कथमभेदः ?

If they are imagined as different on account of having another cause, that is not proper; a non-different effect is seen (to arise) even from a different cause. Diverse causes such as lump of clay, staff, etc give rise to one whole effect. Similarly diverse effects, jar, etc are seen to be produced from even one cause. Therefore things are different not on account of having different causes, nor on account of having different effects; but there can be difference only if the (respective) characters are different. And this difference of character is present in the case of pleasure and soul, so how could there be non-difference ?

किंच, येनैव आकारेण सुखम् आत्मनो भिद्यते तेनैव आकारेण अभिन्नम्, आहोस्विद् आकारान्तरेण ? तद्यदि तेनैवाकारेण अभिन्नम्; तस्य तावदेकान्ताऽभेदः प्रतिपन्नो भवति भवता । अथ आकारान्तरेण अभिन्नम्; आकारान्तरं सुखं न भवति, तदभेदेऽपि सुखस्य भेदात् ।

Moreover, is pleasure non-different from soul by the very character by which it is different from the soul, or by another character ? If it is non-different by the same character, then this is equivalent to your accepting its absolute non-difference. If it is (said to be) non-different by another character, that other character is not pleasure, because even when it is non-different, pleasure is different.

[३. प्रसङ्गात् जैनाभिमतस्यानेकान्तवादस्य निरसनम् ।]

एवं च स्थिते — “तदेव नित्यं तदेव चानित्यम्” इत्येतन्नोपपद्यते, सुखात्मनोर्भेदात् । अनाद्यन्ता सत्ता नित्या, आद्यन्तवती चाऽनित्या ।

[3. Incidental refutation of the theory of Non-absolutism accepted by the Jains.]

This being so, (the view that) one and the same thing is both eternal and non-eternal 'does not stand to reason, because pleasure and soul are different (entities). Existence without beginning and end is eternal and that which has a beginning and end is non-eternal.

तथा — “पररूपतयाऽसत्त्वं स्वरूपेण सत्त्वम्” इत्येतदपि न संभवति । पररूपेण न भावः नाप्यभावः, अपि तु स्वेन रूपेण भाव एकात्मकः—एक हीदं वस्तूपलभ्यते, तच्चेदभावः किमिदानीं भावो भविष्यति ? तद्यदि पररूपतयाऽभावः, तदा घटस्य घ(प)टरूपता प्राप्नोति, यथा पररूपतया भावत्वेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे पररूपानुप्रवेशः, तथा अभावत्वेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे पररूपानुप्रवेश एव । ततश्च सर्वं सर्वात्मकं स्यात् ।

Similarly, “Non-existence in the character of another, existence in one's own character” [gold is existent as gold, but non-existent as water] also is not possible. There is neither existence nor non-existence in another's character, on the contrary, in its own character, existence is uniform [a thing is uniformly existent in its own form], for only this one thing is apprehended, if it be non-existence, what will be existence ? If it be non-existence in another's form, then jar would come to have the jar (cloth); as when thing is accepted as existent in another's form, the other's form penetrates into it, so even when it is accepted as non-existent (in another's form), there will be the penetration of (that) other's form. And then everything would be of the nature of everything.

अथ पररूपस्याभावः; तदविरोधि त्वैकत्वं तस्याऽभावः । नहि तस्मिन् सति भवान् तस्यानुपलब्धेर्द्रष्टा, अन्यथा हि आत्मनोऽप्यभावो भवेत् । अथ आत्मसत्ताऽविरोधित्वेन स्वात्मनोऽभावो न भवत्येव; परसत्ताविरोधित्वात् परस्याप्यभावो न भवति । अथापराकारतया नोपलभ्यते तेन परस्य भावो न भवति; अभावाकारतया च अनुपलब्धेः परस्याभावोऽपि न भवेत् ।

If existence of another's form be understood to mean non-opposition to it, oneness, that is not (found to be) existent. When it is there, you could not apprehend its non-cognition, since otherwise, there would be your negation also. If it be urged that one's own non-existence could never be found to be

non-opposed to one's own existence. (We reply that) there could not be non-existence of another also on account of being opposed to that other's existence. If it is urged that a thing is not apprehended as having another's character, so there is not the presence (existence) of another, we say that it is not cognised in the character of non-existence (of another), so there would not also be the non-existence of another.

अथ अभावाकारतया उपलभ्यते; तथा भावोन्यो नास्ति, अभावाकारान्तरितत्वात् — अभावस्वभाववगाहिनाऽवबोधेन अभाव एव द्योतितो न भावः । यथा सुखावगाहकेन विज्ञानेन सुखमेवाऽवद्योतितं न दुःखम् । अथ सुखज्ञानेन दुःखमपि गृह्यते; तदिदानीं सुखदुःखयोरेकता प्राप्नोति । ततश्च पर्यायरूपतया भेदाभ्युपगमो हीयते—अभिन्नात्मकं जगत् स्यात् । एवं च स्थिते यदुक्तम् —

“भागे सिंहो नरो भागे योऽर्थो भागद्वयात्मकः ।

तमभागं विभागेन नरसिंहं प्रचक्षते ॥”

इति, तत्र प्राप्नोति विश्वस्याऽखण्डरूपत्वात् । एतदपि न वक्तव्यम्—

“एकोभावः सर्वभावस्वभावः, सर्वेभावा एकभावस्वभावाः ।

एको भावस्तत्त्वतो येन दृष्टः सर्वे भावास्तत्त्वतस्तेन दृष्टाः ॥”

If it is (said to be) apprehended in the character of negation, then there is no other existence (distinct from it), because it is interrupted by the character of negation, — it is negation (non-existence) that is manifested and not existence by cognition cognising the nature of negation; as it is pleasure and not pain that is manifested by cognition cognising pleasure. If pain also were grasped by the cognition of pleasure, then pleasure and pain would come to be one. And so there could not be the recognition of their difference in the form of modes,—the world would be of the nature of non-difference. This being so, the statement,

“The thing which is constituted of two parts—in partly lion, and in partly part man,—people call that which is partless (one identical whole) ‘man lion’ by separating (the two aspects)—would not be consistent on account of the world being one whole. The following statement also should not be made—

“One thing is of the nature of all things, all things are of the nature of one thing; he who has seen one thing rightly, (as it is) has seen all things rightly.

अथ पर्याया इतरेतरात्मना भिद्यन्ते सर्वभावानाम्; एवं तर्हि भावाऽभावपर्याययोरपि भेदोऽस्तु । इमामेव मूर्खतां दिग्म्बराणामङ्गीकृत्य उक्तं सूत्रकारेण—यथा—

“नग्न ! श्रवण ! दुर्बुद्धे ! कायक्लेशपरायण ! ।

जीविकार्थेऽपि चारम्भे केन त्वमसि शिक्षितः ॥ छ ॥”

If it is urged that the modes of all things differ from one another (our answer is) then let there be similarly difference of the modes existence and non-existence, keeping this foolishness of the naked (Jainas) in view, the Sūtrakāra has said,

“O Naked Śramāṇka, Fool; one bent on torturing the body ! by whom were you instructed in the effort of even livelihood”.. (there was no need to be taught to make any effort even for food, when he was taught to torture the body and go about naked).

[४. सांख्यमतेऽपि भोगानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनेनात्मानुमान निरासः ।]

तथा सांख्यमतेनापि आत्मनो भोगो नैव सम्पद्यते भोगस्य आत्मनि अवृत्तेः । भोगशब्देन सुखमभिधीयते, तत्संवेदनं वा ? तदुभयं बुद्धौ वर्तते नात्मनि, एवं च व्यवस्थिते बुद्धेर्भोक्तृत्वं नात्मनः ।

[4. Refutation of the inference of soul in the Sāṅkhya view by showing the impossibility of enjoyment.]

Similarly, even according to the sāṅkhya view, the soul's enjoyment could never be possible accomplished, since there is no enjoyment in the soul. Does the word ‘enjoyment’ signify pleasure or its consciousness ? Both these exist in the intellect, not in the soul; this being established, it is the intellect that is the enjoyer, not the soul.

अथ बुद्धिगतेनापि भोगेनैव आत्मनो भोक्तृत्वमभिधीयते; तदा बुद्धिगतेन कर्तृत्वेन आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं प्रसज्यते । ततश्च “कर्त्ता न भवति” इत्येतन्न वक्तव्यम् । अथ आत्मनि कर्तृत्वस्याऽवृत्तेः अकर्त्ता इत्यपदिश्यते; भोगस्याप्यतद्वृत्तेः संभुग् न भवत्यात्मा ।

If it is urged that soul is said to be the enjoyer only on account of the enjoyment present in the intellect, then the soul would come to be the doer, on account of the doership present in the intellect; and then one should not say “It is not doer.” If it is referred to as ‘non-doe’ on account of absence of doership in the soul, then soul is not the enjoyer on account of the absence in it of enjoyment also.

अथ अस्ति कर्तृत्वं यदि नाम औपचारिकम्, यथा भृत्ये जयपराजयौ वर्तमानौ स्वामिनि उपचर्येते तथा बुद्धौ वर्तमानं कर्तृत्वं पुंसि उपचर्येते; यद्येवम् भोगोऽपि बुद्धौ वर्तमानः पुरुषस्यौपचारिकः प्राप्तः । औपचारिकोऽपि आत्मनि न संभवति; अन्यत्र मुख्यतयाऽनभ्युपगमात् । भोगाऽभावे च आत्मनो

मोक्षचिन्ता न कर्तव्या । बन्धनवान् मुच्यते । न चात्मनि बन्धनमस्ति । भोगो हि बन्धनम् । स चात्मनि नैव विद्यते, तदभावात् मोक्षोऽपि निरुपपत्तिकः ।

It may be urged : "There is doership if it is a figurative one; as victory or defeat (really) existent in the servant are condarily said to be in the master, so doership existing in the intellect is figuratively said to be in the soul. (We answer:) If this is so, enjoyment too existent in the intellect, would come to belong to the puruṣa (soul) figuratively. (As a matter of fact) it is not possible in the soul even figuratively, because it is not recognised primarily elsewhere; and when there is absence of enjoyment, one need not worry about the soul's emancipation. That which is in bondage is freed, but there is no bondage in (the case of) the soul; for enjoyment is a bondage, and that never exist in the soul; owing to its absence, emancipation also cannot be accounted for (is not possible, does not stand to reason).

तथा, आत्मनोऽस्तित्वं न सिद्धयति भोक्तृत्वस्याभावे । भोग्येन भोक्तुरनुमानम् । यथा सूपादिमात्रं भोक्तृविनाभूतं दृष्टम्, तथा प्रधानं सविकारं भोग्यं तेन भोक्ताऽनुमीयते; एतच्चायुक्तम्; आत्मनो भोक्तृत्वाभावे कथं भोग्येन आत्मानुमीयते, आत्मना सह भोग्यस्य सम्बन्धानवगतेः ? तदनवगतिश्च आत्मनः प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वात् । तदविषयत्वं च विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः इत्युक्तम् । अथ प्रत्यक्षेण आत्मा अवधार्यते; तदा प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वेन आत्मनः समानता प्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वेन, ततश्च सिद्धसाध्यता ।

Similarly, the existence of the soul is not proved in the absence of enjoyership. The enjoyer is inferred from the thing enjoyed. As soup, etc without exception are found to be invariably concomitant with an enjoyer, so pradhāna (matter) along with its transformation is the thing enjoyed, (and) an enjoyer is inferred from it. And this is not proper. In the absence of enjoyership of the soul (when soul is not an enjoyer), how (could) the soul (be) inferred from the thing enjoyed, because the relation of the enjoyable (thing that can be enjoyed) with the soul is not apprehended ? And its non-apprehension is on account of the soul not being an object of perception. That it is not its object is stated in "There is absence of persistence in the particular"—If soul is (said to be) cognised by perception, then on account of the soul's being an object of perception, it would be the common object of perception and inference, and so there would be the fault of proving what is already proved. (siddhasādhyaṭā).

सूपादि भोक्तृविनाभूतं दृष्टम्; तत्किम्—देहादिव्यतिरिक्त भोक्तृविनाभूतं दृष्टम्, आहोस्विद् देहमात्रभोक्तृविनाभूतं दृष्टम् ? तद्यदि देहादिव्यतिरिक्तभोक्तृविनाभूतं दृष्टम्; तदा दृष्टान्तोऽपि दार्ष्टान्तिकप्रतितुल्यः, आत्मनोऽतीन्द्रियत्वेन । अथ प्रत्यक्षेणावधारित आत्मा; तदा सिद्ध आत्मा, किमनुमानेन ?

Soup, etc is (said to be) seen as invariably concomitant with an enjoyer. (We ask :) Is it seen to be invariably concomitant with an enjoyer other than body, etc, or is it seen to be invariably concomitant with an enjoyer which is only the body ? If it is seen to be invariably concomitant with an enjoyer other than body, etc. then the illustration is a proto-type of that which it is meant to illustrate, since the soul is super-sensuous. If the soul is (said to be) apprehended by perception, then the soul is (already) established; of what use is inference (then) ? (i.e. it is not needed to establish it).

अथ देहमात्रभोक्तृविनाभूतं दृष्टम्; तदा देहविकाराणां भोगयोगेन नात्मनः सिद्धिः । भवतु वा आत्मनो भोगः, तथापि अकृत-कृताभ्यागमनाशदोषप्रसङ्गः—अकृतस्य कर्मणः फलमभ्येति आत्मनः, कृतस्य च कर्मणः फलं न सम्पद्यते बुद्धिः । यदि च अकृतस्य कर्मणः फलमभ्येति; तदा मुक्तात्मनामपि तत्फलं स्यात्, आत्मवृत्तिनियमहेतोरभावात् । ततश्चाऽकैवल्यप्रसङ्गः ।

If it is seen to be invariably concomitant with an enjoyer which is only the body, then the soul cannot be established on account of the modifications of body being joined to enjoyment. Or, let soul be the enjoyer, even then there would be the contingency of the fault of the occurring of what is not done, and the loss of what is not done—the soul comes to have the fruit of action not done (by it), and intellect does not acquire the fruit of action done by it. And if the fruit of an action not done comes to one, then that fruit would be there even in the case of emancipated soul, because there is the absence of any cause of the restruction of its existence in the soul—that it could go to a bound soul, but not to an emancipated one). And therefore there would be the contingency of non-emancipation (non-pure-state).

[५. सांख्यसंमतस्य कैवल्यस्यानुपपत्तिकत्वोपपादनम् ।]

इतश्च कैवल्यं नोपपद्यते, भोग्यभोजकयोरवस्थानात् । नहि भवतां पक्षे सदात्मानं परित्यजति भोग्यम् । येनाकारेण आत्मनो भोग्यत्वेनावस्थितम्, नहि तदाकारमतिवर्त्तते, आत्मनो भोक्तृत्वाकारस्य अनतिवृत्तेः । अतिवृत्तौ च आत्मोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः ॥ छ ॥

[5. Showing that emancipation as accepted by the sāṃkhya does not stand to reason]

Hence also emancipation is not accountable, on account of the enjoyable and the enjoyer remaining. In your view, the enjoyable does not leave the existent soul (does not ever leave the soul). That character in which a thing remains as an object of enjoyment of the soul,—that character a thing never leaves behind, because the character of enjoyership of the soul is not left

behind, and if it were left behind there would be the contingency of the extinction of the soul.

[६. वेदान्तसंमतस्यानन्दरूपकैवल्यस्यायुक्तिकताप्रदर्शनम् ।]

येपि आनन्दरूपमात्मनः कैवल्यमभिदद्यति तेऽपि युक्तिवादिनो न भवन्ति । कथम् ? यद्यात्मनः आनन्दरूपं स्वसंवेद्यं च; तदा संसारावस्थायामपि तत् वेद्यं प्रसक्तम् । ततश्च मोक्षार्थप्रयासो निष्फलः ।

[6. showing that emancipation of the nature of bliss as acceptable to vedānta is not supported by reason.]

Those also who speak of soul's emancipation (state of emancipation) as of the nature of bliss, do not speak in conformity with reason (are not those who speak logically). How so ? If soul were to have the nature of bliss, and if it were self-apprehended, then there would be the contingency of its being apprehended even in the mundane (transmigratory) state. And then the effort for emancipation would be fruitless.

अथ संसारावस्थायां न वेद्यते अनादिमलावगुण्ठितमात्मनः स्वरूपम्, यथा पटान्तरिते घटे घटबुद्धिर्न भवति, एवं मललिप्ते आत्मनि आत्मबुद्धिर्न भवति; तदेतदयुक्तम्, दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः वैषम्यात्—पटान्तरिते घटे घटबुद्धिर्न भवति पटान्तर्धाने सति इन्द्रियेण साकं सम्बन्धो नास्ति तद्भावाद् घटे नेन्द्रियजं विज्ञानं सम्पद्यते । इह तु पुनः मलावगुण्ठनेन कस्य व्यवधानं क्रियते ? न वेद्यवेदकयोर्व्यवधानं क्रियते । वेद्यं वेदकं च आत्मस्वरूपमेव—यथा बौद्धानां स्वसंवेद्यं विज्ञानम्, तच्च विषयसद्भावेऽपि वेद्यते तदभावेऽपि वेद्यते, य(त)थात्मनः स्वसंवेद्यं स्वरूपं मलसद्भावेऽपि वेद्यते तदसद्भावेऽपि वेद्यते, मलस्याऽकिञ्चित्करत्वाद् आत्मनोऽर्थान्तरत्वेनाऽवस्थानात् । अथ तादात्म्येन स्थितानि मलानि; तदा 'मलानि अपनीयन्त' किमुक्तं भवति ? आत्माऽपनीयते । ततश्च मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्गः ॥ छ ॥

It may be urged : The essential nature of the soul, being obscured (covered) by dirt which is beginningless, is not apprehended in the mundane state; as there is not the cognition of jar in respect of a jar covered by cloth, so there is not the cognition of soul (self) in respect of soul anointed (covered) with dust (Answer—) This is not proper, because of the illustration and the thing illustrated not being similar—there is not the cognition of jar in respect of a jar covered with cloth, there being the covering of cloth, there is not relation (contact) with the sense-organ, and because of this, sensuous cognition does not arise. But here, what is separated (covered) by the curtain of dirt ? The object of knowledge and the knower are not separated. Both the object of knowledge and the knower are of the nature of soul—as with the Buddhists, consciousness is self-apprehended

(self-apprehensible); and it is apprehended, even when the object is present; (and so also) even in its absence; Similarly the soul's nature is self-apprehensible; it is apprehended even when the dirt (impurity) is present, and is apprehended even when it is not present, as the dirt is ineffectual, since it remains as an entity different from the soul. If the impurities stay as identical with it, then what is meant by 'Impurities are removed'. It should mean 'soul is removed'. And so there would be the contingency of absence of emancipation.

[७. मीमांसकमतेनापि आत्मानुमानस्यासंभवित्वप्रकटनम् ।]

तथा मीमांसकमतेनापि आत्मानुमानं न प्रवर्तते, प्रमाणान्तरानुवधारितार्थविषयत्वाभ्युपगमात् प्रमाणानाम् । नियतविषयाणि हि प्रमाणानि प्रतिपद्यन्ते—प्रत्यक्षावसेयानुमानं प्रवर्तते, अनुमानावसेये च प्रत्यक्षं न प्रवर्तते । ततश्च इतरेतरव्यावृत्तिविशेषविषयाणि । तदयु(तदु)क्तम्—“विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः” विशेषो नियतप्रमाणग्राहयोऽर्थः, तथाभूतेऽर्थेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे अनुमानस्याऽनुगमाभावः । अनुगमः सम्बन्धः, तद्ग्रहणानुपपत्तिः ।

[7. Showing the impossibility of the inference of soul in the Mimāṃsaka's view.]

Similarly, even according to the Mimāṃsaka's view, inference of soul cannot function (operate, be there), because pramāṇas (organs of knowledge) are accepted as having as their objects things that are not apprehended by other pramāṇas. Pramāṇas are known to have their specific (peculiar) objects— inference does not operate in respect of that which can be determined by perception, and perception does not operate in respect of that which is determined by inference. Therefore pramāṇas have their specific objects to the exclusion of the objects of each other[@]. This is not proper. 'There is absence of relation in respect of a particular (viśeṣeṇugamābhāvaḥ)—particular' means a thing which can be cognised by a specific pramāṇa, such a thing being accepted, there is the absence of anugama of inference. 'Anugama' signifies relation; that is to say, there is the impossibility of its cognition.

अर्थे(थ)प्रत्यक्षाद्यवधारितेऽर्थे अनुमानं प्रवर्तते; नन्वेवं प्रत्यक्षानुमानसाधारणोऽर्थः प्रसक्तः । साधारणता समानता । “सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता” प्रत्यक्षावगतत्वात् । अनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणं च अपार्थक्यम् ।

If (it is urged that) inference operates even in respect of a thing which is determined by perception, etc, then perception and inference will come to

@ Should not the reading be “Itaretarvyāvṛttaviśeṣaviśayāṇi ?”

have a common (sādhāraṇa) object and commonness signifies sameness; 'in the event of there being sameness there would be (the fault of) proving what is already proved (siddha-sādhya), as it is (already) cognised by perception. And the epithet 'cognising an object not (already) cognised would lose its significance.

अथवा, सामान्ये सिद्धे साधनम् इत्यन्योऽर्थः । सामान्ययोः ग्रन्थगमकभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते मीमांसकेन । न च तत् सामान्यं विद्यते, यथा च न विद्यते तथा प्रागेवोदितम् । ततश्च सिद्धस्य साधनम्-विद्यमानस्य साधनम् । न च अग्नित्वमस्ति । तदभावे कस्येदं ज्ञापकम् ?

Or, another meaning is 'proving when the universal is established'. The relation of known (probandum) and that which makes known (probans) is accepted between two universals (e.g. fireness and smokeness) by the Mimāṃsaka. And that universal does not exist. How it does not exist has already been said. Therefore (the meaning is) the proving of what is establishing-the proving of what exists. And fire (universal) does not exist, so in its absence what will this make known.

अथवा, सिद्धं साधनं सिद्धसाधनम् इत्यन्योऽर्थः । विद्यमानं साधनम् । न च धूमत्वसामान्यमस्ति । तच्च(त्त्व) विद्यमानं सामान्यम् । कथं सामान्यं साधनं भवितुमर्हति ?

Or there can be another meaning-established means of proof, (probans) existing means of proof; and smoke (universal) does not exist; but it is non-existent universal. How could universal be a means of proof (probans) ?

अथवा, सिद्धसाधनम्-ज्ञातमनुमानं साधनं भवति, न च धूमत्वं ज्ञातं स्वयमसत्त्वात्, अथवा ग्रहणोपायाभावात् तस्य अनुस्यूतं रूपम् । न च तत् आत्मन्यनुस्यूतम् । नापि एकस्यां व्यक्तौ अपि तु बह्वीषु व्यक्त्यु । न च बह्व्यो व्यक्त्यु उपलभ्यन्ते, अपि तु एकैव धूमव्यक्तिरूपलभ्यते । न च एकस्यां व्यक्तौ अनुगतात्मतया सामान्यसंवित्तिरस्ति । नचाकारान्तरसामान्यम् ॥ छ ॥

Or, 'Siddhasāadhanam' signifies that a known cause of inference is the means and smokeness is not known, because it is itself non-existent, or because of the absence of the mean of cognising it. If it has a persistent form (character). Now, it is not persistent in itself, nor in one individual, but in many individuals, while many individuals are not cognised, but only one smoke individual is cognised. There cannot be the apprehension of universal being persistent in respect of one individual. And there is not universal of another character. (And universal cannot have any other character).@

@ 'Ākāraṅtaraṁ Sāmānyam' instead of 'ākāraṅtara-sāmānyam' is better.

[९. ताथागतसंमतस्यानुमानस्य निरासः ।]

तथा, ताथागतानामपि अनुमानं न प्रवर्तते सम्बन्धानवगतेः । तदनवगतिश्च-किं सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्, आहोस्वित् सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः, स्वलक्षणयोर्वा ? तद्यदि सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणं क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्, सामान्यस्याऽसंभवात् तयोः सम्बन्धः । नापि सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं क्रियते, सामान्यस्याऽसत्त्वात् ।

[9. Refutation of inference as accepted by the Buddhists.]

Similarly, the inference of the Buddhists also cannot operate on account of relation not being known. Its non-cognition is as follows-Is there the determination (knowledge) of the relation between two universals, or between universal and particular, or between two particulars ? If the relation between two universals is (said to be) determined, that is not proper; there being no possibility of the universal, there cannot be their relation. Nor can the relation between universal and particular be determined, because the universal does not exist.

अथ स्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तत्रापि किम् अर्थयोः, ज्ञानयोः, ज्ञानार्थयोर्वा ? तद्यदि अर्थयोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तदहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावज्ञानं किं सत्तामात्रेण, आहोस्वित् तदाकारयोगित्वेन, तज्जन्यत्वेन वा, सामस्त्येन वा ? तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण दहनधूमसंवेदनमपदिश्यते; न केवलं तदहनस्य तत् संवेदनम्, त्रैलोक्यस्य तत्संवेदनं प्रसक्तम्, उपकार विनिर्मुक्तस्य सत्ताऽविशेषात् ।

If there is (said to be) the determination of the relation between two particulars, there also, is it between two objects or between two cognitions or between cognition and object ? If the relation between two objects is (said to be) determined, is the knowledge of the relation of causality between smoke and fire on account of existence alone or on account of association of (knowledge) with their shape or on account of being produced by them, or on account of all these jointly ? If there is said to be (this) apprehension of fire and smoke due to existence alone, then that apprehension would not be of fire alone, but there would be the contingency of its being the cognition of the three worlds because existence is common with all devoid of any aiding factor [if existence alone is required for knowledge without any aiding factor, that is found in all things alike, so there is no reason why there should be knowledge of fire alone, and not of all other things].

[९. प्रसङ्गात् ज्ञानस्य विषयाकारत्वं विचार्य तत्खण्डनम् ।]

अथ तदहनकारयोगित्वेन तस्य संवेदनमभिधीयते; यथा दहनेन स्वनिर्भासमुत्पादितं तथा गन्धाकारोपरक्तगन्धादि ज्ञानेनापि स्वनिर्भासमुत्पादितम् । ततश्च ज्ञानाकारं तदुत्पद्यते इति युक्तं भवति

गन्धाद्याकारम्, ततश्च अनेकाकारयोगित्वे सति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था न लभ्यते । अथ गन्धादिज्ञानं न गन्धाद्याकारमर्पयति दहनज्ञाने; तदानीं ज्ञानाकारार्पकत्वमपि न लभ्यते, ज्ञानतादात्म्यव्यवस्थितोऽसौ गन्धाकारः तदनर्पकत्वे ज्ञानाकारोऽपि नार्पितः स्यात् । ततश्च दहनविज्ञानम् अविज्ञानम् । निरवयवं च गन्धादिज्ञानम्, नैकदेशेन आकारर्पकत्वम् । अथ निराकारं गन्धादिज्ञानम्; प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था तर्हि न लभ्यते, तस्य दहनज्ञानस्यापि निराकारताऽस्तु ।

[1. Incidental examination and refutation of the theory that knowledge assumes the shape of the object.]

If it is urged that it is said to be its apprehension on account of its being associated with the shape of fire, (our answer is) as self-reflex is brought about by fire, so self-reflect (self-manifestation) is brought about by the knowledge of smell etc. tainted with the shape (character) of odour; therefore when it arises as of the shape of knowledge, so it is proper that it should be of the shape of smell, etc and therefore, there being association with a number of shapes, the ordering that each knowledge has its own object does not obtain. If it is urged that the knowledge of smell etc. does not impress the shape of smell, etc on the knowledge of fire, then the impressing of the shape of smell exists in full identity with knowledge, and in the event of its not being impressed, the shape of knowledge also would not be impressed. And then knowledge of fire would be non-knowledge. Further, knowledge of smell, etc is partless, it could not impress shape by only a part of it, (so that the shape of knowledge could be impressed and not that of knowledge). If knowledge of smell, etc is said to be devoid of shape, then the ordering of specific objects (that each cognition has its own object) would not obtain, let that cognition of fire also be shapeless.

किंच, दहनाकारयोगित्वेन यदि दहनसंवेदनम्; तदा पूर्वविज्ञानाकारयोगित्वेन पूर्वविज्ञानस्यापि तद्वेदनं प्राप्तम्, तदाकारयोगित्वात् तदुत्पाद्यत्वाच्च । अथ तथा(दा)कारयोगित्वे तदुत्पाद्यत्वे च तस्य तद्वेदनं न भवति; विषयस्यापि तर्हि तद्वेदनं किम्, इह द्वयस्य विसंवादात् ? अथ तद्विज्ञानं विदितम् इति कृत्वा न वेद्यते ज्ञानान्तरेण; एवं विषयस्यापि तद्वेदनं न प्राप्नोति पुरुषान्तरावधार्यमाणस्य ।

Moreover, if there is (said to be) apprehension of fire on account of association with the shape of fire, then it would come to be the apprehension of the previous cognition also on account of association with the shape of the previous cognition, because it is associated with its shape and because it is produced by it. If it is urged that when it is associated with its shape and produced by it, it is not its apprehension, then why is it the apprehension of the

object also, because here there is the incompatibility of both ? If it is urged that cognition is not apprehended by another cognition because that it is already known, then it does not obtain as the apprehension of the object also which is cognised by another man.

अपि च, यदि दहनाकारयोगित्वेन दहनस्य तद्वेदनम्; वस्तुत्वाकारयोगित्वेन नयनादेरपि तत्संवेदनं प्रसक्तम् । अथ नयनादेरसाधारणाकारार्पकत्वं न विद्यते; तेन तेषां तत्संवेदनं न भवति, नीलस्य स्वभवनदेशकालस्वभावानर्पकत्वात् स्वकारणकलापोत्पाद्यस्वभावानर्पकत्वाच्च । तदर्पकत्वे च नीलाकार योगिता स्यात् तत्कारणजन्यत्वं च । एककालीनत्वे एककारणजन्यत्वे च हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तिः सहोत्पन्नयोगोविषाणयोरिव । अथ असाधारणाकारतया नोपजायते अपि तु नीलमात्र प्रतिच्छायतयैव उपजायते; यद्येवं नयनादिस्वलक्षणाकारतया उपजायमानं नयनादेः तद्ग्रहणं भवेत् ।

Moreover if that is the apprehension of fire on account of being associated with the shape of fire then it should be the apprehension of fire, then it should be the apprehension of fire, etc also on account of association with the shape of thingness. If it is urged that eyes etc do not impress an uncommon (peculiar) shape, so it is not their apprehension, because blue does not impress the nature of its own residence, place, time, and because it does not impress the nature which is brought about by the collocation of its own causes. And if it were the impressor, there would be association with the shape of blue, and the fact of being produced by its cause. The relation of cause and effect is not possible (between two things) when they are simultaneous and produced by one cause, as in the case of the two horns of a bull produced simultaneously. If it is urged that it is not produced as having an uncommon (peculiar) shape, but is produced as a reflex of only the blue, (we answer) being produced as having the shape of the particulars, eye etc. it would be the cognition of eye, etc.

अपि च, दहनाकारता दहनविज्ञानात् किं भिन्ना, अभिन्ना वा ? यदि भिन्ना, सा किं तात्त्विकी, आहोस्विदतात्त्विकी ? तद्यदि तात्त्विकी, तद्वतिः कथम् ? न स्वसंवेद्यत्वेन नापि जनकत्वा-ऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन । स्वसंवेद्या न भवति विज्ञानकार्य(काय) व्यतिरेकात् । नापि जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन गृह्यते । अर्थो हि आकारमर्पयति न विषयाकारता । तदाकारार्पकत्वे वा प्राप्ता आकारपरम्परा । अथ अतात्त्विकी विषयाकारता; सा अतात्त्विकत्वेन असंविदितदेहा कथं प्रतिकर्मनियामिका भवति ?

Moreover is the being possessed of the shape of fire different from the cognition of fire, or non-different ? If different, is it real or unreal ? Now if it is real, how is it cognised, not by its being self-apprehensible, nor by being the producer, and impressor of shape. It cannot be self-apprehended in the ab-

sence of being constituted of cognition. Nor is it accepted as the producer and impressor of shape. It is the object that impresses the shape and not the being possessed of the shape of object, or if it were the impressor of shape, there would be (an infinite) series of shapes. If the being possessed of shape is unreal, being unreal its body would not be apprehended, and so how could it be the determiner of the respective objects (of cognitions) ?

अथ अव्यतिरिक्ता; सा किं तात्त्विकी, आहोस्विद् अतात्त्विकी ? यदि तात्त्विकी; सा किं जडात्मिका, आहोस्विद् चित्स्वभावा ? तद्यदि जडात्मिका; तदा ज्ञानाऽव्यतिरेकित्वं न संभवति चिदचिदोरेकत्वायोगादन्योन्यपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वेन । अथ चिदात्मिका; तदा परिभाषामात्रं भिद्यते-ज्ञानं विषयाकार इति । अथ अतात्त्विकी, तदा ज्ञानस्याप्यतात्त्विकत्वम् । न च ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्ता विषयाकारता नास्ति, अपि तु ज्ञानस्वरूपमेव विषयाकारतात्मकमपदिश्यते । तच्च नयनार्थालोकसाधारण उत्पाद्यत्वेन समं संवेदनं प्रसक्तं सर्वकारकाणाम् ।

If it is non-different, is it real or unreal ? If it is real, is it unconscious or of the nature of consciousness ? If it is unconscious then it could not be non-different from knowledge, because consciousness and non-consciousness being mutually exclusive in character cannot possibly have oneness. If it is of the nature of consciousness, then there is only a difference of terminology in 'knowledge' and 'shape of object'. If it is (said to be) unreal, then knowledge also would be unreal. And it is not that there is not possession of the shape of object as different from the knowledge; on the contrary the very nature of knowledge is said to be of the nature of possession of shape of object. And that is being produced in common by eye, object, light in respect of being produced[@], there would be the contingency of its being alike the cognition of all causal factors.

[२. दृष्टान्तीभूतस्यादर्शस्य मुखरूपतास्वीकारार्थस्य विकल्प्य निरसनम् ।]

यदप्युक्तं केनापि — “आदर्शमण्डलं मुखरूपतां स्वीकरोति न च आदर्शरूपतां परित्यजति तथा ज्ञानमपि विषयरूपतां स्वीकुर्वन्न विज्ञानरूपतां त्यजति” तदप्युक्तम्, आदर्शमण्डलस्य मुखरूपतास्वीकारणार्थो वक्तव्यः—किं मुखतादात्म्यम्, आहोस्विद् अविरलदेशोत्पादः ? तद्यदि तादात्म्यम्; कथं न आदर्शरूपतां जहाति ? एकं हि इदं वस्तु—तत्तादात्म्ये मुखम् आदर्शो वा । अथ अविरलदेशोत्पादो मुखस्य स्वीकरणम्; तदानीम् आकारस्यापि स्वीकरणम् अविरलदेशोत्पाद एव प्राप्तः, ततश्च नाकारेण प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था क्रियते । अनवगतरूपणैव च स्थितेः । दहनज्ञानं यदि साकारं तथापि दहनग्रहणं न भवति ।

@. The text does not seem to be quite correct.

[2. Dialectical refutation of the fact of the mirror serving as an illustration, accepting the form of the face.]

As to what is stated, viz “The disc of the mirror accepts the form of the face, does not abandon the form (character) of mirror, so knowledge also accepting the form of the object does not abandon the form of knowledge”,—that also is not proper. It will have to be stated as to what is meant by the disc of the mirror accepting the form of the face—does it mean identity or production of a place that is not peculiar ? If it signifies identity, then how would it not abandon the form (character) of mirror, if it is identical, this would be one entity, face or mirror. If the acceptance of face signifies production of a place that is not peculiar, then the acceptance of shape (by knowledge) also would come to be production of a place that is not rare (peculiar), and so the ordering or restriction of peculiar objects could not be achieved by shape. And because of remaining only in a form that is not cognised, even if cognition of fire is possessed of shape, it would not be the means of fire.

इतोऽपि दहनग्रहणं न भवति । किं तद् अवगतम्, अनवगतम्, तर्हि ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यम्, स्वसंविदितं वा ? यदि ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यम्; तदयुक्तम्, न ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यं भवत्पक्षे । अथ स्वसंवेद्यम्; तदयुक्तम्, विषयदृष्टान्तबलेन निराकृतं नैयायिकैः । अथ अनवगतम्; न तर्हि तद् दहनस्य ग्रहणम् । ‘अप्रत्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिद्ध्यति’ इति न्यायात् ।

For this reason also there is not the cognition of fire — Is it known or unknown, (if known) is it known by another knowledge or is it self apprehended? If it is (said to be) apprehended another knowledge, that is not proper, in your view, knowledge is not apprehended by another knowledge. If it is (said to be) self-apprehended, that is not proper, as this is refuted by the Naiyāyikas on the strength of the illustration of object. If it is (said to be) unknown, it is not the means of apprehension of fire according to the maxim, “knowledge which is not directly known is not known to have a vision of the object”.

अपि च यत् तद् दहनग्रहणम्—तत्र किमवभाति किम् अर्थः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा ? यदि अर्थः प्रतिभाति; तदयुक्तम्, असंविदितायां संवित्तौ तत्संवित्त्ययोगात् । अथ ज्ञानम्; [न] तर्हि दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धोऽवगतः तत्संवित्तिपूर्वकत्वात् सम्बन्धबुद्धेः । अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; तदयुक्तम्, एकोपलम्भस्या (स्य) द्वितीयाकारपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वात् । न च दहनज्ञाने ज्ञानार्थकारौ प्रतीयेते अपि तु दहनस्यैव प्रतिभासनात् ।

Further, what is it that appears in that which is (known as) cognition of fire? Does the object appear or knowledge or both? If the object (is said to) appear, that is not proper, because there is not the possibility of its apprehension in an apprehension which is (itself) not apprehended. If knowledge (is said to appear), then the relation of fire and smoke could not be known, as the knowledge of relation is preceded by their apprehension. If both (are said to) appear, that is not proper, because the cognition of one is by nature exclusive of the shape of the second. And the shapes of knowledge and object are not cognised in the knowledge of fire; on the contrary, there is the manifestation of fire only.

अथ दहनोत्पाद्यत्वेन तत् दहनस्य संवेदनम्; कथं तत् दहनेनोत्पाद्यते? किम् अतज्जननस्वभावेन, तज्जननस्वभावेन वा? यदि अतज्जननस्वभावेन; अतज्जननस्वभावः कथमसौ तज्जनयेत्?

If it is urged that it is the apprehension of fire on account of being produced by fire, (we ask) how is it produced by fire?—by it of the nature of being non-producer of it or by it of the nature of being producer of it? If by it of the nature of being non-producer of it, how can it which is of nature of being non-producer of it give rise to it?

अथ तज्जननस्वभावः, न तर्हि दहनाद् धूमस्योत्पत्तिः, दहनस्य दहनज्ञानोत्पादकस्वभाव्येन धूमोत्पादकत्वायोगात्। अथ तेनैव स्वभावेन धूममुत्पादयति; प्राप्ता विज्ञानस्यापि धूमरूपता, धूमस्य वा विज्ञानरूपता, अभिन्नात्मोत्पाद्यते, भेदेकं च न बीजमस्ति।

If it is said to be of the nature of being producer of it, then there would not be the production of smoke from fire, because being by nature the producer of knowledge of fire, there is not the possibility of its being the producer of smoke. If it is urged that it produces smoke by that very nature, then cognition also would come to be of the form of smoke or smoke of the form of cognition, a non-different thing is producer, and there is no cause which could differentiate.

अथ स्वभावान्तरेण जनयति; [न] एकस्य स्वभावद्वयाभावात्—स्वभावद्वये च एकतानुपपन्ना। ततश्च दहनेन धूमोत्पादनं क्रियते न तदा स्वज्ञानमुत्पादयति। ज्ञानं विना केन हेतुफलावधारणं क्रियते? अथ दहनो दहनज्ञानमुत्पादयति; न तर्हि दहनस्य धूमोत्पादकत्वम्, तदभावात् न बाह्यार्थयोर्हेतुफलभाववावधारणं दहनादिविज्ञानेन शक्यते कर्तुम्।

If it (is urged that it) produces it by another nature, (we say) No, because one thing cannot have two natures, and if it were to have two natures oneness

would not be possible (—it would not be one). Therefore, when fire gives rise to smoke, it does not give rise to its own knowledge. In the absence of knowledge by what will the relation of effect and cause be determined? If fire (is said to) give rise to knowledge of fire, then fire cannot be the producer of smoke, (and) in its absence the relation of cause-effect between two external things cannot be determined by the knowledge of fire, etc.

[३. कार्यानुमाननिरासाय दहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तेः पुनरुपक्रमः ।।]

इतोऽपि दहनधूमयोः हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तिः। यथा अविचलितदहनस्वरूपस्य पूर्वापरानेककार्याविर्भावकत्वं न प्रतिपद्यते भवद्भिः तथा अनायत्तविकारस्य युगपदुत्पन्नानेककार्याविर्भावकत्वमपि न प्रत्येतव्यम्। अथ अभ्युपगम्यते युगपदरनेककार्योत्पादकत्वं युगपदनेककार्योत्पादकनशक्तियुक्तस्योत्पत्तेः, यद्येवम् — क्रमभाव्यनेककार्याविर्भावकत्वस्योत्पत्तेः अयुगपदेकं कार्यं विदध्यात्। विदधात्येव इति चेत्; इदमापेक्षिकत्वं यत् क्रमभाव्यनेककार्यजनकात्मकं स्वरूपम्। एतदभ्युपगमे अभ्युपेतज्ञानमापद्यते। अथ अविचलितरूपेण पूर्वापरकार्यं न जन्यते; तदा युगपदपि न कुर्यात् अनायत्तविकारः। ततश्च न दहनाद् धूमस्योत्पत्तिः।

[3. Again an attempt to show the unaccountability of the relation of cause-effect between fire and smoke for the refutation of inference from effect on causality.]

Hence also the relation of cause-effect between fire and smoke cannot be possible for. As that which is of the nature of unchanging fire is not known by you to be the manifestator of a number of effects in succession, so that on which modification is not dependent (that which does not undergo modification) should not be known to be the manifestor of a number of effects simultaneously produced. If it is recognised as being the producer simultaneously of a number of effects, on account of the rise of which is possessed of the power to give rise to a number of effects simultaneously (we answer), if this is so, then on account of the rise of that which is the manifestor of a number of successive effects, it would give rise to one effect successively. If it is urged that it actually does so, (we say that) the nature of being the producer of a number of successive effects is relatively (being dependent). If this is accepted it would mean giving up your own views. If (it is said that) the successive effects are not produced by it of unflickering form, then it not undergoing modification would not do so (produce effects) simultaneously also. Therefore there would not be the rise of smoke from fire.

अथ एकमेव तेन ज्वलनेन जन्यते; किं तदेकम्—विज्ञानम्, धूमो वा ? तद्यदि विज्ञानमेव जन्यते; न तर्हि धूमं दृष्ट्वा अग्निं(ग्निः) प्रतीय[तेऽ]तद्व्यापारलब्धजन्मवत्त्वात् । अथ धूम एव उत्पाद्यते; तदा तद्विज्ञानं विना केन हेतुफलभावोऽवगम्यते ?

If only one thing is produced by that fire, what is that one-cognition or smoke ? If cognition alone is produced, then seeing smoke one would not cognise fire[@], because it does not owe its origination to its operation. If smoke alone is produced, then without its knowledge, by what would the relation of cause-effect be known ?

इतोऽपि दहनस्य धूमाविर्भावकत्वं न जाघटीति किं निमित्तभूतेन धूमोत्पादनं क्रियते, किं वा उपादानभूतेन तद्यदि निमित्तभूतेनोत्पाद्यते; तदा धूमरूपता न प्राप्नोति उपादानं विना ।

For this reason also fire's being the manifestor of smoke is not compatible—does it bring about smoke by being its instrumental cause, or the material cause. If it is produced by it serving as the instrumental cause, then without the constituent cause the character of smoke would not obtain.

अथ उपादानभूतेनोत्पादनं क्रियते; ननु असमानजातीयं कथमुपादानकारणं भवेत् ? अभ्युपगमे वा देहेन्द्रिय संघातादेव गर्भादौ विज्ञानं भविष्यति अलं परलोकविज्ञानं कल्पनया ।

If it is (said to be) brought about by it as the material cause, (we ask) how could it which is of a non-homogeneous class be the constituent cause ? Or, if this is accepted there will arise consciousness at the beginning of conception, in foetus, etc. even from the aggregate of body and sense-organs, so enough of hypostatising knowledge of other-world.

अथ समानजातीयेन विज्ञानेन विना न विज्ञानस्य उद्गतिः इति चेत्; एवं तर्हि धूमस्यापि असमानजातीयात् दहनात् कथमुत्पत्तिः ? अथ रूपरूपतया वह्नेः समानजातीयत्वम्; एवं देहादेरपि समानजातीयत्वं स्वलक्षणरूपतया । इदमेव चेतसि समारोप्य उक्तम्—

“शरीरादेव इति बृहस्पतिः ।”

If (it is urged that) there is not the rise of cognition without a homogeneous cognition, (we say), then thus how could there be the rise of smoke also from non-homogeneous fire ? If it is urged that there is homogeneity on account of fire's having the character of colour, (we say) thus body, etc also would be homogeneous on account of the character of being unique particulars. Keeping only this in view, it has been said, “From body only, according

@. Confusion of two constructions. It should be dhūmaṁ “dṛṣṭvā agnim pratyeti”

to Brhaspati”.

अथ ज्ञानरूपतया न समानजातीयत्वं देहस्य; दहनस्यापि धूमरूपतयाऽसमानजातीयत्वम् । नियतकारणजन्याकारतया नियतदेशकालस्वभावतया च सर्वे भावाः अन्योन्यव्यावृत्ततनवः । न च तेषाम् अन्योन्याकारानुगमोऽस्ति, नाप्येकजात्यनुगमः । तदुक्तम् —

“सर्वे भावाः स्वभावेन स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थितेः ।

स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां यस्माद् व्यावृत्तिभागिनः ॥”

If it is urged that body is not homogeneous with possession of (character of) knowledge, (we say) fire also is not homogeneous with the possession of (character of) smoke. All things have constitutions exclusive of each other on account of having a shape produced by a specific cause, and on account having a fixed place, time, nature. There cannot be in them the continuity of each other's character, nor the continuity of one universal. It is said :

“All things are by their nature established in their own natures[@], since they are exclusive on account of their nature and the nature of others”.

ततश्च भिन्नजातीयात् सर्वं जायमानं दृष्टम्, न समानजातीयाद्भवत् किञ्चिद् दृष्टपूर्वम् । एवं च भिन्नजातीयं देहादिकं गर्भादौ विज्ञानमुत्पादयिष्यति । ततश्च न परलोकः प्रसिद्ध्यति ।

Therefore everything is seen to arise from what is heterogeneous, nothing has ever been seen to arise from what is homogeneous. Thus heterogeneous body, etc. will give rise to consciousness at the beginning of conception in the foetus, etc. Therefore, the other-world is not established.

अथ समानजातीयं विज्ञानं विना विज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते; तदा न कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिः स्यात्, समानजातीयकारणासंभवात् । ततश्च कार्यानुमानं ह्रीयते ।

If it is urged that cognition does not arise without a homogeneous cognition, then nothing would arise on account of the absence of homogeneous causes. Therefore inference from effect (or based on causality) would be lost (cease to exist).

इतोऽपि दहनधूमयोः हेतुफलभावाधारणं कर्तुं नैव शक्यते — किम् एकेन ज्ञानेन दहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावधारणं क्रियते, आहोस्वित् प्रतिनियतेन ज्ञानेन ? तद्यदि एकं ज्ञानम् उभयावगाहकं गीयते; तदा ज्ञानस्य अक्षणिकत्वमापद्यते धूमहेतोर्वा ।

For this also it is not possible to determine the relation of cause-effect

@. Should it not be ‘svasvabhāvavyavasthitāḥ’ ?

between fire and smoke – Is the relation of cause-effect between fire and smoke determined by one cognition or by respective cognition (each of fire and smoke). If one cognition is said to grasp both, then either cognition would come to be non-momentary or the cause of smoke.

अथ प्रतिनियतेन ज्ञानेन पूर्वापरवधारणं क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्, धूमावगाहकेन विज्ञानेन तत्सत्तामात्रं प्रद्योत्यते । तत्स्वरूपमात्रपर्यवसायिना तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वं विधीयते तदुक्तम् – “सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता” । सामान्ये धूमास्तित्वमात्रे धूमज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमस्ति ।

If (the relation of) prior and posterior (cause and effect) is (said to be) determined by the respective cognition of each, that is not proper; only its being is manifested by the cognition apprehending smoke. The existence of its nature is asserted by the (cognition) apprehending only its nature. It is said – “In respect of generality, there is the proving of what is already established.” (sāmānye siddhasādhya) cognition of smoke is valid in respect of generality – only the existence of smoke.

“विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः” । विशेषे भेदे दहनेन सह पूर्वापरविकल्पो(ल्पो) अनुगमाभावः व्यापाराभावः । न शक्नोति धूमज्ञानमवगन्तुम् – ‘किमेतद् धूमस्वरूपं दहनात् पूर्वं सह पश्चाद्वा जातम्?’ धूमज्ञानस्य दहनात्मा पिशाचतुल्यतया व्यवस्थितः – यथा धूमज्ञानं पिशाचादिस्वरूपं न विषययति तेन सह पूर्वापरसहभावं न शक्नोति स्थापयितुं धूमस्य; दहनस्यापि धूमज्ञानेन स्वरूपं नावसितम्, तेन सह पूर्वापर सहभावेन धूमज्ञानं धूमस्वरूपं नावगन्तुं शक्नोति ।

‘Viśeṣe’nugamābhāvaḥ’–There is absence of anugama–absence of operation in respect of viśeṣa (particular), bhede (difference, unique points – instant distinct from others), the conception of relation of causality (prior-posterior) with fire. Cognition of smoke cannot know this, viz. “Is this nature of smoke originated before fire or simultaneously with it or after it?” The nature of fire in respect of cognition of smoke has been established as equivalent to ghost (i.e. it can no more be perceived by cognition of smoke than a ghost can)–as cognition does not make the nature of ghost, etc. its object, it cannot establish the priority–posteriority–simultaneity of smoke with it, the nature of fire also is not determined by cognition of smoke; cognition of smoke cannot grasp the nature of smoke as related as prior–posterior–simultaneous with it.

अथ यद्यपि धूमज्ञानं दहनस्य स्वरूपं न विषययति तथापि स्वज्ञानेन दहनस्वरूपं विषयीक्रियते; पिशाचादेस्तु स्वरूपं न केनाप्यवसितम्, तेन सह पूर्वापरभावो नावगम्यते धूमस्य, तदेतदयुक्तम्, दहनज्ञानेनापि दहनास्तित्वमात्रमवसितम्, न तु धूमेन सह पूर्वापरसहविकल्पः । सती सत्ता दहनज्ञानेन

प्रद्योत्यते । सा तु धूमात् किम्–पूर्वं सह पश्चाद्वा चिरोत्पन्ना प्रत्ययोत्पन्ना अनुत्पन्ना वा ? नायं दहनज्ञानव्यापारस्य विषयः अपि तु तत्सत्तामात्रप्रतिबद्धं तदस्तित्वं विदधाति । पिशाचोऽपि स्वज्ञानेनावगतः । कथं ? ज्ञायते, सोऽपि स्वज्ञानावगाहितदेहोऽस्तु–यदि नाम तेन सह धूमज्ञानं पूर्वापरसहभावं न शक्नोति प्रकाशयितुं धूमस्य ।

It may be urged–Though cognition of smoke does not make nature of fire its object, even then the nature of fire is (certainly) cognised by its own cognition, whereas the nature of ghost, etc. is not determined by anything; (so) the relation of cause-effect (casality) of smoke with it is not cognised. This is not proper. Only the existence of fire is determined by the cognition of fire also, but not conception of prior-posterior-simultaneous with smoke. Existence which is real (not conceptual) is manifested by cognition of fire. But “Is it (fire) originated prior to smoke or along with it or after it, is it originated after a long time, or is originated by conceptualising or is it non-originated?”–This is not the object of the operation of the cognition of smoke, but it only asserts its existence as connected with reality alone. Ghost also is cognised by its own cognition. How? It is known, let it also be one whose figure is grasped by its own cognition–if only cognition of smoke is not able to manifest the relation of priority, posteriority, of smoke with it.

इतोऽपि दहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कर्तुम् । धूमज्ञानसत्ताकाले धूमसत्ता न विद्यते ज्वलनज्ञानसत्ताकाले ज्वलनसत्ता न विद्यते । न(ना) विद्यमानस्या(स्य) ग्रहणं नाम, अन्यथाग्राहि(थाऽग्राह्य) केशोण्डुकस्यापि ग्रहणं स्यात् ।

For this reason also, the relation of cause effect between fire and smoke cannot be determined. The smoke does not exist when cognition of smoke is existent, fire does not exist when the cognition of fire is existent. What is non-existent cannot certainly be cognised, otherwise there would be the cognition of keṣonḍuka (woolly mass) also which is uncognisable.

अथ केशोण्डुकस्य सर्वदा सत्ता न विद्यते–न ज्ञानकाले नापि पूर्वम्, दहनादेस्तु पूर्वं सत्ता विद्यते । यदि नाम ‘ज्ञानकाले नासति पूर्वं तु विद्यते’ इति; सुव्याहृतमेतत् ! गृहीतिकाले नास्ति गृहीतेस्तु पूर्वमस्ति, गृहीतिमन्तरेण सुस्थितानि वस्तूनि ! अथ ज्ञानजनकत्वेन पूर्वं विद्यते; तज्जनकत्वं केनाऽवगम्यते, विज्ञानस्य स्वतनुद्योतकत्वेन पर्यवसितेः ? ततश्च पिशाचकल्पौ दहनधूमाकारौ, तयोर्हेतुफलभावावधारणाय न प्रत्यक्षम् ।

It may be urged – The keṣonḍuka (woolly mass) does not exist at all time–neither at the time when there is cognition before, whereas fire, etc are existent

before ("though not at the time of cognition"). If you really want to say, "It is not existed at the time of cognition, but it exists before"—this is well said. 'It is not existent at the time of cognition, it exists before, things are well established without cognition.' It may be urged that it exists before since it is the producer of cognition, (we ask :) By what is its being the producer of cognition cognised, because cognition is determined as manifesting its own person (alone) ? And therefore, the shapes of fire and smoke are like ghosts, add perception is not meant to determine the relation of cause-effect between them.

अथ ज्ञानावलीढतदाकारान्यथानुपपत्त्या तयोः स्वरूपव्यवस्था क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्, आकारो हि प्रागेवापोदितः, न च आकारोर्थयोः प्रतिबन्धोऽवधारितः, तदनवधारणे कथम् आकारोऽर्थं गमयति ? एवं तावदर्थजन्यत्वं न शक्यते ज्ञानस्यावधारयितुम् । नाप्यर्थस्य अर्थजन्यत्वम् । एवं हेतुफलभावानवधारणात् कथं धूमं दृष्ट्वा अनुमिनोति अग्निम् ।

It may be urged – Their essential nature is established as their shapes as comprehended by cognition could not otherwise be accounted for. This is not proper; for shape has already been repudiated and the relation of shape and thing has not been determined; and when this is not determined, how can shape give knowledge of the object. Thus it is not possible to determine that knowledge is produced by the thing, nor that a thing is produced by (another) thing. Thus the relation of cause-effect not having been determined, how can one seeing smoke infer fire ?

[४. विकल्प्य विषयासंभवदर्शनेनानुमानस्य निरासः । ।]

अपि च, आनुमानिकं ज्ञानं किंविषयम् — किं अग्नयादिस्वलक्षणविषयम्, आहोस्विद् वस्तुसू(भू)तसामान्यविषय[म्], [अवस्तुभूतसामान्यविषयं वा], विकल्पविषयम्, स्वांशविषयम्, निर्विषयं वा ?

[4. Dialectical refutation of inference by showing the impossibility of its object.]

Moreover, what is the object of inferential knowledge—is the unique particular, fire, etc. its object or generality which is a real entity, or unreal universal or conceptual construction, or its own part, or is inferential knowledge objectless ?

तद्यदि स्वलक्षणविषयम्; तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदो न प्राप्नोति, स्वलक्षणविषयत्वेन, स्पष्टाकारतानुमानज्ञानस्यापि प्रसज्यते, 'अस्पष्टाभम्' च भवद्भिः प्रतिपद्यते न त्वन्यैः ।

If it has unique particular as its object, then difference of perception and

inference does not obtain; on account of having unique particular as its object, there would be the contingency of inferential cognition also having a lucid character, and it is you not others who regard it as 'non-lucid'.

अन्ये तु वदन्ति — 'स्वलक्षणमेव स्पष्टाकारम्' । यदि नाम प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यं स्वलक्षणं विस्पष्टम् अनुमानग्राह्यम् अविस्पष्टम्, स्वलक्षणस्यैवायं भेदः । एकोऽग्निः प्रत्यक्षजननयोग्यः अन्योऽग्निः अनुमानजननयोग्यः । प्रत्यक्षजननयोग्येऽग्नौ आनुमानिकं ज्ञानं यदि भवति — भवति प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदः कदाचित्, यावता आनुमानिकज्ञानजननयोग्योऽग्निः अन्य एव । अथ स्वलक्षणविषयसाम्याद् अभेदपरिकल्पना प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः; यद्येवम्—गन्धरसादिज्ञानानां स्वलक्षणविषयसाम्यात् सर्वेषामभेदः प्राप्नोति सर्वं गन्धज्ञानं रसज्ञानं वा वक्तव्यम् । अथ स्वलक्षणविषयत्वे सत्यपि अवान्तरभेदविवक्षया गन्धादिज्ञानमपदिश्यते; यद्येवम् — सत्यपि अग्निविषयत्वे प्रत्यक्षानुमानज्ञानयोः अवान्तरभेदविवक्षया प्रत्यक्षानुमानज्ञानव्यपदेशः । अथ करणभेदेन गन्धादिज्ञानानि भिद्यन्ते; तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः करणभेदोपपत्तेः भेदोऽस्तु । एवं च यदुक्तम् — "स्वलक्षणविषयानुमानं भवति" तन्मूढोक्तम्, अग्निप्रपञ्चस्य प्रतिभासनात् ।

Others say, "The unique particular alone has a distinct shape." If unique particular cognised by perception is clear, that cognised by inference is not-clear, this is a difference of the unique particular only (and not of the cognitions). One fire is capable of producing perception, another fire is capable of giving rise to inference. If there arose inferential cognition in respect of fire capable of producing perception, then there might perhaps be difference between perception and inference; as long as fire capable of producing inferential knowledge is quite different. It may be urged that perception and inference are conceived as non-different on amount of sameness of object, viz. unique particular—If this be so, the cognitions of smell, taste, etc would come to be non-different due to sameness of the object, viz. unique particular; all (knowledge) would be knowledge of smell or knowledge of taste. It may be urged that even though (all knowledge) has unique particular as object, it is referred to as 'knowledge of smell, etc', in order to specify out the sub-types (sub varieties). If this is so, even when fire is the object, let knowledge be referred to as perceptual or inferential in order to specify the sub-types (sub varieties). If cognitions of smell, etc are (said to be) different due to the instruments being different, then let there be differences of perception and inference on account of instruments being accountable for. Thus the statement, 'Inference has unique particular as its object' is foolish, because the phenomenon of fire is manifested.

अथ वस्तुभूतसामान्यविषयम्; न, तदभावाद् विज्ञानजनकत्वासंभवाच्च । न च जनकत्वमन्तरेण विषयार्थं उपलभ्यते ।

If it is urged that real universal is its object, (we say) No, since there is absence (non-existence) of it, it cannot possibly be the producer of cognition. A thing is not found to be an object without being the producer (of cognition).

अथ अवस्तुभूतसामान्यविषयम् । तदुक्तम्, — “वैकल्पिकं सामान्यं बुद्ध्युपदर्शितरूपम्”; एतदपि न युक्तम्, अविद्यमानं सामान्यं कथं बुद्धेर्विषयभावं प्रतिपद्यते ? किम्—सत्तामात्रेण, सहोत्पादेन वा, जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन वा ? सर्वस्यासंभवे विषयार्थो भणनीयः । यदि च जनकत्वाद्यभावेऽपि बुद्धौ प्रतिभाति सामान्यम्; तदा रूपादेरपि जनकत्वं न कल्पनीयम् — रूपं विज्ञानमकुर्वत् प्रत्यक्षं स्यात् ।

It may be urged : Unreal universal is its object; it is said, “Universal is conceptual; its form is presented by the intellect.” This also is not proper, how can non-existent universal become the object of the intellect. Can it do so by its mere existence, or on account of co-production, or by impressing the shape of producer ? In the absence of all these, it will have to be pointed out what it means to say that it is the object. If even in the absence of its being producer, etc. universal appears in the intellect, then colour etc. also should not be imagined to be producers—colour without bringing about knowledge would be perceptible.

यदपि “दृश्यविकल्पावर्थाविकीकृत्य तदध्यवसायेन प्रवर्तते” इत्युक्तम् । दृश्यं बाह्यं रूपादिस्वलक्षणम्, विकल्पः (प्यः) बुद्धिसमारोपिताकारः । किं पुनरनयोः एकीकरणम् ? किम् — अभेदेन उत्पादनम्, किं वा अभेदेन अवधारणम्, आहोस्वित् संघटना क्रियते ? तद्यदि अभेदेन उत्पादनम्, सदसतोर्भेदेन उत्पादनं हतत्रपाद्यते नान्यो वक्तुमर्हति । अभेदेनोत्पादने च भावस्याभावप्रसङ्गः, सामान्यस्य वा वस्तुत्वं प्राप्नोति, तद्वस्तुत्वे स्वलक्षणविषयमनुमानम् । प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमानयोर्भेदबीजमन्वेष्टव्यम् ।

As to the statement ‘It proceeds as judgement after having identified, unified the perceived and the conceived objects, — the unified perceived is the external unique particular, colour etc, the conceived is the shape superimposed by intellect. What again is their unification (identification) ? Is it production as non-different, or determination as non-different, or are they brought together ? If it signifies production as non-different, none but one who has smashed all shame can dare to talk of the production of real and unreal as non-different. And if they were produced as non-different, existence would come to be non-existence, or universal would come to be a real, and if it were real, inference would come to have unique particular (which alone is real) as its object. (And then) the sources of the difference of perception and inference would have to be investigated.

अथ एकीकरणम्—एकत्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वं दृश्यविकल्पयोः; तदुक्तं (तदयुक्तम्), किम् एक एव आकारः प्रतिभाति, आहोस्विद् आकारद्वयम् ?

If identification (is said to) signify the cognition as one of the perceived and the conceived, that is not proper. Does only one shape appear, or a couple of shapes ?

तद्यदि एक एव आकारः प्रतिभाति; तर्हि दृश्याकारः, आहोस्विद् विकल्पाकारः ? तद्यदि दृश्याकारः प्रतिभाति; तदा स्वलक्षणविषयमेव अनुमानं प्रसज्यते ।

If only one shape appears, is it the perceived shape perceived, or the shape of conception ? If the perceived shape appears, then inference would come to have only the point-instant (unique particular) as its object.

अथ विकल्पाकारः प्रतिभाति; तस्य सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वेन प्रतिभासाविषयत्वाद्वाप्येतद् वक्तव्यम्स्वलक्षणमेष.....काराव्यतिरिक्ताव्यतिरिक्तो वा ? यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; तदा स्वलक्षणविषयमनुमानं प्राप्तम् । समारोपितं च सामान्यं प्रतीयते इति न वक्तव्यम् । तात्त्विकं च सामान्यं प्रसज्यते ।[दृश्या] तात्त्विकत्वप्रसङ्गो वा । अथ व्यतिरिक्तो विकल्पाकारः; तर्हि न वक्तव्यम्—तदारोपद्वारेण प्रतीयते स्वलक्षणविकल्पाकारान्तरितत्वात् ।

If the conceived shape appears, then due to its being devoid of all reality, or due to its not being an object of apprehension, it would have to be said point-instant.....is it non-different or different from.....? If it be non-different, then inference would come to have unique particular as its object. And it should not be said that superimposed universal is cognised. And universal would come to be real.....or there would be the contingency of the unreality of the perceptible. If the conceived shape is different, then it should not be said that it is apprehended through superimposition, as it is intervened by the point-instant and shape of conception.

अथ घटना क्रियते स्वलक्षणेन सामान्यस्य; तदसत्, सदसतोर्घटनाऽयोगात् । सतोर्घटना दृष्टा यथा चक्षुर्घटयोः ।

If it is urged that universal is conjoined with unique particular, that is not true, because the real and the unreal cannot be joined. (Only) the conjunction of two real is seen, as, for example, of eye and jar.

अथ सामान्यस्वलक्षणाकारद्वयं प्रतीयते; एवं तर्हि अन्योन्यविलक्षणौ सामान्यस्वलक्षणाकारौ प्रतीयते । ततश्च न वक्तव्यम् — “दृश्यविकल्पा(ल्या)वर्थाविकीकृत्य तदध्यवसायेन प्रवर्तते” इति । यदि च विविक्तमाकारद्वयं प्रतिभाति; तदा स्वलक्षणविषयमनुमानं प्रसक्तम् । तद्विषयत्वे मानयोर्भेदकारणं

वक्तव्यम् । सर्वोपाख्याविनिर्मुक्तस्य च सामान्यस्य प्रतीयमानत्वं नोपपद्यते ।

If the couple of shapes of universal and unique particular be apprehended, then the shapes of universal and unique particular which are different from each other should be cognised. And therefore it should not be said – “It proceeds by way of its judgement after having identified the perceived and the conceived objects.” If two distinct shapes appear, then inference would come to have unique particular as its object. And if it be the object, the cause of the difference of the two sources of knowledge would have to be stated. And universal which is devoid of all reality (substantiality) could not possibly be apprehended.

अन्यच्च, धूमोत्पादिते अग्निविज्ञाने अनग्निव्यवच्छेदरूपं सामान्यं प्रतिभातीति व्यपदिश्यते, अजलव्यवच्छेदेन प्रतिभातीति किं नाभ्युपगम्यते ? नाऽजलव्यवच्छेदेन जन्यते, नापि अनग्निव्यवच्छेदेन, तदनुत्पत्तौ प्रतिकर्मनियमानुपपत्तिः ।

Moreover, it is said that universal of the form of exclusion of non-fire appears in the cognition of fire produced by smoke. Why is it not accepted that it appears by way of exclusion of non-water ? It does not arise as excluding non-water, nor as excluding non-fire; if it were not to arise there would be the impossibility of (the sources of knowledge) having their respective objects.

अथ निर्विषयम् आनुमानिकं ज्ञानम्; तदयुक्तम्, स्वांशविषयत्वात् । नहि भवतां पक्षे निरालम्बनं किंचिद् विज्ञानमस्ति, आत्मावगाहकत्वेनोत्पत्तेः । यदि च निरालम्बनं ज्ञानम्; क्व प्रवर्तते निवर्तते वा पुरुषः ? अगतिः स्यात् । अथ दहनेन तदुत्पादितम् इति कृत्वा दहनान्तिकमुपसर्पति; एवं धूमज्ञानोत्पादेऽपि यायात् ।

If inferential knowledge is (said to be) objectless, that is not proper, as it would have its own aspect as its object. In your view, no knowledge is objectless, because it arises as apprehending itself. And if knowledge be objectless, in respect of what would man proceed and from what would man proceed and from what would he desist ? There would be no activity. If it is urged that thinking that it is produced by fire, he moves to the vicinity of the fire, then he would go thus when there is the rise of knowledge of smoke.

अथ स्वांशविषयमनुमानम्; तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः, प्रतीयमानज्ञानस्य स्वलक्षणात्मकत्वात् ।

If it is said that inference has its own aspect as its object, then the difference of perception and inference could not be accounted for, because the

knowledge apprehended is of the nature of unique particular.

[५. ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणस्याशक्यत्वप्रतिपादनम् ।]

अथ ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणं क्रियते; तदप्ययुक्तम्, ज्ञानयोरपि हेतुफलभाववधारणं न शक्यते कर्तुम् — कार्यज्ञानं हि स्वसंवित्पर्यवसितं न ज्ञानान्तरमात्मसात्करोति । तदकरणे ‘केन निव(र्व) त्तितं मम स्वरूपम्’ इत्येतत् कथं वेत्ति, तद्विज्ञानस्य पिशाचतुल्यत्वात् ? तत्र(न्न) ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तराद् भिद्यते । तदभेदे कथं हेतुफलभावः, स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् ?

[5. Showing the impossibility of the determination that two cognitions are related as cause-effect.]

Now, two cognitions are determined as related as cause-effect. This also is not proper, since it is not possible to determine in the case of two cognitions also that they are related as cause-effect-knowledge of effect which results in self-consciousness does not identify with itself another cognition. In the absence of this act, how does it know, ‘By what was my nature brought about’, because cognition different from it is comparable to ghost i.e. unreal ? Therefore, (one) cognition is not different from another cognition. When there is their non-difference, how could there be the relation of cause-effect, because operation on oneself is contradictory ?

[६. प्रसङ्गाद् विज्ञानवादिकृतावयविनिराकरणस्य प्रतिवादः ।]

यापि युक्तिरपदिष्टा—विज्ञानमात्रस्थितावयविनिराकरणपरा वृत्त्यनुपपत्त्यादिरूपा — “ न किल अवयवी एकदेशेन वर्तते, नापि सर्वात्मना । एकदेशवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे हि अवयविनो भेदप्रसंगः । अथ सर्वात्मना वर्तते; तर्हि अन्यत्रावृत्तिप्रसंगः ” इत्यादिका; सापि न युक्तियुक्ता । कथम् ? किम् एकदेशेन अवयवी अभिधीयते, अवयवो वा ? यदि अवयव्यभिधीयते; तदा एकदेशेनैव सर्वत्र वर्तते इति ब्रूमः, स्वकारणान्नियमितस्य तथाभूतस्योत्पत्तेः ।

[6. Incidental refutation of the refutation of ‘whole’ by the vijñānavādin.]

Even the argument which is advanced in order to refute avayavin[@]. Whole located in consciousness alone, and of the form of the impropriety, etc of occurrence, viz. “The whole does not remain by a portion of it, nor in its entirety. For if it is accepted that it remains by a portion, there would be the contingency of the difference of whole. If it remains in its entirety, then there would be the contingency of its not occurring

@. The rexr should be sthīrāvayavi – and not ^osthitāvayava

elsewhere" and so on is not cogent. How ? Does the word 'portion' denote the whole or member ? If the whole is denoted, then we say that it occurs elsewhere only by a portion, because it which is such arises as determined from its own cause.

अथ अवयवोऽभिधीयते तदेकदेशशब्देन; तदा न एकदेशेन अवयवी वर्तते, अवयव[व]स्य अवयवे वृत्त्ययोगात् । भवतु वा अवयवेषु वृत्तेरभावोऽवयविनः, तथापि असत्त्वं न सिद्धयति, तदेहोपलम्भस्य तदस्तित्वविधानपरत्वात् । यथा 'अनुदकः कमण्डलुः' इत्युक्ते सति उदककमण्डलुसम्बन्धाभावः प्रतीयते, न तु कमण्डलोरभावः, तदुदकस्य वा ।

If the expression 'its portion' denotes part, then the whole does not remain by a portion, because a portion cannot occur in a portion. Or let not the whole occur in parts, yet this does not prove that it is non-existent, since apprehension of its body asserts its existence. As when we say 'Waterless gourd', the absence of the relation of water and gourd is cognised, but not the absence of gourd or that of that water.

[७. प्रसङ्गादनुपलब्धिपदार्थस्य विचारः ।]

अथ अवयविन उपलब्धिरेव नास्ति; सा किं दृश्यानुपलब्धिः, आहोस्विद् अदृश्यानुपलब्धिः ? यदि दृश्यानुमानपलब्धिः, सा नोपपद्यते । दृश्यशब्देन किमपदिश्यते ? उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तोऽर्थोऽभिधीयते । उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिश्च प्रत्ययान्तरसाकल्यं स्वभावविशेषश्च । एतच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमनुपलम्भः ? उपलब्धिकारकसाकल्ये सति उपलब्ध्या भवितव्यम्, नानुपलब्ध्या, तत्स्वभावनिबन्धनत्वात्तदुपलब्धिः । उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य यदि अनुपलम्भः, अनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य तर्हि उपलम्भः स्यात्, अनिष्टं चैतत् ।

[7. Incidental examination of the meaning of 'non-apprehension'.]

If it is said that there is not the apprehension itself of whole, is it the non-apprehension of the perceptible or the non-apprehension of the imperceptible? If it (is said to) be the non-apprehension of what is perceptible, that is not proper. What is meant by the word 'perceptible' ? A thing having the characteristic of apprehension (i.e. capable of being apprehended) is denoted. And acquirement of the characteristic of apprehension signifies the entirety of other causal conditions and a particular nature. If this exists, how could there be non-apprehension ? If there is the entire aggregate of the causal factors of apprehension there must be apprehension and not non-apprehension, because its apprehension is based on its nature. If there be the non-apprehension of what has acquired the characteristic of apprehension, then there would be the

apprehension of what has acquired the characteristic of non-apprehension (i.e. what is not capable of being apprehended) and this is not what is desired.

यदि च घटविविक्तभूतलोपलम्भ एव घटस्यानुपलम्भः, तदा भूतलस्याप्युपलम्भो न भवेत्, तस्याप्युपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तत्वात् । अथ उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तमुपलभ्यते भूतलम्; घटस्यापि उपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः । अथ भूतलज्ञाने घटस्वरूपं नावभाति, तेन तस्यानुपलम्भः, घटाभावव्यवहारः क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्; घटावष्टब्धेऽपि भूतले भूतलज्ञाने घटो नावभाति, तत्रापि घटाभावव्यवहारप्रसक्तिः ।

If non-apprehension of jar is only but the apprehension of the ground of the earth without the jar, then there would not be the apprehension of the ground also, as it also has acquired the characteristic of apprehension (i.e. is capable of being apprehended). If it is urged that the ground having acquired the characteristic of apprehension is apprehended, then there would be the contingency of the apprehension of the jar also. If may be urged : The nature of jar does not appear in the cognition of ground, and so there is not its apprehension, and we speak of the absence of jar. This is not proper. The jar does not appear in the cognition of ground in respect of surface of earth supported by jar, so there would be the contingency of the talk of the absence of jar there also.

तथा ज्ञानस्यापि उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य संवेदनं न भवेत् । ततश्च सर्वस्यासंवेदने नानुपलब्धिः, उपलब्धिरेव यतोऽनुपलब्धिः ।

Similarly there would not be the apprehension of knowledge also, which has acquired the characteristic of apprehension. Therefore, there being the non-apprehension of everything there would not be the non-apprehension, as there would be the non-apprehension of non-apprehension itself.

यदि च भूतलाद्युपलब्धिरेव घटानुपलब्धिः, पिशाचादेरपि सैवाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु । भवतु, को दोषः ? पिशाचाभावविनिश्चयः स्यात् । अथ न भवति पिशाचाभावाविनिश्चयः, कुम्भाभावविनिश्चयाभावप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । अथ निरालम्बनज्ञानं दृश्यस्याऽनुपलब्धिः, नहि भवतां पक्षे निरालम्बनज्ञानमस्ति स्वांशपर्यवसितत्वात् ।

And if the apprehension of ground, etc is itself the non-apprehension of jar, then let it only be the non-apprehension of ghost, etc. well, let it be, what wrong is there ? There would be the determination of the absence of ghost. If there be not the determination of the absence of determination of the negation of pitcher. It may be urged that non-apprehension of the perceptible signifies objectless knowledge. (But) there is no objectless knowledge in your view,

because it ends in its own aspect (i.e. it cognises its own aspect).

अथ अहस्यानुपलम्भः अवयव्यनुपलम्भः, सोऽपि तत्सत्तां न व्यावर्तयति, यथा उपलभ्यमानत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपम्, तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमपि वस्तुस्वरूपमेव । यथा कार्यस्य स्वकारणाजनकत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपं तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमपि वस्तुस्वरूपमेव । नहि स्वकारणाजनकत्वे वस्तुस्वरूपमतिवर्तते । तथा अवयव्यपि कार्याजनकत्वेऽपि न स्वरूपं हास्यति, स्वहेतोरेव कार्याजनकात्मकस्योत्पत्तेः ।

If non-apprehension of whole signifies non-apprehension of what is imperceptible, this also does not set aside its existence, just as being apprehended is the nature of a (real) thing, so not being apprehended also is only the nature of a (real) thing. Just as the effect's not being the producer of its own cause is the nature of the thing so not being apprehended is also only (just) the nature of the thing. The nature of a thing does not recede (go away) if it is not producer of its own cause. Similarly, the whole though not the producer of its effect (viz. cognition) will not abandon its nature; because it arises from its own cause itself as of the nature of non-producer of effect.

[८. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य रक्ताक्तत्वप्रसङ्गरूपस्य साधनस्य निरासः ।]

यदपि साधनमन्यदुपदिष्टम्—रक्ताक्तप्रसङ्गरूपम्; तदप्यसत्, रक्ता नाम का अवयविनः ? किं नीलगुणात्मकत्वम्, आहोस्वित् नीलगुणाधिकरणत्वम्, नीलगुणाधिकरणद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं वा, तदविरलदेशोत्पादो वा ?

[8. Refutation of the means of the form of urging the contingency of coloured-non-coloured in the refutation of whole.]

As to the other means taught of the form of the contingency of coloured-non-coloured, that also is not true, what is colouredness of the whole ? Does it mean being of the nature of blue quality (colour), or being the substrate of blue quality, or being cojoined with a substance which is the substrate of blue quality, or production in a place full of it ?

यदि तावन्नीलगुणात्मकत्वं रक्ता; तदयुक्तम्, स्फटिकपटादेरनीलात्मकत्वात् । अथ नीलगुणाधिकरणत्वं रक्ता; साप्यनुपपन्ना, स्फटिकपटादेरवदातरूपयोगित्वात् ।

If colouredness is said to mean being of the nature of blue quality, that is not proper, because crystal white cloth, etc are of the nature of non-blue. If it means being the substrate of blue quality, that also is not proper, because crystal-white cloth, etc are possessed of white colour.

अथ नीलगुणाधिकरणद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं रक्ता; सा स्वयमनभ्युपगता कथमवयविनं व्यावर्तयति ?

अथ परेण इष्टा; यथेष्टा तथाऽविरोधित्वेनाऽभ्युपगता, नहि संयोगावयविनोर्विरोधोऽभ्युपगम्यते परेण यथाकृतकत्वाऽनित्यत्वयोः, साऽविरुद्धा कथमवयविनं विपर्यासयति ? 'रक्ताधिकरणश्च, नास्ति च' इत्यसंगतम् । यथा—नास्ति शब्दः कृतकत्वात्—तादृगेतत् ।

If it means being conjoined with a substance which is the substrate of blue quality, that is not accepted by you yourself so how can it repudiate 'whole' ? If it is urged that is acceptable to the opponent, then as acceptable it is admitted as being non-contradictory; opposition of conjunction and whole is not admitted by the opponent, as that of artificiality and non-eternality (is not admitted); that (colouredness) being non-opposed, how can it repudiate whole ? If it not consistent to say that 'it is the substrate of colouredness' and (at the sametime that) 'it does not exist'. It is (inconsistent) like (saying), 'word does not exist because it is artificial.'

अथ रक्ता नास्ति घटस्य; तथापि असत्त्वं न सिद्धयति । रक्ताभावे तु अभावः कथं भवेत् ? तदभावे विज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गः ।

If it is urged that colouredness does not belong to jar, even then its non-existence is not proved. How could there be non-existence in the absence of colouredness ? In its absence, absence of cognition would be contingent.

अथ एकस्य विरुद्धावेतौ रक्ताऽरक्ताकारौ; केनेष्टौ विरुद्धतया ? नीलद्रव्यसंयोगो हि रक्ता, तदभावोऽरक्ता, तौ च अर्थान्तरभूतौ । न च तयोर्भेदे अवयविनो भेद उपपद्यते, ताभ्यां तस्य भिन्नत्वात् । नच अन्यस्य भेदे अन्यस्य भेद उपपद्यते, विज्ञानभेदप्रसङ्गात् । यदि च रक्ताक्तभेदेन अवयवी भिद्यते तदा अवयविद्वयं स्यात्, नाऽसत्त्वम्, विज्ञानाऽव्यतिरेकित्वं वा ।

It may be urged that the characters of being coloured and non-coloured are contradictory in respect of one, (we ask). By whom are they admitted as being contradictory ? Colouredness is conjunction of blue and substance, and non-colouredness is its negation, they are two different things. It is not proper that the whole should be different if these are different, because it is distinct from these two. It is not proper that one should be different when quite another is different because otherwise different cognition would be contingent. If the whole is different on account of the difference of coloured and non-coloured, then there would be a couple of wholes, but not(its) non-existence, or non-distinctness from consciousness.

अथ अविरलदेशोत्पादो रक्ता नीलद्रव्यपटयोः, तथापि असत्त्वं न सिद्धयति, संस्कृतानां सत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

If colouredness of blue substance and cloth means production in a place full of it, even then its non-existence is not proved, because what are *samskrta* (compounded) are admitted as existent.

[९. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य आवृतानावृतत्वप्रसङ्गस्य खण्डनम् ।]

यच्चान्यत् साधनमुक्तम् — आवृताऽनावृतप्रसङ्गरूपम् — ‘एकस्मिन्नवयवे आवृत्ते आवृतः, अनावृत्ते अनावृतः’ तदेतद्युक्तम् । तद्यदि अवयवावरणे अवयवी आवृतोऽनावृतो अभ्युपगम्यते परैः, तदवयवानामतीन्द्रियत्वेऽपि हि उपलम्भाभ्युपगमात् । न च अवयवानमावृतत्वेऽनावृतत्वे वा अवयवव्यावृत्तोऽनावृतो वा । अपि तु यदा वस्त्राद्यावरणेन देवदत्तेन्द्रियघटसम्बन्धविघातः क्रियते तदा ‘आवृतः’ इत्यपदिश्यते । यस्य तु वस्त्रादिनाऽवरणेन देवदत्तेन्द्रिय-घटसम्बन्धविघातो न क्रियते, तदपेक्षया अनावृतव्यपदेशः । यथा भवत्पक्षे स्वकारणानुत्पादकत्वेन अजनकत्वमभिधीयते, न च स्वरूपभेदमासादयति ॥ छ ॥

[9. Repudiation of the contingency of ‘covered-non-covered’ employed in the refutation of ‘whole’.]

The other means stated of the form of the contingency of (one thing being both) covered and non-covered, viz. ‘When one part is covered it is covered, when a part is uncovered, it is uncovered’—this is not proper. Now if the whole is admitted as covered or uncovered on there being the covering of part, that is due to the recognition of the apprehension (of whole) even when the parts are supersensuous. And the whole is not covered or uncovered according as the parts are covered or uncovered. But it is said to be ‘covered’ when by the covering of cloth, etc the relation of Devdatta’s sense-organ (eye) and jar is cut off. And the expression ‘uncovered’ is used in respect of that (jar) in whose case by the covering such as cloth etc, the relation of Devdatta’s sense-organ (eye) and jar is not cut off. Just as in your view, a thing is said to be non-producer on account of its not producing its own cause [should it not be ‘effect’ ?]; but the thing does not become different in nature.

[१०. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य चलाचलत्वकृतस्य अवयविभेदप्रसङ्गस्य प्रत्यादेशः ।]

यदपि अपरमभिहितम्—चलाचलत्वसाधनम्—“अवयवे चलति चलत्यवयवी, अवयवान्तरे चाऽचलति न चलति — ततश्चलाचलत्वे अवयविनो भेदप्रसङ्गः” तदेतद्युक्तम्, चलनस्य स्वयमनभ्युपगमात् । तदभावे कथं तेन अवयवी भिद्यते ? अथ चलनं विद्यते; तर्हि इदं वक्तव्यम्—स्वविषयलक्षणम्, चलनरूपार्थस्य उत्पत्तेः । अथ परेणैवं चलनम् इति कृत्वा व्यपदिश्यते; सत्यम्, इष्टं

परेण । न तु अवयवे चलति अवयविनश्चलनमिष्टम्, ततो भिन्नत्वात् । नाप्यवयवान्तरस्याचलने अवयविनोऽचलनमिष्यते, तस्यान्यत्वात् । अपि तु चलनयुक्तः चलतीति व्यपदिश्यते । चलनविकलो निष्कम्प इत्यभिधीयते ।

[10. Repudiation of the contingency of different whole due to (the contingency of) mobile-immobile employed in the refutation of whole.]

As to what else is said, viz. the means of mobile-immobile. ‘When the part moves, the whole moves, and as another part does not move it does not move’. So there being mobility-immobility, there would be the contingency of different wholes’ — This is not proper, because you yourself do not admit mobility. In its absence how could the whole be different on account of it ? And if movement (is said to) be there, then it should be said to be of the nature of own object, because an entity of the character of movement is produced.

It may be urged that mobility is discussed (only) because it is acceptable to the other party. True, it is acceptable to the other party. But the mobility of the whole when part is mobile is not admitted, since it is different from it. Nor is the immobility of whole when another part is immobile acceptable because it is different from it (—whole is distinct from the parts). On the contrary, what is possessed of movement is said to move, and what is devoid of movement is said to be unmoving.

अथ तदेव द्रव्यम् उपजातक्रियं चलति अनुपजातक्रियं च न चलति; सत्यम्, तदेव चलति, तदेव न चलति । नत्व(न्व)वयविनो भेदः, प्रसज्यते; न प्रसङ्गः, चलनस्य ततोऽन्यथा (न्यत्वात्) । चलाचलव्यपदेशश्च अन्योपाधिकृतः । यथा भवत्पक्षे ज्ञानं कार्यं कारणं च व्यपदिश्यते — स्वकार्यापेक्षया कारणम्, स्वकारणापेक्षया कार्यम्, न च तस्य भेदोऽस्ति, तथा अवयविचलाचलत्वेन न भेदो दृश्यते ।

It may be urged — The same substance when activity arises in it moves, and when activity does not arise, does not move. True, the very same (thing) moves and does not move. It may be urged that (thus) the difference of whole is contingent. (we say—) This contingency is not there since movement is different from it. (The thing and movement are two different entities). The nomenclature ‘mobile’ and ‘immobile’ is due to another adventitious factor. Just as in your view, knowledge is said to be effect and cause — it is cause in respect of its own effect, and effect in respect of its own cause, but it is not different, so difference is not seen (to be there) due to the mobility or immobility of whole.

[११. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य 'सर्वावयवग्रहणेन' इत्यादिविकल्पजालस्य निरासः ।]

यदप्युक्तम् — “किं सर्वावयवग्रहणेन अवयवी गृह्यते, किं वा कतिपयावयवग्रहणेन गृह्यते ? यदि च सर्वावयवग्रहणेन गृह्यते; तदा मध्यभाग-परभागाऽग्रहणे अवयवग्रहणप्रसंगः। अथ कतिपयाऽवयवग्रहणे अवयविग्रहणमभ्युपगम्यते; तदा कराङ्गिग्रहणे अवयविग्रहणं स्यात्। अथ अवयवग्रहणमन्तरेण अवयविग्रहणम्; तदा सर्वदा ग्रहणं स्यात् ।” तदेतत् सर्वमयुक्तम्; न सर्वावयवग्रहणपूर्वकमवयविग्रहणम्, नापि कतिपयावयवग्रहणपूर्वकमवयविनोग्रहणम्, अपि तु तद्देहेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षालोकादिसाकल्ये सति उपलम्भतु। अन्यथा हि अवयवग्रहणपूर्वके ग्रहणेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने अवयव्यादेरनुपलम्भः स्यात् ।

[11. Refutation of the net of dialectical alternatives
'By the cognition of all parts.....' employed in the
refutation of 'whole'.]

What is said, viz, “Is the whole cognised by the cognition of all parts, or is it cognised by the cognition of some parts ? If it is cognised by the cognition of all parts, then there would be the contingency of the non-cognition of whole when there is the non-cognition of whole when there is the non-cognition of the middle part or the distinct part (—part not on our side). If it is admitted that the whole is cognised when some parts are cognised then there should be the cognition of the whole when the trunk is cognised. If (it is said that) there is cognition of whole without the cognition of parts, then there should be its cognition at all times.” — All this is not proper. The cognition of whole is not preceded by (i.e. based on) cognition of all parts or cognition of some parts; on the contrary there is apprehension when there is the full complement of (causal factors such as) contact of its body and sense-organ, light, etc, otherwise cognition of whole being accepted as based on cognition of parts, there would be the non-apprehension of whole, etc.

[१२. अवयविनिराकरणपरायाः 'यत्र भिन्ने न तद्बुद्धिः' इत्यादि युक्तेः खण्डनम् ।]

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्—अवयविनिराकरणपरं साधनम् —

“यत्र भिन्ने न तद्बुद्धिर्धिया च न सा ।

तद् घटं तु संवृत्तिसत् परमार्थसदन्यथा ॥”

तत्र यदि अवरुणे घटे घटबुद्धिर्न भवति घटस्याऽपरमार्थसत्त्वम्; नीलेऽपि प्रत्यस्तमिते नीलबुद्धिर्न भवति नीलस्याऽस्तमितत्वात् तदा नीलमपि अपरमार्थसत् प्राप्तम् । तथा, विज्ञानमस्तमुपगतं न वेद्यते तदप्यपरमार्थसत् प्राप्नोति ।

[12. Refutation of the argument 'where there is not its
cognition in respect of a different thing etc.'
meant to refute 'whole'.]

As to what else is stated — means meant to refute whole, viz, “Where there is not its cognition in respect of a different thing, and where it is not there by intellect, that jar is empirically real, otherwise it is ultimately real.”— There if cognition of jar does not arise in respect of a broken jar, jar is not ultimately real (its existence is unreal) cognition of blue does not arise in respect of blue that because the blue is faded away; then blue also would come to be unreal. similarly, cognition when faded away is not apprehended, so it also comes to be unreal.

अथ प्राक्तने विज्ञाने नीलान्तरे प्रत्यस्तमिते ज्ञानान्तरं वेद्यते नीलान्तरं च, न तु घटेऽवरुणे घटान्तरं वेद्यते; तत् किम्—उत्पन्नं न वेद्यते, आहोस्विदनुत्पन्नम् ? तद्यदि उत्पन्नं न गृह्यते; तत्रापि हि विज्ञानोत्पादनसमर्थमुत्पन्नं न गृह्यते, तद्विपरीतं वा ?

It may be urged in the previous cognition, when another blue is destroyed, another cognition is apprehended and so also another blue, but another jar is not apprehended when a jar is broken. So (we ask), Is the produced (jar) not apprehended or the unproduced ? If the produced is not (said to be) cognised, there also is the (jar) produced as capable of giving rise to cognition not cognised, to its opposite (i.e. not capable of giving rise to cognition) ?

तद्यदि विज्ञानोत्पादनसमर्थमुत्पन्नं न गृह्यते; तदयुक्तम्, यदि विज्ञानोत्पादनसमर्थमुत्पन्नं घटजातम्, तदवश्यं गृह्यते अन्यथा नीलस्याप्यग्रहणं स्यात् । अथ विज्ञानजनकोत्पन्नस्याग्रहणम्; तदा नीलस्याप्यनया वृत्त्याऽग्रहणे तस्याप्यपरमार्थसत्त्वं स्यात् ।

Now if it is said that it which is originated as capable of giving rise to cognition is not cognised, that is not proper. If the collection of jars is produced as capable of giving rise to cognition, then it is (should be) invariably cognised, otherwise there would be the non-cognition of blue also. If there is the non-cognition of it which is the producer of cognition, then there being in this way the non-cognition of blue also, it also would be unreal.

अथ अनुत्पन्नघटजातं न वेद्यते तेन तस्य अपरमार्थसत्त्वम्; नील-ज्ञाने अपि अनुत्पन्ने न वेद्यते(द्ये)ते तयोरपि अपरमार्थसत्त्वमापद्यते ।

It may be urged that the collection of non-produced jars is not apprehended, and therefore it is unreal. (Reply) Blue and cognition also when unproduced are not apprehended, so they also should come to be unreal.

अथ अवरुणे घटे घटान्तरं न प्रादुर्भवति विज्ञानजनकं कपालावस्थायाम्; यद्येवं निर्विकल्पके रूपज्ञाने नष्टे नान्यन्निरविकल्पकं रूपज्ञानं जायते सविकल्पकावस्थायाम् । तथा, स्थूले नीले नष्टे नान्यत् स्थूलं नीलान्तरं भवति सूक्ष्मनीलोत्पादकाले । अथ तत्र नीलरूपताऽनुगता ज्ञानरूपता वाऽनुगता, यद्येवम् इहापि कपालघटयोः स्वलक्षणरूपताऽनुगता ।

It may be urged : When a jar is broken, another jar producing cognition does not become manifest in the state of potsherds (Reply)—If this is so when the indeterminate knowledge of colour perishes, another indeterminate knowledge of colour does not arise in the determinate state. Similarly, gross blue having perished, another gross blue does not arise at the time of the origination of subtle blue. It may be urged that there the form (character) of blue is persistent (running through), or the form of knowledge is persistent. (we say) If so, here also the form of point-instant (unique particular) is persistent in potsherds and jar.

यदप्युक्तम् — “धिया च न सा — धिया बुद्ध्या विवेच्यमाने न सा घटबुद्धिर्भवति नीलबुद्धिस्तु भवति”; तदेतदुक्तम्, किंभूतया बुद्ध्या विवेच्यते — किं निरालम्बनया, आहोस्वित् सालम्बनया ? तद्यदि निरालम्बनया विवेच्यते; तदा विवेचनीयार्थो वक्तव्यः । यदि च निरालम्बनया विवेच्यमानस्य असत्त्वम्; तदाऽनया रीत्या नीलादेरप्यसत्त्वमापनीपद्यते । न च निरालम्बनमतिरस्ति ।

As to what is said, viz. ‘By intellect it is not there when scrutinised by intellect — reason, that cognition of jar is not there, but cognition of blue is there’— this is not proper. By what kind of intellect is it scrutinised — by intellect which is objectless or by that which has an object ? If it is scrutinised by (intellect) which is objectless, then the thing that is scrutinised will have to be stated. If what is scrutinised by objectless intellect be unreal (non-existent), then in this way, blue, etc. also would come to be unreal. Further there is no intellect which is objectless.

अथ सालम्बनया घटो विवेच्यते; सा किम् आत्मात्मलम्बना, आहोस्वित् स्वकायव्यतिरिक्तालम्बना ? तद्यदि स्वकायालम्बना सती घटस्य विवेचिका; तदा विवेचनीयार्थो वक्तव्यः । यदि नाम स्वकायमात्रावभासा समुत्पन्ना, घटस्याऽसत्त्वे किमायातम् ? अथ तस्यां बुद्धौ घटो[ना]वभाति तेन तस्याऽसत्त्वम्; अनया भङ्ग्या नीलादेरपि असत्त्वमापद्यते ।

If it is said to be scrutinised by intellect which has an object, does it have as its object itself or something different from its own body (constitution) ? If it having its own body as its object, is the scrutiniser of jar, then it will have to be stated what the object scrutinised is (is meant by ‘worthy of being scruti-

nised’). If it arises as illumining its body alone, then what occurs on there being the non-existence of jar ? (What is gained by the non-existence of jar ?) (What comes into prove the unreality of jar ?) If it is urged that jar does not appear in that cognition, and so it is unreal, then in this way there would be the contingency of the unreality of blue, etc also.

अथ स्वकायव्यतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनया घटो विवेच्यते; किं [घटालम्बनया] घटो विवेच्यते, घटव्यतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनया वा ? तद्यदि घटालम्बनया विवेच्यते; तत्रापि विवेचनार्थो वक्तव्यः । तथा किं क्रियते — किं घटस्याऽसत्त्वं प्रद्योत्यते, आहोस्वित् सत्त्वम्, उभयं वा, न किंचिद्वा ? तद्यदि असत्त्वम्; तदयुक्तम्, नहि अन्यविषया सती एतस्य प्रबोधिका भवितुमर्हति अतिप्रसंगात्, न जातु रूपविषयविज्ञान(नं) रसस्थापनाय अलम् ।

If it is urged that jar is scrutinised by (cognition) which has as its object an object other than its own body, (we ask:) Is the jar scrutinised by (cognition) having jar as its basis, or by it having an object other than jar ? If it is (said to be) scrutinised by it having jar as its object, then there also the meaning of scrutiny will have to be stated. What is done by it — Is the non-existence of jar revealed, or its existence or both or nothing ? If unreality, (is said to be revealed by it), that is not proper; having another thing as its object, it does not deserve to be the revealer of this, as this would be extreme absurdity; cognition having colour as its object is not capable of establishing taste.

अथ सत्त्वं प्रद्योत्यते; तथापि सत्त्वम् । स(सं)वृत्तिसत्त्वे वा नीलादेरपि संवृत्तिसत्त्वप्रसंगः । अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; न, तदभावस्य अविषयत्वात् । यथा विज्ञानस्य विषयतां न याति तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम् । किंच, उभयं प्रद्योतयन्त्या भावोऽपि प्रद्योतितस्तथा । तत्प्रद्योतने च कथं घटस्य संवृत्तिसत्त्वम् ?

If reality is revealed, even then there is (its) reality. Or if it be empirical reality, there would be the contingency of the empirical reality of blue, etc also. If both are (said to be revealed), that is not so, since its negation is not the object. How it does not become the object of cognition has already been explained. Moreover, by it revealing both, existence also would be revealed. And when it is revealed, how could there be the empirical reality of jar ?

अथ न किंचिदपि प्रद्योत्यते तथा; कथं तर्हि घटविषया सा अपदिश्यते ? अथ घटभिन्नार्थविषया सा; तत्र वर्तमाना न कुम्भस्य अस्तित्वविधायिका, न व्यावर्त्तिका ।

If nothing whatsoever is (said to be) revealed by it, how then is it said to have jar as its object ? If it has an object other than jar as its object, then (cognition) being present can neither assert the existence of jar nor exclude (deny) it.

अथ तस्यां बुद्धौ कुम्भो न प्रतिभाति तेन तस्य संवृतिसत्त्वम्; यद्येवम् — बुद्धिविषयोऽपि बुद्ध्यन्तरे न प्रतिभाति, तस्याप्यायातं संवृतिसत्त्वम् । सर्वज्ञानानि च इतरेतरज्ञाने न प्रतिभान्ति—सर्वेषां संवृतिसत्त्वं प्राप्तम् । न चैतदभ्युपगम्यते ।

It may be urged that jar does not appear in that cognition, and so it has empirical existence. (We answer :) If this is so, even what is an object of one cognition does not appear in another cognition, so it also would come to be empirically real. And all cognitions do not appear in the other cognitions, so all would come to be empirically real. But this is not admitted (by you)

[१३. विज्ञानवादिना साधितस्य बाह्यार्थविलोपस्य निरासः ।]

यदप्यन्यत्साधनमपदिष्टं बाह्यार्थापह्वे — “न किल विज्ञानमसंविदितम् अर्थस्य वेदनम् । यद्यविदितमर्थवेदनं तदाऽजातेऽपि ज्ञानेऽर्थो वेद्यः स्यात्, सन्तानान्तरज्ञाने च जाते देवदत्तवेद्यः सोऽर्थः स्यात्, न चैतदुपपद्यते । तथा स्वसन्ततिपतिते परोक्षज्ञाने जातेऽर्थो न वेद्यः स्यात् । अथ ज्ञानान्तरविदितमर्थस्य वेदनम्; तदपि ज्ञानान्तरविदितम् इत्यायातमान्ध्र्यं जगतः । अथ स्वसंविदिततदर्थस्य वेदनम्; ततश्च सहोपलम्भाद् एकोपलम्भतो वा बाह्यार्थविलोपः प्राप्तः ।”

[13. Refutation of the extinction of external object achieved by the vijñānavādin.]

As to the other proof (argument) advanced to deny external object, viz. “cognition if it is not apprehended is not the means of apprehension of an object. If it were the means of apprehension of an object without being (itself) apprehended, then the object should become known even when knowledge has not arisen; and when cognition of a different continuum has arisen (i.e. in someone other than Devdatta; that object would be cognised by Devdatta). Similarly, the object would not be cognised when knowledge occurring in one's own continuum has arisen. If it is urged that it (cognition) becomes the means of apprehending the object when it is (itself) apprehended by another cognition, that also should be apprehended by another cognition (in order to be able to cognise the former cognition), and thus there would be the contingency of the blindness of the world (—nothing would be known anywhere at any time). If it is urged that being self-apprehended, it becomes the means of apprehension of the object, then there comes about the repudiation of external object owing to simultaneous apprehension or owing to one apprehension.”

तदेतदयुक्तम् । यत्तावदुक्तम् — ‘ज्ञानान्तरविदितं, यदि ज्ञानम् अर्थस्य वेदनं तदा अनिष्टा प्राप्नोति । एतदनभ्युपगमेनैव पर्युदस्तम् । अपि तु अविदितमेव ज्ञानम् अर्थस्य वेदनम् । ननु अजातेऽपि ज्ञाने अर्थो वेद्यः स्यात्; न वेद्यः, वेदनस्याभावाद् अर्थो न वेद्यते, न तु वेदनवेदनस्याभावादर्थो न वेद्यते ।

This is not proper. As to what is stated, viz. “If cognition being apprehended by another cognition were to be the means of apprehension of an object, there would be infinite series” — This is repudiated by non-acceptance itself (i.e. we do not accept that knowledge can apprehend an object only when it is itself apprehended). On the contrary, knowledge becomes the means of apprehension of an object even when it is unapprehended. It may be urged that (in that case) the object would be apprehended even when knowledge has not arisen. (We answer :) It will not be apprehended; the object is not apprehended in the absence of apprehension, but it is not (true) that the object is not apprehended in the absence of the apprehension of apprehension.

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् — ‘सन्तानान्तरजाते च ज्ञाने सोऽर्थो वेद्यः स्यात्’; तदप्ययुक्तम्, देवदत्तसन्ततिपतिते जाते देवदत्तस्य सोऽर्थोऽपरोक्षः, न तु सन्तानान्तरपतिते ज्ञाने, अन्यथा हि सन्तानान्तरपतितं विज्ञानं स्वसंविदितरूपं जातम् । तस्मिन् जाते सोऽर्थो देवदत्तस्याऽपरोक्षः स्यात् ।

As to what is stated, viz. ‘The object would be cognised when knowledge has arisen in another continuum’ — that also is not proper. When knowledge arises as occurring in the continuum of Devadatta, that object is directly cognised by Devadatta; but not when there is knowledge occurring in another continuum, otherwise, cognition occurring in another continuum would occur as one whose form (character) is self-apprehended. When it arises, that object would be directly cognised by Devadatta.

अपि च, रूपज्ञानं किं रूपगृहीत्यात्मकम्, आहोस्विद् अगृहीत्यात्मकम् ? तद्यदि रूपगृहीत्यात्मकम्; तदा गृहीतमेव रूपं ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यं भवतु स्वसंवेद्यं वा, न ज्ञानग्रहणपुरस्सरमर्थस्य ग्रहणम् ।

Moreover, is cognition of colour of the nature of apprehension of colour, or of the nature of non-apprehension ? If it is of the nature of apprehension of colour, then the colour is already cognised, whether the cognition be apprehended by another cognition, or it be self-apprehended; the cognition of an object is not preceded by the apprehension of the cognition.

अथ रूपगृहीतिस्वभावकं न भवति रूपज्ञानम्; एवं तर्हि स्वसंवेद्यं भवतु व्यतिरिक्तसंवेदकसंवेद्यं वा भवतु अवेद्यं वा, न रूपस्य प्रत्यक्षता, यथा रसज्ञानस्वसंवेद्यत्वेऽपि न रूपस्य प्रत्यक्षता तद्वत् रूपज्ञानसद्भावेऽपि न रूपस्य प्रत्यक्षता रूप गृहीतिस्वभावतयाऽनुपपत्तेः ।

If cognition of colour is not of the nature of apprehension of colour, in that case, whether it be self-apprehended or apprehended by apprehension of a different object or unapprehended (it is certain that) the colour will not be

directly known, just as even when cognition of taste is self-apprehended, colour is not visible, so colour will not be visible even when there is the cognition of colour, because it is not justified as being of the nature of apprehension of colour.

[१४. बाह्यार्थविलोपायोपयुक्तस्य सहोपलम्भसाधनस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम् ।]

यदप्युक्तम्—‘स्वसंवेद्यत्वे सहोपलम्भाद् विज्ञानार्थयोरैक्यम्’ — एतदप्यपनीतं द्रष्टव्यम्, स्वसंवेद्यत्वाऽसंभवादेव । न च सहोपलम्भाद् अर्थस्याऽभावः सिद्धयति अव्यतिरेको वा ।

[14. Dialectical refutation of the argument of simultaneous apprehension employed for the repudiation of external object.]

As to what is stated, viz. ‘In the event of there being self-apprehension, cognition and object would be one on account of simultaneous apprehension.’—this also should be considered as repudiated, even from the impossibility of its being self-apprehended. And neither is the negation (absence) of a thing, nor is its non-difference (from cognition) established on account of simultaneous apprehension.

सहोपलम्भो हि ज्ञानैकधर्मः, अर्थैकधर्मः, उभयधर्मो वा ? तद्यदि ज्ञानैकधर्मः, तदा सहशब्दार्थो नोपपद्यते । ज्ञानैकधर्मत्वे च ज्ञानस्यैवास्तित्वस्थापकं नार्थस्य व्यतिरेकाभावावेदकं सहोपलम्भसाधनम् अतद्धर्मत्वात् । अथ अर्थैकधर्मः सहोपलम्भः, अत्रापि सहशब्दार्थो वक्तव्यः । अर्थैकधर्मत्वे वा अर्थस्यैव सत्तां व्यवस्थापयति, ततश्च विपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धः ।

Is simultaneous apprehension an attribute of knowledge alone, or of object alone or of both ? If it is an attribute of knowledge alone, then the meaning of ‘simultaneous’ is not justified (i.e. it cannot be explained why it is called ‘simultaneous’). And if it is the attribute of knowledge alone, the argument of simultaneous cognition would establish the existence of knowledge alone, but it would not give apprehend knowledge of the absence of distinctness of the object (i.e. would not prove that the object is not different from the knowledge). Since it is not its attribute. If simultaneous cognition is (said to be) the attribute of the object alone, even here the meaning of ‘simultaneous’ will have to be stated. Or, if it is the attribute of object alone, it will establish the reality of the object only, and so it will be contrary (viruddha) (Proof) (and hence fallacious) on account of proving the opposite (of what is intended to be proved).

अथ उभयधर्मः, कथमुभयधर्मत्वे अन्यतरलोपः ? अन्यतरलोपश्चेत् नोभयधर्मता उपपद्यते । ‘उभयधर्मता च अन्यतरलोपश्च’ इति व्याहतमपदिश्यते । उभयधर्मत्वे च ‘अर्थस्यैव विलोपो न ज्ञानस्य’

इत्यत्र नियामकं वक्तव्यम् । तच्च नास्ति । न च उपलम्भोऽन्यतरसद्भावं व्यावर्तयति, सद्भावेऽपि दृष्टत्वात् यथा ज्ञाने ।

If it is an attribute of both, how (possibly) could there be the repudiation of either of the two when it is an attribute of both ? And if there be the extinction of either of the two, it could not justifiably be an attribute of both. ‘Being an attribute of both and extinction of either (one of the two) is a (self) contradictory statement. And if it is an attribute of both, the determining factor here (due to which) ‘there is extinction of object alone and not of cognition’ will have to be stated. But it is not there. And apprehension does not repudiate the existence of one of the two, because it is seen even when it is existent, as in its cognition (even when it is cognised).

अपि च कस्यात्र पक्षीकरणम् — किं विज्ञानस्य, उत अर्थस्य ? तद्यदि ज्ञानं पक्षयसि; तस्य किं साध्यते — अभावः, अव्यतिरेको वा ? तद्यदि अभावः; स किं ज्ञानस्य, उत अर्थस्येति ? यदि ज्ञानस्य तदा अभ्युपेतहानम्, हेतोश्च पक्षधर्मता न लभ्यते । अथ अर्थस्य, तदा असम्बद्धत्वम् — ज्ञानं पक्षयसि अर्थो नास्तीति व्याहतपदिश्यते, सहोपलम्भस्य च व्यधिकरणत्वम् ।

Moreover, what is rendered the subject (minor term of the inference) — Cognition or object ? If you make cognition the subject, what is proved of it ? Negation or non-difference ? If absence, is it the absence of knowledge, or of object ? If, of knowledge that means you renounce what is admitted by it, and the reason would not be found to be an attribute of the subject (of the inference). If, of object, there would be in consistency you make knowledge the subject of the inference and (even then) it is stated that the object does not exist (—Which is contradictory); and simultaneous cognition would have a different substratum.

अथ अव्यतिरेकः साध्यते; स किं ज्ञानस्य, आहोस्विद् अर्थस्य ? तद्यदि अर्थस्य; तदाऽसम्बद्धाभिधातृत्वम् — ज्ञानं पक्षयसि, अर्थस्य चाऽव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं करोसि इति व्याहतमपदिश्यते, अर्थाव्यतिरेको हि अर्थधर्मः ।

If non-difference is (said to be) proved, is it of knowledge or of object ? If it is of the object, then you speak inconsistently — you make knowledge the subject of inference and (yet) establish the non-difference of object. Which is a contradictory statement, since non-difference of object is an attribute of the object.

अथ ज्ञानस्यैव अव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं क्रियते; तर्हि स्वस्मात्स्वरूपादव्यतिरिक्तम्, आहोस्वित् पररूपादव्यतिरिक्तम् ? तद्यदि स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानम्; तदा अविवादेन सम्बोधयितव्याः ।

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193

monstrated with respect to knowledge only, (we
its own nature, or from another's form? Now, if
at form its own nature, then you have to be addressed
at divergent).

व्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं क्रियते; स परात्मा तात्त्विकः, अतात्त्विको वा ? तद्यदि
व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानमपि अतात्त्विकं भवेत् ।

non-difference from another is demonstrated, is that alien self
(other's form) real or unreal? Now, if it is unreal, then knowledge also
which is non-different from it would be unreal.

अथ तात्त्विकः; सोप्यवधारितदेहो वा, अनवधारितदेहो वा ? तद्यदि अवधारितदेहः; स किं
भिन्नाकारतया अवगतः, अभिन्नाकारतया वा ? यदि भिन्नाकारतया अवधारितः; तदा
भिन्नाकारावगाहकविज्ञानदूषितपक्षत्वेन सहोपलम्भहेतोरसिद्धता कालात्ययापदिष्टता वा ।

If it is real, is one whose body is determined, or one whose body is
determined, is it known as having a different shape or as having a non-different
shape? If it is determined as having a different shape, the reason 'simultaneous
apprehension' would be unreal (asiddha) to mistimed (or contradicted –
kālātyayāpadiṣṭa) on account of the subject being rendered faulty (fallacious)
by cognition grasping a different shape (–the subject as an object of cognition
would be quite different from the real entity, so it is either non-existent as a
subject or sublated by true knowledge).

अथ अभिन्नस्वभावतयाऽवधारितः, न तर्हि परमात्मा, 'परात्मा च
अभिन्नस्वभावतयाऽवधारितः' इति च व्याघातः । किंच, अभिन्नस्वभावतया यदि प्रागेवाऽवगाहितः;
तदा किं तत्र सहोपलम्भसाधनेन प्रयोजनम् ? निष्पादितक्रिये कर्मणि साधनं सा [ध ?] नन्यायमतिपतति ।

If it is (said to be) determined as having a non-different character, then
it is not form of another; and 'alien self and one determined as having a non-
different shape' is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, if it is already cognised
as having a non-different character, then what is the use of the means of proof
(reason), viz. Simultaneous apprehension. Once an act has been performed,
the means of achievement goes beyond the way of a means (no longer remains
a means).

अथ अनवधारितदेहः; स परात्माऽस्तीति कथं जानीषे न च अवधारितावधारिताकारयोः एकत्वं
बहुविधो वदन्ति । अनवधारिताकारैकत्वे च ज्ञानस्याप्यसंवेदनं प्रसक्तम् ।

If it is (said to be) one whose body is not determined, how do you know

that it is another's form? The learned (bahuvidah) do not speak of the one-
ness-of that whose shape is determined and that whose shape is not deter-
mined. And if there be oneness with undetermined shape, there would be the
contingency of the non-apprehension of knowledge also.

अपि च सहोपलम्भः किं ज्ञानयोः; उत अर्थयोः, ज्ञानार्थयोः वा ? तद्यदि ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भः;
तदा न द्वितीयस्याभावोऽव्यतिरेको वा सिद्ध्यति, असिद्धश्च हेतुः, दृष्टान्तश्च साधनविकलः—द्विचन्द्रज्ञाने
[न]ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भोस्ति । अथ अर्थयोः; तदाऽसिद्धो हेतुः, न चान्यतरार्थलोपः । लोपे वा
अन्यतरसिद्धौ बाह्यार्थव्यवस्थितिः । अथ ज्ञानार्थयोः सहोपलम्भः; तथापि हेतोरसिद्धता, दृष्टान्तश्च
साधनविकलः ।

Moreover, does the simultaneous apprehension pertain to two cogni-
tions, or to two objects or to cognition and object? If there is simultaneous
apprehension of two cognitions, then neither the negation nor the non-differ-
ence of the second is proved; the probans is unreal and the illustration is
devoid of probans – in the case of the cognition of two moons there is not the
simultaneous apprehension of two cognitions. If it is of two objects, then the
reason is unreal, and there is not the extinction of either of the two objects. Or
if there be extinction, the other of the two being proved, external object is
demonstrated. If there is simultaneous apprehension of cognition and object,
even then the probans is unreal and the illustration devoid of probans.

अथ सहोपलम्भात् इत्यस्यायमर्थः—एकोपलम्भात् । एकोपलम्भेन ज्ञानार्थयोरेकता उपपाद्यते ।

It may be urged : 'Because of simultaneous cognition' signifies because of
one apprehension of one (ekopalambha) due to the apprehension of one, the
oneness of cognition and object is sought to be explained.

ननु एकोपलम्भाद् इत्यस्य कोऽर्थः — किं ज्ञानार्थयोः एक एव उपलम्भः, उत एकस्यैवोपलम्भः,
आहोस्विद् एकेनैव उपलम्भ इति । तद्यदि ज्ञानार्थयोः एक एव उपलम्भ इति, न तर्हि अर्थाभावसिद्धिः ।
संवेद्यमानत्वेन विज्ञानसत्तावद् अर्थसत्ताऽपि सुस्थिता । असिद्धोप्यं हेतुः नीलादावनेकोपलम्भसंभवात् ।
अनैकान्तिकोप्यं हेतुः यस्मादनेकनीललोहिताद्याकाराणाम् एकोपलम्भेऽपि नान्यतमव्यावृत्तिः अभेदो
वा दृष्टः ।

We ask: What is meant by 'because of one apprehension of one? Does
it mean, "only one apprehension of cognition and object", or 'apprehension of
only one', or 'apprehension by only one'? If it means that there is only one
apprehension of cognition and object, then negation of object cannot be
proved. The reality of object also like the reality of cognition remains secure

on account of being apprehended. This probans is unreal also because in the case of blue, etc, there is the possibility of many apprehensions. This reason is inconclusive also, because even when there is one apprehension of a number of shapes, blue, red, etc., there is not seen to be exclusion of one of them or non-difference.

अथ एकस्यैव उपलम्भः एकोपलम्भः; तदेकं किं विज्ञानात्मकम्; आहोस्विद् ज्ञानात्मकम् ? तद्यदि विज्ञानात्मकम्, तदसत् नील-माणिक्य-कुम्भादेर्विज्ञानोत्पादकत्वेन स्वरूपमवधार्यते न तु विज्ञानात्मतया, यस्माद् 'अनेन उत्पादितं विज्ञानम्', 'अत्र ममोत्पन्नम्' इत्येवं प्रवदन्ति सन्तः न तु 'इदमेव ज्ञानम्' इत्येवं वक्तारो भवन्ति । यथा हि वस्तुत्वेन प्रतीयमानं नील-जलादिकम् एकोलम्भानुरोधेन नावस्तुत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते तथा अविज्ञानात्मकतया अध्यवसीयमानं न विज्ञानात्मतया व्यवस्थापयितुं पार्यते, अन्यथा वस्तुत्वहानिप्रसंगात् अथ(था) विज्ञानात्मतया तदेकमवधार्यते तदेष्टसिद्धेरसिद्धिः, सिद्धसाध्यता च स्यात् ।

If 'ekopalambha' means 'apprehension of only one', is that one of the character of knowledge or if the character of non-knowledge[@]. If it is (said to be) of the character of knowledge, that is false, the character of blue, jewel, jar, etc is known as the producer of knowledge, and not as being of the character of knowledge, as good people say[#], 'knowledge was produced by it; 'my (knowledge) arose here (in respect of this)'; but there are not people who say 'This itself is knowledge.' Just as blue water, etc being apprehended as real things, are not known as unreal in accordance with one apprehension, so being determined as of the character of non-cognition cannot possibly be established as of the character of knowledge, otherwise there would be the contingency of the loss (existnction) of reality (-there would be no real object). If that one is determined as being of the character of non-knowledge, then there is (the fault of) asiddhi (inadmissibility) because what is acceptable (to the opponent) is proved, or the (fault of) proving what is already proved.

अथ एकेनैवोपलम्भः; सोप्यमुपपन्न एव, जलचन्द्रादिकः बहुभिरूपलम्भ्यमानत्वात् ॥ छ ॥

If it means, 'apprehension by one only', that also is only improper, because water, moon, sun, etc are apprehended by many.

@. There seems to be a misprint. Should it not be 'ajñānātmakam', instead of jñānātmakam'.

#. Should not the text be 'Pravadantaḥ santi' instead of 'Pravandanti santaḥ' ?

[१५. अवयविनिराकरणद्वारा स्थापितस्य क्षणिकत्वस्योत्थापनम् ।]

यदप्युक्तम् — "अवयविनिराकरणे क्षणिकत्वम् — यदि हि किल अक्षणिको भवति भावः तदा भवति अवयवाऽवयविभावः, तदभावेतत्स्व (तस्याऽ)भावात् । अथ कथं तस्याभावः ? स्थायिनोऽर्थक्रियाऽकरणात् । तदेव कथम् ? कथ्यते किं येन स्वभावेन आद्यामर्थक्रियां करोति किं तेनैव स्वभावेन उत्तरोत्तराण्यपि कार्याणि करोति, अथ समासादितस्वभावान्तरः करोति ? यदि तेनैव करोति; तदा एककालयोगित्वं सर्वकार्याणां प्रसज्यते, क्रमकरणं हीयते तस्य । न ह्येकस्वभावायत्तो वस्तुनां कालविकल्पो नाम । विकल्पे वा एकस्वभावायत्ततामतिक्रामन्ति । अथ स्वभावान्तरापत्तौ जनयति; स्वभावान्तरापत्तिश्च पूर्वाकारपरिहारनान्तरीयकरूपा । तदपरित्यागे न आकारान्तरानुप्रवेशोऽस्ति, आकारयोः एकत्वायोगात् । अथ पूर्वाकारपरिहारः; तदा एतदेव क्षणिकत्वं यत् पूर्वापरकार्यकारणम् ।"

[15. Repudiation of momentariness established through the refutation of 'whole'.]

As to the argument, "If the whole is refuted, there is momentariness — if a thing is verily non-momentary, then there is the relation of 'part-whole', since in its absence there is its absence. It may be asked how there is its absence. (We say) The enduring cannot do an efficient activity. How is it ? We explain—Does it perform the later successive activities by the very character by which it performs the first efficient activity, or does it perform it having assumed another character ? If it performs it by the same (character), then all activities would come to be associated with one time, and its successive performance would be lost. For different time of things (conception of time in the case of things) is not based on one character. Or if there is alternateness they go beyond the dependence on one character. If it is said to give rise (to successive efficient actions) on assuming of another character, (then) assuming of another character is invariably connected with the removal up of previous shape. If it is not renounced, there cannot be the advent of another character, because two shapes cannot be one. If there is the renunciation of the previous shape, then this itself is momentariness, viz; the performance of successive action[@].

तदेतदयुक्तम् । यदि क्रमेण कार्यं न करोति युगपदपि कथं करोति ? एकं नीलस्वलक्षणमनेकं विज्ञाननीलादिकं कार्यं करोति इति वः सिद्धान्तः । तदनेकं कार्यं किम्(किमेके)नाकारेण करोति, आकारभेदेन वा ? तद् यद्येकेन करोति; तदाऽऽयातासर्वकार्याणामेकाकाररूपता एकत्वम्, एकस्य

@. The text should be 'Pūrvāparakārya karaṇam' and not akāraṇam.

चानेकत्वमापद्यते । अथ आकारभेदेनानेकार्थं जनयति, आकारभेदात् तदेकत्वं व्यावर्तते यद्व्यावृत्तौ नैकमनेकं कार्यं करोति ।

This is not proper. If it does not perform activity successively, how could it perform it simultaneously also? Your theory is that one unique particular blue gives rise to a number of effects, cognition, blue, etc. Does it give rise to these numerous effects by means of one shape or by means of different shapes? If it brings them about by one (shape), then there would be the contingency of oneness, the character of having one shape of all the effects, and one would come to be many. If it gives rise to a number of effects by means of different shapes, then its oneness is excluded due to difference of shapes, – in the event of which exclusion, one does not give rise to a number of effects.

अथ इत्थंभूतं स्वहेतुभ्यस्तदुद्गतं यदनेकयुगपत्कार्यकरणात्मकम्; यद्येवं ममापि क्रमभाव्यनेकार्थकरणात्मकं समुद्भूतं स्वहेतुभ्यः ।

It may be urged : “That which is of the nature of being able to give rise to numerous simultaneous effects is produced as such from its own causes.” (we answer:) If this is so, my(thing) also is produced from its own causes as of the nature of being able to give rise to a number of effects simultaneously.

[१६. क्षणिकत्वस्थापनाय प्रयुक्तस्य विनाशहेत्वभावस्य विनाशं विकल्प्य दूषणम् । ।

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् – “विनाशहेत्वभावात् क्षीणको भावः” तदनुपपन्नम्; कथम् ? ते इदं प्रष्टव्याः— विनाशोस्ति वा, न वा ? तद्यदि नास्ति; कस्य सहेतुकत्वं निर्हेतुकत्वं वा विचारयन्ति मनीषिणः। नहि वन्ध्यासुतस्याभावे सहेतुकत्वं निर्हेतुकत्वं वा विचारयन्ति सन्तः ।

[16. Refutation of ‘absence of the cause of destruction’ employed to prove momentariness by positing ‘destruction’.]

As to what else is said, viz. ‘A thing is momentary, because there is the absence of the cause of destruction’, – that is not proper, How? They should be asked, ‘Is there destruction or not? If there is not, what do the wise investigate as having a cause or not having a cause? There are not those who investigate[@] when there is no ‘barren woman’s son’ whether he has a cause or does not have a cause.

अथ विद्यते विनाशः, स वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी वा, विच्छिन्नोत्पन्नो वा ? तद्यदि वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी, न तर्हि निर्हेतुकत्वम्, वस्तुनो वा निर्हेतुकत्वप्रसंगः,

@. [can the text be ‘vicāryaantaḥ Santi’ ?]

सत्स्वभावानुबन्धित्वव्यतिरेकप्रसंगो वा ।

If there is destruction, is it connected with the nature of the thing or is it produced as disconnected? If it is connected with the nature of the thing, then it cannot be causeless, or (otherwise) there would be the contingency of the thing being causeless, or of the absence of connection with the nature of the (existent) thing.

अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; तस्य निर्हेतुकत्वे कोपपत्तिः ? सहेतुकत्वे नियतदेशकालयोगित्वेनोपलब्धिः । यदि नाम निर्हेतुकोविनाशः वस्तूनां क्षणिकत्वे किमायातम्, वस्तुभ्योऽर्थान्तरत्वात् ?

If it is different, what is the justification for its causelessness? It having a cause, there is the apprehension of it as occurring in with a definite place and time. If destruction is verily causeless, how does this help the momentariness of things, since it is different from the things?

[१७. क्षणिकत्वोपयोगिनः विनाशहेतुकत्वस्य विकल्पपञ्चकेन प्रतिवदनम् । ।

“अथ निर्हेतुकत्वे वस्तूत्पत्त्यनन्तरमात्मानं समासादयति विनाशः”; तदयुक्तम् । अत्र पञ्च पक्षा भवन्ति – वस्तूत्पत्तेः पूर्वम्, सह वा, अनन्तरं वा, कालान्तरे वा भवनम्, न वा भवनम् ? तद्यदि पूर्वभवनम्; तदा भावोद्भवानुपपत्तिः । अथ सह; तदा भावानुपलम्भप्रसंगः । तत्सद्भावोपलम्भे वा सततोपलम्भप्रसंगः, अभावस्याऽकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । तथाऽनन्तरभूतेऽपि विनाशे सततोपलम्भप्रसंग एव । अथ कालान्तरे भवनम्; न तर्हि क्षणिकत्वं वस्तूनां विनाशस्य निर्हेतुकत्वे सत्यपि । अथ नैव भवनं विनाशस्य; तदा सर्वभावानां नित्यत्वमापद्यते, विनाशस्याऽसंभवात् ।

[17. Refutation of the causelessness of destruction useful in (proving) momentariness by five-fold positing.]

It may be urged : ‘Being causeless, destruction attains itself immediately after the origination of a thing’. This is not proper. There are five alternatives here : – occurring before the origination of the thing or simultaneously, or immediately after it, or at another time, or not occurring? If there is prior occurrence, then there is not the possibility of the origination of the thing. If simultaneous, then there would be the contingency of the non-apprehension of the thing. Or if its existence is apprehended, there would be the contingency of perpetual apprehension, as negation is ineffectual. Similarly, even if destruction were to occur immediately after, there would be the contingency of perpetual apprehension. If it occurs at another time, then things would not be momentary even if destruction be causeless. If there never is the occurrence of destruction, then all things would come to be eternal, since destruction would not be possible.

अथ सहेतुके विनाशे नावश्यंभावो विनाशस्य, वस्त्रे रागवत् कारणव्यापारपराधीनवृत्तित्वात्, तदभावे तस्याभावः कथं भवेत् ? तदयुक्तम्, स्वहेतोरेव ध्रुवभाविनाशार्हस्योत्पत्तेः । भवतु वाऽभावस्यानुद्गमः न कश्चिद्विरोधः । न तु निर्मोक्षप्रसंगो गुणानां विनाशानुत्पत्तेः, नेदमस्मद्विरोधेषु राजते, मोक्षपरिक्लृप्त्यकरणात् ।

It may be urged : "Destruction having a cause, it need not necessarily colour, since like colour in cloth, it is dependent for its occurrence on the operation of causes; in their absence, how could there be absence of occurrence ?" This is not proper, because it arises out of its own cause as capable of destruction which is sure to occur. Or let there be the non-origination of absence, there is no contradiction. But there would not be the contingency of absence of emancipation, because of the non-origination of the destruction of qualities; this does not shine among the objections against us, because we do not posit emancipation.

अथ कृतकस्य नित्यत्वं प्राप्नोति विनाशासंभवे सति; सावधिका सत्ता अनित्या, निरवधिका तु नित्या, तत्कथं कृतकस्य नित्यत्वं विनाशासंभवे सति ? भवतु वा नित्यत्वम्, न दोषोऽस्ति ।

It may be urged – "If there is not the rise of destruction, then what is artificial would come to be eternal." Existence which has a limit is non-eternal, but that which is devoid of limit is eternal; so how could there be the eternality of what is artificial there (even) when there is not the rise of destruction or let there be eternality; there is no harm.

[१८. प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यत्वेन उपपादितस्य क्षणिकत्वस्य खण्डनम् ।]

यदप्यपदिष्टम् – "प्रत्यक्षेण क्षणिकत्वं वस्तूनां विषयीक्रियते, अतीतानागतकालविकला वस्तुसत्ता वर्तमानकालालिङ्गिता प्रत्यक्षेण आत्मसात्क्रियते" – तदेतदयुक्तम्, अतीतानागतवर्तमानकालानां किं प्रतीयमानादप्यतिरेकित्वम्, व्यतिरेकित्वं वा ? तद्यदि अव्यतिरेकित्वम्; तदा कालत्रयानुमतं वस्तुपलब्धम् । अथ व्यतिरेकित्वम्; वस्त्ववगमे न अतीतानागतवर्तमानकालावगतिरस्ति । वस्तुमात्रोपलब्धेस्तदस्तित्वं सिद्धम्, तदभावश्च निष्प्रमाणकः ।

[18. Refutation of momentariness justified as being grasped by perception .]

As to what is stated : "The momentariness of things is known by perception. The reality of things which is devoid of past and future time and

@ Read 'tasya bhāvah' instead of 'tasyābhāvah'.

characterised by the present time is identified with itself (i.e. cognised) by perception." – This is not proper. Are the past, future and present times non-different from the thing cognised or different ? If they are (said to be) non-different, then thing admitted as present in the three times is cognised. If they are different, on there being the cognition of thing there is not the cognition of past, future and present times. Due to the cognition of the thing alone, its reality is established, its absence is devoid of proof.

अथ स एव भावोऽभावः; भावोऽन्यस्तर्हि वक्तव्यः, अभावस्य सर्वोपाख्याविनिवृत्तिलक्षणकत्वात् । अथ कालान्तरे तस्य अन्योऽभावः; तस्यार्किचित्करत्वात् सत्ताखण्डनं प्रति ।

If it is argued that presence itself is absence, then existence will have to be defined as another (something else) because absence is characterised by absence of all substantiality. If it is argued that another time there is its other, non-existence. (we say)@ (this is not proper) because it would be ineffectual in respect of the refutation of reality.

अथापरकार्याकर्तृत्वं कालान्तरे तदभावः; तदयुक्तम्, सर्वापरकार्यकर्तृत्वमेकस्य प्रत्यक्षात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन च पूर्वोदितानुभवावेदिता सत्ता आत्मसात्क्रियते सैव सत्ता प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन आत्मसात्क्रियते । कथं पुनर्वेत्सीति चेत्; प्रत्यभिज्ञानादेव जानीमः । सैव सत्ता प्रतिभाति । आद्यानुभवेपि सा सत्ता प्रतिभाति । कुतोऽवगता ? एवं ज्ञानयोरपि हेतुफलभाववधारणं न शक्यते कर्तुम्, तदभावान्न कार्यानुमानम् ॥ छ ॥

If its absence signifies inefficiency in respect of another effect, that is not proper. Reality apprehended by an apprehension previously arisen and signifying efficiency in respect of all other effects is cognised by perception and recognition; that same reality is cognised by recognition. If you say, "But how do you know ?" (we say), 'we know from recognition only'. That very same reality appears. In the previous apprehension also that reality appears. Whence is it known ? Thus it is not possible to determine the relation of cause and effect between two knowledges. In its absence there cannot be inference from causality.

[१९. बौद्धसंमतस्य स्वभावानुमानस्य निरासः ।]

तथा स्वभावानुमानस्यापि न सम्बन्धावधारणमुपपद्यते, तदभावात् । भिन्नयोः सम्बन्ध(द्ध)योः सम्बन्धो दृष्टः, नह्येकस्य सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते ।

@. Should not there be 'tad ayuktam' here ?

[19. Refutation of inference based on identity that is admitted by the Buddhists.]

It is not justifiable to determine relation in the case of inference based on identity, because of its absence. Relation is seen between two different things that are connected; there cannot be relation of one.

किंच, कृतकत्वेन अनित्यत्वानुमानं क्रियते—किमवगतेन, अनवगतेन वा ? तद्यदि अनवगतेन, तत्कथं स्वयमनु(मनव)—गतं साधनं भवितुमर्हति ? अथावगतेन; तस्यां कृतकत्वावगतौ अनित्यत्वं प्रतिभाति वा, न वा ? यदि न प्रतिभाति; कथं प्रतिभासमानाऽप्रतिभासमानयोस्तादात्म्यम् ? अथ प्रतिभाति; किमनुमानेन ? निष्पादितक्रिये कर्मणि साधनानार्थक्यम्, अन्यथा हि कृतकत्वप्रतिपत्तावपि अनुमानमुपादेयं स्यात् ।

Moreover, non-eternality is inferred from artificiality. (Is it inferred from artificiality) which is known or not known ? If from it that is not known, (we say) how can that which is itself unknown be a means (of proof) ? If from it that is not known, (we ask) is non-eternality manifest or not in the cognition of artificiality ? If it does not appear, how could there be identity between what appears and what does not appear. If it appears, what is the need for inference ? Means are useless in respect of an action that is already accomplished, otherwise inference would have to be admitted even in the apprehension of artificiality.

अथ कृतकत्वं प्रतिपन्नमिति कृत्वा नानुमानमुपादीयते; तत्स्वभावानुबन्ध्यनित्यत्वमप्यवगतम्, किमनुमानेन ? अवगते च अनित्यत्वे यत् साधनमुपादीयते तत् कदाचिदनित्यताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्, कदाचिच्च नित्यतासमारोपव्यवच्छेदार्थम्, कदाचित्त्व(त्वं) नित्यताव्यवहारार्थम् ?

If you say that inference is not resorted to thinking that artificiality is (already) apprehended, (we say that) non-eternality also which is connected with its nature is known, so what is the use of inference ? And non-eternality being known, the means that is resorted to is at times for the apprehension of non-eternality, is it at times for the exclusion, extermination of the superimposition (wrong cognition) of eternality, but sometimes for the sake of the expression 'non-eternality'.

तद्यदि अनित्यताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्; सा ज्ञातैव, व्यर्थः प्रयासः ।

Now if it is for the apprehension of non-eternality, it is already known, so the effort is meaningless.

अथ समारोपव्यवच्छेदार्थम्; समारोपव्यवच्छेदः अनित्यत्वादव्यतिरिक्तः, व्यतिरिक्तो वा ? तद्यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; असावपि अनित्यत्वावगमेनैवावगतत्वान्न साधनान्तरमपेक्षते ।

If it is for the exclusion of superimposition, is the extermination of superimposition non-distinct from non-eternality or different ? Now, if it is non-different, then it also being cognised by the cognition of non-eternality only, does not require any other means.

अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; स किं वस्तुभूतः, अवस्तुभूतो वा ? तद्यदि वस्तुभूतः; तेन सह शब्दगतकृतकत्वस्य तादात्म्यानुपपत्तिः । तादात्म्ये वा तदवगमेनैवावगमात् नानुमानमपेक्षते ।

If it is distinct, is it real or unreal ? If it is real, identity of it with artificiality present in word would not be justifiable. Or, if it be identical, then it is cognised by its cognition and so does not require inference.

अथ अवस्तुभूतः, स किं क्रियते, ज्ञाप्यते वा ? तद्यदि क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्, सर्वोपाख्याविनिर्मुक्तस्य करणायोगात्, करणे वा वस्तुत्वप्रसंगः । अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तदयुक्तम्, तेन सह कृतकत्वस्य सम्बन्धव्यतिरेकात्, अव्यतिरेके वा तस्य वस्तुत्वं कृतकत्वासत्त्वं वा ।

If it is unreal, is it brought about or made known ? Now if it is (said to be) brought about, that is not proper, since what is devoid of all name cannot possibly be brought about, and in the event of its being brought about there would be the contingency of reality (its being real). If it is (said to be) made known, (that is not proper), because there is the absence of relation of artificiality with it, or if it (relation) is not absent, either it would be real or artificiality would be non-existent.

अथ अनित्यताव्यवहारः क्रियते — यो हि कृतकत्वं जानन्नपि अनित्यताव्यवहारं न करोति स हि अत्र व्यवहार्यते; सोऽपि व्यवहारः अनित्यत्वादव्यतिरिक्तः, व्यतिरिक्तो वा ? यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; असावपि प्रतिपन्न एवानुमानिकः ।

It may be argued : — the verbal expression of 'non-eternality' is brought about; one who even though knowing artificiality does not make a reference to 'non-eternality', is here made to speak of it. (we ask :) Is this expression also non-different from non-eternality or different from it ? If it is non-different, then it also even as known is inferential (i.e. is known by inference).

अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; स किं कृतकत्वेन उत्पाद्यते, ज्ञाप्यते वा ? यदि उत्पाद्यते; तदा न शब्दोत्पादकहेतूनामनुमानत्वम् ।

If it is different, is it brought about by artificiality or made known by it ? If it is brought about, then the causes bringing about word are not inference.

अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽभिधेयः । न तादात्म्यलक्षणः, ज्ञाप्याद् भिन्नत्वात् ।

If it is made known, then the relation with it should be to be stated. It is not of the nature of identify, because of being different from what is made known.

अथ तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणः, सोप्यनुपपन्न एव किं व्यवहारेण उत्पाद्यते घटः, घटेन वा उत्पाद्यते व्यवहारः ? न तावद् व्यवहारेण उत्पाद्यते घटः; आदौ घटसत्ता तदनुव्यवहारः । अथ घटेनोत्पाद्यते व्यवहारः, तदा करणानुमानम्, न स्वभावानुमानम् । तच्च स्वयमेव पर्युदस्तम् ॥ छ ॥

If it is of the nature of origination from it, that also is not possible – is jar produced by verbal expression or is verbal expression brought about by jar ? Now jar is not brought about by verbal expression; there is at the outset the existence of jar, and then the verbal expression (for it). If verbal expression is (said to be) brought about by jar, then it is inference based on causality and not inference based on identify. And that is itself repudiated.

[१०. षड्विधार्थात्तिप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः । ।

एवमर्थापत्त्यादीनामप्यप्रामाण्यम् । किं पुनः अर्थापत्त्यादेः स्वरूपम् ? कथं वा प्रामाण्यम् ? तत्र दर्शनार्थापत्तेस्तावत् स्वरूपं व्युत्पाद्यते—रूपदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्त्या चक्षुःप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा, अनुमानपूर्विका—अनुमानादग्नित्वप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या — अग्निव्यक्तिप्रतिपत्तिः । अभावपूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः जीवति देवदत्तः गेहे नास्ति—गेहाभावान्यथानुपपत्त्या बहिर्भावप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा, आगमपूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः — शब्दार्थप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या शब्दार्थसम्बन्धनित्यताप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा अर्थापत्तिपूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः — शब्दार्थसम्बन्धनित्याप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा, उपमानपूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः — गवयपिण्डग्रहणानन्तरं गेहावस्थितगोपिण्डे गोगवयसादृश्यावच्छिन्ने प्रतिपत्तिरूपमानात् पिण्डावच्छिन्ने वा सादृश्ये, तस्य पिण्डस्य बाह्यदोहप्रसवसामर्थ्यम् अर्थापत्त्या प्रत्येति । एषा षट्प्रकाराऽर्थापत्तिः ।

[10. Refutation of the validity of the six-fold arthāpatti (implication or presumption).]

Similarly, there is the non-validity of arthāpatti, (presumption, implication) etc. also. What again, is the nature of arthāpatti, etc. or how is there (their) validity ? There, we explain the nature of arthāpatti based on perception (darśanāarthāpatti) is being explained the perception of colour not being otherwise justifiable, there is the apprehension of eye. (by arthāpatti). Similarly, the one preceded by inference—the apprehension of fireness by inference not being otherwise justifiable, there is the apprehension of fire-individual (as the substrate of fire universal) (by arthāpatti). Arthāpatti based on by absence—Devadatta is alive, he is not in the house—absence in the house not being otherwise justifiable, there is the apprehension of (his) presence outside. Similarly,

arthāpatti based on verbal testimony – the apprehension of the meaning of word not being otherwise justifiable, there is apprehension of the eternality of word and meaning. So (also) arthāpatti preceded by arthāpatti – the apprehension of the eternality of the relation of word and meaning[@]. So (also) arthāpatti preceded by upamāna (analogy, comparison)—after the cognition of the entity – gayal, there is apprehension through analogy in respect of the body of the cow (entity cow) present in the house and limited by similarity of cow and gayal, or in respect of similarity limited by the body of the cow (entity, cow); one knows the capability in respect of carrying, milking; and giving birth in respect of the body (entity) by means of arthāpatti. This is six-fold arthāpatti.

इयं चानुपपन्ना । यदुक्तम् — ‘रूपदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्त्या चक्षुरिन्द्रियं प्रतीयते’ । तदयुक्तम् । चक्षुरिन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकसम्बन्धावधारणमन्तरेण अन्यकारणपरिहारेण नियतकारणप्रतिपत्तिः अर्थापत्त्याऽनुपपन्ना — चक्षुरादिकरणस्य पिशाचादितुल्यत्वात् न तदवगतिः, अवगतौ वा अर्थापत्त्यनुपपत्तिः ।

And this (arthāpatti), is not justifiable. As to what is said, viz. ‘Perception of colour not being otherwise justifiable, the sense-organ eye is apprehended, that is not possible. Without the determination of the relation (both) positive and negative with the sense-organ, eye, the apprehension of a specific cause to the exclusion of other causes, by means of arthāpatti is not justifiable – the sense-organs, eye, etc. being comparable to ghosts, etc, there cannot be their apprehension, or if there be its apprehension, arthāpatti is not justifiable.

#यदयुक्तम् — ‘अन्यथोपपद्यते’ इति । अत्र काऽनुमा ? अथवा रूपादिज्ञानस्यैव धर्मित्वं करणपूर्वकमिति साध्यो धर्मः कार्यत्वात् रथादिवत् ।

As to what is said, viz. “It is justifiable otherwise’, (we ask) what is the inference here ? Or, knowledge of colour, etc itself is subject (qualified thing); that it is preceded by sense-organ is the attribute that is to be proved, because of being made, like chariot, etc.

एवं सर्वार्थापत्तिविषयत्वेन प्रयोगप्युत्पादनं कार्यम् । प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वाच्च अर्थापत्तेः तदभावे तदभावात् ॥ छ ॥

Thus the exposition of the argument with reference to all arthāpatti should be done. And arthāpatti being preceded by (i.e. based on) perception,

@. Is the text correct here ?

#. Is something missing here ?

on there being the absence of that (perception) there would be its absence (tad-abhāvaḥ).[#]

[११. उपमानप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः ।]

तथा, उपमानमपि संभवति काननगतगवयपिण्डदर्शनान्तरं गेहावस्थितगोपिण्डे गवयसादृश्यावच्छेदेन यद्विज्ञानं तद् उपमानाफलम् । गोपण्डावच्छिन्ने सादृश्ये वा यद् विज्ञानं तद्वा उपमानफलं गवयपिण्डज्ञानमुत्पादनम् । तदेतदयुक्तम्, प्रत्यक्षमूलमुपमानम्, तदपगमे तस्याप्यपगमात् ।

[11. Refutation of the validity of Upamāna (comparison).]

Similarly “Upamāna is possible, after the perception of the body of the gayal (gayal-entity) present in the forest, then knowledge (that arises) in respect of the body of the cow (cow entity) present in the house as limited by similarity with the gayal, that is the result of upamāna. Or the knowledge (that arises) in respect of similarity limited by body of the cow, that is the result of upamāna; and the knowledge of the body of gayal (gayal-entity) is the means of its production.” – This is not possible. Upamāna is based on perception and that receding it also would recede.

अथ किमिदं गोगवयसादृश्यं यद् गोपिण्डग्रहणकाले नावगतम् उपमानादवगम्यते ? किम् अवयवानां संस्थानम्, किं वा विषाणाद्यवयवा वा, सामान्यं वा, अथ धर्मान्तरम् ? तद्यदि अवयवानां संस्थानं सादृश्यम्; तदुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तं वा, न वा ? तद्यदि उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तम्; अवगतं तर्हि । अवगातपूर्वं यद् भवति गवयपिण्डदर्शनान्तरं तत् स्मरणान्नातिरिच्यते ।

Now, what is this similarity of cow and gayal, which not being apprehended at the time of the cognition of cow-entity is apprehended through upamāna ? Is it the arrangement (configuration) of the limbs (parts) or the limbs, horns, etc. or generality, or another entity ? Now if resemblance is the arrangement of the limbs, is it capable of being apprehended or not ? (Is it characterised by apprehension or not ?) If it is characterised by apprehension, then it is known. If it has been apprehended before then (arising) after the perception of the gayal-entity (gayal-individual), it would not be anything more than memory (it would be just memory).

अथ उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तमपि नोपलभ्यते; तदा गवयपिण्डेऽपि तस्य ग्रहणं नास्ति । तदग्रहणे पिण्डमात्रग्रहणे सति भवति ‘मदीया गौः अनेन सदृशी’ इति तदास्व(श्च)विषयमपि स्यात् ‘मदीयोऽनेन सदृशः’ इति ।

[#]. ‘tad-abhāvāt’ seems to be wrong or something is missing after ‘arthāpatteh’.

If it is said that even though characterised by apprehension (capable of being apprehended) it is not apprehended, then there is not (would not be) its cognition even in respect of the gayal-individual (body of gayal). If (even) when it is not cognised, individual on there being the knowledge of the individual alone there is (the knowledge), “My cow is similar to it”, then there could be the knowledge ‘Mine is similar to it (My horse is similar to gayal) even in respect of a horse.’

अथ अनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तम्; तर्हि तस्य क्वचिदपि ग्रहणम्, ततश्च महिष्यादिदर्शनेऽपि ‘मदीया गौरनेन सदृशी, अश्वो वा मदीयोऽनेन सदृशः’ इत्यु[प]प्लवः स्यात् ।

If it is characterised by non-apprehension, then there would never be its apprehension, then even on there being the perception of buffalo, etc there would be the upsetting (travesty of knowledge) viz. ‘My cow is similar to this’, or ‘My horse is similar to this.’

अथ विषाणाद्यवयवाः सादृश्यशब्दवाच्याः; ते च अवगता एव तेषु यद्भवति उत्तरकालं विज्ञानं न[@] तत् स्मृतिरूपतामतिपतति ।

If the limbs, horns, etc. are denoted by the word ‘similarity’, they are certainly cognised, so the knowledge that arises with respect to them later on does not go beyond (i.e. is of) the nature of memory.

अथ गोगवयसामान्यं सादृश्यशब्दवाच्यम्; तच्चानुपपन्नम्, यथा च न संभवति तथा प्रागेव आवेदितम् । भवतु नाम, किं तदुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तं वा — पूर्ववद्विभज्य दूषणं वक्तव्यम् ।

And, if the universal cow and gayal is denoted by the word ‘similarity’, that is not proper; it has already been shown how it is not possible. Or let it, is it characterised by apprehension or – the dialectical refutation should be stated as before.

अथ धर्मान्तरम्; तदपि ऐन्द्रियकम्, अतीन्द्रियं वा ? तद्यदि ऐन्द्रियकम्; तदा तस्य पूर्वोपलम्भे सति उत्तरकालभावि यत् तस्य विज्ञानं न तत् स्मरणाकारतां परित्यजति ।

If it is another entity, is it also sensuous or super-sensuous ? Now, if it is sensuous, then there being its previous apprehension, its knowledge that arises later on does not abandon the shape of memory (i.e. is of the nature of memory).

अथ तदुपलब्धिलक्षण(म)प्राप्तम्; न तर्हि तस्य क्वचिदपि ग्रहणम् । तदग्रहणे न गवयदर्शने सति

[@]. There should be ‘na’ after ‘Vijñānam’.

‘मदीया गौरनेन सदृशी’ इत्यादिज्ञानेन शक्यते भवितुम् । भवने वा गवय(या)दर्शनेऽपि स्यात् ।

If it is not characterised by apprehension, then it would never be cognised. If it is not cognised, there cannot be the knowledge[#], ‘My cow is similar to this’, and so on, when there is the perception of gayal. And if it were to arise, it would arise even when the gayal is not perceived.

[१. नैयायिकसंमतस्य उपमानस्वरूपस्य खण्डनम् ।]

अन्ये तु अन्यथा उपमानं व्याचक्षते विपश्चितः— “गोगवयसादृश्यं स्वज्ञानविशिष्टमुपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिः उपमानफलम् । ” एतच्चाऽसमीचीनम् । प्रागेव वनेचरवचनादवगतं गोसदृशो गवय इति । कोऽर्थः ? गोसदृशस्य गवय इति नाम । एवं च सर्वमेव संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धावधारणं कृतम्, नोपमानं कल्पनीयम् ।

[1. Refutation of the nature of Upamāna as admitted by the Naiyāyikas.]

Whereas, other learned men expound upamāna (analogy) differently – “Similarity of cow and gayal, qualified by its own knowledge is the upamāna (means of upamiti); the apprehension of the relation of name and thing named is the result of upamāna. (i.e. is the upamiti)”— And this is not good. If has already been apprehended from the words of the forester that the gayal is similar to cow. What is meant ? The name ‘gayal’ belongs to (i.e. is given to) (an entity) similar to cow. And in this way, all determination of the relation of name and thing named is accomplished, and upamāna need not be imagined.

अथ संप्लवन्यायेन कल्प्यते; भवतु, तथापि संज्ञी विद्यते संज्ञा तु न विद्यते । द्वेपमानं परिकल्प्येत ?

If it is imagined according to the rule of samplava (i.e. one and the same thing cannot be the object of more than one means of cognition). Let it be, even then the thing named exists, but the name does not exist ? Where (i.e. in respect of what) would upamāna be imagined ?

[२. संज्ञाप्रतिपत्तिविषयकमतद्वयस्य निरासः ।]

एके वदन्ति — “स्वयमुच्चार्य संज्ञा प्रत्येति । ” तदयुक्तम्, संज्ञाकाले सादृश्यज्ञानस्य अनवस्थितेः ।

Some say, ‘Name apprehends name after having itself been uttered it’ –

#. The text should be ityādi jñānam na ‘and not ityādijñānena’.

this is not proper, because the knowledge of similarity is not present at the time of name (naming).

अन्ये तु — “बुद्ध्युपस्थापिता संज्ञा प्रत्येति” एवमामनन्ति । तदयुक्तम् । ‘अविद्यमानस्य विषयार्थता न लभ्यते — न सत्तामात्रेण जनकत्वेन वा’ इत्यादिना प्रागेव उपपादितम् । प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं च उपमानमुद्गीयते । तदभावे तत्कथं भवेदव्यभिचारः येन विज्ञानोत्पादकत्वेन उपमानता, तच्चाप्यभिचारित्वं न शक्यं (कथं) विज्ञानमिति पूर्वमेवावेदितम् ॥ छ ॥

Whereas others hold that ‘name projected (constructed) by the intellect apprehends’. This is not proper. It has already been shown that ‘being an object does not obtain in the case of what is non-existent –’ not by mere-existence, nor by being the producer’, and so on. And upamāna is said to be preceded by (based on) perception : And in its absence how could it be non-incompatibility, so that as giving rise to cognition it could be upamāna, and that this non-incompatibility is not capable of being known has already been shown.

[१२. अभावप्रमाणस्य निरासः ।]

अपरे तु अभावाख्यं प्रमाणं सदुपलम्भकप्रमाणपञ्चकव्यावृत्तिरूपं व्याहरन्ति अभावविषयम् । तत्किमवगतम्, अनवगतं वा ? यदि अवगतम्; तत्केनावगतम् — किं मेयव्यावृत्त्या, मानव्यावृत्त्या वा, सदुपलम्भकेन वा ? तद्यदि मेयव्यावृत्त्या; तद्गतिः कथम् ? अथ मानव्यावृत्त्या; तदा इतरेतराश्रयत्वं दुरुत्तरमापद्यते ।

[12. Refutation of the means of proof, ‘Negation’.]

Whereas others say that the means of proof called ‘negation’ is of the nature of exclusion of the group of five means of proof cognising existent things, and has negation as its object. Is it known or not known ? If it is known, by means of what is it known—by the exclusion of the cognisable, or by the exclusion of the means of knowledge or by what cognises existence ? If by the exclusion of the knowable, how is there its procedure ? If by the exclusion of the means of knowledge, then there is the contingency of mutual dependence which is unanswerable.

अथ स मानव्यावृत्त्या अवधार्यते; सैव ज्ञातुमारब्धा कथं ज्ञापिका भवति ? न च एका ज्ञाप्या अन्या ज्ञापिका भवति सदुपलम्भकप्रमाणमात्रापगमस्य ज्ञापकत्वेनेष्टत्वाद् अनिष्टादोषप्रसंगाच्च—सापि ज्ञापिका कथं ज्ञाता इत्यादिना ।

If it is said to be determined by the exclusion of the means of proof (the text could be sa mānavyāvṛtṭyā), then it (exclusion) is itself beginning to be

known, how could be it be one making known? And one cannot be one that is made known, and another that which makes known, because the refutation of each and every means of proof cognising positive existence is desired as being that which makes known; and because there is the contingency of the fault of infinite series—how is even that which makes known, known and so on?

अथ सदुपलम्भकेन अवगम्यते; हीयते तर्हि अभावाख्यं प्रमाणम्, मेयाभावावगमेऽपि तदेवाऽस्तु।

If it is known by what cognises positive existence, then the means of proof called abhāva is lost (decreased from the list), since let it only be there even in respect of the apprehension of the absence of the cognisable.

अथ अनवगतमेव मेयाभावेऽनुगमं करोति; यद्येवं देवदत्तस्य देशान्तरे विनाशे जाते देवदत्तोपलम्भप्रमाणपञ्चकव्यावृत्तौ देवदत्ताभावनिश्चयः स्यात्, न तु भवति प्रभुसमानस्यापि। अथ वस्तुभूतनिमित्तान्तरवैकल्ये सति न भवति; तदेवास्तु तन्त्रान्तरीयत्वात् तद्गतेः।

If it said that even as unknown it brings about apprehension in respect of the negation of the cognisable, (we answer :) If this is so, on there being the death of Devdatta in foreign country, there being the exclusion of the group of five means of knowledge cognising Devdatta, there should be the determination of the absence of Devdatta, but it does not arise in the case of one who is like a God. If it is said that it does not arise on there being (i.e. if there is) the default of other causal factors that are real, then let it be (means of knowledge.) because its cognition is concomitant with it.

अभावस्य च प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणग्राह्यतां प्रतिपादयन्ति नैयायिकाः। सम्बन्धश्च विषयविषयीभावलक्षणः विशेषणविशेष्यभावलक्षणो वा।

And Naiyāyikas propound that negation can be cognised by the means of proof (called) perception. And relation can be of the nature of object-subject or qualification-qualified.

[१३. संभवैतिह्यप्रमाणयोर्निरासः ।]

संभवस्य अनुमानेऽन्तरीभावसम्बन्धैक निमित्तमर्दने (?) सति अर्थान्तरे प्रतिपत्तिरनुमानम् ॥छ॥

[13. Refutation of the means of proof – Sambhava (inclusion) and Aitihya (tradition)]

@Sambhava (inclusion) can be included (brought under) inference.

@. The text is corrupt : should it not be “sambhavasya anumāne’.....ntarabhāvāh; Sambandhaika nimitta darśane sati.....”

There being the perception of one of the instrumental factors of relation, apprehension in respect of another object is inference.

ऐतिह्यस्य चागमे अन्तर्भावः। तस्य च प्रामाण्यं न संभवति, नानुमानान्तर्गतस्य नापि स्वतन्त्रस्य।

And Aitihya (tradition) is included in verbal testimony (āgama). And its validity is not possible, neither as included in inference nor independently.

[१४. शब्दप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः ।]

[१. वाचकत्वेन शब्दप्रामाण्यं स्वीकृत्वतां मतस्योद्दलनम् ।]

एके वदन्ति – “वाचकत्वेन गोशब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम्।” तच्चासमीचीनम्, शब्दार्थगो(योः) सम्बन्ध व्यतिरेकात्। न तावत्तादात्म्यलक्षणः, तयोराकारभेदात्। नापि तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणः; अर्थापायेपि शब्दोदयदर्शनात्।

[14. Refutation of the means of proof “word”.]

[1. Crushing of the view of those who accept the Validity of word as being expressive.]

Some say – “The word ‘cow’ has validity because as it is expressive”; and this is not proper without the relation of word and meaning. (Relation) is not of the nature of identity, because of difference of character. Nor can it be of the nature of causality because even in the absence of thing, word is seen to arise.

नापि सामयिकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः, शब्दार्थव्यक्तीनामानन्त्याद् अभिन्नैकनिमित्तस्य चाऽसंभवात्। न च संकेतितशब्दस्य अर्थप्रतिपत्तिकाले अवस्थानं विद्यते। नचार्थप्रत्यायकः (क)शब्दस्य संकेतोऽवगतः, समयकरणकाले तदभावात्। नच स्वकार्यसम्बन्धमन्तरेण पूर्वशब्दसम्बन्धं स्वासारूप्याद्(?)वाचकम् अतिप्रसंगात्।

Nor is the relation of word and meaning conventional; – because the individual words and meanings are infinite, and one non-different is instrumental factor is not possible. And the word about which a convention is fixed does not remain till the time of apprehension of meaning. Nor is the convention apprehended with respect to the knowledge of the thing, because it was absent at the time of fixing the denotation. And without relation brought about is not expressive as it is not similar in form to itself, as this would be absurd extension.

नापि स्व(स्वा)भाविकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः; तद्गत्यभावात् न प्रत्यक्षेण नापि अनुमानेन।

Nor is the relation of word and meaning natural, because of absence of its knowledge by perception or inference.

अथ सहकारिक(का)रणोपचरितेन जन्यते; यद्येवं तदा सहकारिकारणं दुष्टमप्यभ्येति, तदनुरोधेन विपरीतमपि ज्ञानं जनयति आसोक्तत्वे सत्यपि । यथा अभिनवकम्बलसम्बन्धिनं माणवकं दृष्ट्वा प्रवक्ता वाक्यमुच्चारयति — नवकम्बलकोऽयं माणवकः इति, अधर्ममनःक्षोभादिना निमित्तेन नवत्वसंख्यायुक्तम्बलसम्बन्धिनं प्रतिपद्यते । तथा प्रतारणबुद्ध्या नवत्वसंख्यायुक्तम्बलसम्बन्धी माणवक इत्युक्ते अवदातकर्मानुरोधेन प्रतिपत्ता अभिनवकम्बलसम्बन्धिनं प्रत्येति, तथा वेदवाक्यानापि अवदातेतरकर्मानुरोधेन विपरीतार्थावबोधोत्पाकत्वमुपपद्यते । तथा, भूतोपघातचेतौ विक(का)-रमनःक्षोमादिना वा निमित्तेन ॥ छ ॥

If you say that it is produced by it as accompanied by auxiliary cause, then if it is so, it would approach an auxiliary cause even though vitiated and accordingly though uttered by a trustworthy person, would produce even false knowledge. As a speaker seeing Mānavaka (a boy) related to a new blanket, utters the sentence, 'This Mānavaka (boy) has 'nava' (new) blanket; a hearer due to demerit, disturbance of mind or the like instrumental factor, knows (understands) him as having blankets connected with the number nine (i.e. as having nine blankets), So also when out of intention to deceive it is said Mānaka has nine blankets, a knower (hearer) in accordance with his pure karma (action) knows him as having a new blanket. Similarly vedic sentences also according as they are penetrated by action other than pure can properly give to wrong knowledge of wrong meaning, similarly, on account of a cause such as pestering by ghost, mental disorder, mental disturbance and the like.

[३. अपौरुषेयत्वेन वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्य व्युदासः ।]

अन्ये तु कुमतिमतानुसारिणो वदन्ति — “वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमन्यथा — अपौरुषेयत्वेन । पुरुषा हि रागादिविपरीतचेतसो विपरीतमुपपादयन्ति, न च वेदविधातृसंभवोऽस्ति । तदुक्तम् — नित्यो वेदः अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृ (क)त्वात् व्योमादिवत् । वेदवेधसोऽपगमे तदायत्ता दोषा व्यपगता भवन्ति । ते हि विधातृसत्तानुवर्तिनः तदव(प)गमे कथमवतिष्ठेरन् । तेषामपाये कथमप्रमाणमाशंक्यते वेदः । यदुक्तम् —

“दोषाः सन्ति न सन्तीति पौरुषेयेषु युज्यते ।

वेदे कर्तुरभावात्तु दोषाशंकैव नास्ति नः ॥ ”

[तत्त्वसं. का. २८९५]

“चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः प्रमाणं दोषवर्जितैः ।

कारणैर्जन्यमानत्वात् लिङ्गासोक्ताक्षबुद्धिवत् ॥”

[श्लोकवा. सू. २. श्लो - १८४]

[3. Refutation of the view of those who accept the validity of veda in as much as it is apauruṣeya (having no person as author).]

Whereas others following the view of those who have a bad intellect say : Veda is invalid in another way – due to its being apauruṣeya (not having a person as author). Men having their minds turned owing to passion, etc explain wrongly (in the opposite way), and there is no possibility of a creator of the veda. It is said, – veda is eternal, because its creator is not remembered (no one has any memory of its author), like sky etc. In the event of a creator of the veda receding (being absent), faults dependent on it also recede (i.e. are absent). Following in the wake of the existence of the creator, how could they remain when he is absent. And in their absence how could the veda be suspected to be not valid. It is said – “That faults exist or do not exist holds good in the cause of things having a person as author (creator); But we ought not to have the very suspicion of fault in the veda because there is no creator “(author)”. (Tattvasaṃgraha, kā-2895).

“Knowledge generated by an injunction is valid because it is produced by causes free from faults, like cognition produced by mark of inference, trustworthy person and senses (śloka-vārttika sū-2, śloka - 184)”

न च चोदनाजनितं विज्ञानं सन्दिग्धम्, किंस्वित् इत्येनानाकारेणानुपजायमानत्वात् । नचेदं भ्रान्तं देशान्तरादावबाध्यमानत्वात् । यत् देशान्तरादौ बाध्यते तत् मिथ्या, यथा मरीचिनिचये अम्बुज्ञानम् कालान्तरे च बाधा यथा आरक्तपटे हाटकविज्ञानमित्येवमादि, न चेदं भ्रान्तं तथा, तस्मादवितथम् ।

Nor is the knowledge produced by an injunction doubtful, since it does not arise in the form ‘can it possibly (be this or that) ?’ Nor is it faulty, because it is not sublated at another time and the like. That is false which is sublated at another place, etc, as for example, cognition of water in respect of a collection of rays, and there can be sublation at another time, as for example, knowledge of gold in respect of golden cloth, and so on. But this is not faulty thus, therefore it is not wrong.

यत्तावदुक्तम् — ‘नित्यो वेदः कर्तृस्मरणात्’; तदयुक्तम्, कूपारामादिभिरनैकान्तिकत्वात् । तेषां हि कर्ता न स्मर्यते अथ च अनित्यत्वम् । अथ देशकालोच्छेदात् तत्र कर्तृस्मरणम्; एवं तर्हि अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानम् ।

As to what is said, viz ‘veda is eternal, because, there is no memory of its author’, – we say : That is not proper, because this is inconclusive in respect of

wells, parks etc. Their creator is not remembered, and still they are non-eternal. It may be urged that in their case there is no memory of the creator on account of its (memory's) being cut off by place and time. (We answer:) Then similarly, if you admit a qualification in respect of something uttered generally, you are subject to the ground of defeat called shifting the ground (hetvantara).

अथवा सत्यपि विशेषणोपादाने हेतोः विपक्षगमनं न निवारयितुं पार्यते यथा कृतकत्वविशेषणोपादानेऽपि न प्रमेयत्वस्य व्यावृत्तिरस्ति । अथ कृतकत्वम्; तदेव गमकं व्यावृत्तत्वात् । न ह्येकस्य व्यावृत्तौ अन्यस्य व्यावृत्तिरस्त्यति प्रसंगात् ।

Or, even if the qualification is admitted, it is not possible to prevent the probans from being present in a heterologous case; as for instance, even when the qualification 'artificiality' is admitted, knowability cannot be excluded. It may be urged that there is artificiality (we answer:) That alone enables one to know, because it is excluded. There being the exclusion of one there is not the exclusion of another, because this would mean absurd over extension.

किंच, साध्यविरुद्धे हेतोः(तौ) किं विशेषणोपादानम्, तद्विपरीते वा ? तद्यदि विरुद्धेः तदाऽनर्थकं विशेषणोपादानम् । अथ अविरुद्धेऽप्येवमेव — नहि विशेषणेन विरुद्धस्वभावता व्यावर्तते, यथा कृतकत्वविशेषणोपादानेऽपि न चाक्षुषत्वस्य शब्दे वृत्तिलाभः । तथा देशकु(का)लोच्छेदाभावविशेषणोपादानेऽपि अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृ[क]त्वस्य न विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिरस्ति । असिद्धोपपत्त्यं हेतुः यस्मात्स्मरन्ति एव कर्तारं कणादाः । तथा लौकिका अपि बहुलं वक्तारो भवन्ति — 'ब्रह्मणा वेदाः प्रणीताः' इति । अपि च किमशेषजनस्मरणविनिवृत्तिरिह हेतुत्वेन विविक्षिता, आहोस्वित् कतिपयपुरुषस्मरणविनिवृत्तिः ? तद्यदि सकलजनस्मरणविनिवृत्तिः; तदाऽसिद्धा, अवधारयितुमशक्यत्वाच्च अर्वाग्भागविद्धिः । अवधारणे वा त एव सर्वज्ञाः स्युः अर्वाग्भागविदो न भवेयुः ।

Moreover, is the qualification accepted with regard to a probans which is opposed to the probans, or its opposite ? If with regard to the opposed one, then the accepting of a qualification is meaningless. It may be argued that with regard to a non-opposed here also it is so — due to the qualification, the opposed nature does not go away, just as even though the qualification 'artificiality' is accepted, perceptibility does not find operation in respect of word. Similarly, even if the qualification 'absence of limitation of place and time' is accepted, the fact of the author (creator) not being remembered does not go away (i.e. is not absent) from the dissimilar (heterologous) case. This probans is also unreal (asiddha) since the followers of kanāda certainly remember the author. Similarly worldly men often say, 'The vedas were composed by Brahṃā.' Moreover, is the absence of memory in the case of all people in-

tended as the probans or absence of memory in the case of a few men ? If it be the absence of memory in the case of all men, then it is unreal (inadmissible-asiddha) as it is not possible for those who know the nearer part (i.e. people with narrow vision). Or if they were to determine it, they would be omniscient and not knowers of the nearer part (i.e. people who can see only things near by).

अथ कतिपयपुरुषापेक्षया; तदानैकान्तिको हेतुः, विद्यमानकर्तृकेष्वपि कर्ता न स्मर्यते कैश्चित् ।

If this be said with respect to some men, then the probans would be inconclusive, because in the case of things whose author exists, the author is not remembered by some.

अन्यच्च, कतिपयैः पुरुषैर्न स्मर्यते—अर्थादापद्यते—पुरुषान्तरस्मर्यमाणकर्तृको वेदः, विशेषप्रतिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुज्ञाविषयत्वात् । न च पुरुषजन्यत्वेन वेदस्याऽप्रामाण्यम्, अपि तु पुरुषदोषोत्पाद्यत्वेन । अतः स एव अपनेयः न पुरुषव्यापारः । अथ पुरुषस्य दोषाधिकरणत्वे तज्जन्यत्वे दोषजन्यत्वमप्याशङ्क्यत इति चेत्; यद्येवम् इन्द्रियाणामपि दोषाधिकरणत्वेन तदुत्पादितविज्ञानानामप्रामाण्यं समाशङ्क्यत इति सर्वत्र प्रामाण्यानास्वा (श्वा)सः स्यात् ।

Moreover 'The author is not remembered by some men' implies that the veda is one whose author is remembered by other men, since negation of particular signifies permission of the rest. And veda would not be invalid on account of its being produced by the fault of the person. Hence it is that(fault) that should be removed and not that of the person. It may be argued that man being a substratum of fault (liable to be faulty), in respect of things produced by him, the fact of being produced by fault is also suspected. (Reply) If this be so, sense-organs also being substrata of (i.e. liable to) faults, invalidity is (i.e. would be) suspected even in the case of cognitions produced by them, and thus there would be lack of faith in validity everywhere.

न च अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वेन वेदशब्दानामपौरुषेयत्वसंसिद्धिः, अन्यथापि अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वमुपपद्यतेकेनापि, विदग्धमतिना वेदसन्दोहमुत्पाद्य आत्मा अपहृयते — 'नाह वेदानां विधाता' इति ।

And the fact of not having a person as author is not established of vedic words on account of their author not being remembered, (since) the fact of the author not being remembered can be explained otherwise also — A person with a nature intellect having created the collection of veda conceals himself — 'I am not the creator of the veda.'

भवतु वा अपौरुषेयो वेदः; प्रामाण्ये किमायातम् ? अथ पुरुषव्यावृत्त्या तद्वेषव्यावृत्तिनिबन्धनं प्रामाण्यम्; तद्व्यावृत्त्या तदगुणव्यावृत्तिनिबन्धनप्रामाण्यं किन्नेष्यते ? अथ पुरुषगतगुणदोषव्यावृत्तौ निसर्गगुणानुवेधेन प्रामाण्यमिष्यते; पुरुषगुणदोषव्यावृत्तौ निसर्गदोषानुवेधेन अप्रामाण्यं किन्न गीयते ? अपि च यथा अपौरुषेयत्वे सत्यपि रागादिदोषसम्बन्धिता उपलभ्यते, तथा वेदेऽपि भविष्यति ।

Or let the veda be apauruṣeya (not having a man as author); how does this help its validity ? It may be argued that due to the exclusion of person, there would be validity based on the exclusion of this fault (we ask) Due to the exclusion of him, why do you not admit invalidity based on the exclusion of his qualities ? If it is urged that on there being the exclusion of qualities and faults present in person, validity is admitted due to the permeation of natural qualities, (we ask) why on there being the exclusion of qualities and faults present in person, invalidity due to the permeation of natural faults is not spoken of ? Moreover as even though apauruṣeyatva (the fact of not having a personal agent) being present, there is found to be connection with faults such as love, etc so will it be in the case of the veda.

किंच, अपौरुषेयत्वेन कर्तृदोषापगमः कृतः, श्रोतृदोषास्तुकेनापनीयन्ते । तथा हि — अर्थप्रतिपत्तौ तानपेक्ष्य विपरीतां प्रतिपत्तिमभिनिर्वर्त्तयिष्यति । ततश्च नित्यमानामपि कर्तृकर्मणां दुष्टसहकारिकारणानुवेधेन विपर्ययामादिज्ञानहेतुत्वमुपपद्यते न वाक्यनां प्रमाणप्रतिलम्भः ।

Moreover, the fault of the author have been (attempted to be) removed by apauruṣeyatva (the fact that the veda has no author), but how will the faults of the hearer be removed ? To wit, in the apprehension of the meaning, he will by virtue of relatively to them bring about an opposite apprehension. And therefore even eternal acts of doers (doers and actions) can justifiably be the cause of knowledge such as error, etc. on account of the interpenetration of faulty auxiliary causes, and sentences are not be found to be valid sources of knowledge.

यदप्युक्तम् — 'देशान्तरादावबाध्यमानत्वात् प्रमाणं चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः' — तदयुक्तम्, स्मृतेर्बाधरहितत्वेऽपि अप्रमाणत्वात् ।

As to the argument — knowledge generated by an injunction is valid because it is not sublated at another place, etc.' — that is not proper, since memory even though free from contradiction is not valid.

किंच, बाधाशब्देन विपरीतविज्ञानमपदिश्यते, तच्च नोत्पद्यते — किं चोदनाजनितविज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वेन उत तदुत्पादककारणवैकल्येन इति सन्दिह्यते ।

Moreover, the word 'sublation' signifies 'wrong cognition', and it is doubted as to whether it does not arise due to the cognition produced by injunction being right or due to insufficiency of causes that could have originated it.

अपि च, बाधारहितत्वेऽप्यप्रामाण्यं दृष्टं — बाधकविज्ञानोत्पत्तेः पूर्वम् । बाधायुपजायमाना कालविकल्पेन उपजायते द्वचिदर्धमासेन द्वचिन्मासव्यवधानेन द्वचिच्च अब्दद्वयत्रयव्यवधानेन, अन्यत्र तु कारकवैकल्यान्नैव संपत्स्यते । नचैतावता प्रमाणं चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः ।

Moreover, invalidity is seen even when there is no sublation — before the rise of the sublating cognition. Sublation even as arising (if it arises) arises by an interval of time — it (arises) at places after a fortnight or after an interval of a month, or after an interval of two or three months, whereas elsewhere it is not accomplished at all on account of insufficiency of originating factors. But simply on account of this knowledge produced by injunction is nor (i.e. cannot be) valid.

किंच, बाधारहितत्वमपि किम् — अशेषपुरुषापेक्षया, कतिपयपुरुषापेक्षया वा ? यद्यशेषपुरुषापेक्षया, तदावगन्तुं न शक्यते, परचित्तवृत्तीनां दुरन्वयत्वात् । अथ कतिपयपुरुषापेक्षया बाधारहितत्वम्; तदाऽनैकान्तिको हेतुः—यथा असत्योदके जातोदकबुद्धिः तस्माद्देशात् देशान्तरं यदा प्रयाति तत्रैव दशार्धतामुपयाति, न च तस्य बाधकं विज्ञानमुत्पन्नम् । किमेतावता तत् प्रमाणं भवतु ? अथवा चोदनाजनितविज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वमेव भ्रान्तत्वम्, चोदनाजनितविज्ञानसमानकालीनकर्तव्यतारूपार्थस्याऽसंभवात् । संभवे वा चोदनावचसो वैकल्यम्, वितानक्रियाविलोपः । अथ न विद्यते कर्तव्यतारूपोऽर्थः; कथं चोदनावचनोद्भूतं विज्ञानं न मिथ्या ? अन्यथा केशोण्डुकसंविदो मिथ्यात्वं न भवेत् । अथ तस्या [ः] प्रतीयमानार्थाऽसंभवेन मिथ्यात्वम्; तदिहापि तदेवास्तु ।

Moreover, is devoidness of sublation with reference to all persons or with reference to some men ? If it is with reference to all men, then it is not possible to apprehend it as the operations of others minds are untraceable (difficult to be known). If freedom from sublation is with reference to some men, then the probans is inconclusive — as for instance, one who has knowledge in respect of (i.e. of) unreal water, when he goes from that place to and other place, he dies there, and in his case the sublating cognition does not arise. Would it be valid due to this much (only). Or, objectlessness itself in the case of knowledge produced by injunction (—it is illusory to regard knowledge produced by injunction as objectless), signifies falsity (that it is erroneous), because an object of the form of activity can be done simultaneously with action produced by injunction, is not possible. Or if it were possible, the injunc-

tive expression would be insufficient, and there would be the cessation of sacrificial rites. It may be argued that the object of the form of what can be done does not exist; (we ask:) how is it that the cognition arising out of injunctive statement should not be false? Otherwise the cognition of woolly mass would not be false. If it is urged that it is false due to the impossibility of the object that is known – (we answer) then, let that be here also.

अथ चोदनाजनितविज्ञानार्थस्य पुनः सद्भावो भवति तेन तस्य यथार्थत्वम् । न तु केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्य कदाचिदपि सद्भावोऽस्ति । सोऽयं विषयभक्षणेन परं प्रत्याययति तपस्वी । चोदनार्थस्य पश्चाद्भवनं तद्विज्ञानानुपयोगि, तस्मिन् काले ज्ञानस्य अस्तमितत्वात्, विज्ञानकाले च अर्थस्य(स्या)संभवात् ।

It may be urged that there is again (later) the existence of the object of the cognition produced by an injunction, and so it is true; whereas there is never the existence (of the object) of the cognition of woolly mass (keṣoṇḍuka) (we answer–) The poor man convinces another by eating (taking) poison. The later coming into being of the object of injunction is not useful to its cognition because at that time, the cognition would be extinct, and at the time of the cognition there is not the possibility of the object.

अथवा, इयमेव बाधा यदुत असंभाव्यमानार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वं यथा तन्तु-तुरि-कारकोपनिपाते सति वस्त्रादिकार्यमुपजायमानं दृष्टम् । पुनः पदार्थिने उपदेशो दीयते – ‘तन्तूनामुपादानं कुरष्व’ इति । न त्वेवं सप्ततत्त्वदातकर्मणोः साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धाधारणम्, नापूर्वम्, येनात्र उपदेशस्य साफल्यं भवति । एवं तावदुक्तेन न्यायेन शब्दानां वाचकत्वेन प्रामाण्यं न युज्यते ।

Or, this is what sublation signifies the propounding of a thing which is not possible. For example, there being the aggregate of causal factors—threads, Shuttle, the effect, cloth, etc is seen to arise. Moreover, the (following) instruction is given to one who wants cloth, “Accept (as constituent causes) threads. But the relation of what is achieved and instrument (sādhya – sādhana) is not determined in the case of seven(red)threads and white effect, nor is there unseen force (apūrva) so that the instruction could be successful here? Thus according to the rule said above, words cannot properly be valid in as much as they are denotative.

[४. विवक्षासूचकत्वेन शब्दप्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्य खण्डनम् ।]

अथ विवक्षासूचकत्वेन लिङ्गभूतस्य प्रामाण्यम् । तदुक्तम् – “विवक्षाप्रभाव हि शब्दाः तामेव संसूचयेयुः” इति ।

तदेतदयुक्तम्, यथा हेतुफलभावो नास्ति सौगते मते तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम् ॥ छ ॥

[4. Refutation of the view of those who admit the validity of word in as much as it indicates the intention (i.e. what is meant to be said).]

It is urged that there is validity of what serves as a sign in as much as it indicates what is meant to be said. It is said – “words arising out of the desire to say (intension), would suggest it only.”

This is not produced. It has already been shown how the relation of causality does not exist found in the Buddhist view.

[५. साधुपदादर्थप्रतिपत्तिं वर्णयतां वैयाकरणानां मतस्य निरासः ।]

अन्ये तु साधुपदशब्दादर्थप्रतिपत्तिं वर्णयन्ति । साधुत्वं च लक्षणयोगित्वेन । लक्षणं च सूत्राण्येव लक्ष्यं गौरित्यादिपदम् । अथ किमिदं नाम यल्लक्षणेन परमर्षिगदितेन सूत्रकलापेन लक्ष्यते ? किं गकारादयो वर्णाः, वर्णेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं वा पदे स्फोटरूपम् ? तद्यदि वर्णाः, ते किं नित्याः सन्तः पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति, उत उपजननधर्मकाः ? तद्यदि नित्याः, कूटस्थाः सन्तो वर्णाः पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति; तत्र किं व्यस्ताः, समुदिता वा ? तद्यदि व्यस्ताः, सनातना एते पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति, तदा गवर्णेनैव केवलेन गोऽर्थप्रतिपादनं क्रियते, ओकारेण वा अर्थप्रतिपादनं क्रियते । ततश्च पूर्वापरवर्णोच्चारणार्थक्यम् । न चात्रैकस्मिन् वर्णे विभक्त्यन्तता अस्ति, अपि तु वर्णकदम्बके विभक्त्युत्पादाभ्युपगमात् ।

[5. Refutation of the view of the Grammarians who admit the apprehension of meaning from correct words.]

Whereas others propound the apprehension of meaning from sound consisting of correct words. And rightness is due to connection with characteristics. The definition consists of aphorism (sūtras), and the thing defined is word like ‘go’ (cow) etc. Now what verily is it that is defined by the definition consisting of a group of aphorisms uttered by the great sage? Is it the letters ‘go’ etc, or a word of the form of ‘sphoṭa’ which is different (distinct) from the letters? Now if it is the letters (that are defined), are they called ‘word’ being eternal or being of the character of origination? If letters being eternal and absolutely unchanging are called word, are they there severally or jointly? If severally then they which are eternal would be called ‘word’, then the letter ‘go’ alone would convey the meaning ‘cow’ or ‘o’ would convey the meaning. And therefore, the pronunciation of letters one after the other would be unnecessary. And, a single letter does not end with a case-affix; but case is admitted to arise in respect of a bunch of letters.

अथ समुदितानां पदसंज्ञा । तदयु(दु)क्तम् — “बहूनां संघातशब्दवाच्यत्वम्, न ह्येकस्मिन् संघातशब्दप्रयोगोऽस्ति, अपि तु गकारौकारविसर्जनीयेषु समुदायशब्दः प्रयुज्यते ।” तदयुक्तम्, वर्णानां नानाता विद्यते । वर्णो हि अवर्णात् वर्णात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते वर्णान्तररानु कथं व्यावर्त्तते ? किं वर्णाकारतया अवर्णात्मतया वा ? तद्यदि वर्णाकारतया व्यावर्त्तते; तदाऽन्येषां वर्णरूपता न प्राप्नोति नीरतीरादेरिव । अथ अवर्णात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते; तदा [ऽ]वर्णात्मता व्यावर्त्तते उक्तानामिव, ततश्चैक एव वर्णात्मा जगति संजातः । तस्य गोऽर्थवाचकत्वं न युज्यते सुप्विभक्त्यनुपपत्तेः ।

It may be argued that letters jointly are called ‘word’. It is said, “Many are denoted by the term ‘collection’, aggregate; the term ‘group’ (aggregate) is not used in respect of one; but the word ‘aggregate’ is used in respect of ‘ga’, ‘o’, and visarga”— This is not proper. Letters are many. Varṇa (letter) is distinguished from avarṇa (non-letter), by virtue of being a varṇa, but how would it be distinguished from another varṇa ? By virtue of the character of varṇa, or by its being avarṇa ? If it is separated by the character of ‘varṇa’, then the others could not have the form of varṇa, like water, bank, etc. If it is separated by its being avarṇa, then the character of avarṇa is separated as in the said cases. And therefore there would be only one character of the world. It could not express the meaning ‘go’ (cow), because the case-affixes would not be justified.

नापि वर्णानां नित्यत्वप्रत्यायकं प्रमाणमस्ति, एवं प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यप्रतिपादनात् । तीव्रमन्दात्मतया गवर्णस्य नानात्वोपलब्धेः गकारोऽपि भेदवान् न गकारे(रै)कत्वम् ।

Nor is there proof convincing (us of) the eternality of letters, since perception, etc have been thus shown to be not valid. Since manyness is apprehended in the case of the letter ‘ga’ on account of its being shrill or low, even ‘ga’ admits of difference and ‘ga’ is not one.

अथ व्यञ्जकवशेन तीव्रमन्दादिबुद्धेरुत्पत्तिः न गवर्णस्यभेदोऽस्ति; तदयुक्तम्, गवर्ण एव प्रतीयते तीव्रमन्दाद्यात्मतया न व्यञ्जकानि गवर्णबुद्धिर्वा । यदि व्यञ्जकभेदेन तीव्रमन्दादिर्भेदपरिक्लृप्तिः क्रियते गवर्णात्मा तु न भिद्यते; तदा गकारादिविभागोऽपि व्यञ्जकभेदनिबन्धनोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, वर्णात्मा त्वेक एव । ततश्च गवार्थप्रतिपत्तिर्न प्राप्नोति एकस्मिन् वर्णे सुप्विभक्त्यनुपपत्तेः ।

It may be argued that the notion of Shrill, ‘low’ etc arises by virtue of the manifestor, and letter ‘ga’ is not different. This is not proper. It is the ‘ga’ letter only that is apprehended as shrill, low etc and not the manifestators or the notion of letter ‘ga’. If the difference of shrill, low, etc. could be brought about by the difference of manifestor, whereas the entity of the letter ‘ga’ does not

change, then let the division ‘ga’ etc. also be admitted as based upon the difference of manifestator, whereas the letter is only one. Therefore, there would not be the apprehension of the meaning ‘cow’, since the case-affix is not justifiable in respect of one letter.

किंच, भिन्नाकारतया प्रतीयमानस्य यद्वैकत्वमभ्युपगम्यते; नानेकं जगत् स्यात्, अभिन्नात्मके च जगति मानमेयव्यवस्थैव हीयते । न च नित्यस्य अनुपजातविकारस्य विज्ञानोदयदानसामर्थ्यमस्ति ।

Moreover, if what are apprehended as different in character are regarded as one, the world would not have multiplicity, and in the world which is non-different in character, there would be the loss of all ordering of means of knowledge and knowables.

अथ क्रियते; किमनुपजातातिशयेन वा, अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन वा, व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन वा ? तद्यदि अनुपजातातिशयेन क्रियते; तदा सर्वदा कुर्यात् एकस्मिन् वा काले कुर्यात् तद्देहमात्रानुबन्धेना(न) कालविलम्बनायोगात् ।

If it is (said to be) brought about, is it brought about with one in whom excellence has not arisen, or in whom excellence which is non-different (from the entity) has arisen, or with excellence which is different (from the entity) has arisen ? Now if it is brought about with one in whom excellence has not arisen, then that would bring it about always, or bring it about at one time, since on account of connection with its body alone, it would not have any connection with the passage of time.

अथ अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन क्रियते; तथापि सनातना वर्णाः अव्यतिरिक्तातिशयकरणपक्षे स एवोपजायते, फलानिष्पत्तिकरणस्वरूपाऽनतिवृत्तेः ।

If it is brought about with excellence which is non-different (from the entity) has arisen, even then, the letters would be perpetual; in the view of its being brought about with one whose excellence is not different, then that itself is originated, since it does not transgress the nature of bringing about the non-achievement of result.

अथ व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन क्रियते; तस्यातिशयः कथम् ? यो यस्य केनापि सम्बन्धेन न सं(न्धेनसं)बन्ध्यते स तस्यातिशयः । यदि च अन्तर्हितवर्णस्मरणविशिष्टोऽन्त्योवर्णः पदम्; तस्यापि स्मरणकालेतिरोहितत्वादवाचकत्वम् — “तस्य व्यञ्जकानां क्षणिकत्वात् क्षणोपलब्धिः” इति वचनात् । यदि वर्णा व्यञ्जकैर्व्यज्यन्ते तदा समानदेशावस्थितं समानेन्द्रियग्राह्याणां प्रतिनियतव्यञ्जकत्वेनेष्टम् एकान्तर्गतोदककनकादीनां वदन्ति वैशेषिकाः । (?)

If it is said to be brought about by one in whom excellence which is different has arisen, then how is it its excellence? That which is connected with another by some relation is its excellence. And if the last letter qualified by the memory of the letters that are disappeared constitutes word, then since it also disappears at the time of its memory, it cannot convey anything because it is said, "Due to its manifestors being momentary there is apprehension for a moment. If letters are (said to be) manifested by manifestors, then it is desired that they which are cognised by the same sense-organs should occupy the same place on account of their having specific manifestors. The *vaiśeṣikas* say this of water and gold which are present in one.

अथ अनित्या वर्णाः पदसंज्ञा भवन्तीति चेत्; तत्रापि किं व्यस्ताः, समस्ता वा? तद्यदि व्यस्ताः, तदा गकारौकारविर्जनीयान्यतमे वर्णे न विभक्त्युत्पादोऽस्ति, उत्पादे वा एको वर्णः वाचकः स्यात् — वर्णान्तरोच्चारणार्थक्यम् ।

It may be argued that non-eternal letters are called word. Even there are they severally (called word) or jointly? If Severally, there would not arise the case affix with respect to any of the letters 'ga', 'o', and visarga; or if it were to arise, one letter would convey the meaning, and it would be unnecessary to pronounce the other letters.

अथ वर्णसमुदायः पदम्; प्रतिक्षणध्वंसिनां समुदायार्थो वक्तव्यः, बहूनामवस्थितरूपाणां समुदायो लोके दृष्टः, न च वर्णानां भूयस्त्वमस्ति उक्तान्यायात् । किंच अन्त्यवर्णग्रहणानन्तरं पूर्ववर्णस्मरणम्, पूर्ववर्णस्मरणानन्तरम् अन्त्यवर्णे ज्ञानम्, ततश्चास्य अर्थप्रतिपत्तिकाले पदं [न] विद्यते तेनाऽपदिकाऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् ।

It may be urged that an aggregate of letters is a word. It should be stated what is meant by 'aggregate' in the case of things perishing every moment. An aggregate is seen in the world of many things whose form remains (i.e. which are enduring), whereas there is not multiplicity of letters, according to the said rule. There is remembrance of prior letters after the apprehension of the last letter, and apprehension in respect of the last letter after the remembrance of prior letters; therefore at the time of the apprehension of its meaning, the word does not exist, so there would be apprehension of meaning in the absence of the word.

न च कार्यरूपता वर्णानां विद्यते । सती सत्ता संवेद्यते । विज्ञानोत्पत्तेः पूर्वं वेद्यस्य सत्ता, पश्चाद्विज्ञानम् । तद्वेद्यं किम् — अधुनोत्पन्नं विषयतां याति, चिरोत्पन्नम्, अनुत्पन्नं वा? नालमालोचयितुं ज्ञानम्, तत्त्वरूपमात्रास्तित्व विधायकत्वेन तदुत्पत्तेः ।

And letters cannot be of the nature of effect. It is existence which is real that is apprehended. Before the rise of cognition there is the existence of the knowable, and afterwards there is knowledge. Does the thing (that is known) become an object-being produced now, or being produced since long or being unproduced. A knowledge is not capable of examining, since it arises as affirming the existence of its nature only.

न च तत्कारणं विद्यते । ननु प्रयत्नादिकं विद्यते; तदयुक्तम्, तेषां प्रयत्नादीनां स्वरूपं कथं गृह्यते- किं सत्तामात्रेण, कारकत्वेन वा? तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण; तदा जनकं रूपं न स्यात् ।

And its cause does not exist. It may be argued that there are effort, etc. But that is not proper. How is the nature of these effort, etc known by virtue of existence alone or by virtue of their being instruments. If by virtue of existence alone, then the originating character would not be there.

अथ कारकत्वेन गृह्यते; किम् आत्मजनकत्वेन, आहोस्विद् अन्यजनकत्वेन? तद्यदि आत्मजनकत्वेन गृह्यते; तदात्मा तेनोत्पाद्यते न वर्णः । अथ अन्यजनकत्वेन अवधार्यते; तदा अन्यस्य सत्ता सिद्धा । तर्ह्या (नह्या)क्षिप्तान्यसद्भाव एव सद्भावोऽस्याध्यवसीयते, ततः तत्समानकालीनत्वेन हेतुफलभावाऽसिद्धिः ।

If it is (said to be) known by virtue of its being an instrument, is it by virtue of its being producer of itself or by virtue of its being a producer of another? If it is known as being a producer of itself, then self (it itself) is brought about by it, and not letter-(sound). If it is determined as being a producer of another, then the existence of another is established. Then its presence in which another's presence is (certainly) implied is determined (its presence in which another's presence is certainly implied is not determined); therefore, an account of their being simultaneous the relation of causality would not be established.

किंच, पूर्वापरभावेन हेतुफलभावः, किं वा पूर्वापरग्रहणेन? तद्यदि पूर्वापरभावेन हेतुफलभावः; तदा ज्ञानं विना 'अस्ति' कथं ज्ञायते? ज्ञानाभावेनाऽज्ञाने किं पूर्वोत्पन्नौ संहोत्पन्नौ वा? अथ पूर्वापरग्रहणेन हेतुफलभावव्यवस्था इति; तदयुक्तम्, अनियतं ग्रहणं दृष्टम् — कार्यं दृष्ट्वा कारणं ग्रह्णाति, कारणं दृष्ट्वा कार्यं गृह्णाति, उभयं च युगपत् गृह्णाति । एवं च स्थिते न हेतुफलभावविनिश्चयोऽस्ति । तदभावात्ताऽनित्या वर्णाः पदं भवितुमर्हति ।

Moreover, is the relation of cause-effect on account of prior and posterior existence or on account of prior and posterior cognition? If the relation of cause and effect be on account of prior and posterior existence, then without

knowledge – how could it be known as 'existent'. There being non knowledge on account of absence of knowledge, what does it matter if they are preciously produced or simultaneously produced. If it is said that the relation of cause-effect is determined by prior and posterior cognition, that is not proper. Cognition is seen to be not determined in specific way – having seen the cause one cognises the effect, or one cognises both-together. This being the position, there is not the determination of the relation of cause and effect. In its absence, non-eternal letters do not deserve to be a word (i.e. cannot form a word).

अथ वर्णभ्योऽर्थान्तरभूतं पदं वर्णव्यङ्ग्यस्फोटरूपमभ्युपगम्यते । वर्णानां किल अर्थप्रत्यायकत्वं व्यस्तसमस्तानां संभवति, अस्ति च सा अर्थप्रतिपत्तिः तेन अर्थान्तरभूतं वर्णभ्यः पदं विद्यते । अभिन्नाकारा च प्रतिपत्तिवर्णेष्वनुपपन्ना तेन वर्णभ्यो भिन्नम् अभिन्नाकारं पदमध्यवसीयते ।

It may be argued – word which is a distinct entity from the letters is accepted as the nature of sphaṭa which is manifested by the letters. Letters can verily convey the meaning severally or jointly, and the apprehension of meaning is (certainly) there, so we know word to be an entity distinct from the letters. And apprehension being non-different in character is not possible in letters so words which is non-different in character is admitted as distinct from the letters.

यत्तावदुक्तम् – “अर्थप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या पदमावगम्यते” तदयुक्तम्, अर्थापत्तेः प्रामाण्यमेव नास्ति । यथा च न विद्यते तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम् । न च पदेन सह प्रतिबद्धा अर्थप्रतिपत्तिः अवगतपूर्वा येन अन्यकारणपरिहारेण पदं बोधयति । प्रत्यक्षं च प्रमाणमेव न भवति । कथं तत् पदप्रतिपादनाय अलम् ? न च नित्यस्य विज्ञानाद्यर्थक्रियाकरण सामर्थ्यमस्ति । एवं लक्ष्यभूतं पदं न विद्यते । तदभावान्निर्विषयं पारमार्थ्य(मर्ष)लक्षणमिति ।

As to what is said, viz. “The apprehension of meaning not being otherwise possible, word is admitted.” That is not proper; (since) arthāpatti (implication) has no validity whatsoever. As to how it has no validity has already been explained. And apprehension of meaning has not been known before as connected with word, so that leaving aside other causes, it may lead to the knowledge of word. And perception is not a pramāṇa (means of knowledge) at all. How could it be capable of giving knowledge of word ? And what is eternal does not have the capacity for performing successful actions like cognition, etc. Thus word which is the object of definition does not exist. In its absence, the definition of parāmṛṣ : is objectless.

अपि च, यानि लक्षणपराणि सूत्राणि तेषां लक्षणं विद्यते, न वा ? यदि विद्यते; तत्रापि अन्यद्

अत्रापि अन्यद् इत्यनिश्चयां च न किञ्चित् पदं ज्ञानं(तं) स्यात् । अथ न विद्यते; किमेवं तर्हि तेषां साधुत्वं न विद्यते ?

Moreover, do the sūtras which are meant to give a definition have a definition or not ? If they have, it also should have another, and even this another, and so there being infinite series, no word like would be known. If they do not have, then why so, then would they not be good (definition) ?

अथ लक्षणाभावेऽपि तेषां साधुत्वं विद्यते; एवं गावी-गोणी-गोपुत्तलिकेत्येवमादीनामपि अपभ्रंसा(शा)नांलक्षणाभावेऽपि साधुत्वं भविष्यति । अथ लक्षणाभावान्नगाव्यादीनां साधुत्वम्; तदा सूत्रपदानामपि तदभावादेव असाधुत्वम् । अपि च, यदि नाम लक्षणविकलता शब्दस्य; तदा किं भवति ? किमुच्चारयितुर्मुखभङ्गः संपद्यते, शब्दस्य वा अवाचकत्वम्, अर्थस्य वा रूपविपर्यासो जायते, किं वा अपशब्दप्रतिपादितार्थस्य अर्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वं हीयते, अपशब्दोच्चारणे सति अमङ्गलोदयो वा भवति ?

If even in the absence of a definition, they are good (definitions), then the corrupt words (āpabharaṁśa) like 'gāvī', 'gonī', 'go-puttalikā' etc would be good (correct) even in the absence of a definition. If (it is argued that) 'gāvī' etc are not good on account of absence of definition, then the words of the aphorisms also even on account of absence of it would not be good (correct). Moreover, if word be devoid of a definition, what would happen ? – would the mouth of the person who utters it be distorted : or would word not convey a meaning ? Or would object denoted undergo a change of form, or would the object denoted by a corrupt word lose its efficiency for successful action, or would there be the rise of inauspiciousness on there being the utterance of corrupt word ?

तद्यदि तावत् प्रवक्तुर्मुखभङ्गो भवति गावीशब्दोच्चारणे सति; तदैते बहुलं गावीशब्दोच्चारणं कुर्वाणाः समुपलम्भयन्ते प्रवक्तारः, न च तेषां मुखभङ्गः समुपलभ्यते ।

Now if it is urged that the mouth of the speaker would be distorted on the utterance of the word 'gāvī' (we answer) many speakers are found uttering the word 'gāvī' repeatedly, and (yet) the distortion of their mouth is not found.

अथ गावीशब्दस्य वाचकत्वं नोपपद्यते; तदयुक्तम्, गावीशब्देन बहुलं व्याहरन्ति प्रमातारः । अथ गोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिसूनां गावीशब्दश्रवणानन्तरं गोशब्दे स्मृतिरुपजायते स च गवाद्यर्थवाचक इति चेत्; तदयुक्तम्, म्लेच्छादीनां साधुशब्दपरिज्ञानाभावात् कथं तद्विषया स्मृतिः ? तदभावे न गोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् ।

If it is urged that the word 'gāvi' would not convey a meaning, that is not proper. Cognisers (speakers) often carry on their conversation with the help of the word 'gāvi'. It may be urged, "In the case of those who apprehend the meaning of 'go', after hearing the word 'gāvi', there arises memory in respect of the word 'go', and it (the word 'go') conveys the meaning 'cow' etc." (Answer) That is not proper. How could there be memory pertaining to it in the case of 'mlecchas', etc. in the absence of the knowledge of correct words? (And) in its absence there would not be the apprehension of the meaning 'cow'.

अथ अर्थस्य रूपविपर्यासो भवति; तदयुक्तम्, न गावीशब्देन अभिधीयमानस्य गोरूपता व्यावर्तमाना दृष्टा । अथ अर्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वं हीयते; तदयुक्तम्, गावीशब्देन अभिधीयमानस्य वाहदोहप्रसवसामर्थ्यं नातिवर्तते गोपिण्डस्य । अथ गावीशब्दोच्चारणादमङ्गलोदयो भवति, न तु वाचकत्वं निराक्रियते असाधुशब्दस्य । तदुक्तम् —

“अपशब्दोनुमानेन वाचकः कैश्चिदिष्यते ।

वाचकत्वाऽविशेषेऽपि नियमः पुण्यपापयोः ॥”

तदयुक्तम्, तेन सह प्रतिबन्धाभावात् । न चापोस्तित्वग्राहकं (?) प्रमाणमस्ति । अन्यथैव काले च न म्लोच्छि[त]व्यमिति नियमोऽभ्युपगम्यते । न च शुद्धम्, अन्यत्र पण्डितानामपि व्यवहारोदयदानदर्शनात् ।

If it is urged that the object would undergo a change of form, that is not proper; the form of 'go' (cow) is not seen to recede from what is expressed by the word 'gāvi'. If it is urged that the efficiency for successful action would be lost, that is not proper. The capability to carry, yield milk to produce (offspring) does not go away from the body 'cow' which is denoted by the word 'gāvi'. It may be urged — There is the rise of inauspiciousness on the utterance of the word 'gāvi', but the expressiveness of a corrupt word is not sublated. It is said, "Corrupt word is regarded by some as expressive through inference. Expressiveness being the same, there is specificity in respect of merit and demerit [—utterance of correct word leads to the rise of merit and that of a corrupt word to the rise of demerit]". That is not proper, due to absence of connection with it. And there is no means of knowledge grasping the existence of (?) (demerit arising from a corrupt word). Otherwise at that time there would be accepted a restrictive injunction 'Do not behave like a mleccha'. And it is not pure; elsewhere conversation, rise charity are seen in the case of learned men also.

तदेवमुपप्लुतेष्वेव तत्त्वेषु अविचारितरमणीयाः सर्वे व्यवहारा घटन्त इति ।

All principles being thus upset, all verbal expressions are consistent in as much as they are complacent so long as not investigated.

यो यता नहि गोचरं सुरगुरोः बुद्धेर्विकल्पा दृढाः,
प्राप्यन्ते ननु तेऽपि यत्र विमले पाखण्डदर्पच्छिदि ।

भट्टश्रीजयरशिदेवगुरुभिः सृष्टो महार्थोदयः
तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंह एष इति यः ख्यातिं परां यास्यति ॥

पाखण्डखण्डनाभिज्ञा ज्ञानोदधिविवर्द्धिताः ।

जयरशोर्जयन्तीह विकल्पा वादिजिष्णवः ॥ छ ॥

संवत् १३४९ मार्ग वदि ११ शनौ धवलकके महं० नरपालेन तत्त्वोपप्लवग्रन्थपुस्तिका लेखीति । भद्रं ॥

The rise of much meaning which will attain much fame as 'Lion in the form of upsetting of principles' has been created by preceptor of gods 'Śri Jayarāśibhaṭṭa' — in which faultless piercer of the pride of heretics are verily found even those firm dialectical alternatives which did not come within the scope of the intellect of the preceptor of gods. Herein shine (lit. are victorious). The dialectical alternatives of Jayarāśi which are proficient in repudiating heretics and are nourished by the ocean of knowledge.

This booklet of the work 'Tattvopaplava' (upsetting of principles) was written by Mahām Narapala in Dhavalakkaka (Dholka) on saturday, the eleventh day of the dark half of Mārgaśīrṣa, in the year samvat 1349, Welfare.